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This thesis argues that the modern system of penal regulation is
significantly different from that of the Victorian period and attempts
to explain the transformation which brought about these differences.
Its particular focus is upon those sanctions and representations which
combine penal and welfare elements and the political and penological
positions upon which they depend.
It is argued that the development of penal-welfare strategies
is related to parallel changes which took place in other social
institutions in the 1900s, and the thesis investigates the conditions
which provoked these transformations. Having identified these
transformative conditions, the dissertation proceeds to describe the
possible forms of change that were available by looking at the range
of programmes of reform which existed in that period.
After an analysis of these programmes and their social implications,
the thesis reconstructs the actual process whereby these programmes
were either rejected, compromised or adopted in the realm of official
discourse and institutional practice. The dissertation ends with an
analysis of welfarist strategies in both the penal and social realms,
and discusses the significance and effects of these in regard to the
circumstances of the past and of the present.
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PREFACE
The following work poses two major questions, one historical and
the other sociological. The first asks, how is penal change possible,
and how does it come about? The second asks, what is the relationship
which holds between "punishment" and "social structure", or rather,
between forms of penality and the forms of social organisation within
which they operate. It sets about answering these questions - and a
number of subsidiary ones such as the relation of theory to practice,
and of knowledge to power - by reference to a concrete historical 'event1,
namely, the transformation of British penality which took place at the
beginning of the present century.
This empirical approach is adopted, not through any distrust of
theoretical abstraction, but rather out of respect for the limits of
such theorisation, and a belief that theoretical work can only proceed
pari passu with the development of a detailed and concrete knowledge of
the field under study. Consequently, if this enterprise has been at all
successful, it will necessarily be a contribution at the theoretical
as well as the empirical levels of understanding and knowledge.
By choosing to study the transformation of penality which occurred
in the early 1900s, it was hoped to achieve a number of objectives.
First of all, it was thought that a focus upon this historical moment
could illuminate the formation and development of 'penal-welfare
strategies', a form of sanctioning and representation which has been of
great importance in modern penality, and which has recently been put in
question. It was hoped that an analysis of this formative period could
clarify the political conditions and presuppositions upon which these
strategies rest, and allow a deeper understanding of the present crisis
in British penal policy.
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Secondly, a focus of this kind seemed to allow an investigation
of the way in which a new knowledge - namely, the 'science of
criminology' - infiltrated and influenced the realm of official discourse
and practices. It seemed to me that only through a concrete study could
the subtlety and complexity of this process be adequately traced and
reconstructed. In fact, it soon became clear that criminology was not
the only new discourse which informed these penal changes, and that,
moreover, the processes whereby 'theories' became 'practicable' were
suffused through and through with political and ideological characteristics.
Finally, it was believed that such a study could illuminate the
relationship between penality and other social institutions, given that
both "punishment" and various other apparatuses (most notably the Poor
Law) were subjected to transformation in this same period. In the event,
the present study has clearly shown the necessity of conceiving penality
in its relation to the 'external' social institutions which surround and
support it. Indeed it will be argued that penal institutions are
functionally, historically and ideologically conditioned by numerous
other social relations and agencies, which are, in turn, supported
and conditioned by the operation of penal institutions. I have argued
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elsewhere that 'the penal' and 'the social' cannot be conceived of as
separate and exclusive realms, since the two are both interpenetrating
and interdependent. That theoretical position is substantiated again
and again in the pages that follow.
As the dissertation proceeds it presents a number of different
forms of argumentation and methods of analysis. The early sections are
historical and comparative, while the central chapters of the thesis
involve the reconstruction of a number of reform programmes and
discourses which were operative in this historical process. These
discourses, and their relation to historical and institutional
ii
developments, ere the subjects of the later chapters, which talk,
therefore, of the relationship of theory to practice and of knowledge
to power. In the course of these chapters, the analysis moves
frequently from abstract, social analysis of institutions and their
functioning, to detailed and often intensive investigation of texts,
discourses and knowledges. This movement between levels is rather
unusual and causes certain difficulties of balance and of exposition.
However, it is believed that only through such an approach can one
substantiate arguments about the influence of various discourses and
ideologies in the construction of penal practice, or indeed, give
evidence of the significance and effects of penality in the realms of
politics, ideology and social organisation.
Chapter One sets up the issues at stake by identifying a radical
difference between the forms of penal sanction and representation which
are prevalent in the late Victorian period, and those which dominate
in the modern era. Having established these differences, and the period
in which this transformation came about, Chapter Two investigates the
conditions which brought about the fact of penal change, and the forms
which it adopted. This investigation involves an analysis of the social,
political and ideological conditions which underpinned Victorian penality,
and the process of their transformation, which began in the 1880s. Having
traced the developments which disrupted the logic and functioning of
the Victorian institutions, the thesis poses the question of how the new
logics and patterns of modern penality came to be assembled. In Chapters
Three, Four and Five a number of sources are identified as contributing
to this new development, the major ones being the programmes of reform
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offered by criminology, eugenics, social work and social security.
These reform movements, and the discourses which they mobilised, are
reconstructed and analysed in programmatic terms before describing in
iii
Chapter Six their varying fortunes in the face of political and
ideological resistance. The final two Chapters describe the eventual
outcomes of these politico-discursive struggles, showing how the will
to political power interrupted the logic of theoretical argument to
produce the penality (and some of the versions of criminology) which
we know today. The dissertation concludes with an analysis of the
actual operation of penal-welfare strategies and the extent to which
they achieved their penal and political objectives.
iv
CHAPTER 1
Modern and Victorian Penality: The Differences
(1) Introduction
The general concern of this dissertation is to examine some of the
fundamental features of the system of penality which operates in Britain
today. In particular it is concerned with the 'penal-welfare* elements
of that system - elements which have been strategically and
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ideologically crucial to penality in its modern form.
Such an aim involves something other than a phenomenological
description of the sanctioning practices, policy formulation and
day to day decision-making which take place in modern penal institutions.
It requires an exploration of the framework of assumptions, logics and
objectives which supports these routine operations and allows them to
exist as such. This framework clearly does not exist in the form of an
explicit code or set of policy documents, nor does it reside in the
theoretical formulations of any one school or any one science.
Nevertheless it will be argued here that the practices of modern
penality rest upon a determinate framework of objectives, techniques
and discourses which in turn presupposes a specific field of political
forces. A central objective of this work will be to describe this
underlying generative structure, along with its political conditions;
to show how it operates to fix the parameters of the penal complex;
and to investigate its penal and social significance.
What is this underlying structure? How can we describe this
entity which is inscribed in practices and decisions without being
anywhere acknowledged, like the grammar of a language which is acted
upon but rarely articulated? Perhaps the most effective way of
discerning the characteristics of this framework is to show what
the phenomenon i^ by first of all demonstrating what it is not. A
number of such methods are available - for example the "imaginative"
production of logically possible alternatives as points of contrast,
or else a more empirically controlled comparative method which can
demonstrate differences with regard to other systems which do in fact
exist. The method employed here, however, will be primarily
historical. The structure or basic pattern of the modern system will
be set in contrast with that which preceded it, thereby allowing a
more precise and controlled form of comparability. Moreover an
historical analysis has the advantage of providing the material for an
examination of the original programmes, struggles and objectives which
lie behind the formation of our present-day institutions, and give
them their distinctive character.
Of course the investigation of these materials does not
necessarily offer an"explanation" or even a privileged description of
the present in terms of its "origins", since these originating projects
and their objectives may since have been subjected to change,
reconstruction, partial success or downright failure. Nonetheless
the documents and sources which are available to us from the period of
transition can produce important information. For example, they can
reveal the competing ways in which the "penal problem" was variously
formulated; the choices available between different objectives,
institutions and techniques; the struggles and concerns which
decided these choices, and the wider issues which were seen to be at
stake in these calculations and struggles. It is these differences,
choices and struggles between the 'old' and the 'new', between
competing alternatives and social forces, which make this moment of
transformation and reconstruction an important point of departure for
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our analysis.
But where is this "moment of transformation" to be located? At
which point did the "modern system" come into existence as an entity
distinct from that which had gone before? Clearly the response to
this question cannot be theoretically innocent since it presupposes
the more general question of what specific features characterise the
present system. To state when "modern penality" began is to know what
modern penality ^s, and that question is one of the main issues at
stake in this thesis. Consequently, the basis for our periodisation,
and the arguments which support it, will not be presented now, but
instead will be developed in the substance of the thesis and its
exposition.
Nor is this simply a formal point emphasising the theoretical
determination of historical periodisation. Other writers, concerned in
their various ways with modern penality, have specified quite different
historical moments at which the "present system" began. Thus the
conventional penological understanding of the modern era as the "epoch
of rehabilitation" puts its starting point just after the Second World
War, when evangelical reform and paternalism gave way to a more
2
technical form of social engineering. Sociological writers such as
Durkheim and Foucault on the other hand, locate the origins of the
modern system - for both of them an origin signalled by the birth of
the prison - much earlier, at the beginnings of industrialised, urban
3
society; while Marxist writers such as Rusche and Kirchheimer or
Flelossi and Pavarini equate the period of modern penality with that
of the capitalist mode of production. Other commentators such as
Cohen, Scull and Mathiesen suggest a more recent origin inasmuch as
they argue that the developments which have occurred over the last
decade or so, especially the new "hidden discipline" of community
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corrections,amount to a qualitatively new and different pattern of
penality.^ Clearly the longevity of the "present" and the way in
which it is conceived, are far from uncontentious.
The thesis which will be argued here locates the actual formation
of the present system in the brief period between the Gladstone
Committee Report of 1895 and the start of the First World War in 1914.
Its argument will be that during this period the various elements
which together compose the basic structure of modern penality were
first assembled in a distinctive pattern which is discontinuous with
the Victorian system while being continuous with that of the present
day. This is not to assert that there was some kind of total rupture
in which the previous practices altogether disappeared to be replaced
by an array of newly-invented institutions carrying no trace of their
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past. Such "breaks" have little in common with the process of
historical change. On the contrary, many of the sanctions, institutions,
and practices which had existed within the Victorian system still
survive and play an important role in the modern complex. Indeed even
the new institutions which emerged in this period such as probation,
Borstal, Preventive Detention and "individualisation" have obvious
precursors and parallels in the previous period or even earlier.
Nevertheless it will be argued that the pattern of penal sanctioning
which was established in this period, with its new agencies, techniques,
knowledges and institutions, amounted to a new structure of penality.
This new structure displayed a distinctive pattern of sanctions,
strategies and representations which ranged across an altered and
extended domain. In particular, it involved a new logic of 'penal-
welfare* which as we shall see, had profound consequences for the
overall operations and representations of the penal complex. Within
this new structure, surviving elements of the Victorian system such as
4
the prison, after-care or the fine,were subjected to internal
transformations as uiell as being allocated a new position in the penal
network.
The following section will begin to substantiate this proposition
by identifying the various elements which make up each of those two
penal networks,as well as the form of their internal organisation and
interplay. Thereafter there will follow a preliminary consideration
of the different logics and modes of operation which underpin each of
these two structures. This contrast between the Uictorian and Modern
systems will take the form of a point by point comparison of elements,
objectives and organisation rather than employing the more dramatic
Foucauldian device of stark juxtoposition, which sets the symbolic
7
essence of the 'old' against that of the 'new'. While losing out on
figurative effect, this form of exposition is perhaps better suited
to maintaining empirical accuracy and balance. In fact the differences
which mark off the modern penal complex from its Victorian antecedents
become clearer and more pronounced by the middle of the twentieth
century, but since a qualitative or structural transformation is being
asserted, and not merely a gradual shift of direction or emphasis, it
should be possible to demonstrate this using evidence from the
transition period itself.
The following account of Victorian penality and the modern system
which replaced it will form the general background to our analysis of
the transformation which separates them. In the course of that
analysis it will be necessary to examine specific practices and
institutions in a detailed and thorough manner, but for this preliminary
comparison, less detail is required. Instead a general overview of the
two systems will be outlined, mentioning their major elements and
characteristics in order that these may be kept in mind during the
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more specialised analyses which follow. The system which will be
described, in convenient shorthand, as "Victorian penality" is that
one which had been assembled by the 1660s and remained in that same
form until after 1895. The formative processes and conditions of
existence of this system will not be dealt with except where they are
clearly relevant to our analysis.
(2) The Late Victorian Penal System (1665-1695)
(a) The range of sanctions
The main penal sanctions which were legally authorised in the late
nineteenth century for the punishment of offenders were as follows:
(1) Death, (2) Penal servitude, (3) Imprisonment, (4) Detention in a
Reformatory School, (5) Corporal punishment (whipping for adults,
birching for juveniles), (6) Release on Recognizances, and (7) Payment
of a fine. In addition to these, though not strictly classed as a
"punishment" nor restricted to offenders, was (8) Detention in an
Industrial School.
In terms of its frequency of use, the death penalty had diminished
in importance since the beginning of the century. The range of
capital offences had been greatly reduced by the reforms of the 1830s
and both executions and commuted sentences of death had subsequently
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decreased in number during the years that fallowed. The popular impact
of the capital penalty was also transformed by the cessation of public
ceremonies of execution in 1868, and although it retained its symbolic
significance as the ultimate sanction, the judicial execution was, by
the 1880s, a rare and infrequent event.
Corporal punishment, at least in the case of adults, was also a
6
rarely used sanction by this period. The Act of 1861 virtually
abolished it as a judicial penalty for adults, after which it remained
only for a few special offences such as shooting at the Sovereign, and
for males convicted as incorrigible rogues under the Vagrancy Act of
1824. In 1863 the Garotters Act restored corporal punishment for
robbery with violence, and Acts of 1898 and 1912 extended it to male
persons convicted of offences related to immoral earnings and
procuration. These curtainments of corporal punishment did not, however,
apply to the birching of juvenile offenders which was regarded as a
valuable alternative to imprisonment in a period when few others were
available. The courts retained power to order the birching of boys
under 14 convicted summarily of any indictable offence and for boys
under 16 convicted of indictment of larceny, malicious damage and
g
certain offences against the person.
The generalised restriction of these punishments of the body was
paralleled by an increasing reliance upon incarceration as the central
mode of sanctioning employed against adult offenders, especially after
10
the decline of transportation between the 1840s and 1867. By the
1870s and 1880s the prison had become the "ordinary, mechanical
11
punishment for every new offence created by the Legislature" and it
was routinely deployed throughout the whole range of statutory and
common law offences and offenders, from the most trivial to the most
serious.
"Imprisonment" is to be distinguished from "penal servitude"
inasmuch as the former involved sentences of up to two years with or
without hard labour (whichr after 1865 was uniformly enforced whether
or not the court had explicitly ordered it) and was served in a local
prison. "Penal servitude" on the other hand, was to be served in a
convict prison such as Flillbank or Pentonville and carried a minimum
7
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term of five yeers (or seven years for a recidivist convict). It
also entailed a form of police supervision for those convicts who were
released on "tickets of leave", although this supervision appears to
have been somewhat uneven and irregular in enforcement, depending upon
13
the practice of local police forces.
Although the minimum sentences of the 1864 Act were intended to
increase the deterrence value of penal servitude, their ironic effect
was to curtail the use of penal servitude and to make imprisonment in
14
local prisons the mainstay of the whole system. At the same time the
indiscriminate use of imprisonment throughout the whole range of
offences ensured a very large number of short sentences:
"At the end of the nineteenth century, detention in penal
institutions had still been the mainstay of the entire
system. The annual number of offenders received in prison
in 1904 was as high as 190,000, at least two-thirds of whom
were undergoing short sentences of two weeks or less,
whilst not even one per cent of the total were serving
sentences of over twelve months." ^
It should also be noted that the prisons of this period contained a
large number of offenders who would later be deemed inappropriate for
prison treatment and removed to specialist institutions - categories
such as children and juveniles, but also 'inebriates', 'habituals' and
16
the 'feeble-minded'.
From the 1850s onwards, children and juvenile offenders were
increasingly incarcerated not in prisons but in institutions which
combined penal detention with educational provision in various
proportions. These Reformatory and Industrial Schools were privately
run, charitable institutions which were certified, inspected and
17
partly-financed by central government. Young offenders between 12
and 16 years of age, convicted of an offence which was punishable in
the case of an adult by imprisonment or penal servitude, could be
sentenced to detention in a Reformatory for a period of three to five
8
years - a sanction which carried with it a preliminary sentence of
14 days imprisonment. Industrial Schools were used to detain children
under the age of 14 who had been referred to court for begging,
vagrancy, having "bad or neglectful" parents or residing in a "disorderly
house", as well as for young offenders under the age of 12 years.
Committal to these schools was for an indeterminate period, but no
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child was to be detained beyond the age of 16 years. Both types of
institution maintained supervisory control for a period after release -
up to age 19 for ex-Reformatory inmates and to 1B for those released
from Industrial Schools - with the sanction of recommittal if
supervisory conditions were breached. A Departmental Report of 1913
estimated that there were approximately 18,000 children then currently
19
detained in such places, and a further 12,000 under their supervision.
The major alternative to incarceration at the end of the century
was the imposition of a monetary fine. While imprisonment was used
about two-and-a-half times more frequently than the fine for
indictable offences, it appears that then, as now, the fine was the
20
predominant sanction used in summary, non-indictable cases. It is
misleading though, to juxtapose fines and imprisonments as simple
'alternatives' during this period. In the absence of any regular
system of instalments or time to pay, fines very frequently had the
effect of a penalty of imprisonment given the widespread inability of
offenders to find the means to pay.
The only other non-custodial sanction that was regularly deployed
at the end of the century was release on Recognizances. Again this was
used mainly in the lower courts and for summary cases, though some
5,653 indictable cases were dealt with in this way in England and
Wales during 1893. This sanction sometimes involved the giving of
sureties to guarantee the offender's good behaviour, and occasionally
9
depended upon the intercession of notables or 'respectable persons'
who would offer to supervise the offender on behalf of the court. From
1876 this practice of intervention was taken up on a regular basis in
London and elsewhere by the Police Court Missionaries of the Church
of England Temperance Society as part of their voluntary rescue work.
However, despite the Acts of 1879 and 1887 which extended and
encouraged this common law practice, the actual supervisory powers of
the missioners had no general statutory basis, depending instead
upon the discretion of the magistrate in recognising the services of
21
this private and otherwise unauthorised agency.
(b) Organisation and control
The organisation and control of Britain's prison institutions had
by 1865 been subjected to a process of centralisation and rationalisation
brought about through the mechanisms of state inspection, regulation
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and financial subvention. The passing of the Prison Act of 1877,
finally transferring ownership of the country's local gaols to central
government, marked the termination of this protracted local/central
power struggle and the commencement of a system which was centrally
organised, uniform and subject to a strict and detailed regulation.
The administrative hierarchy established by the Act of 1877 was
headed by a Prison Commission (appointed by, and responsible to the
Home Secretary) which was given total responsibility for the administration
23
and control of the country's penal institutions. To this Commission
each individual prison governor was directly subordinate and accountable.
The Prison Inspectorate (established in 1835) continued to exist as a
quasi-independent agency of review, though its powers were limited to
the presentation of annual reports and recommendations, which appear to
24
have been subject to alteration by the Commission. At the local level,
10
and despite great protest, the role of the Visiting Committee was
reduced to a limited and formal power of inspection and of adjudication
in matters of internal discipline. Apart from these two 'external'
agencies of review, the prison command structure was centralised and
decidedly vertical, and this steep hierarchy was continued throughout
the lower tiers of authority. Prison warders were organised on a
military ranking system and a large number of the prison staff - from
ranking officers to members of the Commission - were selected on the
basis of their previous military training and experience.
The powers of the Prison Commission, and through them, the central
government, thus came to dominate the realm of penality and to dictate
the direction of reform and administration with regard to the treatment
of serious crime. However there was nonetheless a residue of local
powers which continued for some time after the 1877 Act. Thus the more
minor sanctions of fining, recognizances and birching were left in
the administrative control of the local court authorities, as indeed
was the decision to promote and maintain special institutions for
juveniles and inebriates in keeping with the Acts of 1854 and 1898.
This situation allowed a continuing unevenness in the administration of
these lesser sanctions, but it also left space for the local initiatives
which led to the development of police court missions in London and
the early juvenile courts in Glasgow and Birmingham.
(c) General objectives
Although as we have seen, the repertoire of sanctions available
during this period included a number of capital, corporal and non¬
custodial sentences, the primary emphasis in official policy was upon
incarceration and the prison. While a large number of lesser offences
were dealt with by corporal or financial sanctions, a few petty
11
offenders entrusted to the care and supervision of Police Court
Missioners, and a fewer number of grave offencers to the less tender
mercies of the executioner, these sanctions were displaced into
secondary importance at the level of policy discussion and penological
debate.
The penological favour shown to the prison can be understood both
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in terms of its disciplinary potential and, as we shall see, by
reference to the deep ideological affinity which linked this
"deprivation of liberty" to the political institutions of V/ictorian
Britain. However the official emphasis upon imprisonment also
reflected the organisational pattern described above. The nineteenth
century process of centralisation ensured that national policy
initiatives would come primarily from the central State agencies, and
since these agencies were in direct control of prisons - but not of
fining, whipping, recognizances, etc. - a focus upon the prison was
politically, as well as penologically, favoured.
This carceral focus is particularly evident in the official
Reports, writings and administrative acts of this period in which it
is taken as self-evident that the prison is the most important
apparatus of penality and that the central task of the nation's penal
administration is simply to improve its functioning. In this discourse,
penology becomes virtually synonymous with Prison Reform, and the
diverse issues of penal control are reformulated into the narrower and
more determinate of la Science Penitentaire. The issues which surfaced
in the penal debates of the Victorian period - the choice of silent or
separate regime; the issue of prison labour and its character; the
endless problems of administration which were accorded such detailed
attention - were thus issues posed by the established problematic of
imprisonment.
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If then, we try to identify and examine the main objectives of the
national penal system and its governing agencies in this period, our
discussion thereby becomes prison-centred and concerned with the aims
26
and priorities of the Victorian prison regime.
Like all complex institutions, the prison of this period had a
multiplicity of discernible objectives which were inherent in its
practices and routines. The formal priority of any prison regime is,
as Sir Edmund Ou Cane put it, "the repression of crime", and as we
shall see, the Victorian prison employed a number of techniques and
practices which were explicitly geared towards this deterrent effect.
However when Du Cane was appointed Chairman of the Prison Commission in
1877, his stated concern then, and for the next eighteen years, was with
the administrative and institutional conditions under which this
repression was carried out.
The process of centralisation had put the Prison Commission in
charge of an exceedingly disparate and heterogeneous set of penal
establishments throughout the country, with enormous variations of
regime from prison to prison. Consequently, the main objective which
underpinned the actions of the Commission were to be rationalisation,
economy and uniformity. In the years immediately following 1877, the
network of local gaols was streamlined by the closure of those most
infrequently used, while the remaining stock was gradually refurbished
or rebuilt to conform to the prescribed standards of architectural and
sanitary design. Routine administrative and communication procedures
were given a standard, national form by the publication of standing
orders and uniform documentation. The appointment, training and payment
of officers was transformed to ensure a uniformed, salaried and
disciplined staff which met the minimum requirement of literacy,
numeracy and physical ability. And finally, the doctrine of less-
13
eligibility uias firmly reiterated as a general precept throughout the
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system, both as a costing principle and as a proper penological goal.
The consequence of these changes was a standardised and more
economical prison network which produced annual reports and statistical
returns to document its operations and to justify its annual budget.
This process of economy and rationalisation clearly had effects
beyond the efficiency of the administrative machinery, insofar as these
changes also affected the conditions endured by the prisoners
themselves - who were, after all, the ultimate objects of administration.
This is the case with health and sanitary conditions which were greatly
improved, and with identification procedures which became more
effective as the system's logistics and communications grew in
efficiency. It also applies to the less-eligibility doctrine which has
an obvious penological significance and effect. Clearly then, one
cannot easily distinguish between "the administrative" and "the
penological" when a prison is the institution in question. This point
must be borne in mind when we come to discuss the detailed effects of
the Commission's third objective, that ofoniformity", since what
appears to be no more than an administrative concern to produce
standardisation and homogeneity, does in fact carry a heavy penological
and ideological significance which has frequently been overlooked.
(d) Detailed objectives: Practices and Techniques
liihen we move to the level of the prison regime itself, we can
best identify its day to day objectives by considering the practices,
conditions and techniques through which these operated. Whatever the
claims of the authorities, it seems clear from these practices that
the primary concern was with the production of a disciplined and orderly
regime; a regime which enforced an intense form of obedience through a
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number of uniformly distributed conditions and procedures.
The fundamental condition for this regime of discipline and
obedience was an architectural one - the cellular prison building.
The dev/ice of housing each prisoner in a separate cell of standard
dimensions and minimal furnishings ensured a number of simultaneous
effects such as isolation, prevention of communication and contamination,
and ease of surveillance and control. This first principle of good
prison discipline uas rigorously enforced throughout the national
system, and although a number of different architectural forms uere
used for prison buildings - such as the "hub and spokes" model, or
the "pavillion" model, each of which involved elements of the
28
"panoptican" - the basic unit of each of these uas the individual cell.
29
Although the "silent system" had previously been operative in a feu
local gaols, and a system of associated labour (following on from a
nine month period of solitary confinement) continued to be practised
in convict prisons, the general regime of local prisons from 1877
onuards uas the "separate system" under which inmates worked, ate and
slept in their cells removed from any contact with their fellow
prisoners.
Within this framework of existence each element was rigorously
and uniformly regulated. Thus sleep itself was officially timetabled
and delimited while the wooden plank which formed the inmate's bed uas
the subject of precise regulation as to materials and dimensions.
Likewise with the diet of the prisoner, which uas a topic of some
considerable concern, being the specific focus of a number of official
30
reports and investigations. The regulation diet, which was uniformly
provided for all prisoners (subject to modifications by way of
punishment or ill-health) was scrupulously calculated to provide the
minimum necessary level of nutrition for subsistence,thereby conforming
15
to the principles of less-eligibility and uniformity, or, as
Ooshua Debb more prosaicly put it, of "hard work, hard fare and hard
31
bed". The question of the prisoner's labour was also the subject
of careful planning and calculation on the part of the authorities.
The Prison Act of 1865, following the recommendations of the Carnarvon
Report on local prisons, had specified Oakum-picking and work at the
crank or the treadwheel as the recommended forms of labour to be
undertaken by prisoners, and during the Victorian period these were
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generally used throughout the English prison system. Labour was thus
generally unproductive and of a harsh and menial character, designed
not to teach particular skills, but to enforce discipline, work-habits
and obedience. However, it is important to note thet this element of
"unproductivity" was, so far as the Carnarvon Report was concerned,
actually secondary and inessential. The choice of treadwheel and
crank as the most appropriate apparatuses of labour was based not on
their uselessness, but upon their capacity to exact a precisely
measured quantity of labour, thereby promoting the goal of uniformity
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in this aspect of the prison regime as in all others.
The only interruptions to this strictly regulated and silent regime
of eating, sleeping and labouring,consisted in a few hours per week of
cellular visits by the Chaplain, the education officer or a philanthropic
visitor, being for the purposes of elementary education and moral
improvement. Discipline - which attended to the very slightest of
deviations - was enforced by a system of graded punishments which could
involve reduction of diet, increased work periods or the corporal
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punishment of whipping.
One point which emerges clearly from this brief description is
35
the importance of what the Webbs termed "the fetish of uniformity".
This notion of the universal standard affects not just architecture,
16
sanitation and cell conditions, but also diet, clothing, labour,
education and discipline. And the problem of how to achieve this
uniformity recurs again and again throughout the official Reports and
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papers of this period. The Victorian penal system should thus be
viewed as operating a mass regime with a general objective which is,
as 0. C. Howard said:
"the very reverse of that sought in any modern penal
institution: namely the treatment of all offenders
exactly alike." ^
This general objective, however, operated at the most detailed level
of particulars:
"The size and structure of the cell, the form of labour
... scale of dietary, so nicely adjusted ... as if the
weight of the body were a greater concern and business
for the State than the saving of the soul; ... rules of
discipline by which every movement was regulated according
to plan, and woe betide the wretch who deflected by an inch
from the prescribed path of conduct ... a multitude of
details which now seem to us foolish and unnecessary."
The author of these last remarks is Sir Evelyn Rugglea-Brise, who was
to preside over the transformation from the regime we are describing
to the modern system of penal practice. The purpose of quoting him
here is to show that while Victorian prisons exhibited a close and
detailed form of discipline or "dressage", they did not manifest a
concern with individualisation. On the contrary, each individual was
treated "exactly alike", with no reference being made to his criminal
type or individual character. As Sir Edmund Du Cane put it:
"A sentence of penal servitude is, in its main features,
and so far as it concerns the punishment, applied on
exactly the same system to every person subjected to it.
The previous career and character of the prisoner makes
no difference in the punishment to which he is subjected." ^9
Of course this absence of individualisation did not preclude the operation
of some forms of classification and categorisation. Prisoners were
differentiated according to age, sex, sentence length, and even from
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1879 onwards, according to the presence or absence of previous
sentences of penal servitude. There were also separate categories for
the unconvicted, for debtors, and for first class misdemeanants guilty
of sedition, all of whom were accorded modified treatment on account
of their ambiguous legal status. However, these differentiations were
mainly administrative and segregational, carrying little importance in
terms of treatment or conditions. The main classification system
categorised each prisoner as one more individual to be subjected to
the uniform and universal regime It was thus a system which
recognised individuals but not individuality.
In this respect the Victorian prison corresponded precisely to the
tenets of the so-called 'classical criminology' and its view of the
criminal actor. Unlike subsequent criminologies which based
themselves upon a particular characterisation of "the criminal" and
its differences from the non-criminal, the classical theory recognised
no such entity or differentiation. Criminal acts, like any other
actions, were the outcomes of individual choice and volition on the
part of human subjects. Criminals differed from non-criminals only,
in the contingent and non-essential fact of their law-breaking. In
fact to call the work of writers such as Beccaria, Voltaire, Bentham
and Blackstone a "criminology", is altogether misleading. Their work
is essentially the application of legal jurisprudence to the realm of
crime and punishment and it bears no relation to the "human sciences"
of the nineteenth century which were to form the basis of the
criminological enterprise. The voluntarist and rationalist theory of
action, which formed the centrepiece of this jurisprudence, borrowed
from utilitarian psychology the idea of the free and calculating
individual engaged in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of
pain. Each individual, with the exception of the mad or the infant,
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possessed these faculties of will and freedom and could choose his or
her own destiny. Criminals then, were to be presumed to have calculated
that crime would serve them well, and were to be shown that in a
civilised social order, this was an erroneous calculation. Hence the
emphasis upon less-eligibility, "deterrence" and a voluntarist process
of reform, all of which presuppose a freely calculating and reasoning
subject. The universal, rational subject-at-law is thereby carried
over into the penal realm without modification.
It was precisely this entity which would be referred to
disparagingly by later writers as the "type abstract" of the law - a
conception which misrecognised its subjects and prevented penality
from undertaking its proper function of individualisation:
"The prison, as formerly established, was based on the
now exploded idea that crime is an abstract and uniform
entity, the special characteristics of the criminal
himself being a negligeable quantity: thus the prison
was not adapted for the individualisation or even the
classification of criminals." 1
It was also this entity which ensured the absence of any detailed
investigation of the criminal, precluding any mental, moral or familial
inquiry or any semblance of the question which asks "who are you?"
of the individual criminal. As we shall see, Foucault is partly correct
when he says that modern penality revolves around this very question,
but he is wholly wrong when he goes on to state that, in the classical
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system, the criminal was not even an element in the judicial equation.
In fact, as we have already shown, the criminal was a definite and
important element in this "equation", but it was one which was not
variable and therefore need not be questioned or explicitly stated.
The question was not asked because the answer was always already
known - there was the assumption that the accused was necessarily a
legal subject with all the presumed attributes thereof. Authors of
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criminal acta who were not at the same time legal subjects could only
be children, madmen, companies or animals - all of whom could be relied
upon to display this fact prima facie and without question.
(e) Official representations of penality
Finally in this brief description, we should consider the form in
which the Victorian penal system was publicly represented by those in
authority. This is difficult to define since there is no singular or
authorised form of representation but rather a diverse collection of
statements which range from the rhetorical to the apologetic and which
address a number of different audiences. However some key terms,
themes and priorities can be assembled from the official reports and
documents of the period which together form the basic elements of
Victorian penal ideology.
The primary framework in which these statements were couched was
that of legal justice. Offenders were to be accorded their just
deserts in the form of a proportional measure of retribution. However
it was well established that the question of proportion and desert
must be considered along with the question of deterrence, since justice
partakes of social prudence as well as the natural order. Consequently
this framework of justice, with its social contract basis, promoted
the twin goals of "deterrence" and "retribution". These two terms
occur again and again throughout all the official representations of
penality in the nineteenth century. As Lord Cockburn put it in 1878,
the object to be realised by sentencing was "suffering inflicted as a
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punishment for crime, and the fear of repetition cff it". Indeed
throughout most of this period the phrasing of the standard prosecution
plea everyday proclaimed that justice should be done"so as to deter
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others from this offence in all time coming". But this invocation
20
of the social contract and the doctrines of utility did not exclude
a different kind of representation which appealed not to Reason but
to moral Righteousness:
"The criminal law proceeds upon the principle that it
is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and
justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals
punishments which express it."
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In fact contrary to Foucault's assertions, in the Victorian period
punishment was not yet an altogether shameful and self-effacing thing.
A sufficient measure of religious belief still persisted to allow
earthly sanctions to appeal to a higher authority and hence to be
explicit about Its expiatory purposes.
If justice was the basic term of penal representation, and
deterrence and retribution its two primary elements, there was also
a third element which was constantly present and presented - that of
"reform". Much care was taken over the precise status of this
third element, and in most official statements it appears as a
subsidiary or secondary aim or else as an object to be hoped for, but
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with little certainty. Nonetheless in each authoritative statement,
from the 1779 Penitentiary Act and the 1823 Gaol Act through to the
Reports and Statutes of the 1890s, the moral reformation of the
offender is specified as a concurrent if subsidiary aim of penality.
Even the Carnarvon Report, the reputation of which rests upon the
severity of its deterrent principles, endorses reformation as a proper
if not primary objective. So too does Sir Edmund Du Cane's work,
The Punishment and Prevention of Crime, despite the strict limits which
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he sets upon the State's responsibility in this regard.
Now to point out that "reformation" featured as an element in
the official representations of penality is not to claim that it
existed as an operational objective in penal practices. However it is
significant that the British authorities did not follow Beccaria in the
21
view that justice and a respect for individual rights actually
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excluded reformation as a proper goal. The dominant philosophy was
much closer to Bentham's in asserting that imprisonment and punishment
in general should be concerned to "grind rogues" by way of deterrence
and retribution. If, by doing so, it should grind them honest, then
so much the better.
To run ahead a little, we might say that the prison, penal law
and the judicial process of this period effectively transferred the
concepts of economic liberalism into the realm of punishment. In
direct replication and support of broader ideologies,their practices
combined to constitute the offender as an individual subject, the carrier
of responsibility, reason and liberty. The twin doctrines of individual
responsibility and presumed rationality formed the basis for the
judicial findings of guilt - since in free-market society the criminal
actor, like his economic counterpart, was deemed to be in absolute
control of his destiny. Reason and responsibility were absolute and
essential attributes, and since freedom was guaranteed by market society,
there could be neither excuse not mitigation for crime - at least none
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short of absolute insanity. Illegality, like poverty, was an effect
of individual choice. Accordingly, punishment took forms appropriate
to its object. The proper response to the rational criminal thus
constructed was a policy of deterrence and retribution, the former
to deny the utility of crime, the latter to reconstitute the social
contract after its breach. And it was precisely this policy which
structured the penal institutions of Victorian Britain.
The actual forms in which this policy was realised were equally
specific in their ideological signification. Considerations of less-
eligibility, derived from the logic of political economy, underpinned
the strategy of deterrence which was expressed in the general conditions
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of the prison, its diets, labour and discipline. The means of
retribution also assumed an ideological significance: the central
technique of State punishment took on the form of a rigorously
uniform system of solitary confinement in individual cells, as if in
its uniformity the regime was constantly celebrating the equality of
all before the law, its solitary cells repeating the message of
individual responsibility. By means of a careful prison architecture
and a rigorous silence, interrupted only by the softly spoken
exhortations of governors, chaplains and philanthropic visitations,
the offender was made to look inuiards, to contemplate the causes and
consequences of his crime and thus allow his essential reason to prevail.
And of course the fact of incarceration itself spoke directly to the
basic principles of social organisation. In its deprivation of liberty
the prison struck directly at the essence of the free subject and thus
repeated that this liberty was after all contingent upon a tenuous
social bond. The very existence of the Victorian prison was an open
appeal to the political philosophy of the social contract.
Ue might also note that the fact of nineteenth century punishment
is an exclusively legal event. The crime, its causes, its trial and
punishment are all established and understood entirely within the
categories of the law. In this process of punishment there is no
reality beyond that one determined by legal discourse: all individuals
are free, equal, rational and responsible. They are judged and
punished accordingly. Knowledges (such as psychiatry, economics,
sociology, medicine) which challenge or deny this reality are quite
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literally ruled out in court. There is thus an exact symmetry between
the legal and the penal which expresses the ideological centrality of
legalism in the age of laisser-faire. It is bourgeois formal justice
in perhaps its purest form.
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In its ideology and representations this carceral style of
punishment alludes to certain definite conceptions of the State and
the nature of Stete power. At the same time it characterises the
object of punishment in a v/ery specific manner. The offender is
defined as a legal subject, a citizen inscribed with rights and duties,
entitled to equal treatment before the law. The State which punishes
does so by contractual right in accordance with the terms of a
political agreement. Its power to punish has its source in the
offender's own action - it is the agreed consequence of a
contractual breach. The State has here no intrinsic dominance or
superior right. It meets the citizen on terms of equality and must
not encroach upon his or her rights, person or liberty except in
circumstances which are rigorously and politically determined in
advance - nulla poena sine lege. In this penal vision we meet the
ideology of the minimal legal State, the liberal dream, guardian of
the free market and the social contract. Its power is of a strictly
legal nature and each instance of that power, each punishment, is
publicly justified in the terms of this political ideology.
(3) The Wodern Penal Complex
If we turn now, by way of contrast, to the framework of penal
sanctions, institutions and representations which had been assembled
by 1914, we can begin to identify a quite different pattern of
elements and relations between them.
(a) The range of sanctions
In the relatively short period between 1895 and 1914 the number
of sanctions available to the criminal court was practically doubled.
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This extended range of dispositions included the following new
sentences: (1) Probation orders, (2) Borstal training, (3) Preventive
detention, (4) Detention in an Inebriate Reformatory, (5) Detention
in an institution for the mentally defective, (6) Various forms of
licensed supervision, and (7) Supervised fines.
The Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, transformed the previously
ad hoc practice of notables and evangelical missioners into a statutory
provision which specifically empowered the court to make probation
orders, and the local authorities to appoint professional probation
officers. Its provisions thereby established a non-custodial,
supervisory sanction for both juveniles and adults which was to be
used in cases where the character of the offender or the nature of
the offence made "punishment" inexpedient. The duration of this
supervision was variable up to a maximum of three years, and its
conditions involved regular reporting to the supervising officer,
the avoidance of "undesirable persons or places" and the maintenance
of regular employment. The Criminal Justice Administration Act of 1914
extended the range of possible conditions to include "abstention from
intoxicating liquor", specific directions as to residence, and upon
"any other matters" which the court considers necessary. Any breach
of these conditions, or even a general failure to "lead an honest
and industrious life", was to result in the officer referring the case
back to the court, which could thereupon sentence the offender for
the original offence.
The new sanction of Borstal training involved a semi-determinate
.custodial sentence of between one and three years at an institution
which was to provide "such instruction and discipline as appears most
conducive to his reformation and the repression of crime". It was
available for offenders between the ages of 16 and 21 who were shown
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to manifest "criminal habits or tendencies" but were also deemed
"likely to profit" from the training provided. The date of release was
specified not by the judge but by the Prison Commissioners and urns to
depend upon their estimation of the offender's progress and reformation.
Release was followed by a period of licensed supervision, its duration
being a minimum of six months plus the unexpired period of the three
year sentence, and its conditions being supervised by agents of the
newly established Borstal Association. Any offender who failed to
comply with the conditions of licence was to be recommitted to the
institution to serve the remainder of the three year sentence or else
a further three months if the full sentence was already completed.
The Prevention of Crime Act of 1908 which enacted these Borstal
provisions for young offenders also dealt with "habitual criminals"
by way of a new sanction of preventive detention. This too was a
semi-determinate sentence, though of the much longer duration of five
to ten years. Moreover the period of preventive detention was to
follow on from the term of penal servitude which was deemed appropriate
to the offence for which the habitual was initially committed, thus
establishing a kind of "double-track" sentence. The Act defined an
habitual criminal as anyone "leading persistently a dishonest or
criminal life" and having been three times convicted of a criminal
offence since the age of 16. After serving the required period of
penal servitude, such offenders were to be transferred to a regime of
"less rigorous treatment" where they would be detained under
"disciplinary and reformatory influences". The date of the habitual's
release from P.O. could be determined by the Secretary of State,
who "if satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that he will
abstain from crime and lead a useful and industrious life" could allow
release on supervised licence. Otherwise the offender would remain for
26
the maximum term of ten years and would thereafter be subject to a
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period of five years under supervision.
The Inebriates Act of 1898 had earlier introduced similar
provisions to deal with persons deemed to be "habitual inebriates"
who could be sentenced to detention in an Inebriate Reformatory for up
to three years. Again this sanction depended upon the character and
antecedents of the accused rather than the specific offence which had
led to his or her committal and such detention could be imposed in
addition to any punishment addressed to the immediate offence. In
much the same way the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 gave courts the
power to place in an institution for the mentally defective any person
found guilty of any criminal offence who fell within that Act's rather
wide definition of "mentally defective". Such orders of detention were
to be for one year in the first instance, thereafter renewable for
successive periods of five years according to the findings of the
Board of Control set up by the Act.
Supervision licences were not in fact independent sanctions but
were important adjuncts to the Preventive Detention and Borstal regimes,
and as such have already been described. In 1911 this policy of
licensing, which was designed to combine the provision of 'after-care*
with the continuation of surveillance and control, was extended to
convicts released from sentences of penal servitude. In that year the
Central Association for the aid of discharged convicts was set up, and
the ex-convict'8 duty of reporting to the police was suspended on the
condition that he or she followed the guidelines laid down by the
Association. As ever, the threatened penalty for licence violation
was a return to the institution from which the offender had previously
been released. Another form of supervision was introduced by the
Criminal Dustice Administration Act 1914 which allowed the court to
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impose a supervision order upon any person aged 16 to 21 who had been
ordered to pay a fine. Such supervision was to persist throughout
the period of repayment and to have regard to the offenders conduct
as well as his means.
As well as the introduction of new sanctions this period saw the
abandonment of certain old ones as well as the modification of some
others. Thus the Children Act of 1908 altogether abolished penal
servitude in the case of children and young persons, and restricted
imprisonment to young persons between 14 and 16 whose character was
"so unruly" or "depraved" that detention in a Reformatory was deemed
unsuitable. Similarly the 14 day period of imprisonment which formerly
proceeded a Reformatory School committal was abolished by the
Reformatory Schools Amendment Act of 1899, having already been made
discretionary in 1895. The minimum period of five years which had been
previously attached to a sentence of penal servitude was decreased in
1891 to three years, while the 1898 Prison Act introduced a new graded
sentence of imprisonment which empowered courts to place an offender
in one of three 'divisions' or categories of imprisonment, according to
character, offence and antecedents. Finally, the Criminal Justice
Administration Act of 1914 allowed offenders the option of instalment
payments and a specified time to pay any fine that was imposed, if
their means made immediate payment impossible. Default after a number
of instalments was to reduce proportionately the length of any prison
sentence served in consequence.
(b) Organisation and Institutions
This expansion and diversification in the repertoire of penal
sanctions was accompanied by the creation of a number of new agencies,
institutions and organisational patterns which substantially altered
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the field of penality and its functioning.
The Acts of 1907 and 1914 marked the beginnings of a national,
professional probation service by instructing each court to appoint a
special probation officer for its jurisdiction. These officers were
to be selected according to certain guidelines - thus they should not
be police officers for example, although they could be selected from
one of the approved voluntary agencies such as the C.E.T.S.. They
were to be paid at the specified level of remuneration, either directly
or through their particular agency, and had a number of statutory duties
to perform at the court's behest, such as providing information on the
offender's background and conduct, supervising orders and enforcing
their conditions. By 1912,at the instigation of the Home Office,
there was established a National Association of Probation
Officers (NAPO) and the beginnings of specialist training programmes
53
and courses of instruction. The previously ad hoc and private
pattern of rescue work by unauthorised "missioners" was thus quickly
replaced by a public, national agency with statutory authorisation and
administrative powers of reporting and recall.
A very similar shift from the private, aci hoc and charitable to
a more systematically organised, publicly funded, national agency also
took place in regard to the after-care and supervision of offenders
released from the various institutions. As we mentioned above, the
Central Association was set up in 1911 to organise and regulate the
supervision of all released convicts. A similar body, though with
less supervisory power, was set up a few years later to organise the
provision of after-care to those released from local prisons. The
Borstal Association and its allied organisation in charge of supervising
habitual offenders, completed this newly-organised and centralised
field of after-care and surveillance which emerged in the years before
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the First World War.
As well as providing new sanctions and agencies, the reforms of
this period produced a number of new institutions in the penal realm.
These new institutions were of a variety of sorts, designed to house
a variety of different sanctions, but each one shared a common feature
of specialisation and classification. Each was designed for a specific
category of offender and was intended to provide a regime particularly
appropriate to its inmates. In that sense each was marked off as
quite distinct from the "general mixed prison" of the Victorian era.
Thus the new Camp Hill P.D. institution for habitual offenders was to
offer conditions which were secure but less rigorous than those of
regular prisons, on the basis that the preceding term of penal servitude
had exhausted the punitive element of the offender's sentence and this
subsequent detention was merely preventative. Similarly the new
Borstal institutions were designed (or refurbished) to facilitate a
reformative and training regime which offered scope for intensive
physical exercise, industrial training and educational facilities, as
well as dormitory accommodation which formed the basis of the celebrated
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"House System". The new institutions for feeble-minded offenders and
for inebriates were also to be specialised in function, concerned with
the classification of inmates and the differentiation of treatment.
The provision of these asylums, and their day to day management, was
left to the enterprise of private bodies or local authorities, on the
basis that this would produce a differentiated network of specialist
institutions, catering for the various localities and types of inmate.
However the central authorities certified, regulated and subsidised
these institutions and themselves provided State Reformatories in order
to contain those inmates who posed discipline problems elsewhere in
the system.
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Another important specialist institution, this time established
by the Children Act of 1908, was the juvenile court which was given
jurisdiction to hear the cases of children and young persons under the
age of 16 years. Although one or two cities such as Glasgow and
Birmingham had previously set up separate courts to deal with criminal
proceedings involving children, this was the first time that such a
separation had been ordered by statute throughout the country. The
juvenile court was to be staffed by magistrates with a special
knowledge or concern in regard to children and was directed to take
account of the child's welfare in any dispositions which it made. Its
jurisdiction was from the start extended beyond criminal offences to
include cases where children were deemed to be in need of care or
protection.^
Although most of the developments and initiatives which occurred
in the 1895 to 1914 period took place outside of the prison system,
involving extraneous agencies and institutions, these changes clearly
had a large impact upon the prison and its functioning. Many of these
new sanctions such as probation, or instalment-fines were conceived
as direct alternatives to imprisonment, while others functioned to
remove certain classes of offender out of the domain of the prison
and into specialist institutions. The consequence was that the prison
was de-centred - shifted from its position as the central and
predominant sanction to become one institution among many in an
extended grid of penal sanctions. Of course it continued to be a
sanction of major importance, but it was now deployed in a different
manner, for a narrower section of the criminal population, and often as
a back-up sanction for other institutions rather than the place of
first resort. Moreover these external changes led to a recomposition
of the internal prison population which now included less offenders who
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were inebriate, weak-minded or "habitual", but also less who were
young, short-sentence, or first-offenders and therefore more likely
to reform. In other words the prison actually increased its
proportion of "normal" criminal recidivists.
Along with these indirect changes there was a number of developments
which directly affected the administration of the prisons and also
their internal regimes. An important development brought about by the
1898 Prison Act allowed the Secretary of State to enact administrative
changes or new prison rules without undertaking the normal Parliamentary
procedures, thereby leaving more scope for executive decision-making
and less for public policy discussion. The same Act, along with a
Home Office Circular of 1895 directing prison governors to adopt a
number of the Gladstone Report's recommendations, led to a number of
official changes in the standard prison regime. Unproductive labour
was officially abandoned, to be replaced by work which was both useful
and educative; labour and education in local prisons were put on an
associative basis, in line with the traditional practice of convict
prisons; and the silence rule was replaced by a discretionary granting
of permission to talk under certain conditions and for a stated period.
The "mark system" of gratuities (given in return for hard work and good
discipline) and a new system of remission in local prisons were also
generally adopted, thereby establishing a form of internal discipline
which worked by means of small reward-incentives and the threat of
their withdrawal in contrast to the older purely negative system of
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punishment for misbehaviour. Finally, there was a proliferation of
new divisions and classifications in both convict and local prisons.
When these were added as,they generally were,to the traditional
groupings which had existed in the Victorian period,the result was a
fairly complex pattern of prisoner categorisation. Thus Ruggles Brise,
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writing in 1910, could specify 22 separate categories of prisoner
without including in his list any mention of female, lunatic, feeble-
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minded or inebriate prisoners or their subdivisions.
(c) General objectives
With the decentring of the prison and the formation of an extended
grid of sanctions and institutions in the modern period,it becomes even
more difficult to define the objectives which underpinned the range of
penal practices. Different sectors of the complex operated quite
different regimes, often with quite specific categories of offender
and varied forms of resources and techniques. However one can at least
infer from this fact that a general objective which inheres in this
structure is that of assessment and classification. As we pointed out
above, the practice of classification is hardly an invention of the
1690s, and so long as there was a choice of sanctions available to the
court, or even a discretion as to length of sentence, the task of
assessing the appropriate class of penalty was necessarily operative.
Nonetheless, the new range of specialist institutions, and the
possibility, since 1698, of a classified prison sentence, meant that
the importance and complexity of classification was greatly extended.
Moreover there was a qualitative change in the criteria of assessment
insofar as many of the new sanctions directed attention towards the
type of character and antecedents possessed by the offender rather
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than the gravity of the offence. Classification between and within
institutions was thus a key practical objective of the modern system
even as early as 1914.
As for the various individual sectors, these must be considered
one by one. There is good reason to believe that despite the changes
to its population structure and the revision of its "official aims"
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which will be discussed shortly, the prison continued to operate its
traditional objectives of security, uniformity and strictly enforced
patterns of obedience, albeit with important modifications in its
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disciplinary techniques. Other sectors, while no doubt sharing a
general concern to promote disciplined behaviour and obedience to
authority, also displayed other, more particularised objectives.
Thus the privately-run network of Inebriate Reformatories, attempted
to "dry out" their clients and to promote a curative regime which might
prevent continued alcoholism, just as the institutions for feeble-minded
offenders displayed a more psychiatric and educational orientation in
their various regimes. The State Reformatories, on the other hand, were
more concerned with the containment of their inmates, and their secure
confinement, rather than with any more ambitious aims. The preventive
detention regime at Camp Hill was similarly designed to provide a
"segregative facility" and its original design appeared to deny the
very possibility of reformation insofar as its inmates were, by
definition, incorrigible.^ The Borstal institution was designed to
promote certain loosely defined aims of "reformation" and "training"
which it pursued by means of physical exercise, moral instruction,
industrial or agricultural training and reward-incentive schemes, the
precise pattern of training being decided on the basis of various
forms of assessment, involving extensive reports and inquiries.
Probation officers and the agents of after-care societies hoped to
produce this same reformative effect, but using a number of different
means, ranging from detailed surveillance, control of associations,
and interventions in the offender's family or home life, to old-
fashioned personal influence or even religious conversion. The system
of instalment payment for fines carried a negative objective which
most of the other sanctions implicitly shared to some degree - namely
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"the abatement of imprisonment" - but it also had a more positive
aim inasmuch as it could regulate the offender's (and often his or her
family's) expenditure over a considerable period of time, thereby
making criminogenic leisure pursuits, such as the consumption of
alcohol, more difficult for that duration.
It will be apparent by now that in modern penality the "type
abstract" so beloved of classical jurisprudence has been radically
undermined, along with the strict uniformity of treatment which its
notion of justice entailed. From the point of view of this new system
there no longer exists a universe of free and equal legal subjects
which coincides with the sane adult population. Now there are
categories which pose exceptions to the rule, classes which exhibit
only limited degrees of freedom and a large population of "special
cases". Neither "Reason" nor "Responsibility" can any longer be
simply presumed in the presence of juveniles, vagrants, habituals,
inebriates or the feeble-minded. The modern system's "recognition"
of these diverse populations, and the new "criminologies" which
encouraged this enlightenment and sought to extend it, together prompt
the question of "who are you?" whenever an offender enters their gaze.
However in contrast to the certainties of the past, the answer to this
question cannot now be known in advance. Inquiries are necessary,
including extra-legal inquiries, and officers are now authorised to
continue the investigation beyond the court and to relay back their
assessment.
So although the law retains its central place in modern penality,
it is no longer a singular discourse which excludes all others. The
new system accords a place to the judgements of non-judicial personnel
such as probation and after-care officers or the Borstal and P.O.
authorities. It invites information and advice of an extra-legal kind
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whenever it demands social background reports, character judgements or
the certification of experts. The findings of the "psychological
sciences" are allowed to enter into circulation, particularly in regard
to the category of the "juvenile-adult" and its treatment in Borstal
institutions. Likewise the medical definitions of alcoholism and
"feeble-mindedness" come more and more to prevail in the legal
treatment of inebriate and mentally-deficient offenders. There is
even a discernible tendency in the regimes at Borstal and elsewhere to
see "reformation" less as a deliberate choice on the part of offenders
and more as an effect of the physical or psychological practices
brought to bear upon them.
(d) Official representations of penality
These notions of classification and the production of individual
change through applied practices of reformation were well described by
Ruggles-Brise when he insisted that:
"... each man convicted of crime is to be regarded as an
individual, as a separate entity or morality, who by the
application of influences, of discipline, labour, education,
moral and religious, backed up on discharge by a well-
organised system of patronage, is capable of reinstatement
in civic life." 61
Here we have the new Chairman of the Prison Commission designating
"individualisation" as "the principle from which we can all start
forward today in our campaign throughout the world", in stark contrast
to his predecessor's absolute exclusion of that principle in the name
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of justice itself. And while Du Cane and the Victorian Regime gave
the objective of reformation a subsidiary and tenuous place in the
practices and representations of penality, the official rhetoric and
representations from the Gladstone Report onwards cited "reform" as
the central and organising aim of modern penal practice. This aim of
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reform or social readjustment was clearly the designated principle of
the new institutions of Borstal, probation and State-funded after-care,
but even the prison was now characterised more and more as a complex
machinery of reform. As Havelock Ellis put it, while previously:
"the prison was not adopted for the individualisation
or even the classification of criminals, [it] is now
becoming recognised that the prison must have in it
elements borrowed from the hospital, the lunatic asylum
and the technical school."
In the public pronouncements which appeared in the Reports,
Parliamentary debates and official documents of the period between
1895 and 1914, there thus emerges a new style of penal representation
which, although it shares elements with that of the Victorian period,
is quite different in its overall signification. Thus while the
notion of legal justice continues to form a basic element of the image
which is produced, it is no longer presented as the primary means by
which penality should be judged. Certainly there is no explicit
challenge to the authority or centrality of "the Law", but it appears
more and more as a background feature, a necessary but not sufficient
characterisation of what penality has become. Moreover, if legal
justice itself stands unchallenged, at least one of its elements - that
of uniformity of treatment - is explicitly questioned and increasingly
denied in almost every official pronouncement from Gladstone onwards.
"Deterrence" and "Retribution" continued to be presented as
proper goals of the system,appearing as regularly as before whenever
the official aims of punishment were rehearsed. However the moral
sentiment which had underpinned these terms in the Victorian system -
"the principle that it is morally right to hate criminals", as
Stephens had put it - was now quite foreign to the realm of penal
representation. Criminals are presented as individuals to be pitied,
cared for, and if possible, reclaimed. Whenever apparently punitive
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or deterrent measures are under discussion, they appear as last
resorts when all else has failed, as unpleasant but unavoidable evils
out of keeping with the general tenor of the system. In this neui
system punishment has indeed become a shameful thing.
"Reform" on the other hand, had by this time moved from being a
subsidiary term in a series of aims to become the central and
predominant signifier in the neu penal discourse. Moreover it could
assume this position of dominance without undermining the other
"concurrent" aims of deterrence and retribution, since what was being
presented was not just a more civilised or liberal penality, but
also a mare preventative, reformative and efficacious form of social
control. The connotations of "reform" thus reached simultaneously in
two directions: to moral progress, civilised enlightenment and the
liberal conscience, but also to the benefits of a more efficient and
economical discipline, guaranteed by "acquired experience and recent
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scientific research".
(4) The Differences: A Preliminary Discussion
It should be clear from the points made above that, at least in
particulars, there is a substantial series of differences between the
Victorian and the Modern systems of penality. In this section we will
begin to suggest that these differences are of a more major and
fundamental character than mere particulars. To this end, we will
abstract a number of general features of the two systems and present a
preliminary discussion 'of their differences. This differentiation and
discussion will be continued and developed, at a number of different
levels, as the dissertation proceeds, the present section being merely
a first approximation.
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Perhaps the best place to start this discussion is with the
distinctive shape and contours of the two systems and their different
modes of operation. From what has already been said, we can see that
the general repertoire of penalties and the manner in which individual
sanctions are selected for specific offenders have both undergone a
change of form. There has been a move from a calibrated, hierarchical
structure (of fines, prison terms, death) into which offenders were
inserted according to the severity of their offence, to an extended
grid of non-equivalent and diverse dispositions into which the
offender is inscribed according to the diagnosis of his or her condition
and the treatment appropriate to it. This change entails a greater
diversification in the field of penal practice, the development of a
more complex language of differentiations (between types of offender,
classifications, characters, treatments, etc.) and the possibility of
greater discrimination and refinement in sentencing. But it signifies
more than just an increased range of options and possibilities: it
marks the beginnings of 8 new mode of sentencing which claims to treat
offenders according to their specific characteristics or needs and not
according to a scheme of metaphysical equality. Of course this is not
a total transformation in actual practice: the Victorian system went
some way towards making the penality appropriate to the offender
(through judicial discretion, extenuating or aggravating circumstances,
the 1B79 Act, etc.); and the Modern system's consideration of "specific
characteristics" is strictly limited to those formally recognised in
law (inebriacy, feeble-mindedness, youth, etc.). But the important
change is at the level of the logic or philosophy which underpins the
system. As a result of this shift it became a respectable and
established policy to disregard the formal equality of legal subjects
and instead take account of their peculiarities as specific individuals.
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There is thus a move from individualism to individualisation which
alters the penal field fundamentally.
An immediate consequence of this move is an alteration in the
structural position of the prison. In this transformation the prison
shifts from the very centre of the penal realm to a kind of terminal
position,forming the endpoint on an extended network of "alternatives
to imprisonment" and specialist establishments. At the same time, the
law, in recognising knowledges beyond itself (the psychological problems
of adolescence, the medical nature of alcoholism, the economic
difficulties of some offenders, etc.) abandons its own claim to be the
exclusive form of penal discourse. And of course once this exclusivity
is disturbed, and the absolute tenets of law are opened up to qualification,
the way is open for a continuing struggle between the law and the
various "human sciences" which claim the right to speak on issues of
personal character and conduct.
The clearest illustration of this conflict is perhaps the contest
between law and psychiatry over the question of madness and crime. In
the Victorian system there was an absolute separation between these
two categories, formalised in the notorious M'Naughton Rules which, as
The Times was later to put it, assumed "that anyone who is not the
victim of manifest delusions is to be treated as an entirely free agent".^
In such a system the mad could be absolutely distinguished from the
criminal. The subsequent recognition of degrees of responsibility
served to replace this absolute separation by a graduated continuum,
at least in non-capital cases which involved inebriates, mental
defectives, juveniles, and so on. From being strictly separate and
removed from the court's consideration,questions of madness begin to
become inextricably linked with questions of crime, and this
relationship becomes crucial in the sentencing of a whole range of
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offenders.
This transformation in modes of penal sanctioning was characterised
by Raymond Saleilles as a shift from \/erqeltunqsstrafe - a mechanical
and exact retribution - to zweckstrafe - a form of sanctioning
characterised by its instrumental or utilitarian purposes.^ But while
this distinction usefully draws attention to the uniformity of the
first mode and the more extensive utilitarian ambition of the second,
it unfortunately limits their differences to the level of objectives.
As we shall see, this transition also involved a shift in the form of
regulation. It moved from a reliance upon the forms of legal
prohibition and penalty, to a new mode of normalisation which specified
more detailed normative requirements and sought to bring offenders into
line with them through positive techniques of intervention. As we will
demonstrate in Chapter Seven, this new form of regulation is of
immense importance because it altogether transforms the scope, range
and penetration of legal control.
One feature of this change which is relevant to our present
discussion concerns the relationship between penality, knowledge and
the public. For Victorian penality there was no attempt to adopt the
sanction to fit the peculiarities of the offender, and consequently no
need to "know" or recognise these peculiarities - hence the absence of
formalised procedures of social inquiry or penological assessment.
The law's categories were uniformly applied without seeking any special
knowledge of the offender. On the other hand, the certainty and fixity
of punishment was intended to convey a definite knowledge to the
public, especially those sectors of the population who could be tempted
into crime. As Bentham and Beccaria had made clear, the measured
severity of sanctions, together with their uniform certainty of
application, gave the public reason to know and fear them, and in turn
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promoted a general effect of deterrence. Victorian penality was thus
blind to the particular offender, but well known by its public.
For modern penality, on the other hand, sanctions require a
knowledge of the offender, of his or her background, family and
character, in order to achieve maximum effect. They demand a series
of inquiries, investigations and procedures of assessment before the
disposition can be properly made. In this sense, penality changes from
being a blind, repressive discipline to being a more perspicacious,
knowledgeable form of regulation. Where it previously produced a
knowledge bj£ the criminal population, it now more and more demands a
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knowledge _of_ it as well.
This move from blind repression to a more informed 'normalisation'
can even be seen in the precepts of the modern prison. The phrase
•prison reform' now takes on a new meaning which denotes the purpose
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of the institution and not, as formerly, its limitations. Classification
procedures take on a more positive purpose relating to training
allocation rather than administrative segregation; prison labour is
asked to change its effect from that of a punitive imposition to that
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of a basic element of an educational and training regime, and
disciplinary practices are henceforth to place their emphasis upon the
positive incentives of "hope" with its possibilities of moral
regeneration, instead of the negative conformity produced by fear. In
all this,the responsibility for producing reformation begins to shift
away from the individual offender and his free-will to the prison
regime, its knowledge, and its curative techniques.
Finally, as we have already indicated, the official representations
of penality and its meaning undergo an important transformation during
this transition. UJe do not mean by this that the whole corpus of
Victorian representations was suddenly discarded and replaced by a
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completely new configuration. Representational figures of this kind -
"ideologies" - are deeply embedded in the practices and discourses of
institutions and public knowledge; they are not singular images which
can be totally repainted or rewritten at will. Rather the transformation
of these complex ideological configurations comes about through the
discursive revision of signifiers, the gradual production of new
connotations and the re-structuring of the existing representational
practices.
We will describe this restructuring process in some detail in
later Chapters, but for the present a brief outline of the new ideology
is all that we require. If, for the moment, we reduce these complex
formulations to a few basic terms, it is possible to express the
fundamental image of official penal discourse in the form of a three
term statement involving the State, the offender and the relationship
of censure which holds between them.
It is the contention of this thesis that each of these three terms
was transformed in the movement from Victorian to Modern penality,
bie have seen how the "offender" is reconstructed in the categories of
the new penality, not as a free and rational legal subject but as an
"individual" with particular characteristics, an uncertain degree of
rationality, and a character of a specific type, be it normal,
criminal, defective or whatever. Similarly, the relationship
between State and offender is no longer presented as the exercise of
a contractual obligation to punish but as a positive attempt to
produce reform and normalisation for the benefit of the individual as
well as the State. Finally, the implicit characterisation of the State
and its power - a characterisation which inheres in all penal
discourse - undergoes a transformation. The new State relates to the
individual not as an equal but as a benefactor, an assistantial expert,
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intervening to relieve the conditions which detract from formal
equality, "rescuing" its subjects from vice and crime. Its power is
legitimated not in contractual terms but in terms of a natural
ascendancy marked by its resources and knowledge, its ability to care.
If Victorian penality suggested the image of the ideal Liberal State,
then one can trace in this new ideology the first semblances of what
was later to be termed the "Welfare State".
(5) Summary and Implications
What we have described then, is a transformation. On the far side
of this is the Victorian penal system and on this side is the modern
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system of penal practice and representation which continues todays
two distinct forms of penality separated by their distinctive agencies,
objective, ideologies and modes of operation. The importance of this
"marvellous transformation" (London Times. 28 Dune 1911) is
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unquestionable. It lays the foundations for the system of penality
which has dominated Britain, and indeed, the whole of the industrialised
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Western World, throughout the twentieth century. However, as was
suggested above, this moment of transformation has not been recognised
in theoretical analysis. In particular the work of Michel Foucault
has argued, with great influence, that the present form of penality was
constructed a whole century earlier with the development of the modern
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prison and its "disciplinary" forms. He insists that the functions
of disciplinary reform and normalisation were not "added on" at a
later date but were from the outset an essential aspect of the Prison.
In his analysis, the prison is from the start a technique of
transformation and not a "punishment"; directed at the criminal's
nature and not his act.
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In this Chapter we have begun to demonstrate that, at least for
the case of Britain, Foucault's thesis is incorrect, li/hile the prison
as an apparatus of penality has always offered a potential space for
"reform" and transformative practices, the constraints of legal
practice and political ideology denied any serious development of
this potential throughout the nineteenth century. The legalistic
insistence upon "uniformity", "equality of treatment" and proportionality
ensured a mass regime which could allow a marginal place to generalised,
reformative practices, but which refused any serious concession to
individualisation. The development of specific practices of normalisation,
of classification, categorisation and discrimination between criminal
types simply did not occur in Britain until after 1895. Moreover this
development was neither natural nor inevitable, nor was it the simple
unfolding of penality's true essence. It required a definite struggle
between contesting forces - a struggle which demands specific analysis
and explanation.
There are, however, a number of writers who have acknowledged
this transformation, and to a greater or lesser extent, endeavoured to
explain its occurrence. Thus Nigel Walker suggests that the development
can be understood in terms of the increasing "flexibility" and
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"sophistication" which modern systems gradually attain, while Morris
and Mclsaac account for the change by reference to the impact of
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positivist criminology upon legal practices and policy. Gordon Rose,
in a more detailed account,offers an explanation rooted in the "social
conditions and attitudes" of the time:
"These trends were firmly based upon a gradual change in
attitudes towards the misery of the poorer sections of
the population. It is not easy to put this into words
but one cannot but be conscious of the growth of thought,
which had not existed before, for human life and human
beings. Respectable people were moved, for the first time,
by the sufferings of the children, the poor, the disabled
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lunatics, defectives and criminals (and also of animals)
ti
• • • •
Penal reform was thus "interpreting ... a trend towards greater
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humanity in dealing with social misfits". We can sympathise with
Rose's difficulty in articulating the ineffable progress of the
liberal spirit of the age without accepting his mystical theory of
historical change, and equally we can accept that "positivist
criminology" and "increasing sophistication" played a part in the
transformation without mistaking these points for an adequate
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explanation.
The subsequent Chapters of this thesis will begin to explore the
tBrms of this transformation and to provide an explanation of its
conditions of possibility and emergence. Something like a "genealogy"
of the present system will thus be attempted, focusing upon the moment
of transition in order to illuminate aspects of penality which are




Victorian Strategies of Social Regulation
(1) Introduction
Throughout the nineteenth century the developing logic of British
penality centred around impriaonment and the principles of prison
discipline. And while the protracted struggle between local and central
government had a deeper constitutional and political significance, it
1
was in part at least, a struggle to disseminate and extend this logic.
By 1877 that struggle had been won and a new set of disciplinary
principles based upon the prison had been inscribed into the national
system of penal administration.
The penal strategy established then, and the network of uniform and
centrally-controlled prison institutions which formed its centrepiece,
continued in a stable and settled form for the next twenty years.
However this stability was suddenly disrupted in the years after 1895,
and in a very short space of time the system which had been worked for
and slowly assembled throughout the century was altogether transformed.
One by one its institutions, practices and representations were
transformed in a process which quickly deconstructed that system's logic
and set another one in its place.
This Chapter attempts to explain that transformation, to
investigate its conditions and its dynamics and to render them
intelligible. It asks "how was this change possible?", and "why did
it happen when and as it did?". It seeks answers to these questions
by first of all examining the social location of Victorian penality,
its external relations and strategic supports, identifying the
institutions, ideologies and social forces which formed its external
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conditions of existence. It uill be argued that in the 1880s and 1890s,
these various conditions of existence uere themselves disturbed and
transformed in the context of a crisis of social regulation. This
broader social transformation, its causes and its implications for
2
penality, will form the framework of our general explanation.
As we said in the Preface, there is no absolute demarcation to be
drawn between penality and its 'outside*. These external forces and
institutions were supported and, in part, reproduced by penality's own
practices and vice versa; each one forming an element in an interdependent
social network, not a dependent variable in a causal chain. Consequently
we must also examine the 'internal' dynamics of penality during this
transition period. UJe must look at the specific features, problems and
contradictions of penal institutions as well as the penal implications
of more general developments. As we shall see, by the 1890s the
British penal system was itself experiencing a number of serious
difficulties which were exacerbated by the more general social crises
to which they, in their turn, contributed. Again these specific
problems, their causes and their implications for change, will be
identified and discussed in the course of our argument.
It was suggested in Chapter One that the practices and
representations of Victorian penality were closely linked with more
general social patterns and forms of organisation and that the penal
system replicated and supported broader ideologies and institutional
strategies. But what was the precise nature of this relationship?
How were the social and penal spheres conjoined? How did the particulars
of penal regulation relate to the general field of social management
and control?
Perhaps the best way to approach this question is to examine the
social functions of the penal complex and the type of problems and
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populations its institutions administered. By doing so we can see
penality18 practices and objectives in more abstract social terms and
ascertain whether it shares these general concerns with other social
institutions.
(2) The Social Functions of Victorian Penality
Official representations of Victorian penality state that the
fundamental problem it faces is the problem of crime and its control.
Likewise the population it administers and regulates is simply the
population of criminals and offenders, whoever they may happen to be.
But this is at once too simple and too limited. To begin with,
Victorian penality, like that of the present day, did not concern
itself with every crime or with all crimes equally. The illegal
activities of the business world and of middle-class society appear,
then as now, to have been less closely policed than crimes of the
3
working classes. Similarly many acts which had substantive 'criminal*
characteristics - deliberate law-breaking, serious social harm,
violence, personal injury, etc. - were administered not by the criminal
law but instead by the civil procedures of the factory inspectorate or
4
the inland revenue. So already political and ideological considerations
overlay the simple duties of penal regulation, refining and redefining
its functions and practices.
But more importantly, when we talk of the population of criminals
dealt with by penality, we should not mistake this for a diverse
amalgam of individuals randomly distributed throughout the general
population. Penality deals, and has always dealt, with a population
overwhelmingly drawn from the working classes. By the late nineteenth
century, however, its major 'problem population' was no longer even the
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working classes in general.^ Instead the penal institutions of the
late Victorian era largely concerned themselves with the lowest sections
of the working classes - the poor, the lumpenproletariat, the 'criminal
classes'. Surveys of the prison population at the time of Ou Cane
suggest that the vast majority of offenders wsre illiterate, unskilled
and often unemployed workers or their dependents - a population drawn
from a very particular stratum of a very definite class.®
This fact in itself was partly due to the effects of the Victorian
penal system. Indeed it was hailed as something of a triumph by the
7
likes of Edmund Ou Cane and Gabriel Tarde. The prison, together with
its allied disciplinary institutions (the police, the workhouse, the
school, the labour market ...) had successfully concentrated criminality
into the lowest sectors of the population and produced a definite
social division between these groups and their more 'respectable' peers.
By the 1880s, the individuals who wound up in prison tended to be drawn
from the same families and neighbourhoods, and to return again and
again, while large sectors of the working population displayed the
behaviour of well-disciplined moral subjects, rarely if ever transgressing
Q
the laws of property and propriety. Equally significant, the early
confusion of politics and crime which brought large numbers of workers
into the prison for 'protest offences' such as arson, conspiracy or
g
sedition, tended to fade as the century wore on. The prison thus
became an institution for the truly criminal, marked off from their
class by the prison brand, while the political protests of the working
class were channelled through forms less dangerous than criminal
behaviour and breach of the law.
Of course this social division between the classes which fed the
prison and those which did not was not solely a moral one. It also
depended upon an economic division which had come into play by this
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time. The ekilled workers of the so-called "labour aristocracy" had
managed, by means of their special scarcity and organisational strength
to establish for themselves a social position of relative favour and
This economic difference was used as the basis for a series of moral,
cultural and political differences which overlaid and extended its
impact, creating significant social divisions such as the one we have
described.
It would be overstating a complex process or practical negotiation
and compromise to claim that this favoured section was 'co-opted' into
11
"becoming bourgeois" as Engels and many subsequent writers have done.
But it is certainly the case that the institutions of this sector - the
mechanics institutes, friendly societies, co-operatives, temperance
societies and methodist chapels - often embodied the central bourgeois
values of respectability, self-help and thrift, albeit in a form
12
adapted to those workers' distinctive conditions. Moreover for a
lengthy period after 1850, its political stance towards employers and
the authorities was one of co-operation and compromise - "Defence not
13
defiance" as one slogan had it. These features produced a definite
gulf between 'respectable' and 'rough' elements of the working classes,
a separation clearly understood by the individuals involved, end often
14
expressed in explicit terms.
This division, and the respectable lifestyles, responsible opinions
and respectful attitudes which it upheld, were major achievements of
the forces of discipline and moralisation. And the practices of
penality, the Poor Law, the charities and so on, ensured that these
divisions were maintained by the threat of punishment or pauperisation
for those who traversed the moral divide. But this separation, once
established, was by no means secure. Its line of division was always
security which cut them off from the mass of unskilled workers.
10
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precarious, dependent more upon short term economic fortune than deep-
rooted cultural commitment. Thiers was thus a continuing problem of
containment and quarantine. Once concentrated in this small class,
criminality and its related vices had to be kept there, within its
fixed and manageable bounds. Having narrowed the field of disorder,
penality and its allied institutions strove to prevent its redispersal.
This problem was particularly acute in regard to the large middle
sectors of the working classes who were generally in employment and
respectability but were less well-placed and secure than the labour
aristocracy. Composed mainly of semi-skilled workers, low-grade clerical
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staff and tradesmen in seasonal or casual trades, these sectors formed
a kind of "perishing class" subject to the effects of trade cycles,
seasonal unemployment and economic depression and continually in danger
16
of 'demoralisation* and social 'failure*. In relation to these
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groups, the residuum were seen to form a permanent danger, a constant
source of contamination always ready to "foul the record of the
1B
unemployed" and to "degrade whatever they touch". As Helen Oendy
warned the Economic Club in 1843:
"At every turn of their daily lives [these] two classes
meet and influence each other, they are connected by
every tie of service and disservice"
and distinguished only by the tenuous moods of 'character' and
19
"disposition". Such promiscuous intermingling, and the social
dangers it entailed, made the work of separation and containment all
the more important and all the more difficult.
The institutions of penality supported this crucial division by
dealing with its underside. They administered the residuum, helped
establish and police its boundaries, and formed important channels of
recruitment, since the status of ex-convicts virtually condemned them
and their dependents to membership of this class.
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There uere, of course, other dangers presented by this residuum
besides the problem of criminality and contamination. In the eyes of
the ruling classes this population was without morality or manners,
disdaining the disciplines of respectable family life, religious duty
20
or steady employment. In a sense it existed outside of society's
regulatory institutions, free from moral constraint or obligation and
therefore "beyond control", existing in a state of "total
21
irresponsibility". Such a paradoxical 'freedom* had definite
political dangers:
"In political commotions, the uneducated pauper has
neither principle nor motive to induce him to respect or
defend the state of society, the benefit whereof he has
not been taught to appreciate. He is prepared for any
alteration in the state of things, fearless of change,
and indifferent as to consequences." 22
Consequently, it provides "the ready materials for disorder when
occasion serves", and perhaps more menacingly, the stark human
evidence used by "socialist agitators" and "sensational writers" to
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organise political opposition to the status quo.
Excluded by laws and property, marginalised by the labour market
and political forces, this class stood outwith respectable Victorian
society, devoid of social attachment and the constraint it entails.
It stood on the very margins of the system of production, in turn
exploited or excluded, but this marginality carried with it the menace
of the unpredictable and the unattached. The destitution of this class
was also its danger.
This then was the population administered by penality and the nature
of the problem it presented. "Crime and punishment" or "law and order"
were the signs beneath which this administration was conducted, its
rubric of legitimation and official concern, but the real significance
and dimensions of the problem went well beyond criminality. Indeed
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the penal complex was by no means the sole administrator of this
problem-population. On the contrary, it was only one element in a
network of social institutions which addressed themselves to the
disciplinary, moral and political regulation of these lower classes.
This network supported a definite framework of social action aimed et
the poor, a framework composed of shared principles, methods snd
objectives which, taken together, formed a definite strategy of social
regulation.
(3) The network of Social Regulation: Victorian Ideoloqy and the
lower classes
A8 well as penality and the prison, the Victorian network of
regulation also involved the national poor law and the parish or union
workhouses, the elementary schools and a number of private agencies of
moralisetion such as charities, temperance societies, settlement
missions and so on. Of course each of these institutions had a
distinctive function, each claiming a separate jurisdiction and sphere
of competence, each administering a particular aspect of the
individual's life, with particular ends in view. But, as we shall
argue, these distinctive functions and modes of operation were arranged
in a network which displayed a number of common characteristics and an
important element of co-ordination. There was, for example, a common
problem-population and field of incidence which was the general concern
of each of these agencies. Each shared a set of fundamental social
values, objectives and political principles with the others. Moreover
their joint actions together formed a loosely co-ordinated pattern,
each one depending upon and supporting the operations of the others,
each existing in the spaces left by their allied agencies and orienting
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their practices to complement or underpin the rest of the institutional
24
field. The overall effect of this amounted to a loosely organised
but nonetheless distinctive disciplinary strategy aimed towards the
poor.
The crucial linkage which held this strategy together was a
common ideology, or more specifically a common ideological regard which
fixed the problem-population of each institution in fundamentally
similar terms. Despite the varied, individual characteristics of these
institutions, and their separate concerns and criteria,they each
shared a common ideological conception of the class they administered
and the dangers it posed. This class was never defined in its own
terms, by its self-declared welfare needs, or its educational
aspirations or even its views on law and morality. Instead it existed
for these institutions in the terms by which it had been defined in
the ideologies of the ruling bloc. For this network of institutions
and its operational strategy, the position and significance of this
class was fixed by the dominant bourgeois ideology in the images of
danger, demoralisation and contamination described above. It was
this, ideologically-defined object which was the common focus of all
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of these institutions. They shared a definite ideological viewpoint
which specified the nature of the problem, and its implications for
social action were subseguently operationalised in the specific
practices of the various agencies involved.
In a moment we will describe these practices and their impact upon
the working classes generally, but before doing so it is necessary to
chart the terms of this dominant ideology and to give some indication
of its basis in the social organisation and structures of Victorian
society.
The dominant ideology of British society in the years between 1650
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and the 1880s was structured around three main supports - classical
economics, utilitarian philosophy and evangelical religion (in various
26
conformist and non-conformist forms). These elements were drawn
together and given cohesive force by the all-encompassing notion of
individualism which permeated every aspect of bourgeois life, from
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economics and philosophy to law and philanthropy. In terms of
everyday social philosophy, the values of work, thrift, respectability
and above all, self-help formed the basis of Victorian common sense,
while the theories and precepts of a vulgarised political economy were
commonly taken for universal logic and Reason itself. But while there
is an obvious spuriousness about an ideology which represents
particular bourgeois values as universal or natural, the fact that
these values had been inscribed into reality in the organisation of
the economy, the policies of the State and the practices of its
institutions, gave this ideology a practicality and hegemonic
potential, at least for those classes whom its values favoured. It
was an ideology with its own regime and hence its own practical
"truth".^
Thus if we look at the economic position of Britain in the 1850s
and 18608 it becomes easier to appreciate the ideological emphasis
upon "freedom" and its corrolaries of free enterprise, free trade and
the freedom of the individual. By 1850 Britain had achieved a virtual
monopoly of world industrial production and her trade routes and
export markets were secured by a vast colonial empire and her post-1815
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naval dominance. The production relations which underpinned this
imperial supremacy consisted of an exceptionally "free" economy of
small-scale, owner-managed, competitive private firms (normally
partnerships or family concerns) in an environment free of mercantilist
trade restrictions and rich in exploitable resources, particularly
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coal, iron ore and labour power.
In this context, the liberal values appropriately represented the
interests and position of the dominant class, and did so in a coherent
and legitimatory manner - a manner which "made sense". The ideologies
and institutions of this class consequently endeavoured, with
considerable success, to universalise these values, imbricating them
in the daily practices and beliefs of all classes. The outcome was
an institutionalised ideology of individualism which characterised
each person as a free, rational, responsible subject, choosing and
acting in accordance with utilitarian calculation, in possession of his
self and his destiny.
Similarly, in the political aspect of this ideology, each
individual was again fixed in his freedom. Each person was characterised
as free and equal, unconstrained by arbitary power or hierarchical
rank, possessing all the freedom of speech and action of a free-born
citizen. And once again there was a degree of substance in these
representations, a necessary core of "truth" which was then extended
and universalised in the distortions of ideology. For each individual
(by which the Victorians meant each male, adult, British-born
individual) was indeed a citizen, in possession of a full range of
civil rights - to vote, to own, to contract, to sue, to avoid arbitrary
arrest and so on. However, these civil rights implied no necessary
capacities, no given political or social entitlements. A citizen who
lacked property would thus have all of the rights specified above, but
would lack any capacity to exercise them. Excepting of course the
capacity to contract and sell the only asset he owned - his personal
labour power. But then in that case a freedom or right was scarcely
distinguishable from a pressing necessity.
This concept of the individual free subject - which is of course
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the necessary basis of capitalist commodity relations and their
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representation - was prominent throughout all the philosophical,
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religious and cultural discourses of the mid-Victorian period.
Thus the doctrines of the Christian Churches specified that, though
God was indeed all powerful, He had created human beings with an
absolute freedom of choice in the hope that they would freely chooae
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their Plaster. Even the societies of care and Christian charity, with
all their experience of the forces and effects of destitution, chose to
assert that individual moral choice was indeed the basis of social
failure and also the necessary lever of subsequent rescue work. But
it was primarily the law which cemented this idea into the fabric of
society, both in its public representations of freedom and liberty and
in its practical regulation of men's social relations and wordly
affairs. Symbolically and practically the law fixed the category of
individual freedom and created the world in this bourgeois image. It
demanded and enforced freedom of contract, freedom of trade, freedom
of ownership, of movement and of choice. But at the same time, if
with less display, it named the rules of private property as the
condition and guarantee of each of these freedoms - a condition which
entailed the massive unfreedom of the whole propertyless class.
When we turn to the criminal law we find the same figure writ
large, this time appearing as the guilty subject, fully responsible
and held to account for a crime that was always freely chosen:
"... a crime is caused by the inscrutable moral free¬
will of the human being, doing or not doing the crime,
just as he pleases; absolutely free in advance, at any
moment in time, to choose or not to choose the criminal
act ... the sole and ultimate cause of crime." 33
Here, above all, resided the "free subject" of Victorian ideology, its
liberty and freedom dogmatically upheld against all the evidence of
common experience. A freedom rivalled only by the fundamental liberty
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of paupers to choose their poverty. In the discourses of penality
and pauperism in Victorian Britain, the free subject reigned supreme.
Of course this entailed an obvious and less than gentle irony since
the criminal and pauper populations were manifestly the least free
and the least equal in the social universe. So how was this paradox
maintained?
Not because of error or lack of evidence,to be sure. Contrary to
Radzinowicz*s suggestion that this notion derived from "an underlying
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belief in human equality", there was rarely a firmly-held belief in
the truth of these universal freedoms. Instead there was a certain
belief in their status as necessary fictions. They were prudential
axioms of bourgeois social organisation, necessary for disciplinary
and ideological rigour, rather than credible truths about human nature
and social conditions. Judges and their spectators knew of the
"extenuating circumstances" and limited freedom of offenders as the
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decisions of juries frequently showed and poor law authorities were
well aware of the conditions which enforced unemployment and
destitution (as they were forced to admit in the 1890s when their
election was opened up to the working classes). But it was a
fundamental principle of bourgeois ideology that the essential freedom
of each individual should be "recognised", even when least apparent.
After all, if the unfreedom of the poor should be recognised how could
they be punished for their crimes or blamed for their poverty? And
how could this oppression, once admitted, be justified or maintained?
Put simply, this fiction of freedom was "convenient for princes and
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states and the laws they supported", and never more so than in the
age of laisser-faire.
In the terms of bourgeois thought, the corollary of this maximum
freedom of the individual is a minimal "interference" on the part of
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the State, and this "non-interventionist" conception of the State's
role formed a prominent element in V/ictorian ideology. Now of course
to suggest that the State in capitalist society should somehow refrain
from "intervening" is quite unthinkable. In a capitalist Society,
the agencies of the State are the central institutions through which
power is ordered, populations regulated and social relations reproduced.
Any capitalist State must at minimum be "involved" in the provision
and maintenance of a legal system which sanctions certain forms of
property and definite forms of contract, a relatively peaceful order
in which production and exchange can occur, a money supply, defence,
external relations and so on. Besides these basic functions, the
Victorian State was already deeply engaged in regulating the general
conditions in which the labour force was maintained and reproduced,as
the existence of Poor Law, Factory Acts, the Board of Health, Education
Acts, legislation on Vaccination and Pollution, etc. all clearly show.
And of course all of this government activity was financed by taxation,
customs and excise and involved a considerable staff of public employees.
Yet in spite of this, it remains true that in both the economic
and social spheres, Victorian Britain was remarkably limited in its
degree of State intervention. Such State action as did occur was
mainly regulatory - undertaken to facilitate market mechanisms and
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free enterprise, not to inhibit or supplement them. Moreover, it
was usually entered into reluctantly and on a minimal basis, justified
as a necessary and instrumental evil rather than a positive end in
itself. Whenever the principles of laissez-faire had of necessity to
be breached, the political discussions and Parliamentary debates
involved would centre upon this issue of ideological principle,
abhorring its violation and reaffirming its universal value, so that
even where this liberalism was violated, its fundamental validity was
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upheld in the very act of tranegresBion. In the terme of the State'e
official pronouncements and representations then, there uas an
important distinction draun between the spheres of public and private
life, a distinction uhich affirmed that, with a few special exceptions,
the economic, moral or religious welfare of individuals was strictly a
matter for private arrangement.
"Laissey-faire" individualism was thus the "philosophy in office"
during the period between the 1850s and the 1880s, and it was a
philosophy closely suited to the conditions of British economic and
political life at that time. Of course there were sections of the
population which did not appear to benefit from this environment of
untrammelled liberty - the poor, the unemployed, those in casual or
seasonal employment, and so on. But even where this was recognised,
the problem was restated in terms of individual failing, requiring not
State aid or market controls but rsther the inculcation of habits of
self-help, discipline and thrift. As one contemporary put it:
"All forms of State support are founded on erroneous
conceptions of the relation between the State and the
individual. It is the duty of every man to make provision
for himself and for those dependent on him; and of the
State to see that no obstacles hinder his doing so.
Where the State does more, or the individual less, there
is nothing but disaster in store for both."
It was in these terms, and according to the principles of this
ideology, that the Victorian network of disciplinary institutions
understood and dealt with its problem population. Its strategy
adamantly refused sny recognition of the conditions which produced
unemployment, poverty, criminality and destitution, preferring instead
to operationalise in concrete forms the doctrines of individualism,
self-help and freedom. In this way the abstract conceptions and
philosophical preferences of the ruling classes were pressed upon the
social world, and realised through the practices of institutions.
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Precisely at the moment of maximum unfreedom, at that instant when the
destitute individual was forced to turn to crime, to seek parish
relief or to beg for charity, he or she was greeted by a discourse of
liberty and moral choice and was administered according to its terms.
(4) Institutions and Ideologies
life have already seen in Chapter One how penality, and above all
the Prison, operated within the terms of this dominant ideology. Not
only did the criminal law proclaim and enforce the "freedom" of the
subject - in order to justify an end to that freedom - but the very
architecture, practices and techniques of the prison represented the
figure of individualism in their every aspect. The basic administrative
principle of less-eligibility presupposed that the prison, like
everything else, was a market option, chosen by free individuals if
its attractions outweighed those of other calculable choices. Great
care was thus necessary lest imprisonment became preferable to the
relations of production and exploitation in the 'free' world outside.
The irony of this "choice", and the significance it lent to the
"freedom" and "equality" of working class life, could not have been
more obvious, were it not for the dogma of political economy, and the
necessity of its fictions.
As for the ideology of the minimal State, this too resonated in
the practices and representations of penality. Of course the penal
system, by its very nature, was "interventionist", involving the Stete
in serious forms of prohibition, regulation and interference with
personal liberty. But these interventions were conducted and
presented in the minimalist terms of the social contract: only these
acts publicly specified and prohibited in law could trigger a penal
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intervention end that penalty must be limited to the "contractual
equivalent" proportional to the crime. Penality represented itself
as policing a specified code of minimal conformity and punishing
illegality on a limited and proportional basis. No "interference" was
allowed beyond this. Thus the morality, attitudes or norms of
behaviour of certain individuals might be reprehensible or even
dangerous, but until they resulted in breaches of law, penality was
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seen to be powerless. The ideology of liberalism, and its strict
division between public and private spheres, specified that such
questions of morality and welfare were private matters, unsuitable for
State concern. Accordingly the welfare and reform of the offender
remained a matter for his or her own conscience and for any private
agencies which chose to offer their aid.
Pluch care was taken to ensure that the agencies dealing with the
welfare of offenders - reformatories, police court missions, discharged
prisoners aid societies and so on - retained their private status and
reputation, even when they werB a _de facto element in the normal
routines of penal practice. Thus while private rescue work might be
facilitated, it was made quite clear that the moral welfare of the
offender was in no sense the duty, responsibility or proper concern of
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the Liberal State.
If we turn now to the Poor Law in this period and examine its
relation to this overall strategy and its ideological framework, we
find a number of direct continuities. Like the prison and penality, the
practices of Poor Law institutions operated in accordance with the
doctrines of less-eligibility and self-chosen impoverishment. In the
long period which followed the 1834 Report, the practices of virtually
all the Poor Law Unions in Britain completely excluded able-bodied males
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from out-relief. This line of exclusion operated by means of the
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u/orkhousB 'test* which stipulated that relief would be afforded to
this category of applicant only on the basis of entry into workhouse
detention. The conditions of less-eligibility which characterised the
house regime - close supervision, segregation of family members,
minimum diet, disciplined labour, etc. - ensured that the test effected
an automatic division between the 'truly destitute* and the 'vicious
mendicant' (or else those who still retained sufficient dignity and
self-respect to refuse its degradations). Moreover, this practice,
like the routines of Victorian penality, operated without the
requirement of knowledge or investigation:
"[it] favoured a particular kind of blind, repressive
discipline without knowledge. Investigation of pauper
cases was rejected on the grounds that it only set
up clumsy and partial barriers against fraud and
misrepresentation. The correct procedure was not to
investigate but simply to offer all applicants relief
in a disciplinary workhouse. Such an offer was 'a
self-acting test of the claim of the individual. ...
If the claimant does not comply with the terms on
which relief is given to the destitute, he gets
nothing; and if he does comply, the compliance proves
the truth of his claim - namely his destitution'." ^2
This Poor Law practice was to continue in operation for almost 60 years,
but in 1670 the line of exclusion was extended, in accordance with
the Longley Report, to prohibit all categories of outdoor relief
(including women, children, old people, the sick, etc.). This
"crusade against out-relief", which was accompanied by the general
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publication of benefit rules and assessment criteria - a didactic
device to create a knowledge by the poor - was less successful than
the strategy of 1834. It failed in its aim to'educate the poor*
or to transform their habits, and in practice the pedagogic aspect of
the strategy was soon omitted. But as Williams points out, this
failure did not make the 1870 developments a "non-event" or a
'debacle1:
64
"The perpetual failure to achieve educational ends allowed
a displacement of goals whereby crudely repressive ends
were promoted and became predominant. Because the Longley
strategy never worked, the outdoor strategy of the crusade
was in practice redefined as dispauperisation by any and
every means. ... In five years from 1871 to 1876 the total
number of outdoor paupers fell by 276,000 - or some 33^." 44
The ideological basis of this practice of repression and exclusion,
as with that of penality, involved a denial of the effectivity of
structural or economic conditions and a complementary assertion of
individual freedom. However we must stress again that this was a
calculated political position - a strategic posture - rather than any
false belief or lack of awareness. The various systems of public
relief operating before 1834 had acknowledged the play of seasonal
forces, economic cycles and trade depressions and had considered these
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in their calculation and distribution of relief. The 1834 Report
and the strategy which it inaugurated also recognised these forces but
chose instead to exclude them from consideration. In doing so, it
explicitly acknowledged the repressive effects of this policy on a
section of the population, but argued that the groups affected were a
"small disreputable minority, whose resentment was not to be feared,
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and whose favour was of no value". As Qordan remarks:
"... in order to ensure industrious habits among labourers
and the free-play of economic self-interest, an unknown
proportion of the population was to be treated with
intentional severity, regardless of their individual
merits." 47
How did this calculated repression square with the liberal ideology
of citizenship, freedom and equality? Quite simply, by posing as a
chosen alternative. Poor relief was not an aspect of the normal rights
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of citizenship as it was to become in the twentieth century. It was
instead a denial of citizenship, an alternative to it which involved
the individual in a disavowal of the rights of freedom and franchise in
exchange for the minimum necessities of life. To claim state aid was
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to relinquish private freedom, to quit the political community and
choose the status of outcast or pariah. Nor was there, before the
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1690s, any positive attempt to reform those who entered the
workhouse. Individuals were free to come and go as they chose, the
workhouse strove to restructure that choice, not the individual who
made it.
Penality and the poor law, the prison and the workhouse then,
framed the negative, repressive axis of the disciplinary network which
operated in l*iid-\/ictorian Britain. The other axis of this strategy,
its positive, restorative aspect, was left to the elementary schools
on the one hand, and to private agencies of moralisation on the other.
Together these institutions attempted to dismantle the culture of
immorality, intemperance and promiscuity which they recognised in the
lower classes and to install in its place the values of self-help,
sobriety, respectability and hard work. For most of the nineteenth
century the State took responsibility only for the education of vagrant,
criminal and pauper children, the rest of the population being either
untutored or else schooled privately. However the dangers of an
"unprincipled" and hence irresponsible populus, prompted an expanding
provision of elementary education, privately run at first, but later
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subject to various forms of State inspection, regulation and subsidy.
These schools operated as:
"... a means of securing public morality and preventing
crime; a means of forming a population with useful
habits though the instrument of good principles in order
to secure a moral foundation for governmental and religious
authority." 51
As Sones and liiilliamson point out, by the middle of the century these
elementary schools had ceased to give priority to the inculcation of
religious and moral principle, instead engaging in the more secular
practice of training up individuals who would be fit in terms of
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physique, mental development and political attitude to take part in
the culture of working-class respectability. They did so by means
of a basic curriculum which endeavoured:
"To instruct in reading, writing and accounts; to preserve
from idleness: to induce habits of industry, subordination
and order." "
This curriculum and its lessons were inculcated by means of more than
just the skills and persuasion of teachers or the enthusiasm of young
scholars. A number of disciplinary techniques such as the monitor
system, the Madras system, and the careful spatial arrangement of classes
were employed, all of which ordered the movements and conduct of pupils
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in a rigorous and closely supervised fashion. And for those children
who proved too unruly for this normal system of schooling there was
always a resort to the Industrial and Reformatory School system which
provided the network with a more explicitly disciplinarian form of
education. Thus the field of elementary education functioned to
provide important skills of literacy and numeracy to children who would
not otherwise have had them, but at the same time to extend a form of
discipline and cultural policing to a population which was at risk.
It was organised:
"as a project to eliminate the topographies of the dangerous
classes on the one hand, and ... to improve and prevent
the decay of the perishing classes on the other."
If we examine the practices of the various philanthropic and
voluntary agencies of this period we find that here too, the work of
moralisation owed as much to the desire for political order as to the
tenets of Christian charity. There was of course a wide range of such
agencies, representing various denominations and specialising in
specific areas, types of client and aspects of lower class life. Each
one therefore organised its relief practices according to specific
criteria, usually accompanied by moral exhortation and sometimes by
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private forms of discipline such as rent control, church attendance,
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the temperance pledge - or even marriage. However for all their
differences, these agencies generally shared an allegiance to the
dominant ideology of individualism and the political strategy outlined
above. In the early 1870s the indiscriminate alms-giving of previous
years came to be largely replaced by a more careful, calculated form
of charitable relief which sought to avoid the problems of "demoralisation"
and mendicacy which unconditional relief was said to produce. This
movement (running parallel to the official Poor Law strategy of the
Longley Report) was led by the Charity Organisation Society which
campaigned for the introduction of a strict economic rationality into
the field of charitable giving.
In many ways the COS epitomised the bourgeois perception and
treatment of the poor in the age of laisser-faire. Composed mainly of
middle-class intellectuals and professionals, with a particularly
rigorous adherence to self-help individualism and a determined hostility
to any extension of State or municipal aid to the poor,^ the COS was
set up in 1869 with the explicit aim of centralising, rationalising and
professionalising the organisation of charity. Subsequently all
applicants for charity were to be subject to general, publicised rules,
dealt with through a central agency and individually investigated by
trained case-workers. Central to COS practice was a distinction
between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor which restricted aid to
those who merely required "to be put back on their feet again" after
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some temporary and exceptional hardship. As for the others - those
who's homes or characters failed to achieve the requisite level of
respectability, who were deemed feckless or spendthrift, or who had
relatives who were liable (though not necessarily able) to give
support - they were simply refused relief and reminded of the necessity
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for self-help, hard work and constant thrift. For the COS and its
allied agencies the primary object of the exercise was not Christian
charity and welfare aid but rather the enforcement of the principles
of economic liberalism and the constitution of the poor as disciplined,
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self-helping individuals. Any other form of charitable aid was
considered subversive insofar as it both interfered with the free play
of market forces and jeopardised the ideology of freedom and equality
upon which these forces stood.
The general effects of these agencies of moralisation is not
easily discerned with any accuracy, nor is their success in
transforming the values and culture of the population they addressed.
Most probably the results were uneven and diverse, varying according to
the situation, background and prospects of the individuals concerned.
Certainly there was no general success, no massive transformation of
the culture of the lower orders, no end to the stream of destitute
and impoverished individuals which filled the prisons and the poorhouse.
But perhaps that was to be expected. It is more likely that the success
of this crusade was to be measured not in absolute, but in relative
terms. Its effect was not to convert the whole working population but
to establish and reinforce a division within that mass which rendered
it more manageable and more easily contained. The basic conditions
for security or destitution - the labour market, housing provision,
wage levels, all the factors which produced an economic divide between
the casual poor and the labour aristocracy - were entirely ignored.
Instead all of the endeavours of these agencies were directed to the
moral and cultural elements which overlaid and reinforced this
economic division; trying to show that the problems of the poor were
moral problems, that social differences were differences of character
and morality, of righteousness and responsibility. Thus a major
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effect of these institutions was a symbolic one, contained in their
constant affirmation that the hierarchies and divisions of the social
world did indeed correspond uith men's morals, their merits and their
just deserts.
Whatever the reassuring impact of these practices upon those in
higher ranks of the working class, it seems fairly clear that these
head-on ideological assaults met uith little success among the casual
poor and the unemployed, the clientele of the workhouse and the prison.
According to Stedman Jones, the culture of these lower classes, "proved
virtually impervious to evangelical or utilitarian attempts to determine
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its character or direction". For while this philosophy of self-help
might make good sense to workers in a situation of stable, secure
employment, often with high wage levels and positions of authority over
subordinate workmen, it would make no sense at all to the mass of
unorganised workers and their families who periodically entered the
ranks of the unemployed and the destitute through the effects of trade
cycles and seasonal fluctuation. Nor could it impress those who lived
permanently in a state of struggle as they tried to carve out an
existence below the poverty line. To those classes - and Booth
estimated that in London they numbered as many as one-third of the
whole population - facing appalling housing conditions, bad sanitation,
seasonal and structural unemployment and frequent malnutrition, the
notion of the individual in control of his or her own destiny was
simply unsustainable, as were notions of "temperance", "respectability"
and all the other symbols of the alien culture. As Mayhew pointed out:
"Where the means of subsistence occasionally rise to 15s.
per week and occasionally sink to nothing, its absurd to
look for prudence, economy or moderation. Regularity of
habits are incompatible with irregularity of income ...
it is a moral impossibility that the class of labourers
who are only occasionally employed should be either
generally industrious or temperate." 60
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In other words the dominant ideology was incapable of winning over
the poor because for them it was simply impractical. On this terrain,
self-help individualism suffered the limitations of its class basis,
failing to find any economic rationality in which to anchor its
significance and sense. Moreover, the actual processes of
moralisation and supervision whereby these values and principles
were to be imparted, themselves reeked of class distance and superiority.
For all their good intentions, the philanthropists, missionaries and
settlement workers could not disguise their own social standing, and
this factor undermined their major technique of moral suasion - that
of personal influence. As Hobson pointed out:
"... few persons who are members of a richer and better
educated class can really influence their poorer
neighbours for good. ... The little differences of
manners and even dress form an aloofness which chills
the atmosphere of free familiarity in which alone the
deeper individual facts emerge. ... A single breath
of 'suspicion', the unconscious emission of a class
point of view, the betrayal of some little difference
in feeling, and all hope of influence is lost."
Because the axis of positive moralisation was this limited and
partial in its effects, the major thrust of the overall strategy
towards the poor was one of coercion. Together the agencies of
penality and the poor law, operated to enforce a line of repression
and exclusion against the lower sectors of the working class. These
sectors became "outcasts", a "dangerous class" excluded from the
political community and unrepresented in the dominant ideology - a
social danger posing a problem of management and domination. As far
as this group was concerned, the relation of State to individual was
one of force and not authority, a relation of coercion typified and
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symbolised by the workhouse and the prison.
This strategy of repression and exclusion had a number of
positive and negative effects. Most practically it displaced or
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dispersed any political threat by isolating and detaining individuals,
breaking up neighbourhoods and families, deterring resistance by
threat of force and making impoverishment shameful and degrading.
However it also produced an important ideological effect, reaffirming
the dominant values in the face of opposition. Potentially at least,
the very existence of a whole class of destitute or deviant individuals
presented a fundamental threat to the legitimacy of the social order
and its values of equality 8nd freedom. The prison and the workhouse
diverted this threat. Their categories routinely displaced the
problem to the level of individual morality, thereby denying the
structural effects of unfreedom and any implied demand for the State
to counteract them. At the same time this orthodoxy prevented any
rupture in the dominant ideologies of individualism, political economy
and social laisser-faire. These two institutions formed a kind of
market policing mechanism - a security net which was the inverse of the
"social security net" which developed in the twentieth century. Far
from recognising the social contradictions of the market and repairing
them by means of welfare provision, penality and the poor law
rigorously upheld the principles and integrity of 'free enterprise',
removing those human elements who proved unable or unwilling to accept
its terms.
On the other hand, and negatively from the point of view of power,
this strategy involved a number of serious costs. In terms of finance,
and despite rigorous adherence to "less-eligibility", these institutions
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represented an expensive pull upon local rates and national expenditure.
Moreover, as we shall see, these institutions increasingly appeared
to reproduce and expand their problem populations and the financial
and political costs which they entailed. Far from diminishing the
residuum, their practices seemed to fuel its expansion, producing
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increasingly high rates of recidivism, pauperisation and
demoralisation. Perhaps more crucially, the very nature of this system
precluded the "consent" or voluntary submission of the submerged
population uihich was its target. As we have seen, its ideological
terms were difficult or impossible for its recipients to live their
lives by and consequently failed to transform lower class culture or
morality. The result of this strategy was thus the social exclusion
and coercion of a large and growing sector of the population. The
hegemonic domination which characterised the bourgeoisie's relationship
to other classes (such as the landed gentry, the intelligentsia and
new professionals, the 'respectable' working class, etc.) - their
ideological mandate to rule - was thus seriously flawed. A whole class
of people was caught up in a relation of exclusion/repression which
gave them no stake in the social system and every reason to oppose it.
The result was the continued reproduction of a Victorian "dangerous
class" towards whom the only available response was further repression.
(5) Social Developments and the Disruption of V/ictorian Strategies
Ue have seen then, that the V/ictorian penal system was constructed
around the categories of a strict individualism (individual
responsibility, the free and equal subject, legalism, a classical
criminality of reason, etc.) and directed at a particular social class.
Ue have also seen that penality was not alone in this, but rather
formed one element within a generalised disciplinary strategy
involving a nurtiber of institutions, ideologies and diverse practices.
These external supports and related agencies shared a basic framework
with penality and to some extent functioned in co-operation with it.
Moreover, the tenets of this strategy - its political objectives and
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ideological values - were grounded in an individualistic and
hierarchical form of social organisation dominated by the bourgeoisie
and its allied forces. In the years between 1895 and 1914 all this was
to change, as we have seen from Chapter One. So how are we to explain
the transformation of this system and of the forces, ideologies and
institutions which formed its conditions of existence? What were the
developments and events which brought about this transition?
As we have indicated already, the effect of the Victorian State's
social and penal policies was to maintain an ideological rigour and a
social discipline, but at a cost of the political alienation of a
considerable sector of the population. Viewed abstractly, these
policies therefore presupposed (1) the importance and viability of
the ideology of laisser-faire individualism and the "free market"
which it upheld and (2) the disorganisation and powerlessness of this
repressed class. In the 1880s and 1890s a whole series of developments,
struggles and events occurred which fundamentally undermined each of
these presuppositions and the policies which they supported. Nor was
this transformation restricted to penal policy or the field of social
regulation. The developments of this period and their repercussions
amounted to a social reordering which extended far into the domains
of economics, industrial relations, political power and social
philosophy.
Our primary concern here is not with these diverse developments
so much as their political repercussions and their precise impact upon
the ruling bloc's disciplinary strategy and penal practice. Nonetheless
a brief summary of these changes is required if we are to come to terms
with the external conditions of penal change.
At the end of the nineteenth century the economic and political
structures of Victorian Britain underwent a period of transformation
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which marked the end of liberal, free-market capitalism and a
transition into a new epoch of monopoly capital. By the 1890s the
drive to combine capital on an increasingly social scale in order to
economise on the means of production and to outstrip the productivity
of competitors had led to a concentration of industrial capital
which considerably altered the economic field. Individual industrial
firms began to combine to form monopoly groups and cartels in an attempt
to promote a degree of planned production and market control and the
family firm or partnership, hitherto the dominant unit of production,
gave way to a rapidly increasing number of corporate or joint-stock
firms. These movements of industrial consolidation and of corporate
organisation were paralleled and stimulated by the increasing
centralisation of finance which was also taking place during the 1670s
and 1880s. The free-market economy of individual production which
grounded the whole ideology of laisser-faire individualism was thus
transformed as a result of its own essential dynamic - the will to
profit.
At the same time other critical factors impinged upon Britain's
economic position. In terms of external trade, her dominance was
challenged by the incursions of Germany, the United States of America
and Dapan into the world market, while at home the rate of industrial
profit began a marked decline as a joint result of underinvestment
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and a revived working class militancy. The period of the Great
Depression (1873 - 1896), following upon an era of prolonged prosperity,
further undermined the assumptions of laisser-faire capitalism and the
inevitability of "progress" within its terms. The effects of this
depression were felt not so much in real economic terms as in the
crisis of confidence which it induced and the challenge to liberal
orthodoxy to which it gave rise. In particular the depression caused a
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significant shift in the relationship of the various sectors of the
working class to the ruling bloc,destabilising the fragile relations
of compromise and co-option which had been evident in the 1860s and
1670s. The influence of socialist ideas and organisations also
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proliferated in this period, provoking alarm within the established
political parties which were already anxiously mindful of the changing
balance of political forces uhich followed the extension of the
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working class vote. In particular they feared that these emergent
socialist groupings might in future win the support, not just of the
poor and unemployed but also of the vital leading sectors of the
working class whose favoured position was now in jeopardy as a
consequence of rapid mechanisation, extensive unemployment and the
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decline of traditional skilled working practices.
At the same time, the depression and the falling rate of profit,
bringing the greatest pressure to bear upon the lowest groups of
unorganised, unskilled workers provoked a startling growth of
unionisation amongst these sectors. The new, militant "Unionism for
All" brought about a wave of labourers' strike action in the last
years of the 1880s and for the first time in this country the lowest
sectors of the working class acquired the potential of acting as a
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united, organised social force. Between 1886 and 1892 trade union
membership actually doubled from 10% to 20% of the workforce and the
formation of the Independent Labour Party in 1893 marked the first step
towards an autonomous political party representing the newly
enfranchised workers at national level. The Local Government Act of
1894 further extended the local franchise and opened the way for
greater participation by the working class in the administration of
municipal facilities such as housing, transport and poor relief. The
effect of these changes was to bring into question the stratification
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and divisions amongst ths working classes which had been so crucial
to the strategies of Victorian rule. Particularly in London there
was evidence to suggest that the insanitary housing, overcrowding
and high rents which had previously afflicted only the casual poor was
now beginning to encompass the better-off artisans and skilled workers
as well,as a result of extensive unemployment and a chronic housing
shortage. The enforced proximity between the respectable working class
and the disreputable poor had put in danger the fragile cultural
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divide which had taken so long to establish and confirm.
This social crisis was highlighted and exacerbated by a series
of revelations which emerged from the new public and political focus
upon the "social question". Empirical social surveys and journalists'
reports told of a massive population in the heart of the large cities
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living in conditions of the utmost deprivation, and well-known
figures wich as the Barnetts and Charles Booth confessed the impotence
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of charity in the face of such problems. Moreover there was a
developing conviction that these conditions were producing degeneracy
and physical deterioration amongst the working population, and causing
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a sharp decline in the efficiency and vigour of the nation.
By the 1890s it was becoming apparent to all but the most
reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie that any adequate solution to
the social problem would involve large-scale State intervention in
the shape of welfare provision, housing improvements, medical care
and unemployment relief. Moreover these could not be undertaken without
being accompanied by a dramatic re-interpretation of the distinction
between the deserving and the undeserving poor. In other words the
political repercussions of these developments involved a fundamental
breach of laisser-faire individualism and the Victorian strategy of
social regulation. The consequence was that the social question became
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the nodal point of a major ideological crisis. In point of fact such
a crisis was in the making throughout the previous decade, as changes
in production relations and the economic field began to undermine the
foundations of free-market liberalism and its associated ideologies.
Hou/ever the social question served to displace this crisis from the
theoretical sphere where it was previously expressed (in the work of
Marshall, Hobson and T. H. Green, for example) to the political arena
itself.
In the years that led up to the twentieth century an increasingly
successful assault was mounted against the Cobdenite orthodoxy of
economic liberalism. Given the social importance of this ideology,
this critique struck at the very foundations of Victorian society and
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its political relations. For the first time the 'natural laws' of
the market came to be viewed as inadequate to the task of maintaining
social stability and social justice. Theorists such as Alfred Marshall,
T. H. Green and David Ritchie reoriented orthodox political economy to
talk in critical terms about "unrestrained capitalism" and the positive
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potential of State action. New perceptions of the social problem end
its underlying causes were formulated and contributed to the call for
an extension of State intervention in the social sphere and in the labour
market. These included theories of urban degeneration and eugenics, which
as we shall see, were of immense significance in the formation of social
policy in the 1900s. Following upon the massive depopulation of the
countryside - the movement from the land to the debiliteting
conditions of urban life - the notion that the Imperial Race was
threatened with decline and degeneration rapidly worked its way into
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political discourse. Official complaints about the poor quality of
military recruits during the disastrous Boer War and concern at the
greater efficiency of the German workforce served to amplify these
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fears, as did the growing likelihood of an Imperial war in Europe.
In these circumstances, the call for serious government intervention in
the social sphere came not just from Fabians and the various socialist
groupings but also from a broad range of 'Social Imperialists' whose
allegiances cut right across the normal party boundaries. To this
was added the increasingly vocal demands of the new social stratum of
professionals, technicians, scientists and intellectuals, calling for
"the professionalisation of government, the accumulation of expertise,
the solution of problems by the application of reason and the creation
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of an administrative State".
This rapidly changing ideological climate had major effects upon
the manifestoes and programmes of the established political parties.
The Liberal Party - the party of Free Trade and Non-conformism - had
previously commanded the vote of the industrialists and businessmen
and, after 1867, those of the enfranchised working class as well, but
by the 1890s both of these sectors had begun to disaffiliate. Some
industrialists followed Chamberlain and his Tariff Reform League in
demanding protection for British industry from the threat of foreign
competition, while increasingly large sectors of that class began to
acknowledge that the new realities of economic life demanded expression
in political terms contrary to those of traditional liberalism.
Meanwhile the Liberals working-class vote was depleted by the new
independent Labour groupings (the SOF, the ILP, the Fabians, etc.)
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which openly demanded the reorganisation and expansion of the State.
In response to this challenge a group was formed around the theorists
Marshall, Hobson and Hobhouse, calling itself the New Liberals and
adopting the role of a progressive pressure group within the larger
party. Its founding statement of 1896 expressed its purpose as being
to:
79
"Unify the multiplicity of progressive movements, to
come to grips with that 'huge unformed monster' the social
question, and to implement a specific policy of
reconstruction based on a new conception of economic
freedom, the conscious organisation of society and an
enlarged conception of the functions of the State."
In fact this left-wing liberalism indicated more than simple concessions
to the labour movement under threat of losing the working man's vote.
By injecting an element of social reform and non-laisser-faire
ideology into the Liberal Party, it marked an accommodation to the new
facts of British life and the first steps towards a modern political
strategy. Soon the majority of politicians and all of the major
parties were agreed upon the advisability of some measure of State
welfare legislation, particularly in view of the success which
Bismarckian policies had met in unifying the German nation and
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undermining the growing tide of socialism. Social Imperialists
began to influence even conservative politicians with their arguments
that the State's role in protecting British capital abroad must be
matched by a policy of social welfare at home in order to guarantee
internal stability, to combat socialism and to improve the efficiency
of the workforce. Thus Balfour in 1B95 could boldly declare that:
"Social legislation, as I conceive it, is not merely to
be distinguished from Socialist legislation but it is
its most direct opposite and its most effective antidote.
Socialism will never get possession of the great body of
public opinion among the working class of those who wield
the collective forces of the community show themselves to
be desirous to ameliorate every legitimate grievance and to
put society upon a proper and more solid basis."
(6) The Political Repercussions
These diverse developments of the 1880s and 1890s with their
various sources and particular effects, had thus the consequence of
raising for revision a number of fundamental political questions,
80
particularly questions concerning the character and proper role of the
State and the manner in which the social problem of the poor was to be
administered. From now on political prudence mould demand that the
lower classes be somehow addressed and treated as full political
subjects whose power was recognised and whose conditions would not be
allowed to fall below a certain standard, moreover any such strategy
would be administered primarily through the State and by means of the
regulation of markets and the provision of welfare.
The subsequent responses to those questions - the transformations
which occurred in British society as a result of these developments
and crises - amounted to a fundamental social transformation. As we
shall se8, this changed not only penality and the social regulation
of the poor, but also the operation of markets, the organisation of
class relations and the role of the State and its agencies. It
produced new modes of addressing the poor and the unemployed, new
discourses of administration, and new ways of organising the social
field, using technologies of insurance, of labour regulation, of social
work and the welfare sanction. Together these changes transformed
Britain from a market society of laisser-faire individualism to a form
of sociality constructed around mass democracy, monopoly capital and
an interventionist State. In doing so they provided the conditions
for a form of social organisation which persists to the present day.
Subsequent Chapters will return to the effects of this transition,
describing some of the social technologies and strategies which it set
in place. However for the moment our concern is with the overall
effect of this transition on the fields of penality and social
regulation. For this purpose we can summarise the effect of these
diverse developments as amounting to a breakdown of the free-market
form of social organisation and its corresponding disciplinary apparatus.
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What this came to imply, in political terms, was a fundamental
displacement of certain social regulatory functions from the realm
of civil society to the realm of the State.
On the one hand, the "automatic" and unorganised market
distribution of resources (of employment, wages, housing, health care,
etc.) was no longer politically or economically tenable, nor could the
system be repaired by private or acd hoc initiatives such as charity,
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philanthropy or emergency doles. Henceforth distribution would be
supervised and part-regulated by an "interventionist" State and a new
apparatus of intervention and provision of some kind.
83
On the other hand this displacement implied a disciplinary problem -
a breakdown of the control strategy which had previously operated. This
modification of the "free-market" and its mechanisms not only undermined
the social control inherent in unemployment, poverty, debt and so on:
it also destroyed the rationale of the market's back-up institutions -
penality and the poor law - each of which had been based upon the very
principles which were now in question. Our argument will be that
many of the Official Reports, administrative discourses and criminological
developments of the late nineteenth and sarly twentieth centuries
should in fact be read as responses to this "disciplinary problem", or
at least as having been influenced by it. Ue will see in subsequent
chapters how a number of reform programmes addressed themselves to the
problems of this period, proposing a variety of projects for reconstituting
the social and penal domains, and we will trace in detail the process
whereby a new set of institutional strategies was gradually established,
utilising elements from these programmes and from elsewhere. However
the remainder of this Chapter will concern itself with the disciplinary
problems which were at this time disrupting the more specific field of
penality. Uie will thus examine the dynamics and conditions of change
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which were internal to penality - its own specific problems, contradictions
and failures - and how these related to the external dynamics we hav/e
already discussed.
(7) The Crisis of Penality in the 1890s
The first, and most important internal condition of change was
undoubtedly a growing recognition, by the 1890s, of the serious failure
of the prison as a disciplinary institution. Now it has been argued by
Michel Foucault that the prison was an acknowledged failure virtually
from the moment of its inception in the eighteenth century and so, in
these terms, this disillusionment has the status of a constant condition,
not a new and effective cause of change. However it is necessary to
take issue with Foucault on this, and to insist that the phenomenon
in question was indeed a novel one when it occurred in the 1890s.
For while the history of the prison has indeed been laced with
criticism and pleas for reform, these criticisms took on a rather
different and more fundamental nature in this later period.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the problems of
imprisonment were viewed as being organisational, administrative or
technical. The ideal of the well-ordered prison house, and a firm
belief in its efficacy, lay behind the long struggles of central
governments and penal reformers to rationalise and impose a uniform
standard upon the various gaols and lock-ups of the local authorities.
So long as these issues remained unresolved, in other words up until
1877 and the implementation of full centralised control, any "failures"
or problems of incarceration were laid at the door of inefficient
buildings, staff or administration. The model of the prison itself
went virtually unchallenged. By the 1890s, however, there had been
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almost 30 years of efficient, rationalised prison administration,
using a network of well-ordered institutions and a propsr staff of
salaried officers. In this context it became increasingly apparent
that the continuing problems of imprisonment - its failure to deter,
to reform, to reduce criminality, etc. - were characteristic of the
84
prison itself and not merely accidents of a flawed administration.
In the penological literature of the 1890s and early 1900s almost
every text endorsed this critique of imprisonment in some form or
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other. Thus Garofalo:
"... imprisonment, especially that of brief duration,
is a stimulus to crime. ..." 88
Morrison:
"[imprisonment] ... aggravates the conditions which tend
to make a man a criminal ... it not only fails to reform
offenders but in the case of less hardened criminals
and especially of first offenders it produces a
deteriorating effect." 87
Carpenter:
"... to consign a man to prison is commonly to enrol him
in the criminal class ... prisons the world over produce
the very thing they are designed to prevent." 88
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and so on through the texts of Saleilles, Holmes, Lewis, and
numerous others. In his compendium of the axioms and laws of the new
"Science of Penology", Henry PI. Boies could put it thus:
"It may be stated as a penological law, that temporary
imprisonment must never be imposed as a penalty when
any other can be made to satisfy the conditions. The
stigma of the prison, the corruption of the associations,
the long days of idleness, the physical deterioration,
work a speedy and total ruin of the tainted character."
Nor was this recognition of failure limited to the critics of the
penal system or the reformers and academics of the new penology. As
The Times declared in March 1898, "Administrators, no less than
irresponsible critics, own that every prison is more or less a failure.
And if we sift through the official reports and documents of this
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period we find the Prison Commissioners themselves doubting the
efficacy of imprisonment as regards the professional or habitual
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criminal, the young prisoner under 21 years of age, the short
96 97 98
sentence prisoner, the vagrant, the inebriate, and finally,
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the feeble-minded offender.
This general concern over the failure of the prison was focused
particularly around two specific issues - the question of short
sentences and the problem of recidivism. Some indication of the
frequency with which short sentences were used is given by the fact
that in 1898 the average duration of all prison sentences in England
was only 28 days, while in Scotland it was as low as 15. This
practice of using the prison as a sanction of first resort (and therefore
using it for very minor as well as more serious offences) was
increasingly criticised in terms of its high financial costs, its
repetitive and time-consuming administrative effects and the overcrowding
which it frequently caused. Moreover it was seen to be detrimental to
many young and first offenders for whom early imprisonment meant
contamination, demoralisation and subsequent criminality. Penologists
in the 1890s made much of the discovery that most habitual criminals
were "made" between the ages of 16 and 21 - and needless exposure to
the degradation of imprisonment was seen as a primary aspect of this
formation.
The other issue - that of recidivism and habitual crime - was if
anything, even more serious. The problem of short-sentences could
perhaps be regarded as an inappropriate use of the prison sanction,
with no necessary implications for the prison as an institution.
Recidivism, on the other hand, and "the hundreds of thousands who
flock to the local prisons over and over again",) was a failure which
went right to the essence of imprisonment itself. As early as the
85
Gladstone Report in 1895 the increasing number of habitual recidivists
was registered as a serious problem, particularly in the local prisons
and in regard to offences against property. As the Report pointed out,
the recommittal rate for simple larceny was as high as 78% (79% for
larceny from the person) and more than half of all those convicted at
Assizes or Quarter Sessions had undergone a previous conviction.
By 1898 the Scottish Commissioners could report that over 500 of those
committed in that year to Scottish prisons had been there more than
50 times before.1^1 Writers such as Tarde, Du Cane, and even R. Brise
argued that this phenomenon need not necessarily be regarded as a
question of failure since it might indicate that criminality had been
concentrated into a specific class which, presumably, would soon die
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off, thereby effecting "the whole object of punishment". However the
fact that this class of habituals was clearly on the increase,
continually fed by young offender recruits and showing no signs of a
future diminution,ensured that arguments such as these were viewed as
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mere apologetics of little substance.
Some indication of the alarm and concern caused by this problem in
the early 1900s is given by Sutherland in the Preface to his 1908
text on recidivism:
"Perhaps at no time within living memory has there been
such activity and anxiety as is at present manifested by
Ministers of State concerned with Home Affairs, by the
executives responsible to them, by judges and magistrates,
by social reformers, by the Salvation Army, by Churches,
by philanthropic agencies, by publicists and by the
press, to check recidivism." 10
Of course one would forgive an author for believing that his peculiar
concern is also that of the world at large, but the evidence of Official
Reports, Prison Congresses, parliamentary debates and other penological
texts suggest that Sutherland was correct in his estimation of the
general view. Recidivism was indeed viewed as a very serious problem
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requiring urgent meaeures.
This phenomenon of mass recidivism in the nineteenth century had
a range of contributory causes. That the use of the death sentence had
drastically diminished and transportation altogether ceased uere
obviously important here, as uere the absence of organised after-care
and the grouing efficiency of Britain's police forces and their
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techniques of identification. Houever it uas undeniably the case
that the real headsprings of recidivism lay in the prison itself - in
its contamination, its brutalisation, its stigmatisation and
demoralisation. Prison uas seen to produce that uhich it should
prevent, to manufacture delinquents instead of mending them.
This alarm about prison's effects upon its inmates also spilled
over into other lines of social concern. The grouing public concern
over the increasing level of feeble-mindedness among the louer classes
(a phenomenon identified and in a sense produced by the neu educational
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complex) led to a number of alarming survey-estimations of a very
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high number of feeble-minded persons in prison. The same pattern
folloued uith the question of 'urban degeneration', and investigations
of the health and physique of the prison population shoued a very high
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proportion of 'degenerate' and 'unfit' inmates. The recognition of
these large categories in the prison population led to further questions
about the prison itself: uas it contributing to this deterioration?
Was it an appropriate institution for these types of offender? Should
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it not attempt to provide restorative treatment? and so on.
If these uere the problems of the prison, Victorian penality's
main apparatus, there uere also other less publicised problems elseuhere
in the penal field. Thus at the level of sentencing there uas a major
difficulty uhich had operated increasingly since the Penal Servitude Act
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of 1864. This Act, passed in the midst of a major panic about lau
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and order following the cessation of transportation and a series of
t~
celebrated "gatfotting" attacks upon London notables, had increased the
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minimum term of penal servitude to five years. However this brand
of severity brought its own difficulties, since the next possible prison
term below the five year mark was a two year sentence of ordinary
imprisonment in a local gaol: the result was a distinct lack of middle-
to-long term sentences. Judges ware thus frequently forced to choose
between a sentence which was markedly higher or else lower than that
which seemed appropriate. In the event it appears that judges most
often chose to use the shorter sentence and the local prison rather
than to be seen passing 'unjust* or •over-severe' sentences of penal
servitude, but it is clear from a number of judicial statements and
Home Office documents that this was deemed to be a very unsatisfactory
practice. Even when this minimum was reduced by the Act of 1891, the
pattern of sentencing which had by then been established proved
difficult to alter. As Ruggles-Brise put it:
"There is ample power; but it is useless for a code to
prescribe effective sentences when the public sentiment,
of which the Judges must be to a large extent the
interpreters, is opposed to severity of punishment."
Another problem also concerning penal servitude was the sanction
of police supervision which this sentence entailed since the 1879 Act.
As we saw in Chapter One, this auxiliary sanction was most uneven in
application and by the 1890s had markedly declined in use. The reasons
for this decline were partly to do with the lack of uniformity in police
practice and the reluctance of many local forces to take these duties
seriously. However one important factor in this was the view held by
many magistrates, penologists and members of the public, that the
police were an inappropriate agency of supervision. The problem was
that any police inquiries or visits to the ex-convict's neighbourhood,
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employer or landlord would publicly reveal the past record of the
individual concerned and ruin his or her chances of rehabilitation.
Thus in the case of police licencing, as with the minimum sentence
terms, the fact of over-severity placed definite limitations upon the
use of the sanctions concerned, given the constraints of "public
opinion" or else the judgement of individual penal agents.
Thus we have limitations of severity on the one hand, and the
ineffective rigours of prison on the other, together constituting the
problems of the field of penality as it stood in the 1890s. However
there was also a growing feeling expressed in Departmental Reports,
Home Office documents and the writings of the press that this field of
penality was also too narrowly circumscribed; that its parameters were
not sufficiently wide to contain deviance and disorder in all its
forms; that there was a growing number of deviant groups who were
literally "beyond control" as things stood. Thus there were categories
and groups which presented a definite social danger - of disorder,
degeneration, contamination, etc. - but which did not necessarily
transgress the criminal law: groups such as moral imbeciles, the
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feeble-minded, inebriates, the unfit and so on. Again there were
categories who did come within the scope of the law, and were dealt
with accordingly, but for whom the "proportionate punishment" was not
sufficient - groups such as vagrants, petty offence recidivists,
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habituals and "hooligans", whose social danger was deemed greater
than their degree of punishable criminality. So long as penality was
defined in its present legal terms, there were thus categories -
dangerous categories - who would escape its discipline and defy its
terms.
In this context of over-severity and under-achievement moral
115
outrage flourished. The middle years of the 1890s saw a remarkable
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public outburst uhich severely criticised the penal system, its
institutions, principles and authorities. The most notable and
perhaps most effective element of this protest was the series of
articles and editorials which appeared in The Daily Chronicle in
January 1894 under the title "Our Dark Places". The anonymous
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author of these statements criticised in detail the shortcomings
of the prison system, its general failure to reform, its contamination
of juveniles, its alarming recidivism rates, its lack of scientific
method or classificatory technique and so on. Moreover he took great
trouble to describe and criticise the autocracy and secrecy of the
central prison administration, arguing for 8 more open system which
would entail structures of local control and regular access for M.P.s
and the public. These articles, together with the revelations of
other penal reformers and organisations, provided the basis for a
popular wave of protest against the methods and institutions of
penality. This "sweeping indictment" as it was called by the Gladstone
Report, rocked the standing and legitimacy not only of Du Cane's
administration, but of the British penal system itself.
The immediate response to this outcry was the appointment of a
Departmental Committee of Inquiry to take up these allegations and to
review the principles and practices of the whole penal field. And far
from being a mere device to delay or defuse the issues, this Inquiry
seriously addressed itself to those problems of penal practice and to
the equally crucial question of penality's public image. As we shall
see, the long term effect of this and other developments was a series
of transformations which reconstituted the penal complex in a form
designed to repair its disciplinary deficiencies and to re-establish
legitimacy and public support.
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At the end of the nineteenth century then, there uae a period of
crisis and transformation produced by a complex series of intersecting
events and developments. This crisis centred around two related
issues: the proper role and function of the State in relation to the
economic and social spheres, and the condition and regulation of the
lower classes. The penal complex,being a series of State agencies
dealing overwhelmingly with the poor, was clearly implicated in this
crisis - its ideological foundations and strategic position being
undermined by the breakdown of market society and its political
balances. Moreover, penality was simultaneously undergoing a serious
crisis of operation and of public legitimacy which provided an additional
force of transformation.
In later Chapters we will try to show how this two-fold crisis was
resolved by the development of the "Welfare State" on the one hand, and
the "Welfare Sanction" on the other. However, our immediate task is
to show the means by which the new penal complex was assembled in the
1900s, and how this construction related to the problems and conditions
which have been identified. Although we have talked of the operation
of disciplinary strategies, these should not be understood as emerging
from the global calculations or battle-plans of an omniscient ruling
bloc. As we will show in detail later, there is no question of a
strategy existing first as "intention" and later being implemented as
"fact". Consequently the modern strategy of welfare-control which was
assembled in the years after 1900 is not to be discovered fully-formed
in the texts, speeches, or agendas of the authorities of that time.
Instead there occurred a fragmented series of responses to perceived
problems, responses which were constructed and struggled over within
the limits set by the political situation, according to the various
objectives involved and using the various knowledges and programmes of
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action available. The term "strategy" will be used to refer to the
distinctive and structured pattern of practices and effects which was
the outcome of these struggles, a pattern which will be identified
as the dissertation proceeds.
As a first stage in our discussion of how the modern penal complex
was assembled, the next three Chapters will set out the details of the
articulated programmes of reform which became available at this time,




(1) Introduction: On Programmes of Reform
The social crisis of the 1990s and 1900s provoked a complex series
of political responses and initiatives. These political movements of
calculation, realignment, transformation and reaction were - at least
at first - neither uniform nor coherent. There was no easy resort to
a self-adjusting social balance or to a ready-made strategy imposed by
the ruling bloc. Instead a complex pattern of responses emerged at a
variety of different points and levels in the social formation:
institutions reconsidered and adjusted their practices, political
parties altered their direction and manifestoes, individuals and
voluntary agencies pressed for specific forms of political action and
governments responded in more or less pragmatic fashion by means of
legislation, propaganda, the appointment of Inquiries and the
deployment of force.
Ide shall argue in later Chapters that out of this complex and
fragmented field of forces emerged a new set of strategies and political
balances - a new hegemonic project - and the struggles and tactics
employed in this construction will be discussed when we get to that
point. However, our immediate intention is to examine the basis of
these political responses as they emerged in the crisis period. If it
is true that new forms of calculation and practices were proposed
(e.g. for social work agencies, for penality, for the State generally)
and were eventually established in a re-formed hegemonic structure,
then it is important to examine the source and nature of these
innovations. For new developments such as these do not just occur,
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they depend upon the availability of definite materials - knowledges,
ideologies, institutional forms, techniques, etc. - as discursive and
technical resources, and upon the promulgation and utilisation of these
resources by specific social forces. The following Chapters will try
to describe some of the major new ideational materials which were made
available at this time and which were subsequently employed (directly
or indirectly) in the re-assembly of a stable network of social
regulation - the new "order of the social".
We have referred here to "discursive resources" and "ideational
materials" not simply to emphasise the materiality and limited
availability of these social products, but also to avoid the
unfortunate connotations evoked by the notion of "ideas". "Ideas", at
least those which come to inform social relations, are not free-
floating, a-political products of individual inspirations. "Ideas"
are always inscribed within definite discursive (and hence social)
practices, and those 'ideas' which we shall discuss in these Chapters,
far from being free-floating,were the constituent elements of definite
social movements which developed and carried them,pressing their claims
as solutions to the problem of social regulation.
Our suggestion is then, that the "ideas" which played a decisive
part in the transformations of the 1900s were those which attracted the
support of definite social forces and found a place within an organised
programme of social reform. We will therefore refer to particular
programmes or schemes of social action, their discursive and technical
resources and their organisational basis and social support.
In the years between 1890 and the First World War - the period of
social crisis and its resolution - it is possible to identify four major
programmes which addressed themselves to the social question and pressed
particular means for its solution. Each of these programmes had its
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ouin analysis of "the problem", its own objectives, a repertoire of
discursive and technical resources and a definite social support.
Each was organised to a greater or lesser degree,and through a
variety of means, its supporters sought to establish their programme
as the basis for a new strategy of social regulation. The schemes in
question will be termed the Criminological programme, the Eugenic
programme, the Social Security programme and the Social Work programme.
There were of course other movements and proposals for social
reform which were presented in these years: socialist programmes,
Christian fundamentalist schemes, feminist and syndicatist formulations,
as well as other less organised and articulated proposals. However,
these failed to gain the social basis and organisational strength
necessary to impress themselves directly upon the political field. At
most their impact amounted to providing lines of resistence set
against certain kinds of development or else winning concessions to
their views within the four major programmes of social change.
It was pointed out in Chapter Two that the crisis of the 1890s
centred upon a dual problem of the social regulation of the poor and
the proper role of the State. Each of these four programmes addressed
these crucial issues and proposed various levels and forms of State
intervention, various techniques for the regulation of the lower
classes and various schemes for the general re-organisation of the
social realm. However, despite this common concern with the State
and the social domain, and despite certain other shared features (e.g.
overlapping social support, some common techniques, etc.) these
programmes may be analysed as distinct entities which sometimes
complemented and sometimes opposed one another. As we shall see,
there were great differences in their specific objectives and political
positions. For instance, regarding the level and quality of State
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intervention demanded,the social work and criminological programmes
called for specific forms of social hygiene and aid to be provided
by the State, while the Social Security and Eugenic programmes, in
their different ways,insisted upon a much deeper and more far reaching
form of State regulation, the one covering the whole labour market and
the other, the reproductive practices of the population. In terms of
their level of operation, some of these programmes sought to re-order
the whole spectrum of economic and social relations, while others
concentrated upon specific aspects or areas of social life. As for
their target populations - the social groups which the programme sought
to administer - these also varied from programme to programme; the
Social Security scheme addressing the whole workforce, the Eugenic
attack being launched primarily at "the unfit" but also at reluctant
parents among the middle classes, the Criminological and Social Work
programmes focusing their concerns upon the lower classes generally and
their 'dangerous' elements in particular.
Nor were these programme-movements homogeneous in formal
character, point of origin or mode of operation. Eugenics, for example,
was a tightly organised movement or recent origin, centring upon a
powerful Association and a very definite conceptual discourse. The
Social Work movement, on the other hand, was much more diffuse,
operating through a large number of separate agencies, with a programme
which cohered around a number of concerns, techniques and proposals
rather than a systematic conceptual system. And while these two
movements were British in origin, the Social Security and Criminological
programmes relied heavily upon the experience and innovations of the
European countries, and to a lesser extent, the U.S.A..
Although the Social Security programme owed much to a number of
distinguished New Liberals (particularly Beveridge, Hobson, Hobhouse
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and Plaster-man) and also to Fabians such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
none of these schemes u/ere 'political programmes' in the Party-
political sense. Certainly each aimed to influence and be recognised
by the established parties, as a means of effecting their objectives,
but generally they existed outside of the formal political system. In
consequence their channels of influence were those available to most
pressure groups - the mobilisation of public support through popular
texts, press articles, the persuasion of professional opinion,
evidence of official committees, informal lobbying, "insider influence"
and so on.
As for their origins, it would be misleading to say that these
schemes were produced by the crisis of the 1890s. To begin with, some
of these programmes, particularly criminology and social work, were
already being formulated before this time. More importantly, such
social crises can only provide the conditions and the political desire
for such programmes, their actual production is always a different
matter, involving the development of discursive resources, techniques
and political mobilisations. Nonetheless, we shall see that each of
these programmes was deeply affected by this crisis and indeed some of
the material and political developments described in Chapter Two made
positive contributions to their construction. Thus the failures of
prison and philanthropy nonetheless produced information and technical
experience which could be employed within new schemes, while the social
surveys and investigations which caused so much alarm also provided
valuable information which could be utilised in solutions to the very
social problems which they exposed. Similarly the new forms of
economic calculation, political argument and ideological discourse
which accompanied the economic and political changes of the 1880s and
1890s, both contributed to the crisis and provided resources for the
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new programmes which that crisis provoked.
By and large though, these programmes owed their existence to
conditions far beyond the immediate political context in which they
came to prominence. As we shall see when each programme is individually
discussed, they were made possible by information gleaned from
institutional practices, the data of experimental research, the
invention of new techniques and the provision of new materials (social
data, survey results, market trends, etc.). Above all they depended
upon the general development of "the sciences of man" which took place
in Europe during the nineteenth century, particularly in the fields of
medicine, psychiatry, genetics, economics and sociology, developments which
provided the methodologies, concepts and models of knowledge which
1
formed the basis for these practical offsprings.
This Chapter and the two which follow will be concerned with a
discussion of the criminological, eugenic, social work and social security
programmes, their content, support and social implications. The most
detailed attention will be afforded to the first of these four, the
criminological programme. The programme of "criminology" merits this
emphasis because it presently lacks the critical historical literature
which exists for the others and also because its precise relation to the
penal reforms of the 1900s is, as yet, barely understood. However, this
special attention does not mean that we consider the criminological
programme to be the only, or the most influential, element in the
construction of the modern penal complex. As we argued in Chapter One the
penal reforms of the 1900s were one aspect of a more general re-ordering
of the social realm which involved much more than criminological issues.
Moreover as will become clear in the following Chapters, there is good
reason to suppose that other programmes such as social work and eugenics
had as much immediate impact upon the penal reforms of the 1900s as did
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the criminological movement itself.
The discussion of these programmes will include an examination of
the various organisations and individuals which provided their social
support and political energy. It will also discuss the way in which
the existing network of institutions, agencies, ideologies and
professional or political interests provided lines of resistance,
opposition or assistance to the goals of each programme. In other
words we will attempt to provide a kind of diagram of the field of
forces in play around the social realm in the 1890s and 1900s, to be
set against the background of crisis described in Chapter Two.
(2) The Criminological Programme
The last few decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the
formation of a new form of knowledge which has become familiar to us as
the "science of criminology". Within a remarkably brief period, perhaps
no more than twenty years after the appearance of Lombroso's L'tlomo
deliguente in 1876 - this knowledge developed from the idiosyncratic
concerns of a few individuals into a programme of investigation and
social action which attracted support throughout the whole of Europe
and North America. This explosion of interest in the "criminological"
2
enterprise led to the publication of hundreds of texts, the formation
of dozens of national and international congresses, conferences and
associations, and the assembly of an international social movement
which pressed the claims of "criminology" upon the legislatures and
penal institutions of virtually every western nation.
The widespread success of that movement in establishing criminology
as an accredited discipline in the institutions of government, penality
and education,means that a detailed description of that programme might
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today appear to be unnecessary. The character and concerns of this
knowledge are well known. Its premises and implications hav/e been
frequently discussed, either with approval or, more recently, with
3
some dismay. Its concepts and recommended practices, for better or
for worse, underpin many of the penal sanctions and institutions of
nations throughout the modern world.
But for all that it is a familiar and established discipline in
today's world, it would seem that its history and development have
escaped the close and critical scrutiny usually afforded to powerful
social knowledges. There has yet to be produced a serious history of
the discipline, either in terms of its internal development or else its
4
social effects. This failure of cr minologists to reflect critically
upon their own practice, has, with a few honourable exceptions, meant
that our knowledge of criminology's development is sparse and
inadequate. We are left with, on the one hand, hagiographies of "the
5
founding fathers" and their "scientific mission", and on the other,
wholesale dismissals of the "reactionary purpose" and legacy of
"positivism" with all the simplifications and overstatements which these
entail.^ What is missing is any detailed account of the formation of
the criminological programme, its internal characteristics and conflicts
and most importantly, of the processes whereby this programme entered
into the strategies and institutions of government in Britain and
elsewhere. The following account does not claim to make good this
absence. But it does attempt to take these issues seriously and to
deal with the evidence of concrete texts, statements and events.
Moreover it attempts to trace the precise paths whereby this programme
(and others) entered into official practice, rather than simply assume
such an entry was inexorably guaranteed - either by criminology's
scientific character or by its reactionary attractions.
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(3) Conditions of Existence
The emergence of this new form of knowledge, with its concepts,
objects and methods of study,required for its possibility much more
than the ecstatic discoveries of an Italian doctor in the prisons and
7
asylums of Pavia. Similarly its ability to attract the attentions and
support of so many powerful individuals and organisations rested upon
a certain resonance between the concerns of this new discipline and the
preoccupations and affairs of men of science and public office in this
period. The following section will give a brief outline of some of the
conceptual, institutional and political conditions which made possible
the emergence of this new criminological movement, its discoveries and
its desires.
No new form of knowledge is ever without a line of precursors and
a hazy ancestry of analogous practices and objectives. And if we
consider particular features of this knowledge,for example the
commitment of the criminological programme to a practice of correctionalism,
reform and rehabilitation, then this ancestry becomes obvious. Thus as
Saleilles points out, the Ecclesiastical law of penance prefigured the
new criminology in focusing not upon the individual's act but rather
the personal state (of sin or of grace) from which the act arose. This
state of the soul was to be the target of ecclesiastical intervention
and transformation - "the conception of 'castigatio* was [to be] allied
g
to that of 'discipline' and 'remedium"' - just as punishment was to
be alligned with correction within the new criminological programme.
A more immediate precursor of this correctionalism was the reformative
schemes of men such as Howard and Bentham. As we pointed out in
Chapter One, the notion of reform - in either its evangelical or
utilitarian form - had been a constituent objective of penality for
more than a century, at least in the rhetoric of officials and
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reformers. But although this line of precursors provided historical
echoes and "precedents" u/hich gained support and authority for the
new movement, the parallels involved were far from exact. As we
shall discuss shortly,the conception and methods of correction involved
differed markedly between the old and the new. The basis of crime no
longer lay in sin or in faulty reasoning but in an aberration or
abnormality of the individual. Similarly the process of reform no
longer attended upon the visitation of God's Grace or the return of true
reasoning, but instead mobilised its own positive techniques of
intervention and human transformation.
Again if one considers its project of tracing patterns of
behaviour and action back to a source in the physical constitution of
the criminal, then we find another historical precursor in the work of
F. 3. Gall, and 3. C. Spurzheim. These two writers were the leading
exponents of "phrenology", a form of knowledge which conceived mental
faculties as localised brain functions, thereby allowing the analysis
of personality to take place by examining the shape and contours of
9
the individual's cranium. Quite clearly the work of Lombroso, Boies,
Ellis and Goring,as well as many other criminological writers gained
support from this earlier form of'physicalism' and from what OeQuiros
terms "the old longing to discover in man the relations between body
10
and soul, the correspondence between spirit and matter".
Between the early "physicalism" of the phrenologists and the
opening up of the criminological field lay one very important attempt
to answer this ancient question. The search for scientific explanations
of human and social life, for the discovery of the laws of movement of
'man' himself, was in the nineteenth century expressed in the methods
and concerns of "scientism" in general and "positivism" in particular.
And although the criminologists of the 1880s and 1890s sought to
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distance themselves from the particular philosophy and historicism
which characterised this positivist movement in its Comptian form,
there can be no doubt that the pro ject of positivism (in a more modest
form) and its corresponding methods, formed the broad intellectual
11
basis for the criminological programme. As we shall see later,
observation,classification and procedures of induction, quantitative
methods, "naturalism" and the formulation of causal laws, were all
aspects of this positivist inheritance which fundamentally shaped the
configuration of this new knowledge.
In addition to these historical continuities, and the intellectual
heritage and social support derived from these traditions, there were a
number of more proximate and immediate conditions which allowed the
emergence of "criminology". Above all, the criminological genesis was
tied to three main conditions: (1) the development of statistical
techniques, survey methods and the national and local data thereby
produced, (2) the advances made in the realm of psychiatry and the
growth of that knowledge in intellectual and social standing, and
(3) of greatest importance, the existence of the prison as an
institutional surface of emergence for the concerns, techniques and
data of the new discipline.
To take these in turn, the development of statistical information
and method was obviously an important precondition for a discipline
which sought to classify and differentiate a population on a quantitive
and 'scientific' basis. Gf course the formulation of precise techniques
and conceptual means (e.g. chi-square tests, regression techniques,
correlation procedures) had to await the work of Karl Pearson and
12
R. A. Fisher in the early years of the twentieth century, but the
production of statistical data preceded its scientific interpretation.
In fact the collection and collation of data - on births, deaths,
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marriages, crimes, migration, incomes, etc. - developed correlatively
with the growth of the modern centralised State and its increasing
13
desire to regulate its subject population. By the 1330s and 1340s
this state science had become more ordered and regular, producing
census materials, Blue Books and annual statistical reports from the
various official agencies (including prisons, police, asylums,
judiciary, Poorhouses, etc.). These resources were employed not
just by governments and their institutions but also by private
individuals and associations who grasped these figures as evidence for
particular programmes of social regulation or reform. Thus in France
14
the "moral statisticians", Quetelet and Guerry, established patterns of
regularity in the levels of crime, pauperism, marriage, etc. and
proposed appropriate calculations on the part of government, while in
Britain a Statistical Society was formed to expand the production of
social data and thereby further the campaigns of its membership for
15
social hygience and institutional reform. By the 1890s this movement
had been augmented by the detailed social surveys of the likes of
Flayhew, Booth and the COS and by the increasing generation of data
16
provided by the expanding State sector. These resources, which
allowed quantitive comparisons to be drawn between the characteristics
of particular categories (say prisoners,or the asylum population) and
the population at large, were to be the basic raw material upon which
criminology worked. Nor was the absence of rigorous methods of
interpretation which could specify the real significance of this
material perceived as a major limitation to the claims of the
criminologists. On the contrary, this absence of rigour was overshadowed
by the prestige accorded to the "facts" of statistical data - and the
technical limitations of their mode of production, the crude manner in
which they were interpreted and the massive speculations involved in
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the processes of induction, were perceived as no more than minor
considerations which barely detracted from achievements of this new
"positive" science.
The second major basis for the development of criminology lay in
the claims and concepts of psychiatrists and psychiatry. From its
inception to the present day, criminology has relied upon the data
and the prestige of the psychiatric movement to support its own
propositions and concerns, to provide 'hard', 'scientific' evidence or
more often, to derive a certain social power from the quasi-medical
image of that discipline. In a sense, criminology has ridden upon the
back of the psychiatric institution, using it as an ally and support
for its more eclectic and social policy-oriented concerns. As with the
philosophy of "Positivism",there was never a complete identification
between criminology and its psychiatric support, but particularly in
the early years, a considerable "borrowing" of concepts, proposals and
social standing took place.
Between about 1845 and 1880 the new medical specialism of
"alienism" or "psychological medicine" succeeded in establishing itself
as an independent and institutionalised discipline known as "psychiatry".
The national network of lunatic asylums formed after the 1845 Acts,
together with the formal organisations of alienists formed in the same
period,provided an institutional enclosure and an organisational basis
17
for the development of this area as a career specialism. Moreover
the development of physiological investigation into the field of brain
functions appeared to give a scientific basis to psychiatry's theories
and correspondingly advanced its social standing.
The early criminologists leaned heavily upon this newly established
science and its propositions. Not only was the concern with observation,
classification and 'positive data' endorsed and emulated, but specific
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theories and categories were taken over and employed in criminological
discourse. Thus the application of determinist principles to human
behaviour and the consequent rejection of free-will doctrines were
presented by early criminologists such as Ferri and Garafalo as
conclusive and indisputable findings provided by the psychiatric
sciences. Similarly, categories such as "the moral imbecile", "moral
insanity", "degeneracy" and "feeble-mindedness" were taken over
wholesale from the work of Maudsley, Pritchard, Morel and Nordau and
18
used as a basis for criminological argument.
However, this systematic borrowing was not without its advantages
for the psychiatrists whose terms were thus repeated and reproduced.
The psychiatric movement,in the late nineteenth century,saw its major
line of expansion as lying in the judicial domain - not just in dealing
with criminal lunatics and the insane residents of Broadmoor, but in
pronouncing upon the psychiatric state of all accused persons before the
19
courts, the petty as well as the monstrous. In this it found an
important ally in the criminological movement which pressed these claims
for psychiatric intrusion in the context of a more general programme of
penal reform. Thus while psychiatry provided conceptual conditions for
the emergence of criminology, the latter promised in exchange to promote
psychiatric knowledge and expertise in the judicial field.
Finally, there is an important sense in which the emergence of
criminology owes its possibility not to an intellectual movement or a
theoretical discovery but to a particular institution - namely the
prison. Bust as the clinic formed the real basis for the development
of medicine, and the barracks,the monastery and the schoolroom
supported the foundation of a disciplinary knowledge and practice, so
the prison acted as an institutional surface of emergence for criminology
20
and its particular concerns. The prison provided a kind of
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experimental laboratory, a controlled enclosure in which the new
knowledge could develop. It provided the possibility for the long
term observation of criminals who could be examined, measured,
photographed and catalogued in an organised and rigorous manner. It
produced statistical data on conviction rates, recidivism patterns and
criminal careers which were invaluable criminological materials
unavailable elsewhere. It even allowed a degree of experimentation
insofar as various regimes of labour, diet, discipline and so on could
be compared with one another to assess the effects of each upon the
prison population and the causes of crime.
There was a natural link between the prison as an institution
which sought to deter and reform offenders and a knowledge which posed
the question of what an offender is. As Ruggles-Brise clearly saw,
"la science penitentiaire develops gradually into the science of the
21
discovery of the causes of crime - the science of criminology". Hence
the international emergence of this new knowledge (prisons being
established throughout the Western World) and hence the abiding
criminological concern with prison populations and the data drawn
22
from them.
But there is one more linkage between the prison and its
criminological offspring, a linkage which goes straight to the heart of
the criminological enterprise and ties it firmly to a particular
project and a definite politics. The linkage concerns the dual
concepts of individualisation and differentiation, two terms which
establish the very basis of the criminological project and shape the
methods, concepts and techniques which are most characteristic of this
knowledge. We will be discussing the significance of these terms later,
so our purpose here is merely to locate their institutional origin, to
indicate how these theoretical terms were promoted by their institutional
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context. To take "individualisation" first, it should be apparent
from the description of the prison presented in Chapter One, that the
primary unit of the prison, its basic term, is the individual cell
23
containing the individual prisoner. When criminological investigation
is brought to bear upon the prison, and its population, the very
architecture of the institution has thus already inscribed the individual
as a proper unit and object of analysis. It is an object written into
the prison and its cellular design. But as we saw in Chapter One and
again in Chapter Two, this fixing of the individual as penal and
criminological object is not without its social and political conditions
and connotations. All the premises of bourgeois individualism - of
private responsibility for action and crime, of free-will and liberty
in the face of social forces, of the individual source of criminality -
are thus reproduced in the prison and its criminological product. And
although as we shall see, criminology would drastically revise these
notions of responsibility and action, at no point did it question this
institutional fixing of the individual as the source of crime and the
proper object of study and correction.
As for "differentiation", there is a clear sense in which this
theoretical project also exists 'readymade' in the context of the prison.
In the nineteenth century, when incarceration was the primary sanction
employed by the criminal law, the clearest and simplest demarcation
between the criminal and non-criminal populations was provided by the
prison walls Those who were placed behind these walls were, by this
fact alone, members of a distinctive criminal class. Consequently, as
we said above, the characteristics of the criminal could most easily be
ascertained by observing the prison population, while the control groups
of the non-criminal would be drawn from the free population outside -
from army recruits, undergraduates, boys' club members or whatever.
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This convenient demarcation and basis of comparison was used by the
early criminologists as indeed it continues to be used today,albeit in
a more closely controlled manner. But the direction of this research
and the special characteristics which were hypothesised (and duly
found) involved the covert introduction of a definite premise into
the argument; for it was assumed that the difference in legal status
and social placing which marked off the prison population from the
population "at large" corresponded to a constitutional difference
between the individuals who composed the two groups. In other words
the prison demarcation became a natural demarcation which criminology
24
first presupposed and then "discovered".
To explain this process we need to show more than its practical
convenience and possibility: we need to show that its direction and
assumptions were likely or probable in these circumstances. And to do
this we need look no further than the strategy of social politics
which prevailed in Britain and elsewhere in Europe in the late nineteenth
century. The urge to differentiate and individualise the criminal
(which establishes not only the methods and concepts of criminology but
also its purposes and politics) is nothing but the intellectual
expression of the political strategy of differentiation which we
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described in Chapter Two. It is a strategy which sought to divide
and demarcate the masses against themselves, to specify and enforce
divisions the better to control a general population. Without this
'desire' and its institutional and strategic surface of emergence,
there is no basis for the criminological enterprise. Why should it be
supposed that criminals are constitutionally abnormal or "different"
when common sense and previous philosophies suggest the apposite? Why
should there be a science of the individual criminal and his
differentiation when there is no science which differentiates the
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rich, or the poor, or the law abiding or the masterful? Why? Simply
because a configuration of social, institutional and intellectual
conditions made it at once possible and manifestly desirable.
(4) The Critique of Classicism and the Status Quo
One other obv/ious condition u/hich facilitated the rise to
prominence of this criminological programme was the social and penal
crisis of the 1890s. The failure of the existing strategy to deal
effectively with crime was used as a tactical point of entry for the
new programme which offered a radical critique of the current strategy,
its institutions and particularly its classical jurisprudence. Thus
Enrico Ferri:
"It is oyt experience (noted every day, in every country,
on both sides of the ocean) that the penal laws inspired
as they still are by the traditional doctrines, are
powerless to preserve civil society from the scourge of
criminality." ^6
And Baran Garafalo:
"It is useless to protest against verdicts of acquittal
or the leniency of judges. What we see is, after all, the
triumph of judicial logic, but a triumph which is at the
expense of social security and morality." 27
This political failure was referenced again and again in the work
of the new criminologists, and its source was each time traced to the
philosophical framework of classicism and the procedures and practices
which it implied. In fact if we are to describe the elements of this
new programme and the themes and concerns which its exponents shared,
then there is no better place to begin than with the critique of
classicism. The assault upon this jurisprudence was pursued by
virtually every text in the field,as much to establish the practical
advantages of a penality based on positive 'criminology', as to
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demarcate the differences between the two forms of discourse. And one
should emphasise that this was indeed an assault. In its early stages
the new programme sought no accommodation with classicism, no revision
28
or reform or discursive compromise. Instead it attacked the very
heart of classical philosophy, and established its own discursive space
and right to exist against the traditional principles!
Against the doctrines of free-will and responsibility which formed
the basis of the whole legal edifice, there was counterposed the
conclusions of science. Thus Ferri:
"Positive psychology has demonstrated that the pretended
free-will is a purely subjective illusion." ^9
No need for argument or contestation here, science has had its say. But
of course the practical conseguences were the real issue at stake: if
free-will was illusory then "responsibility" and "guilt" were egually
suspect and need no longer limit the exercise of penal control. Thus
Emile Faguet of the French Academy:
"It is not at the point of culpability that one must
place oneself. That is too obscure and metaphysical.
... It is not necessary to consider criminals as
re8ponsibles, demi-responsibles, irresponsibles - that
concerns only the philosophers. It is necessary to
consider them as very dangerous, dangerous, semi-
dangerous and not dangerous. Only that, and nothing
else should be considered." ^0
•Free-will', 'responsibility*, 'guilt' and 'punishment* - not just
fictions out of favour with science but metaphysical concepts which posed
a danger to society's security, leaving society "practically defenceless
against the most dangerous criminals and failing to provide effective
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protection". Saleilles put it bsst when he counterposed the exchange
logic of retribution to the utilitarian design of social defence: seen
in this light,the classical way with penalties is:
"the most dangerous theory for society ... because, though
it attempts to make criminals pay for their debts, it does
not succeed in preventing them from contracting new and
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equally irresponsible ones." ^
Against.therefore,'penal proportion' and its attendant 'metaphysics'.
To reject free-willed responsibility is to relieve penality of the task
of measuring justice in these "impossible" terms. And once freed of
these burdens it can concentrate upon its proper defensive tasks: thus
Enrico Ferri:
"... penal justice, instead of having a mission of measuring
the 'moral fault' of the delinquent (a measure which is
unalterably impossible), and of measuring a 'proportionate
punishment' (a proportion which is impossible, because,
for instance, science and practice can have no absolute
criteria by which to determine whether the proportionate
punishment for murder should be death, life imprisonment,
or imprisonment for a certain number of years), instead of
this mission, penal justice can only be a tactical defence
against the danger and injury represented by crime."
The abuse of this 'metaphysics' was a favourite tactic, used by
psychiatrists like Maudsley and Robertson as much as their criminological
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allies. In place of this speculative contemplation its "straight
^t 35
lines, regular/ties and fictions", the criminologists insisted upon
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"the positive study of the facts". The new programme aimed:
"to substitute the realities of experience for purely
judicial abstractions; to give fact a place above law,
the spirit of observation a place above the legal
spirit."
And if the rejection of these metaphysics implied that the doctrine of
individual rights should also be abandoned then this was hardly a
calamity,even for such well-established figures as F. H. Bradley, since:
"The old metaphysical doctrine of individual's rights
became obsolete early in this [nineteenth] century [andl
can hardly today be considered a rational principle."
Against uniformity of punishment, its assumptions and effects.
Up until now, the prevailing system of penality had been premised upon
these mistaken principles - penal proportion, individual rights,
equality of treatment. The consequence was the 'uniformity' of
penality, now seen not as an achievement but rather as a lack of
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refinement or discernment - "the promiscuous consignment to the common
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form of imprisonment" - the "antiquated blunderbuss of punishment".
Not only was there a lack of diversity in the available sanctions, but
within prison itself there was no adequate classification or
differentiation. Penal classification was "just as legal, abstract and
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final as the sentence itself". The new criminologists protested
against this "uniformity" and its egalitarian assumptions. The findings
of "anthropology" were summarily asserted to disprove this well-
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intentioned fiction while its egalitarian effect was stood on its
head:
"It has been said that in prison all men are equal; but
their natural inequalities are not removed by putting
men in custody; they are only ignored; and prison treatment,
being uniform is therefore unequal treatment of individuals."
But the consequence was more than a uniform inequality: it
involved a failure of prison to reform or even to incapacitate society's
most dangerous elements. The prison was presented as a breeding ground
for delinquents, a regime in which le bon detenu was also le mauvais
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sujet, where "the ideal of a 'good prisoner' is the recidivist, the
veteran, the habitual criminal, whose prison experience and the
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docility he has acquired are guarantees of his orderly conduct".
Not content to assert "science" against metaphysics, the new
criminologists securely tied the practical failure of the prison, its
recidivism rates and its various malfunctions,to the inadequacies of
its classicist foundations.
Finally, there was one more aspect of the status quo from which the
new programme wished to assert its distance. It proclaimed itself
wholeheartedly against the compromises of "nap-classicism" and its
recommended practices. The neo-classical school (3oly, Rossi, etc.)
and its revision of the classical doctrines had some success in
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establishing itself within the judicial systems of Europe in the late
nineteenth century. Concepts such as "diminished responsibility" and
"extenuating circumstances" appeared to prefigure the new programme
46
and to represent one way in which its demands might be met. Against
this the new criminologists resolutely set their face. Ulhile Ferri
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contemptuously dismissed this "compromise with reason" Garafalo
addressed himself to the practical logic of the neo-classicists and its
potential results. As far as he was concerned neo-classicism had
modified the rules of classicism in a manner which actually weakened
their capacity for social defence. Notions of "partial responsibility"
and of "extenuating circumstances" remained firmly in the jurisprudential
paradigm of responsibility, guilt and punishment while simultaneously
reducing the degree to which offenders would be sanctioned. In terms
of logic and practice this compromise had less in common with the new
criminology than did classicism itself, as Garafalo indicates in the
following reductio ad absurdam;
"Now there are but few cases in which the offender is
without some'extenuating circumstances'. In fact there
is no crime in which it is not easy to discover them.
It requires but a slight investigation and they swarm
on all sides. In short, the only criminals who appear
to us to be without excuse, are those for whom we have
not taken the trouble to find it." 48
And of course the effect of this infinite regress into the realms of
good excuse would, for Garafalo, seem to be:
"... the acquittal of the most ferocious type of murderer
[for] once establish his extreme natural brutality or the
irresistability of his criminal impulses, and no shred of
moral responsibility remains. The outcome of every case
would be the proportionate diminution of punishment,
according as the causes of the evil inclinations become
better known." ^
In terms of its conceptual logic and in its practical implications
for sanctioning, the neo-classical compromise was seen as an
impediment to the new programme rather than an early form of its
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implementation. As such it was criticised and ridiculed along with
the other elements of the judicial status quo. However, there was one
very important (if unacknowledged) sense in which neo-classicist
concepts and procedures did prepare the ground for the new programme,
acting as an intermediary between classical jurisprudence and the
scientism of criminology. This concerned the question of knowledge.
If there had to be a single term which was to stand for the
difference between the old system of criminal jurisprudence and the
new criminology, this would be, above all, the element of "knowledge"
in regard to the offender. We have already discussed how the premises
of classicism - of rationality, responsibility, freedom and so on -
obviated the need for any inquiry to be put to the accused. These
qualities were deemed to be known in advance, an _a priori assumption
without need of positive proof. As far as the new criminologists
were concerned, this judicial attitude was merely a prejudiced
ignorance with regard to the criminal - an absence of knowledge
masquerading as intuitive truth. No wonder classicism had failed in
the war against crime - it preferred to indulge its prejudices rather
than recognise its foe:
"... to fight with any hope of success we must know our
enemy. The enemy which we are called upon to face is
unknown to the followers of the judicial school. Knowledge
of him comes only from long-continued observation in
prisons, penitentiaries and penal colonies." ^0
Criminology's mission was to supply this precious knowledge;to
extend the inquiries of penal science "into regions where our fathers
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could see nothing at all ...". Albert Wilson put it nicely when he
said:
"When a criminal is caught ... his case should be sifted
from before the time when he saw daylight. The questions




What are you?" 52
This inquiry, and the'\/ast field of re-examination"53 which it
opened up, was to be the proper domain of criminological science.
Indeed criminology was just this knowledge, in the same way that
classicism was the framework of judicial premises which were now in
question. And the point to be made about the neo-classical revision
was that it formed a kind of bridge between these two forms of
discourse and procedure. Of course it retained the premises of
classicism while modifying their practical application - and it was
this reformist retention which was so heavily criticised. But the
fact was that this modification introduced, in a routine and systematic
way, questions of knowledge in regard to offenders: questions regarding
their degree of responsibility (and consequently their mental state,
their personality, etc.); questions regarding their circumstances (and
so their history, their finances, their families). And though the
basis and terms of inquiry proposed by criminology were quite other than
those of this compromise position, there can be no doubt that neo-
classicism supplied a definite opening through which criminology would
later approach the judicial establishment.
(5) Discursive resources - arguments, concepts and evidence in the
criminological programme
Up until now we have characterised the new criminology negatively
(against classical jurisprudence) and historically (emerging from a
number of conditions of existence). In this section we will begin to
describe the positive content of this new programme by reference to
its discursive resources and principles. In the process of demarcating
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the discursive contours of this programme, two points will be made
which might appear to be in contradiction to one another, so
consequently a preliminary word on this is perhaps necessary.
On the one hand, we wish to assert that the multitude of texts
and arguments and discussions which began to appear in the 1880s,
setting forth this new discursive orientation in regard to crime, did
in fact amount to an independent and distinctive discourse. To
insist upon this point is to assert that there is some identifiable
and distinctive principle or principles which these disparate texts
held in common and which justify their collective characterisation as
"criminological". The present section will endeavour to justify this
assertion and to set out the common principles and positions which
structured the discourse of criminology.
On the other hand, having asserted this discursive unity, it
will also be argued that this criminological corpus was marked by
internal differences, theoretical conflicts and contradictory positions.
At a level of detail which lay beneath the shared principles and
programme, the texts and proposals of the early criminologists
displayed a number of serious divergences and differences inter se.
These internal differences are important,and not merely because they
give the lie to any statements which refer to "early positivism" as
if it were all of a piece. As we shall see in Chapter Six they played
a crucial part in the re-alignments and maneouvres which occurred as
the criminological programme struggled to become established in
practice. These points of conflict and difference within the
criminological programme will be set out in the section which fallows
the present one.
If one reads through the vast range of criminological literature
which appeared in the late nineteenth century,the most notable feature
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which emerges is the remarkable unity which characterises those texts.
Despite their international origins and the differences of detail which
have just been noted, they express a remarkable unity of purpose and
of principle. This unity goes beyond a common commitment to positivist
methods and eclectic procedures to include many other shared positions,
arguments and recommendations which are not entailed by their 'scientific'
orientation. This common discursive structure emerged from a general
commitment to a number of positions which could be listed as
differentiation and individualisation, pathology and correctionalism,
and finally interventionism and Statism.
However these general positions did not appear as such in the
texts themselves. Rather they were implicit in the premises of
arguments, the selected objects and objectives of research, or else the
particular choice of recommendations which followed. Consequently, if
we wish to present evidence of these shared positions, we must do so
at the level of the explicit textual arguments which were presented,
showing what these arguments were, and how they entailed the general
positions which have been listed. Before doing so, however, we might
simply note that these shared positions were supported by more than
the discursive logic of individual texts. The criminological enterprise
was a self-conscious social movement, geared to a very definite
practical programme and supported by a number of motivated organisations
and institutions. The uniformity and repetitiveness of criminological
discourse owed as much to this movement and its scientific crusade as
to its own internal logic.
liie have already referred to criminology as the field of inquiry and
knowledge which follows from the question 'what in fact i_s the criminal?'
This question, which forms the basis of criminology, already
presupposes a number of operations which allow such a problem to be
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meaningfully posed. Thus as we have seen, it assumes a position of
indiv/idualisation which fixes the individual as the proper object and
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unit of analysis, and of differentiation which hypothesises a
qualitative and substantiated difference between the criminal individual
and his law-abiding counterpart.
The first of these two positions - individualisation - is not
difficult to comprehend. As we saw, it was written into the established
system of law and of penality and was a position shared by the classical
jurisprudential framework. "Differentiation", however, is a position
auite at odds with that jurisprudence and its specified system of law,
even if, as we saw, it was promoted by the prison and by contemporary
political strategies. In classical jurisprudence the only difference
between criminal and non-criminal is a contingent event: one has
chosen, on occasion, to behave in a criminal fashion while the other
has not. This difference of conduct reveals nothing beyond itself.
The individual in each case is assumed to be similarly constituted -
as a free, rational, human subject.
Criminology founds itself in a re-interpretation of this logic.
Having rejected the "metaphysics" of free-will and chosen action, the
"difference" between criminal and non-criminal takes on an entirely new
significance. The law of universal determinism abolishes the realm of
contingency and freedom and demands that phenomena - even human
phenomena - be viewed in terms of cause and effect. As Spinoza put
it, "consciousness of our liberty is but ignorance of the causes which
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make us act". Consequently the difference between an individual who
offends and one who does not is no longer a contingent or formal matter.
It is a difference of substance and necessity. A criminal offends
because he is caused to do so in a way which a non-criminal is not;
"crime is a detected sign, symptom and result of a human personal
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condition".In a single operation "freedom" is replaced by
determinism, the criminal is differentiated in a qualitative fashion,
and the search for the causes of crime begins.
If we follow this operation through its various stages we can
clearly see how the criminological enterprise is discursively established.
First of all, the critique of human "freedom",based as we have seen,
upon the method of positivism and the data of psychiatry:
"Free-will is a delusion. Human movements, the actions
of men, like the other movements of the world, obey
natural laws ... the first of these laws is that nothing
is created out of nothing. All things are engendered."
Following from this, a move from a philosophy of freedom to a
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psychology of human behaviour and its determinants. This move
entails a radical re-ordering of the elements of human action. It
rejects the spiritual notion of the Ego as Sovereign,"the absolute
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monarch of Consciousness and of Will". It rejects the idea of an
intangible and unknowable point of creativity and choice - the human
soul. In place of this spiritual essence is fixed an entity which
has a definite substance, definite conditions and is amenable to
investigation and perhaps even change - the personality or character of
the individual. This personality "is not one and independent" but is
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rather complex and "constituted". Thus Garafalo:
"We know that the Ego cannot create itself, and that the
character has already been formed by a series of anterior
facts." ^
and Claye Shaw:
"It is personal character that is the ultimate cause of
volition. ... Instead of will being free, it is, in fact,
a determined process." ^
This "personality" or "character" depends for its construction upon
"hereditary, physiological and social circumstances", and forms the
basis and proximate source of individual conduct.
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The implications of this philosophy-to-psychology shift are
complex and wide-ranging. To begin with,it promotes the possibility
of a positive knowledge of human subjects. As Saleilles put it, "In
the newer view the personality ... becomes amenable to a precise
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psychological analysis", and it is upon this knowledge that
criminology stakes its claim to be a superior form of discourse
regarding the criminal. Secondly, it provided a new object to be
assessed and administered in the courts of law:
"The terms of free will and responsibility must be
reconsidered in the light of fresh knowledge. We are
but machines of varying potential, endurance and capacity,
and according to the quality of the mechanism so we should
be judged." ^
Finally it opens up the possibility of techniques which can transform
this object and its determinants. As Oe Fleury vividly put it,
"... the soul is there, under our scalpel".^
The next stage in this operation is a simple question of logical
differentiation. If personality or character is the basis of individual
behaviour, then different forms of behaviour signify different forms
of character. The criminal act now signifies more than itself,being
a sign of the criminal character from which it sprang. As Boies
phrased it, "Criminal moral depravity is an actual condition of
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individual character, not a transitory passion or disposition".
And for criminologists at least, this logic was amply confirmed by
experience: as Flarro put it, "all who deal with the physical study of
the criminal are forced to the conclusion that he is a being apart",
to which Garafalo adds, "Few who have ever visited a prison or
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penitentiary will maintain the contrary".
Thus by a process of differentiation and classification, tracing
effects back to causes,criminology arrives at the distinctive "criminal
character"At this point we see the introduction of the "pathological
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principle". According to the logic of the operation so far, we have
the identification of a character-object and its classification
according to the type of behaviour it promotes. As yet,there is no
hierarchy of character-types. The introduction of the notion of
pathology fixes a definite norm of social and individual "health" and
places the criminal character below that norm. It becomes a "theorem"
of criminology:
"that criminality is a diseased condition of human
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character." '■
"the delinquent is not a normal man; ... on the contrary
he represents a special class, a variation on the human
race through organic or physical abnormalities, either
hereditary or acquired."
"... crime is always the effect of an anomaly or of a
pathological condition. ..." ^3
liie should note that the uncontentious entry of this principle marks
another point at which social and political criteria are directly
inscribed into the categories of criminological discourse. Criminology
is thus fixed in its place as a correctionalist discipline, fundamentally
uncritical of existing legal and social relations.
We have then, the notion of criminal behaviour as a product and
expression of a distinctive pathological entity, "the criminal
character". Or rather,since the personality is deemed to be complex
and not singular, we have "criminality" as a pathological element of
individual character. In this concept of "criminality", criminology
finds both its raison d'etre and its practicable object. For if
criminality is the source of criminal behaviour, then a systematic
knowledge of it - a criminology - is obviously necessary. And once
known and identified, this object should clearly become the target
for - the practicable object of - investigation, observation and
finally transformation.
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In claiming to have discovered "criminality" in the bodies or the
brains or the "milieux" of criminals, criminology claimed a social and
scientific space for itself. In the century that has passed since
that discovery that space has been expanded and extensively worked
over, and the position and character of "criminality" has been
repeatedly revised and relocated. It has been seen as an entity which
completely characterises an individual as "the criminal type",or more
recently, as a more limited characteristic which can affect individuals,
families or even neighbourhoods. Nevertheless,criminologists have
remained committed to this particular object for the simple reason
that without its existence there can be no grounding for criminology as
an independent discourse or discipline. The discovery of criminality
then, is the discovery of criminology itself. Henceforth its mission
would be, in its theoretical phase, to investigate criminality, and in
its practical phase (qua penology) to eliminate criminality from the
individual and from society itself.
(a) The investigation of criminality
If the discovery of criminality founds a science of its further
investigation, it also sets in place the need for further investigative
procedures, apparatuses and qualified personnel. Consequently it was
a constant demand of the criminological programme that the legal
system should open itself up to the entree of a staff of non-legal
experts. The precise nature of the required expertise varied
according to the predelictions of the criminologist in question - thus
B. Hollander (himself an 1*1.0.) maintained that "crime calls for
intelligent and scientific treatment which lies with the future
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learning of the medical profession", while Albert Wilson insisted
that criminals "require careful examination ... not by the police, the
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lawyer or even the Judge but by the expert psychologist", and Lydston
recommends "the direction of wise and experienced men of broad
information and a thorough knowledge of the physical aspect of crime
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and of the principles of sociology". Other demands were less
specific, calling for "medico-psychologic examinations by psychologic
physicians" or merely "highly and specially trained persons", but the
consistent thrust of the programme was for the introduction of an
expert staff of a non-legal character.
Indeed the desire of the criminological argument was to shift the
v/ery object of forensic investigation away from "the criminal fact"
77
and towards "the criminality of the agent as revealed by the fact".
And if lawyers, judges and judicial procedures had been adequate to
the investigation of acts and 'facts', the investigation of criminality
required quite others means« Hence the demand for assessment centres,
"mental and physical observatories", "court clinics" and a revised
7
criminal procedure which accorded these apparatuses their due authority.
Hence the call for:
"The development of machinery adequate to the requirements
of the psychiatric point of view in criminal trials and
hearings including court clinics and psychiatrists and
ultimately a routine compulsory psychiatric examination
of all offenders with latitude and authority in the
recommendations made to the court as to the disposition and
treatment of the prisoner."
If, as Ferri claimed, "the great truth of the present and the future
for criminal science" lay in "the individualisation of penal treatment -
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for that man, and for the cause of that man's crime" then this
individualisation implied a very definite process or procedure. It
implied firstly observation, and on that basis, the production of
information and knowledge concerning the- individual and his criminality.
From this springs the demand far an investigative apparatus which would
provide the materials for criminology as a positive scientific knowledge
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and for penology as the application of that knowledge in the practical
sphere. It then implied a system of assessment, classification and
differentiation, which entailed the demand for trained 'diagnostic*
personnel, and the endless production of classificatory schemes and
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typologies. Finally, as we shall see, it implied a wide and
differentiated array of sanctions, dispositions and treatments which
would be adequate to the different categories, forms and types of
individual criminality.
(b) The elimination of criminality
We have emphasised throughout our discussion of the criminological
programme that criminology was no innocent academic pursuit but in
fact an applied, disciplinary discourse which aimed to establish itself
in the institutions and practices of power. We also noted that the
object which formed the focus of scientific investigation - namely
"criminality" - was at the same time a practicable object, the focus of
policy demands and practices. Criminality was thus an object of
'disinterested' research but also the target for penal practices and
forms of regulation. It was a scientific problem but also a social
problem to be addressed, attacked and transformed. In view of this
crucial unity of "theory" and "practice" it comes as no surprise to
find that the criminological programme was heavily committed to a
definite penology, and that moreover, the common theoretical and
discursive positions identified above ware tied to a shared programme
of practical demands and recommendations.
Having identified "criminality" as the real source of criminal
behaviour, the practical programme of the criminologists addressed
itself solely to this object and its extermination. Whereas the old
system had punished the criminal for having "chosen" crime and then had
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set him frse to make the same choice again, the new criminology aimed
to remove his criminality once and for all. Given the existence of
criminality, three separate modes of extermination were available.
first of all, criminality might be reformed. The individual criminal
might be transformed in some way which brought about his social
adaptation or re-attachment - his character might be transformed and
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his criminality cured. Secondly, where such reform was impossible or
impractical, criminality might simply be eliminated. Thus the
incorrigible criminal could be executed, transported, or else
permanently segregated in such a way as to remove his criminality from
the social body. Finally, for the future, criminality might be
prevented. If the determinants and causes of criminality could
themselves be altered or eliminated, then new generations could be
immunised against the condition and its gradual extermination could be
achieved.
In fact all three of these modes or objectives were concurrently
proposed by nearly all of the criminological texts and manifestoes.
Thus Henry Boies:
"The unintermitted, continual restraint of the
incorrigible criminal, the reformation of the curable,
and the wholesome rearing of every child constitute the
triplicate solution by Science of the social problem of
Criminality." 83
and again:
"The problem is resolved into three elementary phases,
those of prevention, of reformation, and of extinction -
the last the most important of all." 84
or the 1906 Turin Congress:
"To instruct ignorant criminals,to reform the corrigible,
to prevent the incurable from offending, are the duties
which the State must fulfil with loyalty and zeal." 85
and finally Enrico Ferri:
"In sociological medicine, the great classes of hygienic
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measures (preventive means), therapeutic remedies
(reparative and repressive means) and surgical operations
(eliminative means) form the arsenal which enables society
to face the permanent means of its own preservation."
Criminality was thus to be exterminated, either by prevention,
reformation or elimination. This triple strategy required not only
procedures of assessment and classification which could identify
offenders as corrigible or incorrigible, but also a diversity of
dispositions, sanctions and techniques to implement these objectives.
Thus we find that a major demand of the criminologists was for an
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extended repertoire of penal sanctions and institutions, including
juvenile reformatories, preventive detention institutions, institutions
for inebriates, for the feeble-minded, a variety of prison regimes,
forms of supervision, conditional liberation, indeterminate sentences
and "pre-delinquent interventions".
And although there was a degree of variation between different
individuals in their lists of recommended sanctions - particularly in
regard to more controversial innovations such as sterilization or
execution - by and large most of these sanctions were given general
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endorsement.
There was thus a remarkable consistency in the positions, arguments
and recommendations proposed by the various proponents of the new
criminological programme. Indeed if we were to take this further and
identify the specific topics which were most discussed by criminologists
we would discover that it was the same few issues and problem-categories
which are discussed over and over again in the literature. Nor was this
choice arbitrary or coincidental: the favoured items of discussion -
juveniles, habituals, the feeble-minded, the inebriate - were
precisely those items on which either "science" or social policy had
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most to say. The most "easily explained" categories (the undeveloped
juvenile, the disturbed defective) or else the most dangerous (the
habitual, the professional thief) were those used to provide exemplary
models of criminality which could then be extended to other, less
well-discussed types of offender.
UJhat was the basis of this consistency? How could this new
discourse establish such stability and uniformity in such a small space
of time and over such a large, international terrain? The answer to
such a question can only be tentative and to a certain degree,
speculative. Nonetheless, we would suggest that the consistency of
this early criminological discourse does not lie in scientific truth,
frequently discovered, but is a product of (l) the simple repetition
or paraphrasing of earlier work, and (2) the theoretical implications
of the ideological ("social problem") basis of the discourse. If one
reads closely the texts of the criminological programme in this period,
there is a surprising shortage of any actual research or positive data
underlying their statements. Itore often these texts are simply
commentaries, compilations or glosses upon other, earlier texts.
Despite its claims to be a positive science, criminology in this early
period more nearly resembles a new theology with its dogmas, glosses
and evangelists. Hence the remarkable degree of repetition and the
89
static nature of the discipline through time.
As for its theoretical foundations, criminology had tied itself
to a search for the antecedent, observable causes of criminal
behaviour. Its commitment to a positivist methodology of observation,
correlation and induction meant that it was fundamentally eclectic in
character, prepared to encompass any number of factors in its
explanations. Consequently, different causal explanations, involving
different "factors" and determinants,were not always seen as competing
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or contradictory accounts. As u/e shall see, after the initial period
of debate between proponents of biological and of social factors, most
explanations took on an eclectic multi-factorial approach which simply
listed a multitude of factors in a bid for comprehensiveness rather than
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coherence. This additive.eclectic character is well illustrated by
Ferri's text Criminal Sociology which was 160 pages long when it first
appeared in 1884, but by the fifth, 1900 edition, had reached 1,000
pages through the accumulation of other "relevant factors" derived
from the growing literature on crime. This massive eclecticism was in
turn possible because, as we have seen, criminology's object and
direction of inquiry were dictated not by scientific discovery but by
practical social policy concerns. "Criminality" was a social problem
demanding a "scientific" solution and its investigators were committed
more to that solution than to any single or coherent theory of human
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behaviour.
This social problem orientation brings us to our final point in
this section. Underlying the concern to provide new principles and
procedures for penal regulation there is the constant figure of the
State as the presumed subject of this enterprise. Just as classical
jurisprudence had organised itself around a liberal conception of the
State/individual relation, criminology too assumed that the State
and the individual were the proper subject and object of this process -
though the nature of these terms and their relationships were
fundamentally revised. As we shall see in Chapter Six, criminology's
arguments were explicitly directed towards an increased interventionism
on the part of the State, as well as a new conception of the individual
and the means employed against him. But the assumption that the
central State is indeed the proper subject of this process (and not
private organisations, or even localised administrations) is so basic
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as to go mostly unspoken. At one point we see Saleilles object strongly
to the private nature of Brockway's experiments in the U.S.A., insisting
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that only the State can be entrusted with the penal function, and
occasionally Conference resolutions are explicit about "State
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establishment and control". However in his statement of the
"Principles of Scientific Penology" Boies supplies us with an
expression of this basic principle and demonstrates that not only the
politics but also the practical ambitions of criminology necessitate
the State as their subject:
"Scientific Penology is impossible, all social penal effort
is futile, or worse than futile, unless it is initiated,
directed and controlled by the State, so that it shall
include every unit of the population within its constant
scope and care."
(6) The internal variations and conflicts of the criminological
programme
So far in this Chapter we have described the central elements of the
criminological programme and emphasised the remarkable consistency with
which these elements and themes appear in the texts and manifestoes of
this movement. Ue will now comment briefly upon one or two of the
disputes or arguments which took place within this movement during its
formative period.
In any programme or discipline there are bound to be numerous
points of variation, debate or disputation upon which even committed
advocates of the programme are divided. Each author, each organisation
and each text will assert particular formulations which differ either
in substance or in nuance from other positions in the field. Thus in
criminology there were endless disputes over modes of classification,
preferred forms of sanction and exact causal priorities, as well as
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over the terms and formulations to be employed. Disputes such as
these though were matters of detail and refinement which may have been
of vital concern to the practitioners of the discipline, but signified
little in terms of that discipline's public profile or its practical
repercussions in the social world.
For our purposes then, there would be little point in detailing
the exact variations between the different authors, in terms of their
formulations, arguments, degrees of rigour, originality and so on,
although such differentiations undoubtedly existed. Nonetheless there
are a number of these disputes which are of relevance to our project
and whose significance stretches beyond the internal 'house talk' of
criminology. As we shall see in Chapter Six, these contestations and
variations played an important part in the maneouvres and tactical
movements whereby criminology sought to establish itself socially.
It will therefore be helpful for our later understanding of that
process if these issues are mentioned briefly now.
The first such debate is well known and may be characterised simply
as the nature/nurture dispute which was argued - in these general
terms - at the early congresses of criminal anthropology and to a
lesser extent, in the first criminological texts.^ This still-
familiar issue counterposed the influence of "the environment" (a
position supposedly championed by the French) to those of the
individual constitution (the "Italian" position). Much has since been
made of this contest and its national protagonists but in fact, as we
have noted above, criminological writers realised early on that there
was little substance to this rhetorical debate since the two positions
need not in fact be contradictory. The practical solution lay in the
additive formulae of an individualistic eclecticism which held the
individual as the central object of inquiry, and merely listed together
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the constitutional and environmental influences which acted upon him.
A mono-causal dispute of substance thus became a mere question of
priorities within a multi-factorial approach, and as the texts of
Lombroso, Ferri, Tarde and the others went through their numerous
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editions one can clearly see this movement occur.
But if this early dispute was easily resolved there were related
issues which were more significant in their continuing and practical
effect. In particular the question of the "born criminal" continued
to evoke important conflicts,even after it was reduced to one 'type'
among many. So too did the related question of 1 corrigibility' and
the potential scope of rehabilitation.
The notion of "born criminal" or the "criminal by nature" was
probably the criminological term best-known to the lay public and, as
we will see, it was to have important ramifications in the ideological
struggles which surrounded criminology's promotion to institutional
practice. Its public notoriety however, was matched by a continuing
internal dispute which centred around the concept and its practical
implications. The idea that "criminal man" was an identifiable
constitutional type represented a claim of great significance for the
programme, but its implications were not altogether unproblematic.
In one sense it represented criminology's strongest scientific and
practical themes if such an entity existed in nature, then its
discovery and investigation did indeed herald the opening up of a
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scientific discipline. Moreover if, as some criminologists claimed,
these born criminals could be identified before they first offended,
then a real preventative policy was a practical possibility. As one
commentator put it, comparing the born criminal with the image of
Calvin's doctrine of the Elect, even "Calvin could not indicate the
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elect and non-elect, while Lombroso says he can ...". At the same
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time, however, this doctrine undercut its own policy advantages by
asserting that "if crime is really a fatal consequence of certain
constitutions which are naturally predisposed to it, it is then
almost irremediable . ..'0^ The other side of this confident doctrine -
endorsed by writers such as Garafalo, Ferri, Tredgold, Ellis and
Maudsley, as well as Lombroso - was thus a therapeutic defeatism,
which implied that criminals of this type were "absolutely irreformable".
The extent of this "defeatism" varied enormously between writers.
Lombroso himself affirmed that there was a range of criminals who
could be improved by remedial measures even if the born criminal
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could not, while Garafalo - who is less often associated with the
doctrine - was actually less optimistic:
"There are certain psychologists who believe in the
possibility of modifying character by education. ... In
fact it seems clear that education is an influence which
acts only upon infancy and early youth. ... Once fixed,
the character, like the physiosnomy, undergoes no further
change during life. And even in the period of early
childhood, it is doubtful whether education can create a
wanting moral instinct." 104
Against this defeatism was focused a major thrust of the
criminological programme. Writers such as Saleilles, Morrison,
Holmes, Ruggles-Brise and others emphasised the goal of rehabilitation
and its possibility in most if not all cases, dismissing the conception
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of the born criminal as mere "superstitution", unfounded by evidence.
As we shall see in Chapter Six, this particular dispute was of major
importance in the struggle to implant criminology in the institutions
of government.
A related conflict with very similar origins and consequences
involved the question of "determinism" versus "free-will". Although
it was a mark of the criminological programme that it rejected the
classical conceptions of "freedom", "will" and "chosen action", there
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was littla agreement as to how an alternative position should be
framed. The theoretical conflict revolved around the precise
characterisation of 'the Ego' or the personality, with writers/ such as
Ferri, Garafalo, Ellis,and Smith and Schlapp vehemently asserting a
logic of determination and behavioural reaction while the likes of
Saleilles, Prins, Won Liszt, etc. proposed a compromise formulation.1**^
For these latter writers "freedom" and "determination" were both
operative in the human personality since people were seen as "free"
to develop their moral character, but once this character is formed,
"the fundamental law of physical causality prevails. Freedom prepares
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the soul, determinism receives the seed and makes it fruitful".
And of course the practical implication of this debate lay with the
question of criminal "responsibility" and the possibility of reform:
"... without freedom, there is no hope of a return to
virtue, and thus arises the tendency to recognise only
criminals by nature, to regard them all as beset with an
incurable criminality, as belonging to the lost." '"-'8
Another issue which promoted serious divisions within the
criminological corpus was the question of eugenic sanctions and their
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employment against offenders. On the one hand were writers such as
Garafalo,11^ Battaglini,111 Ellia,11^ and Bradley11** who openly endorsed
various forms of "elimination" or "social surgery" which aimed "to
prevent the procreation of individuals who in all likelihood would
turn out to be vicious and deprived".114 As Boies put it:
"Society must take cognizance of the reproduction of the
race and correct the tendencies to degradation, as a
measure of self-preservation. It is idle and foolish to
waste energy, sympathy and money in the hopeless effort
to cure and restrain what should never have been permitted
to exist."
They were supported by less explicit eugenists such as R. F. Quinton,
Thomas Holmes1^ and Or. Goring.1 Ranged against this position were a
number of writers such as Dames Devon and 3. F. Sutherland who took
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issue with it on grounds of evidence and of principle. They
challenged the conception that habitual criminals are either prolific
or capable of transmitting criminal traits to their offspring and they
altogether refused the morality of the eugenic argument. Sutherland
thus sought to displace the preventative arguments away from the
individual, when he argued that "before society decrees this kind of
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surgery, if ever it does, it must have clean hands itself", while
Devon resorted to irony and ridicule when he pointed out that;
"If some of the Apostles of Fitness had any sense of humour
they would hold their tongues and hide themselves, for
neither intellectually nor physically do they show much
claim to present an ideal standard."
Finally, it is worth emphasising here that the "individualisation"
which was identified as a central characteristic of criminology did
not at all proclude discussion of the "social" aspects of crime-
causation and the possibility of social reform. It will be recalled
that one of the three programmatic responses to "criminality" was
actually "prevention" - and the strategy involved a strong social
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element in at least some of its formulations. Indeed in a few of the
early writings there was a definite emphasis upon the re-organisation of
social relations as a preventative means, and several of their
recommendations were radical or even socialistic in character as the
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work of Bonger or Ferri amply demonstrates. The point of stressing
this fact here is that at later stages in the development of
criminology this radical-social aspect has tended to disappear,as the
focus of inquiry and policy decision has narrowed to frame only the
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offender or at most the offender's family. Moreover recent histories
of "positivism" and early criminology have excluded all reference to
the more radical or social aspects of the initial programme.
Against this tendency it is worth recalling that social reform
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elements in the programme were stressed not only by Enrico Ferri and
Bonger, but also by Devon, Sutherland, Holmes, Tallack, Morrison and
Ruggles-Brise. Thus Ferri insisted that the abnormality which gives
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rise to criminality lies "in society itself", as well as in the
individual,and he demands that these "social pathologies" (including
many of the central elements of capitalism) be addressed and transformed.
Similarly writers like Holmes and Sutherland attacked inequalities of
wealth, unemployment, bad housing, etc. as fundamental causes of crime
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which had first to be removed before individuals could be reformed.
Of course some writers gave merely token attention to social questions
or else presented a radical analysis critical of property, social
inequalities and so on, only to conclude by recommending penal reform
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which centre exclusively upon the offender. And of course social
reform could mean for Ferri, a transition to socialism and for Ruggles-
Brise, the social programme of the incoming Liberal government:
"What is summarised by criminologists under the title
of 'l'hygiene preventive* comprises all those social
and political reforms which make up the 'Social Programme*
which is engaging the attention of our statesmen today.
Better housing and lighting, the control of the Liquor
Traffic, Cheap food, fair wages, insurance, even village
Clubs and Boy Scouts ...". ^
Nonetheless there were serious arguments for social change, and
a number of radical recommendations such as Sutherland's demand for
the appointment of official "environmental observation officers" to
report alongside the psychological or medical observers in criminal
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cases, or else the call for working class judges in criminal trials,
proposed by "Investigator" and Arthur St. John as well as by
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M. Magnaud at the 1906 Criminal Anthropology Congress.
The fact that these demands receded and the "social aspect" all
but disappeared from the programme is no reason to pass them over as
if they had never existed. On the contrary, it raises a problem to
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be explained and the reasons for this development will be examined
more closely in Chapter Six.
(7) Criminology's Social Implications
Having described at length the criminological programme, its
conditions, structure and elements, the last few sections of this
Chapter will briefly indicate the kind of social implications, this
movement entailed and the social base of support which it commanded.
We began by emphasising the pertinence of criminology (and the other
three programmes) to the social crisis of the 1890s. This pertinence
lay in the regulatory and ideological possibilities offered by the
new programme, possibilities which allowed the extension of effective
disciplinary control while doing so in a manner which had strong
claims to legitimacy. As we have seen, criminology allowed a
differentiation to be produced which would mark off the field and
population of "criminality" in stark contrast to the universalism of
classical jurisprudence. The classical insistence that all men are
equal, free and rational (derived from Christian humanism as well as
from liberal theory) put definite limits upon the operation and
presentation of regulatory forms. All subjects in law had to be seen
to be treated equally, impartially and without differentiation. Only
by their acts could they be judged and on that basis alone the law was
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empowered to intervene in their affairs. As a form of discipline
then, the traditional criminal law is severely limited. It functions
through the specification and prohibition of definite acts and is
thereby limited to the policing of these acts rather than the general
inspection/control of individuals themselves. Moreover the criminal
law is inextricably bound up with the question of legitimacy. Its
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prohibitions are a public declaration of the limits of individual
freedom and require to be justified as such. Its intersection with
the discourse of political obligation precludes it from functioning with
the requisite discretion, flexibility or penetration. The advantages
of criminology lay in its rejection of this formal liberal egalitarianism.
It insisted upon a qualitative differentiation which would trace out
the dangerous classes and the real contours of criminality. But where
this strategy differed from previous attempts to do this in the realm
of charity or the Poor Law was in its terms and justifications. It
abjured the blatant moralism and class basis of distinctions such as
"deserving/undeserving" or "Respectable/rough" which had anyway become
politically intolerable by this time. Instead it phrased its
divisions in the terms of a "scientific" discourse which excluded any
reference to politics or morality. The unspoken advantage of
criminological discourse in this troubled period was its capacity to
differentiate in terms of "abnormality", "pathology" and the
unquestioned norms of physical and mental "health".
At the end of the nineteenth century the indiscreet class bias of
penal sanctions was an embarrassment which failed to disguise the grave
economic and social inequalities which the law reproduced. Criminology
provided a different explanation which relieved this legitimatory
deficit. The existence of a class which was constantly criminalised -
indeed the very existence of an impoverished sector of the population -
could now be explained by reference to the natural, constitutional
propensities of these individuals, thereby excluding all reference to
the character of the law, of politics or of social relations.
So differentiation was possible within more acceptable ideological
terms. But this discursive shift also allowed a new and extended
basis for disciplinary intervention and regulation. Firstly, because
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the range of the "abnormal" can exceed the "criminal", criminology
allowed a wider scope for control than did the criminal law. Its
proponents argued that the law was not an absolute measure of normality
nor even the best one available. Individuals could behave within the
terms of the law and yet be abnormal, dangerous and in need of control.
In contrast, the terms of criminology permitted - indeed demanded - the
firm regulation of all those groups such as inebriates, the feeble¬
minded, vagrants, epileptics and habituals which were previously
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'within the law' and hence "beyond control". It even allowed the
extension of this logic of pathology and normalising regulation to
include the whole class of "paupers" and the destitute poor, as writers
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such as Henry Boies and the eugenists made perfectly clear.
Secondly, criminology's purported ability to identify "criminality"
in the bodies of criminals (and not merely in their acts) opened up
the possibility of an anticipatory form of regulation. It produced the
categories of the "predelinquent", the "near-criminal" or the
"presumptive criminal" and accompanied them with arguments for
pre-emptive intervention:
"It is evident, then, that the supreme function of the
Science of Penology is the discovery of the infected
members of society before their disease has become an
actual offence."
Finally, the shift of focus from the offender's act to the
offender himself implied a new and more penetrating form of intervention.
Sanctions were to be aimed not at meeting degrees of guilt but at
transforming aspects of character. Questions of the duration, nature
and seriousness of the sanction were not to be limited by considerations
of desert or proportionality. Moreover sanctions should be personalised
or individualised, seeking to address the very fabric of the offenders
person in a manner which need not be embarrassed by liberal considerations
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of individual freedom and privacy.
"The act", "guilt","desert", "proportion", all of these were
dismissed as the marks of an outdated and metaphysical system:
"The new penology is no longer activated by vengeance
and does not look at the moral gravity of the offence.
... 'Judge not' is its maxim."
In place of these judicial notions, criminology proposed standards of
health, doctrines of utility, and measures of social defence. In
this new logic the measure of an offence was not its intrinsic moral
seriousness, but its capacity for repetition, its potential for
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generalisation, its symptomatic value. "Punishment is measured by
the perversity of the criminal" and not his crime, and accordingly
attempt is no different from action and proclivity no less dangerous
than actual practice.
But if the framework of judicial reasoning was to be abandoned,
along with the limitations and restraints of legality, what stood
between penality and a completely arbitrary power? In fact this vital
question was all but absent from the discussions of the criminologists,
being explicitly framed only by Raymond Saleilles who warned against
replacing the "objectivism" of the classical regime with a "subjectivism"
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which would allow complete and arbitrary discretion. But Saleilles'
solution to this problem, and the solution which most criminologists
assumed without the necessity of argument, was an objective code of
scientific norms and standards which prescribed the proper ideals of
moral, mental and physical health. It is an important testimony to
the nature of this movement that these norms and ideals - the actual
values and standards which were presupposed whenever pathologies or
differentiations or rehabilitation were discussed - were never
explicitly identified or adequately described. Usually these norms
were simply assumed, unstated, on the basis that reasonable men from
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a similar social situation were talking one to the other, sharing a
framework of values and ideologies which could go unsaid. Bradley
illustrates this assumption well when, in his argument for "social
surgery" and the 'unrestricted right' of the community in this regard,
he begins:
"Ue may leave welfare undefined, and for present purposes
need not distinguish the community from the State."
It was thus left to the wisdom of science and the mutual understandings
of reasonable men to quietly identify and act upon "objective"
standards of social health. Law was to be replaced by "normalisation";
punishments by the"straightening out" of characters, the identification
and repair of behavioural abnormalities; but no one saw any need to
debate or even describe the actual norms to be imposed through these
procedures.
Perhaps the major implication of the criminological programme was
this social engineering capability which it claimed to offer. Criminology
would replace the ineffectual niceties of legal punishment by practical
technologies involving diagnostic, preventative and curative
instruments and institutions. Criminality was now a knowable positive
entity which, with the aid of scientific investigation and appropriate
practical techniques could be removed from the social body. But if we
examine these claims carefully we find that the programme repeatedly
offered arguments and legitimations for intervention, but actually
offered few effective means of carrying this out. In fact if we
consider the techniques and apparatuses proposed at this time, it
becomes evident that the powerful claims of criminology in this regard
were somewhat lacking in technological substance.
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(8) Techniques
Perhaps the most repetitive aspect of what is generally a rather
repetitive literature is the section in each text devoted to
penological techniques. One finds that again and again the same items
appear on the pages - "reformative" prisons, indeterminate sentences,
supervisory orders, preventive detention of one form or another,
partial or complete "elimination" through deportation, sterilization or
even execution. And while these recommended sanctions may differ from
those displayed by the classical system, they hardly amount to a
technical repertoire of prevention and rehabilitation. Certainly the
demand for reformatories, indeterminate sentences, supervision and so
on, provided a space for characters to be transformed, but the point is
that very little discussion addressed the question of exactly how this
transformation was to be achieved. Criminology, despite its claims,
provided few techniques of its own to support its social engineering
ambitions.
TherB were of course grand-sounding schemes involving "neuro-
electricity in the service of penitentiary work", lie-detectors
("plethysmographs"), or else special regimes of physical exercise for
the training of adolescents, but these were invoked by way of
impressive illustration and were never discussed in any detail.^^Instead
rehabilitation had to rely upon the unspecified effects of "personal
influence" and "the power of a normal or healthy personality" to
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overcome criminal tendencies. Prison training should involve
physical, intellectual and moral aspects - but then it always had
141
done, with little notable success.
In fact the only area in which any real technical advance took
place concerned the development of identification techniques.
Anthropometry, finger-printing, the Bertillon system, elaborate
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systems which marked the bodies of ex-offenders with a sign language
of indelible marks,and various other ID techniques,were extensively
discussed and developed, not least because they had the full backing
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and support of police, and prison authorities in every country.
The technical armoury provided by the criminological movement thus
amounted to a number of elaborate identification techniques, a range
of eliminative means such as deportation, labour colonies, preventive
detention, etc. which owed little to criminological theory, and a
faith that medicine and psychiatry could be relied upon to provide
effective rehabilitative techniques,if not now,at least in the near
future. In terms of its technological profile then, the criminology
programme offered an effective social defence - through eliminative
means and police techniques - but little in the way of prevention or
rehabilitation. However much it described itself as a curative
programme, what was actually on offer was a technology of segregative
control.
A final social implication which may be noted here is the promotion
of an extended Statism, which in turn entailed the promotion of certain
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professions and functionaries at the expense of others. Criminology
implied an elevation in the status and power of the likes of prison
executives, forensic scientists, psychiatrists and other "penological
experts". It widened the fields of medicine, psychiatry and even
sociology to cover what has previously been a judicial domain, and
sought to effect a shift of power away from the judiciary and
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towards a non-legal executive staff. In part then, the theoretical
debates between criminology and classicism concealed a competition
between professions seeking to advance or defend their positions in
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the social division of labour. But the significance of this debate
was not confined to the level of theory or even to the level of
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professional competition in the "administration of deviance". The
challenge which criminology posed to legalism, and the rival principles
and values carried by these contesting professions, had a profound
ideological significance which, though rarely acknowledged, was at
the very heart of this struggle. As we shall see, the challenge posed
by criminological discourse to established concepts such as individual
"freedom", "responsibility", "rationality" and "rights",raised major
political and ideological issues and offered important possibilities
for the wider field of social politics and legitimation.
(9) The Social Base of Support
It was indicated earlier that the criminological movement was more
than just a discursive event insofar as it involved a definite social
base of organisational and individual support. The characteristic
elements of this infrastructure will now be briefly mentioned.
First of all, of course,criminology enjoyed strong support from
those groups and professions which were directly and positively
implicated in its programme. It thus derived strength from the
ambitions and beliefs of prison administrators, police scientists,
social scientists and a number of statisticians, anthropologists and
biologists. Bast organised of these supporting professions was that of
psychiatry which, already possessing its own domain, used this as a
basis from which to promote the criminological programme. Thus the
Medico-Psychological Association, the Medico-Legal Society and
publications such as The Journal of Mental Science and Transactions
of the 1*1—LS devoted much time and energy to arguing the criminological
cause.
But the programme also developed an organisational basis of its
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own, establishing regular Conferences and Congresses at an
international level as well as the theoretical schools and professional
pressure groups which operated on a national or more local basis.
Conferences of Criminal Anthropology and Sociology, the International
Union of Criminal Law, the International Penitentiary Congresses, and
the International Criminological Association all attracted large,
often official, national delegations to their regular meetings, each
one publishing reports of their papers and debates and pressing the
claims of criminology upon national governments and an international
audience. Britain was represented at most of these Conferences after
1695 (having been host to the very first Penitentiary Congress in
1872 and thereafter withdrawing support during Du Cane's period of
office) and Ruggles-Brise, the -Hmd of the English Prison Commission,
A
was a particularly active participant and publicist for the movement.
In point of fact there was no single group or association in
Britain devoted solely to the promotion and furtherance of the
criminological programme,or at least not until the 1950s. Nor were
there any theoretical schools or journals established here in this
early period. However a number of individuals and publishing houses
took it upon themselves to translate and make available in English most
of the more important criminological texts published abroad. Thus
LI. D. Morrison established the "Criminology Series" on a similar basis
to the celebrated American Institute series published by Little Brown
& Co. in Boston and London, between them translating most of the
classic texts from Italy, France and Germany. Writers such as
Havelock Ellis and Morrison himself also presented the work of foreign
writers to the British public through the medium of their own work,
thereby establishing eclecticism, rather than any singular theory, as
the typical British style.
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But if Britain lacked a specifically criminological society,
there was no shortage of associations, organisations and pressure
groups which concerned themselves with criminal justice and penal reform.
The Howard Association, the Penal Reform League, the Reformatory and
Refuge Union and the Humanitarian League were all directed towards
objectives similar to those proposed by criminology. These groups,
along with various social work organisations, the State Children's
Association, the Committee on Wage Earning Children and the Association
for the Feeble-Minded.gave important and consistent support to the
criminological programme, as did the writings of their individual
members such as William Tallock, Thomas Holmes and Rev. Merrick.
However it is important to stress that this support was never
unqualified or complete. These groups were usually charitable,
evangelical associations, committed to the reform of institutions or
individuals in accordance with their Christian or humanitarian
principles. Their support for criminology normally centred around the
actual policy recommendations made by that programme - for indeterminate
sentences, classification, individual reformation, probation, labour
colonies, etc. - rather than the theoretical or philosophical premises
from which these were derived. In other words the relation of these
groups to the criminological programme was mediated by Christian
evangelicism which allowed a large degree of policy support but
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prohibited any total endorsement of the programme as a whole.
Finally, criminology derived a more general and diffuse support
from the new professional and intellectual classes which had developed
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in Britain by the end of the nineteenth century. The scientism of
the programme, its promotion of expertise and professionalism as well
as its rejection of tradition in favour of more 'rational' and
'humanitarian' arrangements were guaranteed to appeal to the ideologies
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and interests of this class. So while few lawyers or clergymen were
entirely enthusiastic, many of the newer middle-classes - state officers,
medics, university intellectuals, social workers, etc. - found the
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doctrines and methods very appealing. As we shall see, a similar
social class affinity occurred in relation to the Eugenic, Social
Security and Social Work programmes, and it comes as no surprise to
find that many of the individuals and organisations devoted to these
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programmes, were also advocates or supporters of criminology.
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CHAPTER 4
Social Work and Panal Reform
(1) Introduction: Political Subjects and Practicable Objects
Criminology then, was one programme uhich came to addresa itself
to the late nineteenth century "social question" and its corresponding
penal crisis. Ii/ith its own terms and its own techniques, it sought to
bring about a definite re-ordering of social life - a re-ordering which
centred upon penality but which extended far beyond it into the wider
social realm. And in a quite explicit manner its proponents presented
this programme to those in power as a complex of knowledges, techniques
and legitimations with which to tackle the problem of social politics.
tiie now turn to the other major programmes of reform - social work,
social security and eugenics - to examine their projects for the
reorganisation of social life. Our discussion of these programmes will
be more cursory than that afforded to criminology, for two reasons.
First of all, these programmes are already better served by historical
and social analysis. Secondly, the focus of our investigation is such
that these programmes will be examined in order to elicit their
significance for modern penality and the strategic network in uhich it
operates, rather than to produce a more exhaustive account of their
character and effects.
As with criminology, we shall be concerned to identify the conditions
and contours of these programmes, their discursive and technical
resources, and their organisational basis and social support. But while
the last Chapter operated at the level of textual detail, this one will
tend towards a more abstract or general level of analysis. This
analysis will highlight certain features of these three programmes
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which will allow us to understand their relationships with one
another, with the 'social problem1 of the 1890s/1900s and with the
political forces of that time. Moreover the concepts and categorisations
used to define these features will later prove useful in describing the
general strategic forms adopted by social and penal regulation in
twentieth century Britain.
All of the programmes under scrutiny here are projects for the
re-ordering, reorganisation and repair of the social realm. They are,
in other words, specific schemes of social engineering and reform.
Viewed abstractly, all such schemes must provide two forms of
proposition - the "practical" and the "political". The practical
form of proposition defines the processes, techniques and methods to be
used in the engineering task, but it also specifies its point of
incidence, the point at which it makes contact with the social realm,
in other words, its practicable object. The political form of
proposition on the other hand, states by what authority, under whose
control, and"in whose name" these interventions are to be conducted;
it specifies the political subject of the engineering process. Uie
stated in Chapter Two that the crisis of the 1890s centred around a
"dual problem of the social regulation of the poor and the proper role
of the State". In our new terms this amounted to a crisis of social
engineering in which both the 'subject' and the 'object' of social
regulation were put in question. Ue intend to characterise the
following programmes (and that of criminology too) in terms of the
positions they adopted on these basic issues.
If we examine our programmes in the light of these considerations,
we find that the range of practical and political propositions which
they produce can be represented within a schematic grid or matrix,
formed around two axes. On the one hand is the practical axis which
149
forms a line of possible objects of intervention ranging from
'individual* to 'mass', specifying the individual case at one end,
and the national population at the other, with numerous intermediary
points such as the family, the labour force, the unemployed, etc., in
between. Against this can be set a political axis which ranges from
'public' to 'private', representing the range of political forms from
the central State through local government to more or less private
agencies such as the Churches, independent charities, or philanthropic
individuals.
Despite its general terms, it is important to note that this matrix
does not define the whole range of possible waye in which 'the social'
might be regulated, but rather the specific grid of possibilities
proposed by these programmes within that particular conjuncture.
Indeed it was precisely along these 'axes' and the specific questions
of "public or private?", "individual or mass?" that their discourses
and debates functioned. Thus to take the criminological programme as an
illustration; at the level of practice, criminology was clearly
concerned with individualization, demarcating the differentiated
individual as its practical abject. However, in some of the texts
which make up this programme, individualization was allied with a more
generalised or "mass" form of intervention which involved preventative
2
measures of social hygiene, education, housing, etc.. Thus the
criminological programme would be located primarily, but not
exclusively, at the 'individual' pole of the practical axis. At the
same time, this criminology was predominantly Statist, insisting that
criminal sanctions, penal techniques and the norms they prescribed and
enforced should be defined end exercised by the central, national
State, leaving only minor functions for private or local agencies.
Before proceeding to describe the other programmee and to locate
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them within this general framework of analysis, two points need to be
made. Clearly, each of the programmes under discussion aimed to produce
a mass effect and to regulate, transform or moralise if not the national
population, then at least substantial sections of it. In these terms,
all of the programmes are geared to the 'mass* or to a specific
'population*, be it the 'criminal class* or 'the feeble-minded* or 'the
unemployed*. But as we shall see, it is of crucial importance to
distinguish between those programmes for which a 'class' or a
'population' is merely a fictional term designating an aggregate of
individuals who would have to be worked on 'one by one',and those for
which the terms 'population', 'class', 'labour force', etc. were real
entities which could be operated upon directly.
Secondly, it might seem appropriate in these circumstances to
adopt the concepts provided by Michel Foucault to deal with this
problem - namely 'bio-polities', 'anatomo-discipline', 'macro and micro-
power', etc. - rather than to construct new terms which appear to
amount to much the same thing. But there are two reasons why Foucault's
terms have not been used here. First of all, without further elaboration
his terms are too general and unspecific for our purposes. Moreover
they do not correspond to the discursive terms used by the programmes
themselves and so are less easily applicable. Indeed it might be said
that they are not intended as a means of analysing the differences
between programmes so much as the characteristics which they share.
Secondly, and more importantly, Foucault'a terms are not designed to
distinguish the precise political form (public/private, State/non-
State, etc.) which different interventions take. 'Bio-polities',
'micro-power', etc. include public as well as private forms of
intervention which, for his purposes, need not be distinguished.
However, for the programmes under discussion here, it is precisely this
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question of political form which emerges again and again as an issue
of principle - one which may seriously inhibit the practical ambitions
of the programme concerned.
(2) The Social Work Programme
"The crucial feature of social work is its heterogeneity
and the fact that it is always allied to other practices.
Unlike medicine and educationt social work doea not have
specialised institutions and semi-autonomous enclosures
of its own; it works by grafting itself on to education,
medico-hygienic practices and to the penal and the
Judicial." 3
The authors of this statement are describing social work's place
in the institutional complex of the twentieth century. In nineteenth
century Britain the institution with which social work allied itself
was that of charity. The practice of providing aid to the poor and
destitute provided a basis for a programme of social work which was
concerned to transform those 'cases' which the offer of charity prised
open for intervention.
It is this crucial alliance between charitable and 'social work'
objectives which marks off the philanthropy of the 1870s and after
from the long tradition of charitable giving. Where charity had
concerned itself with material aid and the relief of distress, this late
nineteenth century alliance concentrated upon merging assistance with
advice, counselling and moraliaation. The charitable gift, with its
connotations of Christian duty, bad conscience and social superiority,
was thus displaced by a more direct form of political investment -
one which took care to ensure that its material outlay was rewarded by
definite moral returns.
This notable shift in the practice of charitable giving was not
the first occasion where distinct 'moral' objectives have overlain
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thoss of helping the poor - as the history of denominational charity
4
makes clear. Nor were the methods and techniques utilised by the new
'scientific charities' altogether without precedent, as the much
earlier work of Thomas Bernard, John Venn, Thomas Chalmers, Elberfeld,
etc. will demonstrate.6 But the formation of a distinct programme
which promoted social work as its basic aim was the achievement of a
number of organisations in the late nineteenth century, including the
Settlement movement, the housing reform groups promoted by Octavia Hill,
and above all, the Charity Organisation Society or "C.O.S.".
Within the field of charitable practice - which as we argued in
Chapter Two, operated as an important strategic complement of the
liberal state - this new programme can be seen as a reaction to the
problems of indiscriminate almsgiving.6 The COS in particular, argued
that the practice of distributing alms without regard to the character
of the recipient, his subsequent behaviour, or the operation of other
charitable agencies, was a primary cause of demoralisation and
pauperism. Consequently the new programme of social work with its
focus upon organisation, investigation, character and reform presented
itself as a corrective to indiscriminate charity in much the same way as
criminology was developed in reaction to the general 'indiscriminacy'
7
of earlier penal practice.
But to view this new programme as merely an improved charitable
technique would be to miss the significance of social work's
intervention, and the political character of its objectives. Indeed,
it would be to miss the overall significance of "charity" in this
particular conjuncture when, as Bones (1971) has shown, it amounted to
a political intervention aimed at reversing the detrimental effects of
the geographical division of the classes, restoring a stable and
hierarchical social order, and reforming (or else repressing) the
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'outcasts' of the residuum.
lite remarked in Chapter Two on how the Victorian charities operated
within a strategic network which held the poor within an "ideological
regard", employing categories and distinctions which were saturated by
political norms and values. To this underlying politicality the new
programme added a more immediate political concern. A crucial aspect
of the "social problem" in the late nineteenth century was the threat
posed to the balance of power by the advance of democracy and an
expanded citizenry. As we shall see, the various programmes responded
to this "problem" in different ways, but for each of them it was a
central issue. For the COS, and its secretary, Charles Loch, the
advance of democracy made the promotion of individual independence not
a problem of the past but rather a current task of the utmost
importance:
"Pauperism is the social enemy of the modern State. The
State wants citizens. It cannot afford to have any
outcast or excluded classes, citizens that are not
citizens." ®
The social work programme then, was a project which aimed to resolve
the social problem by means of a number of distinctive techniques and
in line with a series of definite political principles. Its target
population was composed of the poor, the unemployed, the sick and aged -
all the customary concerns of charity. But the new programme addressed
this population in a new and distinctive manner. It divided up the
general field of poverty so as to differentiate and categorise "cases"
and deal with them appropriately. It applied new techniques of
casework and developed its own methods of assistance and "aid". One
of the first and most concise statements of this new programme is
provided by the annual report of the COS for 1875:
"The aim of the Society is to improve the condition of
the poor, upon the following definite principles:
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1. Systematic co-operation with Poor Law authorities,
charitable agencies and individuals.
2. Careful investigation of applications for charitable
aid, by competent officers, each case being duly
considered after inquiry, by a Committee of experienced
volunteers, including representatives of the principal
local charities and religious denominations.
3. Judicious and effectual assistance in all deserving
cases, either through the aid of existing agencies, or,
failing these, from the funds of the Society; 'those
cases that cannot be properly dealt with by charity
being left to the Guardians.
4. The promotion of habits of providence and self-reliance,
and of those social and sanitary principles, the
observance of which is essential to the well-being of
the poor and of the community at large.
5. The repression of mendicity and imposture, and the
correction of the maladministration of charity.
It is desirable that it should be distinctly understood that
it is the chief aim of the Society to deal with the causes
of pauperism rather than its effects, and permanently to
elevate the condition of the poor by the application of the
above principles, combined with pecuniary or other material
assistance." 9
Ue can see from this statement that the principles and positions
of the COS - the base from which the social work programme was launched -
were distinctly conservative. The social and political analysis which
they formed amounted to an emphatic restatement of the liberal synthesis
of political economy, individualism and laissez-faire. The continued
operation of a limited and deterrent Poor Law was taken for granted and
the role of charity was to operate alongside it, reinforcing the norms
of self-reliance, domeaticity, temperance and thrift, preventing
de8titution by moraliaation and the timely provision of material aid.
When the above statement declare8 its aim of dealing with the causes
of pauperism it refers to the necessity of "dealing with" the characters
of the poor, in opposition to those who would treat the outward effects
of these characters - their visible distress, their hunger, or their
destitution. Thirty years later Loch and the COS would still be
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maintaining this position - not against the old plague of indiscriminate
almsgiving but this time against the new "environmentalist!!" of Booth
and Rowntree and its attendant concept of "class":
"The grouping of the people in what are after all unreal
classes, aids not a whit in the solution of the problem.
The remedy depends on the cause; and the causes are lost
in the classes; and thus the class only confuses the issue." ^
The consequence of this position is a programme which takes as its
practicable object the character of the individual. But whereas the
individual object for criminology emerges from the institutional surface
of the prison, for the COS it develops directly from two quite different
sources - the Christian morality of the Church and the liberal political
economy of the free market system. However, these ideological sources
dictate not only the practicable object of this programme but also its
political subject: the task of social work and character reform is
specified as a private task, involving not the State but the voluntary
endeavours of charitable individuals- In this regard, the COS remains
within the framework of the Victorian system whose failure we have
already described. However, the importance of the COS was that its
response to this 'failure1 - and to the social problem which it caused -
was not one of ideological revision but rather one of technical
rearmament. Instead of turning to the State or revising the market
system, the COS proposed new means of rendering the old project more
effective.
It is at this practical level, regarding the manner in which the
individual character is to be assessed, classified and dealt with, that
the social work programme of the COS displays its originality. In
striking parallel to the criminology programme, and at precisely the
same historical moment, the COS began to develop and propagate new and
extended methods of investigation and scrutiny, new forms of knowledgs
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and classification of cases, and a general professionaliaation of
charitable practice.
On the failure of its initial project of "organising" (and hence
rendering effective) the diverse forms of charitable giving already in
existence, the COS set about putting its own principles directly into
11
practice. It established a number of District Offices, charged with
the distribution of relief according to a series of publicised
principles and regulations. These Offices, employing trained and
salaried agents, operated a new apparatus of inquiry and intervention,
involving case papers, visiting forms and record books, designed to
investigate the character of the applicant and to allocate him to the
12
proper channel of relief, advice or assistance. Meanwhile the Central
Office concerned itself with the promulgation of these methods, through
ita evidence to Committees, its public agitation and the publishing of
numerous texts, case-histories and "Notice to Persons Applying for
Assistance".
The principles of relief entailed in both the practice and the
propaganda of the COS are briefly specified in a paper of 1880 which
states them as follows:
"... each case must be treated separately; the welfare of
the whole family must be considered; full inquiry must be
made as to the causes of distress, needs, resources,
character; temporary help should be given only if it will
result in permanent benefit, not merely because the
applicants are respectable and 'deserving'; thrift should
be encouraged and repayment of help required if possible;
and the assistance of friends and relatives should be
sought. Personal help should bear a large proportion to
material aid." 14
These imperatives of individualisation, inquiry, observation of
causes and assessment of character are already familiar to us from our
examination of the criminological programme. So indeed is the assertion
of a utilitarian or consequential logic ("only if it will ... benefit")
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and the general thrust towards character reformation. In this sense,
scientific charity's critique of an indiscriminate almsgiving which
operated without knowledge and had regard to 'desert' rather than
'helpability' is a precise replication of criminology's critique of
classical jurisprudence.
However the striking parallels which thus emerge between these
two programmes in terms of their logic of individuation, differentiation
and reform are quickly undercut by the different political principles
which each one brought to bear upon this scheme. Where criminology's
thrust towards normalisation was extended by its Statism and its denial
of subjective moral freedom, the political principles of the COS
operated to inhibit and place limits upon its normalising practices.
To begin with, the individual character which was to be social work's
practical object of intervention and transformation was conceived in the
traditional terms of moral freedom and responsibility. It was to be
taught, supported and improved by exposure to sound principles and
proper example, but in the end, its reform depended upon the individual's
will rather than any positive transformative technique, ("lore
importantly, the 'political subject' charged with the promotion and
exercise of the programme was to be private rather than public:
"Everything should be done to help distress in such a way
that it does not become a matter rather of public than of
private concern; that it is met and if possible prevented,
within the private circle of family and friends." ^
The COS was implacably opposed to any State interventionism beyond the
16
'normal' limits of the liberal State. Thus while it was proper for
the State to run Poor Law institutions, asylums and prisons, even to
administer sanitation laws, elementary education and institutions for
the feeble-minded; the field of charity, of moral reform and of social
work, should be strictly the preserve of private, voluntary agencies.
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The liberal politics of the COS insisted that the individual's welfare
should be contained within the private sphere of the family, supported,
if necessary by a discriminate, and equally private, practice of social
work:
"Not to give alms but to keep alive the saving health of
the family becomes the problem."
The family must be preserved as the fundamental social unit, providing
the social ties and responsibilities which keep individuals in check,
while simultaneously disseminating the political and economic "virtues"
upon which society depended. "The absence of the economic virtues"
was the consequence of "ths looseness of the family tie and the absence
of all mutual responsibility" which were to be observed in the families
18
of the residuum. Welfare provision by the State could only extend
the disruption of this private sphere, demoralising its occupants and
destroying the fragile family unit:
"To shift the responsibility from the individual to the
State is to sterilize the productive power of the
community as a whole." ^
This COS solution to the question of social order was thus an
emphatic restatement of liberal political positions,geared to a new
technology of professionalised social casework. The various problems
of housing, unemployment, political instability and industrial unrest
did not require a new political ordering or a change in the form of
social organisation. What they demanded was the more rigorous
application of conventional principles. The State was to limit its
provision to the strict terms of a less-eligible poor law, individual
responsibility was to be promoted, and only charity was to operate within
the space between the poor law and the family network. But if this
traditional strategy was to work, and to avoid the failures which had
begun to register in the 1870s and 1880s, then it was vital that the
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new practices of casework be allied to the older principles of
Liberalism.
This programme of privately-based social work as a means of
repairing the growing social crisis attracted widespread support in
the 1870s and 1880s. It was adopted and developed in the practices
of the Guild of Help, the Civic League and the Social Service League,
and by 1894 the COS's principles were emulated by some 85 other
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agencies throughout Britain. The University Settlement Movement of
the 1880s, Or. Bernardo's homes and the earlier Housing schemes run by
Octavia Hill also operated within the programme's terms, though they
extended its principles to meet their own specific concerns.
In terms of public and Parliamentary opinion, the COS succeeded
in being:
"At least until the end of the eighties, the most
influential determinant of serious English middle-class
opinion about the care of the poor." *1
Support was profound within what Stedman Dones (1971) calls the 'urban
gentry' and the 'liberal professional classes', and included large
numbers of public figures, most notably Queen Victoria herself. It was
notably unpopular, however, with many of the more traditional charities,
22
and - not surprisingly - amongst the working classes.
(3) The Revision of the 1880s
The COS continued to press this programme well into the 1900s and
not without some influence, as the 1909 Poor Law Majority Report will
23
demonstrate. Indeed we shall argue that the COS's insistence on
transforming questions of political rights and social organisation into
issues of personal conduct and morality, is a continuing feature of
social politics in the twentieth century. However there came a point
160
in the 1880s when the COS was actually displaced from the centre of the
social work programme, to be succeeded by a revisionist current led by
supporters of the ideas of Toynbee, Booth and the Barnetts. This
revision addressed itself to the increasingly visible contradictions
within the COS's position and resolved these tensions by releasing the
programme's practical objectives and techniques from their location
within a dogmatic liberalism. The result was the retention and extension
of the new social work methods and the rejection or modification of
their political terms.
The basic paradox of the COS position was that the success of its
programme would presuppose such a massive degree of intervention, in the
form of organised provision and casework, that in the end only a public
agency could assume such political and administrative responsibilities.
The COS's own statistical findings and practical experience - as well
as those of Booth and Rowntree - had proved the vast extent of poverty
and destitution among the working classes. In 1877 a COS Report on
the Feeble-minded had argued that "Voluntary bodies could not provide
for the numbers involved (about 49,000 of all ages in England and Wale8
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in 1871) and the action of the State was necessary". Only political
dogma prevented the same argument being extended to the treatment of
the poor, and by the 1880s this dogma of laisser-faire liberalism, and
the strategy of repressive exclusion which it implied for the residuum
was increasingly untenable.
While the supporters of the COS clung to their rigorous principles,
appearing increaaingly reactionary a8 time went on, an attempt was
made by the followers of Toynbee and Barnett to change the basis upon
which social work proceeded. In this revised programme the principles
of casework, visiting and moralisation would continue, but within a
different, and more viable political framework.
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"Scientific charity" by itself, was inadequate to its task. It
succeeded only in alienating the working class by its severity and
rigour. It possessed neither the political qualities nor the financial
resources to repair the "division of classes" which formed the basis of
25
the social problem. Toynbee and Barnett proposed two means of
developing the social work programme to overcome these problems. The
first development was the new form of social work practice implicit
in the Settlement movement,with ite concentration on group work within
particular neighbourhood communities, and its attempt to 'bind classes
by friendship* and the personal example of conscientious settlement
26
workers. The second and more significant development concerned not
the techniques and practices of social work but rather the political
framework within which they operated. In place of the repressive
exclusion which the Poor Law and the COS signified for large sections
of the poor, the revisionists offered a more conciliatory policy. In
place of an outdated and overrigorous liberalism, they proposed what
Barnett termed a 'practicable socialism'.
Practicable socialism would maintain the norma and practices of
social work, and continue to promote "the sense of independence" and
27
individual character. But the social work task would be supported by
new forms of provision which would automatically reward the respectable
and assist the needy in a manner which was not degrading. Hence the
recommendations for non-contributory pensions for "every citizen who
had kept himself until the age of 60 without workhouse aid". Hence
the suggestion of a free system of national health, improved dwellings,
28
municipal parks, libraries and playgrounds for the poor. All of these
proposals placed demands upon public provision, either at the municipal
or the central state level. As Barnett put it, they called "on Society
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to do what societies fail to do". As such,they marked an important
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break with the politics of the COS and with the Victorian strategy
for dealing with poverty which we described in Chapter Two. But
an equally important aspect of these proposals involved a tactic of
co-option whereby members of the working classes would be induced to
become actively involved within the institutions of poor relief.
Thus Toynbee, Barnett and Alfred Marshall each put forward the proposal
that "... the qualification for a seat on the board of guardians might
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be removed and the position opened to working men". The significance
of this proposal was that it hoped to lend a much-needed legitimacy to
the system of poor relief, while at the same time directly instructing
working men in the proper principles of charitable relief:
"... it is necessary that these men should ... learn how
impossible it is to adjust relief to desert, and how much
less cruel is regular sternness than spasmodic kindness."
Stedman Tones has argued that this co-option of the respectable
working class into the machinery - and morality - of government,was to
be at the expense of the residuum,who were now to be more effectively
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disciplined by their fellow workers. And the proposals of Barnett,
Marshall and others for labour colonies and compulsory detention for
members of this Residuum1 lends support to Tones' view. However, we
will postpone our discussion of these proposals until the following
Chapter on the social security programme which will describe the whole
range of tactics of co-option and forms of exclusion, of which these
schemes form an early part. In other words, we would suggest that the
proposals of Toynbee, Barnett and their colleagues can best be seen as
an intermediary point between two distinct programmes; the social work
project of the COS, and an early version of the social security
programme which would be more thoroughly developed by the likes of
Beveridge, Churchill and the Webbs in the 1B90s and 1900s. In their
attempt to disengage the practice of social case work from its links
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with a repressive and less-eligible poor law, and to realign it with
new forms of provision and security, these schemes formed a vital
bridge between the older tradition of social work and a new one of
33
social security.
(4) The Social Work of Penal Reform
Before leaving this discussion of social work we will consider
another important set of proposals which also involve an amalgam of
elements drawn from two separate programmes. These proposals were the
work of a number of penal reform groups, particularly the Howard
Association, and they drew upon both the social work programme just
described, and the criminological programme discussed in the previous
Chapter. As we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven,the location of
these penal reform proposals between the two programmes, lent them a
peculiar form and a critical historical importance. Indeed it will be
argued that the specific manner in which the penal reform groups
combined these two different traditions allowed them to function as a
kind of intermediary between the radical proposals of criminology and
the conservative instincts of penal authorities and government
legislators. Thus although these penal reformers produced very little
that was original in the way of analysis,technique or recommendation,
their importance lay in their ability to translate programmatic
statements into the pragmatic terms of British penal politics.
The field of charitable work in Britain touched upon penality in
two related ways: directly,through the practicee of certain charities
which focused upon offenders and ex-convicts, and indirectly, through
the political lobbying and campaigning of various penal reform groups.
Agencies of the first type were devoted to activities such as giving
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aid to discharged prisoners, prison visiting, and the 'rescue' of
delinquent children, as well as the establishment and operation of
34
reformatories and "police court missions". Some of them practiced
various styles of casework, involving inquiry, supervision and
character-reform, adapting the general techniques of social work to
their own specific purposes. However, as we saw in Chapter Two, the
development of these new techniques was sporadic and disorganised,
particularly amongst the provincial aid societies. Only the missions
of the Church of England Temperance Society displayed a distinctive and
recognisable method of casework,combining an evangelical zeal with the
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careful training and techniques provided by the COS or the Church army.
Occasionally these groups were also concerned to promote particular
arguments for penal reform, as when the Reformatory and Refuge Union
pressed for new laws on inebriacy in the 1890s, but most of the
proposals and pressure for reform came not from these practicing
charities but from distinct societies organised for this reforming
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purpose.
The Howard Association (formed 1866), the Penal Reform League (1907),
the Romilly Society (1897) and the prison department of the Humanitarian
League (1896) all existed in order to promote specific penal proposals
through various forms of campaigning, Parliamentary lobbying and
propaganda, thus forming a distinct organisational infrastructure of
penal reform. Our familiarity with these groups, and the continued
existence of this infrastructure today,should not prevent our realisation
that there is something very notable about this "institutionalisation"
of the demand for penal reform. The fact of private societies existing
not on an ad hoc temporary basis, but as permanent and officially
acknowledged agencies for the promotion of this seemingly timeless
charitable pursuit, is of itself remarkable. It gives support to
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Foucault's argument that penal reform is a functional and essential
aspect of modern penality, which has institutionalised not only the
forms of sanction but also the forms of criticism and reform which are
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authorised to exist. Moreover, it demonstrates how this form of
"pressure group" is at once a product and an auxiliary of the modern
administrative State. Once the State has occupied a particular realm
of activity those who would reform that realm must direct themselves to
influencing the State,in the terms and through the channels it will
recognise. In this sense, the State 'monopoly* of a field of social
practice - such as existed in the field of penality, especially after
1877 - tends to define not only the field itself but also the forms of
opposition which emerge within it.
On the basis of this argument we can better understand the
proposals put forward by these groups and ths impact they have had upon
penal practice in modern Britain. Thus if we examine the proposals
of the most important of these groups - the Howard Association - a
number of important points become apparent. We heve already mentioned
the location of such groups between the social work and criminological
programmes. This location seems tenable enough, given the similarities
and parallels we identified in the two programmes, and it would appear
an understandable position to adopt for a charitable agency operating
in the penal realm. But on closer examination we find that the
proposals of the Howard Association give rise to two paradoxical
positions. Firstly, here was a private,charitable association which
explicitly adopted COS positions on general questions of charity and
social work, which at the same time was demanding a definite extension
of the responsibilities and functions of the State. Secondly, here
was an organisation which put forward the standard demands and
recommendations of the criminological programme, while simultaneously
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rejecting the baeic tenets of criminological science in favour of
common sense and an evangelical conscience. It will be argued in later
Chapters that these two paradoxes-in-discourse gave rise to a third,
this time a paradox in development. Ii/e will see then that the
development in the twentieth century of an interventionist State
penality, utilising criminological concepts and methods,was directly
inspired and promoted by the proposals of penal reform groups which
were neither 11 criminological•' nor "Statist" in their apparent
character; These positions,which I have ascribed to penal reform groups
generally and to the Howard Association in particular,are thus of some
importance and the remainder of this section will be devoted to
discussing them.
If one examines the texts and statements of the Howard Association
and its officers it becomes clear that penal reform was conceived of as
a form of philanthropy, the prevention of crime being one specific aspect
of a generalised campaign against vice, intemperance, pauperism and
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irreligion. Consequently, the Association had no hesitation in
declaring its views upon general questions of poverty, vagrancy,
mendicacy, etc., nor in encouraging social work initiatives as a means
of preventing the perishing classes from turning to crime. In these
matters the Association followed what Rose calls "the main lines of
progressive thought in these spheres", castigating "the indiscriminate
givers of charity" and advocating "central organisation and prior
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investigation, thus supporting the main lines of the COS". This
support for the COS involved both its "proper methods of investigating
each case" and its political positions on responsibility, less-
eligibility, the preservation of families and the limited role of the
40
State. Thus an 1882 Report by the Association on Vagrancy and
Wendicacy calls for:
167
"A provision, by the Law, for the effectual local examination
of every vagrant and of every applicant for relief, followed
by prompt assistance to those found to be deserving, and an
equally prompt and certain detention of the wilfully idle
mendicant, for penal and reformatory treatment. ..."
and in similar vein, Tallack's Penological and Preventive Principles
(1895) attacks the idea of State provision of pensions, using the
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standard laisser-faire arguments of 'scientific charity' and the COS.
But if the Association adopted COS policies and methods, and
regarded itself as a firm supporter of its general doctrines, how are
we to explain the fact that nearly all of the penal reforms proposed by
the Howard Association involved a clear extension of the sphere and
responsibility of the State? For the Association, penal reform was aimed
at bringing about a reformative penality. It aimed to establish a
state-organised probation service, compulsory State-funded after-care,
indeterminate sentences and a reformatory prison discipline for adults
as well as juveniles, each of which extended the duties of the State
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well beyond the limits decreed by nineteenth century liberal doctrine.
How could these proposals emerge from an Association which claimed to
support a programme of social work whose anti-Statism was its most
prominent feature?
This contradiction is reduced if one analyses the specific features
of 'offenders' as a target population for charitable interventions. Up
until now we have tended to discuss offenders and the poor - or the
prison and the workhouse - in tandem, and this parallel analysis has
produced a number of fruitful insights and suggestions. But at this
point it is necessary to have regard to the structural differences
between the two. To state the point simply, the State imposes an
exclu8ive claim upon the trestment and administration of offenders while
no such monopoly is exercised in regard to the poor. Offenders only
exist as such in and through the institutions of the State,with the
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consequence that private proposals to alter or extent or mitigate the
treatment of offenders must be addressed to the State. The poor on the
other hand, exist and are made poor outside of State institutions, in
'civil society*. The nineteenth century State was concerned not to
monopolise their care but rather to minimise its involvement, relieving
only the truly destitute, and leaving the remaining field open to
charitable intervention. Philanthropy could thus have direct access to
the poor, attracting applicants by the offer of relief and using this
to enforce moral conditions. In contrast, 'penal philanthropy' could
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have access to offenders only as and where authorised by the State.
It could operate on the margins of penality when permitted to do so -
as with visiting, after-care, missionary work, etc. - but the general
administration and treatment of offenders was the constitutional
task of the State.
It is apparent from this that the same objectives (e.g. the
transformation of individuals into moral subjects) will necessarily be
promoted differently in the two fields. In the case of the poor, the
demand is for a minimal and less-eligible public sector which leaves
the maximum space for private casework and reform. In the case of
offenders, the demand is for the State itself to engage in the casework
and reform which is not generally open to private enterprise. And it
is these circumstances which lead to the paradox of an extensive State
interventionist!) being demanded by the otherwise laisser-faire liberals
of the social work movement. In other words, the penal reform
movement was 'Statist' in spite of itself, demanding a shift in the
State's sphere of responsibility not on the basis of political
principle but in terms of the expedient pursuit of a particular goal -
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namely the moralisation of offenders.
To turn now to the second paradox, during the period from its
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formation up until the First World War, the Howard Association
campaigned for a number of proposals which were also being proposed by
supporters of the criminological programme. These included forms of
classification, indeterminate sentences, surveillance after discharge,
probation, preventive detention and reformatory regimes for adults and
47
juveniles. Indeed the two sets of proposals have often been run
together by historians and described as a single programme of penal
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reform. However, if we scrutinise these demands carefully we find
that they are in no way dependent upon the precepts of the new science
of criminology. Indeed many of these recommendations are to be found
in the Association's inaugural statement of 1866, years before the
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development of Lombroso's theories.
In fact the superficial similarity of these demands conceals an
important difference in their intended significance and mode of
operation. Classification, for example, was proposed on a moral basis,
not a diagnostic one. It was above all to prevent contamination and to
reflect the moral status of the individual, in much the same way as
probation was recommended only for 'deeerving' offenders. Likewise
indeterminate sentences and preventive detention were viewed as sound
examples of deterrence rather than a response to the irresponsible offender.
And above all, reformation was seen as a process of moral atonement
rather than a behavioural modification, to be brought about through
moral exhortation and the grace of God, and not through positive
techniques of transformation.^ Thus against the selective and
utilitarian treatment of criminology, the Association proposed
reformation as simply the "honour due to all men":
"the severity of penalty and the rigour of discipline
should be everywhere qualified by ... the fact that
honour is due to all men, by reason of the intrinsic
worth of each soul gifted with a capacity for immortal
life and endless moral development. The basest of men,
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the most degraded of women, for all of whom Christ
has lived, died and risen, may through the power of
his Spirit, be purified into saintly excellence." ^
The fact that the positions of criminology and of the reform groups
differed radically at the level of detail is of more than passing
interest. For while these differences were suppressed in the common
call for specific measures and shared demands, they were never
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altogether effaced. Indeed we shall argue in later Chapters that
this duality of meaning allowed the initial success of these recommendations
in being legislated,and, facilitated a subsequent shift in the style of
probation, Borstal and other practices from the evangelical to the
criminological, from paternalistic Reform* to a more scientific
'rehabilitation'.
Before leaving this discussion of the penal reform groups we
should note that,at some points, their campaigns included proposals
which are not to be found in the criminological programme. These
recommendations reflected their general concerns with the preservation
of families and the moralisation of offenders as well as their
pragmatic engagement with the practical problems of criminal justice.
They included demands for a system of fine-instalments, productive
prison labour, extended access for philanthropic prison visiting, the
abolition of imprisonment for children and the establishment of separate
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juvenile courts. It is perhaps indicative of the strategic position
and pragmatic approach of the Howard Association that each of these
recommendations was enacted in legislation without the benefit of
'scientific' argument or criminological evidence for their necessity.
171
CHAPTER 5
Programmes of Social Security and Eugenics
(1) The Social Security Programme
"Security of life is the first object of government."
3. A. Hobson (1906).1
(a) Rethinking the Social Problem
The social security programme which emerged in the 1890s and
1900s offered a solution to the social problem which differed markedly
from charitable or social work schemes. In place of private casework
and governmental laisser faire it demanded new forms of social
organisation and a national framework of social administration,
sponsored and controlled by public agencies.
This programme emerged neither ae the unified proposals of a
particular group or profession, nor as the practical aspect of a new
discipline. Instead it appeared as a number of definite schemes
proposed by statesmen such as Churchill and Lloyd George, intellectuals
and journalists like Blackley, Booth, Plasterman and Beveridge, and
various political groupings including the Fabians, the Social
Imperialists and the New Liberals. These schemes, which were
heterogeneous and freguently in competition with one another, nonetheless
shared a fundamental programmatic objective in their concern to
re-organise the social realm by means of definite apparatuses of
security and administration. Such a programme, especially when one
considers the powerful status of its proponents, amounted to a radical
transformation in the terms and parameters of respectable political
debate. Lie have already discussed the general conditions for this
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transformation in Chapter Two, and in Chapter Seven we shall see how
the success of this new programme facilitated a break from Victorian
penal, as well as social, policies. Our task here is to describe the
particular lines of formation which lad to the emergence of this
crucial programme.
Ue have seen how the social work programme distilled the "social
problem" into questions of individual character and morality, which
in turn were seen to cause the social ills of pauperism, vice, class
estrangement, and political instability. The criminological programme
too, though locating the problem outside the realm of moral choice,
shared a similar view of its social consequences. For the proponents
of social security, however, the most serious consequences of the
social problem operated at higher, less visible levels. For these
statesmen and politicians, charged with the task of internal
governance and imperial policy, the most damaging effects of the social
problem were registered in the quality of the Nation, the fitness of
the Race and the efficiency of the Empire.
In the face of growing foreign competition over trade, concern
over the military security of the Empire,and evidence of physical
deterioration among the population which was needed to service and
2
defend the Imperial machine, the social problem took on a new aspect.
The 'condition of the people* ceased to be a localised question of
3
philanthropy and became a primary issue in national politics.
Unemployment, low wages, bad housing and malnutrition were reworked
from a traditional discourse of demoralisation into a new framework
in which they represented the economically dysfunctional and the
inefficient. What for social work was a moral question of individual
character, for this new programme was a political question concerning
the quality of the national character. The themes of social reform
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thus became interlinked with questions of national efficiency and
4
Imperial survival.
In changing the terms whereby the social problem was conceived,
this reorientation fundamentally undermined the rationale of the
traditional institutions which organised and administered the social
realm. As we saw in Chapter Two, the network of poor law, ad hoc relief
and charitable casework was directly geared to a moralistic and
individualistic conception of 'the problem*. Its operations were
designed to promote less-eligibility and moral example and thereby to
reinforce individual responsibility. If the primary aim of social
policy was now to be the promotion of economic and social 'efficiency*
and the old deterrent system seen as economically inefficient, then a
new apparatus of administration was implied. And given the
destabilisation of these institutions by the advance of democracy, and
the changing balance of class forcss described in Chapter Two, this
economic inefficiency was increasingly compounded by a political
'inefficiency', wherein the political 'costs' of the system (disaffection,
resistance, etc.) outweighed its social benefits.
Accordingly, the advocates of social security proceeded via a
critique of the status quo. The Poor Law was said to be "compromised,
degraded, hardly deterrent and increasingly expensive",*' lacking both
the practical and the ideological qualities necessary to the present
crisis:
"the degradation of our Poor Law, the brutality of our
casual ward, the damnable method with which our prison
seeks to deal with the most delicate problems of human
character must all give way to more humane and more
intelligent modes of handling our battered types of
humanity." 6
Likewise the supplementary provision of ad^ hoc work relief in times of
high unemployment - a feature which had become more and more frequent
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after 1886 - was seen to be expensive, inefficient and inadequate to
7
the problem it addreesed. As Gilbert points out, the failure of
such schemes provided a central argument for those who proposed to
0
breek with the poor law and its local institutions.
Finally, the practices of charity and the social work programme
came under attack. This critique carried the authority of figures such
as Beveridge, Buxton and Alden, whose experience in the Settlement
missions had taught them the limitations of social work and alerted
g
them to its harmful social offsets. As Beveridge argued in 1905, such
a system might achieve the objective of promoting contact between
different social classes, but it totally ignored the economic causes
of poverty and "simply stereotyped an unhealthy relationship of patron
and dependent between rich and poor'O^ 0. A. Hobson put the same point
more forcefully when he argued that "the material conditions of poorer
11
working-class life are hostile to the attainment of personal efficiency".
For him, the neglect of these conditions by COS casework was both
motivated and obstructive:
"the principle that individual 'character is the condition
of conditions' is much worse than a half-truth in its
application. For it is used to block the work of practical
reformers upon political and economic planes, by an
insistence that the moral elevation of the masses must
precede in point of time all successful reforms of
environment. Plenty of people are only too willing to
listen to insidious advice which takes the form: why
disturb valuable vested interests ... why stir a general
spirit of discontent in the masses; why suggest 'heroic'
remedies for unemployment when all that is needed just now
is a quiet, careful, organised endeavour to ... build up
individual character?"
Even to figures such as Charles Booth and the Barnetts, who were
clearly less hostile to philanthropic endeavour, it was evident that
the problems of chronic and endemic poverty and physical deterioration
could not be dealt with by means of private agencies and individual
casework.^
175
(b) Conditions of formation and discursive resources
The nature and magnitude of the social problem thus conceived
gave rise to a 'macro-political' programme which took as its abject
not an individual to be reformed but rather a population to be
14
reorganised and reconstituted. And given this object, and the forms
and scope of intervention it required, the programme uas led to define
not private agencies but rather the State itself as its proper subject.
Such a programme obviously has certain conditions of existence by
way of discursive resources and techniques, which were not always present
during the nineteenth century. It presupposes a notion of population
as an entity which can be managed and administered; a set of
apparatuses, techniques and personnel capable of such a task; and the
various forms of statistical, economic and sociological concepts and
data necessary to a national scheme of social administration. Some of
these practical conditions were already being set in place by the
1890s (cf. the statistical investigations of Booth and others, official
census reports, etc.) or else were supplied by the discursive developments
of the programme itself (see later), though it should be emphasised that
the limited availability of 'actuarial' and statistical data remained
a constant problem for these schemes.^ However there are also
political and ideological conditions which are crucial for this social
security programme, not least an ability to present its blatant
Statism or 'collectivism' as a respectable political option. Such a
task was,of course,facilitated by the economic and political
developments which were described in Chapter Two, but it nonetheless
required the construction of a definite ideological position which
could justify a new and extended role for the State and a positive
administration of the social realm.
The development of this new position in British political discourse
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has been frequently noted and described. Figures such as Marshall,
Beveridge and the Webbs who were directly involved in its construction
characterised it as a shift from "the problem of pauperism" to "the
problem of poverty"^ or more precisely as "a shift from moral and
17
personal to industrial and environmental explanations". More
recently, Gareth Stedman Jones has termed it a shift from a "problematic
18
of demoralisation" to one of "degeneration". Each of these
descriptions has some degree of truth, but we would argue that this
complex transformation cannot be reduced to a single formula, nor can
its occurrence be described in such a direct and simple manner.
Consequently it is worthwhile describing this position and its formation
in a little more detail.
The 'New Liberalism', as this position is generally described -
despite the adherence of Fabians and others who were not members of the
19
Liberal Party - derived from a number of sources. The most important
of these were (l) a philosophical reworking of Liberalism by writers
such as T. H. Green and David Ritchie, which revised its doctrines to
20
accord with a new conception of "positive freedom" and a more positive
21
account of the nature of power". If Liberalism was to continue its
stress upon individual freedom it would have to have recourse to the
"moral agency" of the State to remove the economic hindrances which
made men unfree. It would, in Ritchie's words, have "to construct a
strong and vigorous state and thereby to foster a strong and vigorous
22
individuality". (2) a new conception of "society" which emphasised
23
"not individuals, or their aggregates, but the social organism".
It is no surprise that Charles Booth was one of these who adopted this
view,since it was a conception which the discipline of statistics - its
data on social correlations, laws of tendency and patterns of social
change - did much to promote. Weiler puts it thus:
177
"the old Liberals thought of society as simply an aggregate
of individuals. Society,if studied or conceived at all,
could be thought of only as the isolated actions of a series
of individuals. It was, as Bentham said, a fiction. In
contrast to this view, the new Liberals, drawing on
Victorian sociology and philosophical idealism, thought of
society as an organism, a unity of political, social and
economic forces ... society was more than just the sum of
its parts; it had an independent existence."
(3) a transformation in economic theory which gave rise to new
conceptions of the labour market and its attendant phenomena of wages,
unemployment and poverty. Economists such as Hobson, Marshall and
Beveridge challenged traditional assumptions that the market for labour
was automatically self-adjusting. This,in turn,led them to reject the
corollary that unemployment - caused by surplus population, overpriced
wages or personal failure - could be relieved but not prevented. They
argued that the major problem was not so much total unemployment as
25
chronic underemployment and intermittent employment and that these
resulted from an absence of planning, transfer and mobility in the
26
labour market. Such problems could be addressed by means of a
technology of organisation and information, provided that the point of
intervention was shifted from the labourer to the market itself. This
shift in the focus of intervention was a major and radical development,
and it was precisely this desire to rationalise the market by
administrative means which was shared by the schemes of Beveridge,
27
Booth, the Itfebbs, H. L. Smith and others during the 1900s. What was
28
for the COS "a problem of social competence and moral responsibility"
was translated into a problem of social organisation: "the responsibility
of society for poverty and unemployment" was for Hobson "... not merely
29
a sentimental phrase but ... a scientific truth". It is worth noting
at this point however, that although Hobson's "scientific truth" was
shared by the other proponents of social security, this "industrial
and environmental approach" did not altogether reject questions of
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individual character from its explanation. From being the prime cause
of unemployment and poverty, "character" became a competing cause,
held in tension against its rival "the environment", and introduced
into the explanation alternatively as 'cause* and as 'effect*. Thus
in Booth's work:
"character is both cause and effect - cause to the extent
that it is the explanation of why certain individuals come
to occupy the location of unemployability; effect to the
extent that it was induced as a result of the demoralisation
coincident upon casual labour and the influences of the
environment of the casual labour market." 3^
As we shall see, this particular ambivalence was intrinsic to the social
security programme,and was put to productive use in the formulation of
policies such as national insurance, labour exchanges and the Uiebbian
schemes to break up the poor law.
The adoption of these positions provided a framework of social and
economic analyses which would both underpin the programme of social
security and develop the Liberal political tradition in a profound way.
As Hobson put it:
"The full implication of this movement may not be clearly
grasped, but Liberalism is now formally committed to a
task which certainly involves a new conception of the State
in its relation to the individual life and to private
enterprise." 31
Similarly Herbert Samuel in 1902 reformulated "the first principle of
Liberalism" to state "that it is the duty of the State to secure to all
32
its members, the fullest possible opportunity to lead the best life".
What we witness in these remarks is a reformulation of the State
and of the conception of power. From being conceived as a negative
political force to be limited it has become a positive social force to
be harnassed and put to productive use. Sovereignty, as Hobson clearly
sees, was to become a matter not of power but of welfare, and the




(c) Techniques and Apparatuses: Security and Administration
The progrsmme of social security then, aimed to intervene at the
level of population in order to render that population more fit, more
efficient and better integrated. It provided analyses which identified
the possibility of, and the necessity for, forms of social administration,
organisation and rationalisation. It identified the State as the
necessary subject of this social engineering and provided arguments to
render its Statism more palatable to the conventions of political
discourse. But above all, this programme operated by reference to
specific techniques, apparatuses and institutions which were specified
in detail in numerous schemes and individual proposals. Unlike the
criminology programme which promoted the principle of intervention
without providing the methods of treatment which its principles
entailed, the social security programme concentrated above all on matters
of detailed practical technique. No doubt this pragmatism reflects the
status of its proponents, who were in a position to maks specific
recommendations to government ministers and Inquiries - provided such
proposals were sufficiently detailed and "realistic". But whatever its
basis, the consequence was a series of detailed proposals for social
institutions and apparatuses which formed the heart of the programme.
These concrete proposals ranged from the relatively simple
devices of state-subsidised emigration, housing provision,and the
provision of old age pensions through the post office network, to more
complex schemes to bring about decasualisation in industry or the
redevelopment of national resources such as land and transport
34
facilities. But by far the most significant proposals concerned a
series of three new social apparatuses - the labour exchange, a state-
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run insurance system and a system of labout or detention colonies.
These three apparatuses were designed to form a concerted institutional
network for rationalising and administering the market in labour, and
through it, the labouring population and its dependents. These were
the crucial techniques necessary to support the objectives specified
in the discourses of Hobson, the Idebbs, Beveridgs, etc. and as such
formed the central elements of the social security programme.
(i) Labour Exchanges:
"... the labour exchange will rationalise the labour
market, eliminate futile drifting and wastage in
periods between work and, coupled with decasualisation,
subject the market for employment to the order and
regulation imposed by visibility." 36
The Exchange was designed to facilitate mobility by the
introduction of a stock of knowledge and an informational
technology which would benefit both the worker (who spends less
time "drifting") and the employer (who is to be offered "a
37
better sort of man" ). But its functionality is not exhausted
in this. It also renders both the labourer and the labour
market visible. The labourer's qualifications, work record and
willingness to work (or not) are to be observed in order to allow
38
"discrimination, classification and assessment". On this
basis he can be confirmed as worthy of unemployment relief or
insurance benefit or alternatively, he will be "discovered
unmistakably" as a vagrant or malingerer "and sent to an
39
institution for disciplinary detention". At the same time
the market itself is opened to scrutiny, allowing for the
collection of statistics which will help to predict and stabilise
trade depressions, to facilitate decasualisation, to dovetail
seasonal occupations, and so on.4"
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(ii) A System of Insurance:
The chief apparatus of security proposed by Beveridge and his
colleagues was not a system of automatic state provision but a
system of compulsory and contributory insurance. Of course a
system of the former type was proposed in the form of old age
pensions, but then pensions had a marginal statue relative to
the active work force. To some extent they operated as a
41
distant - and meagre - reward for unstinting service, but their
real significance was as a gesture of "social justice", saving
the aged and respectable poor from the humiliation of the
42
workhouse. The central scheme of social security - that of
contributory insurance - was designed in a quite different
manner in order to preserve a conception of individual thrift
43
and a distinction between earned and unearned benefit. The
insurance schemes proposed to establish a nationwide system of
compulsory social insurance which would tie each individual
worker into a pattern of weekly payments and conditional
entitlements in the event of unemployment or ill health. This
'security net* was designed:
"to entail a definite reduction in the general social
and political consequences of economic events -
industrial conflict, unemployment and so forth - by
ensuring that, whether working or not, citizens were
in effect, employees of society."
At the same time its existence provided a definite incentive for
workers to remain "regular" in their work habits, lest they fall
through the net of provision through failure to contribute.
45
Moreover, as Beveridge was well aware, an additional effect of
the insurance principle was to promote a definite form of social
integration - through the workers direct involvement in the
State system and the concomitant sense of "having a stake in
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society". Where the protection of Friendly Societies end
Industrial Insurance had previously extended only to the better-
off workers of the labour aristocracy, the new programme
proposed to include the whole working population in its net:
"Underneath ... the immense disjointed fabric of social
safeguards and insurance which has grown up by itself
in England, there must be spread - at a lower level -
a sort of Germanized network of State intervention
and regulation." 46
(iii) Labour Colonies:
For those who, despite the Labour Exchange and the security of
insurance, persisted in their failure to find work, the new
programme identified an institutional solution - the labour
colony. Beveridge puts it thus:
"... those men who through general defects are unable
to fill a whole place in industry are to be recognised
as unemployable. They must become the acknowledged
dependents of the State, removed from free industry
and maintained adequately in public institutions,
but with a complete and permanent loss of all citizen
rights including not only the franchise, but civil
freedom and fatherhood."
This conception of a 'labour colony* - with or without its
eugenic entail - recommended itself to practically every section
of the programme's supporters, from Fabians like Shaw and the
Webbs,to converts from charity such as Booth, the Barnetts and
48
Alfred Marshall. It is therefore important to stress that this
was a programme of security and administration, concerned with
'provision' but also with administering those who would not be
'provided for' in the normal way. It is thus more accurately termed
'Statist' than 'collectivist'.
As with all of these new institutions, the labour colony was
to have a plurality of functions and objectives. It was to
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operate as "a real deterrent" in much the same way as the
workhouse, but according to its advocates, this was the only
similarity:
"The advantages claimed for the colony, as contrasted
with the workhouse ... can be stated in a few sentences.
The advocates of the colony system assent that by the
workhouse methods ... the home is destroyed and the
man is generally demoralised, both morally and
economically, and that the cost to the rate-payers is
great. In contra-distinction they maintain that,
under the colony system the home is preserved, the man
improved, and this at ... much less cost. ... Indirect
advantages are slso claimed ... in the inducement or
facilities in may give to townsmen to settle subsequently
upon the land."
At one and the same time the colony thus offered itself as a
"curative treatment"^1 for a degenerate urban workforce and as a
final destination for the 'unemployable' who refused or failed
52
to assume a place in the newly organised economy.
These then,were the major apparatuses proposed and designed by the
social security programme. Along with the more traditional techniques
of social hygiene, housing provision, etc., they provided facilities
which allowed the social realm to be 'administered', organised and to
some extent 'directed' by the agencies of the State. These in turn gave
rise to new forms of data and knowledge by which society might "know
53
itself" and to a bureaucratic framework in which the "professional
administrators" so favoured by the new programme, might operate. Here
is Beveridge again:
"Half the virtue of such a scheme lies in the machinery
which it compels the State to establish, and which when
established serves many purposes besides its immediate
one. It affords the basis of knowledge and organisation,
which is essential if social reform is to be something
other than chaotic philanthropy." ^4
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(d) Internal differences
Ae with the other programmes we have described, it should not
be assumed that the various schemes which compose the social security
programme were unitary in their form or content. Disagreements
existed as to the form which pensions, insurance or emigration schemes
should take and many of the proposals stood in direct competition one
55
with another. Likewise the political positions of their proponents
ranged from the revised Liberalism of Booth, through the committed
social democracy of Hobson, to the meritocratic State socialism of the
56
Webbs with all the varieties of the 'New Liberalism' in between.
These political differences gave rise to many conflicts of principle
and of practical technique. Thus while Charles Booth was prepared to
advocate a "limited socialism", allowing "thorough interference on the
part of the State with the lives of a small fraction of the population"
in order to "dispense with any Socialistic interference in the lives
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of all the rest", figures such as Beveridge, Churchill and the Webbs
sought to establish a much more extensive and thorough-going network
of State regulation and administration. Similarly, while the Barnett's
call for "practicable socialism" was in essence a demand for a
Charitable State, William Beveridge was opposed to this kind of public
philanthropy:
"the State ought not to provide social welfare, but social
service - the organisation of the labour market."
Political principles also expressed themselves - often in quite
surprising ways - in the disagreements over the practical detaile of
schemes such as National Insurance. Thus whereas Churchill claimed to
dislike "mixing up moralities with mathematics" and insisted that
59
benefits be peid irrespective of personal fault, and Hobson went so
far as to talk of claims upon the State as a question of rights,^ the
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Webbs demanded that benefits be made conditional upon behavioural
61 62
reform and,along with Beveridge, that no question of rights should
be allowed to arise:
"It is, I find, extraordinarily difficult to get a kind of
return in the form of better conduct from a sickness or
out-of-work benefit to which a person feels they have a
right." 53
Similarly the endorsement of eugenic positions and of thorough-going
forms of discipline and inspection which took the working classes as
their target,meets with opposition not from the "socialism" of Shaw
and the li/ebbs - who went out of their way to advocate such techniques -
but from the reconstructed Liberalism of Hobson, Plasterman and other
such figures.^
(e) Social implications
Having described the essential elements of the social security
programme - its objectives, discursive resources and techniques - we
will end this section by making a number of general points about its
social implications.
The first point to note is that the programme does not propose
'security1 to be extended to all of the population, or even to all of
the working population, but only to those individuals who reach the
required standards of fitness, discipline and efficiency. Beveridge
is quite explicit on this point:
"The ideal should not be an industrial system arranged with
a view to finding room in it for everyone who desired to
enter, but an industrial system in which everyone who did
find a place at all should obtain average earnings at least
up to the standard of healthy subsistence. ... The line
between independence and dependence, between the efficient
and the unemployable has to be made clearer and broader.
... Those men who ... are unable to fill such a whole place
in industry are to be recognised as unemployable [and]
removed from free industry." 65
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Nor uas this bifurcation limited to Beveridge. Every scheme of social
security from Booth and the Barnetts to the Uebbs, Churchill and the
New Liberals proposed a similar strategy.® Again and again we find
a system of inclusion and security for the respectable, disciplined and
regular worker, played off against a measure of exclusion and segregation
for 'the unfit', the 'unemployable' and the "degenerate". On the one
hand, the security of insurance schemes and pensions, on the other,the
discipline of the labour colony, with the labour exchange playing a
central role of assessment and allocation, redistributing the population
between these two destinations. Nik Rose describes these proposals
thus:
"From Booth to Beveridge, proposals for decasualisation
had as their object the re-establishment by administrative
means of the boundary between the employable and the
unemployable, bringing to the former the beneficient and
educational discipline of regular employment, coupled with
full civil rights, exposing the latter for the harsh but
necessary action by the Stats. ... An intervention is
demanded which would have the effect not only of breaking
the downward spiral of degeneration, but also of removing
the perpetual spot of infection of the body politic, of
providing, for the social question, a final solution." ^
And of course while the strategy of 'splitting' which this entails is
by no means new, its significance lies in the new methods and
mechanisms which it describes. What was once a moral judgement made
by upper-class philanthropists becomes the automatic administrative
action of institutions in which the workers themselves participate.
The second point to note is that the proposals of this programme
entailed a massive extension of the Stats and a transformation in the
conventions of political relations. The programme envisaged not only
a huge framework of public institutions but also the routine intervention
by the State in the affairs of the mature, adult worker. The "free" and
"voluntary" contract of employment between two parties was henceforth
to be mediated by the compulsory levies, conditions and regulations of
1B7
the State, just as the 'free' market was to be subject to a degree of
organisation and administration from above.
The importance of this last point cannot be overetated, but it is
also important to stress that, despite talk of "limited" or "practicable"
socialism, or of "State socialism" this programme uas clearly and
explicitly non-socialist. Esch scheme put forward assumed and celebrated
the system of commodity relations, hoping only to improve its operation
and its efficiency. Even the pseudo-socialism of the Fabians was in no
doubt as to the meaning of social security: the 'national minimum' was
not to be the end to frae enterprise but rather "the inviolable
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starting-point of industrial competition". Indeed it is perfectly
apparent from the statements of figures such as Churchill, Lloyd-George
and Campbell-Bannerman that the programme is a replication of Bismarck's
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strategy of defeating socialism by means of social reform. Nor was
this political effect merely a by-product of a scheme for social
reform. Rather the programme of social security has to be understood
as operating at two distinct levels. Plost immediately it provided a
means of combatting the degeneration, pauperism and unrest of the
social problem by a series of apparatuses of security, exclusion and
administration. But these same institutions were also designed to
serve a second, political, function. The establishment of such an
apparatus formed an explicit and conscious response to the new political
conditions of advanced democracy. Viewed negatively, they attacked the
roots of socialist militancy by addressing the 'legitimate grievances'
of respectable workers. Viewed positively, they were to produce a form
of social integration which would tie individual workers to the social
system, and force them "to know more of the state and to know it not
as an abstraction but as an organisation of which they form a part and
70
to which they owe duties". And of course the party which provided
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these reforms could look forward to the more immediate benefits of the
working class vote and an extended social base for its support. But
for many proponents and supporters of the social security programme,
party political considerations such as these were of minor significance
compared with the importance of constituting the new worker-voters as
responsible and efficient social units, capable of taking their place
in the system of industry and representative democracy.
Finally, we would repeat that this programme amounts to a radical
innovation when contrasted with nineteenth century forms of intervention,
or else with that envisaged by the social work programme. Helen Dendy,
future wife of Bernard Bosanquet and an officer of the COS,wrote in
1895 complaining of:
n... the member of the Residuum who has no fears for the
future. ... With his debts cleared off, and a week's wages
in hand, the final utility of the reward [of working] is
so small that he has absolutely no inducement to work; the
smallest temptation will keep him away, the smallest
inconvenience cause him to throw up the job; and it is not
until he is destitute and his credit exhausted that he
finds himself beginning his [marginal utility] curve again
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diss Dendy despaired of this character. She argued that "no artificial
social arrangements" can make good the absence of "the economic virtues",
leaving the social worker with the arduous task of teaching thrift to
men who were "economic irresponsibles ...".
The radical character of social security lay in its ability to
compel such a character to responsibility - not through exhortation,
but by means of an apparatus which altogether transformed the nature
of his utilities, his temptations, and the price of their indulgence.
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(2) The Eugenics Programme
(a) The Social Problem and the Deterioration of the Race
"Eugenics" is the study and deployment of agencies under social
control for the purpose of improving the "racial qualities" of future
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generations, either physically or mentally. Of the four programmes
us have examined, the eugenics scheme appears today as the one least
relevant to our understanding of the present. Despite the continuing
existence of the original Eugenics Society, eugenics appears to modern
eyes as a marginal and disreputable concern, associated more with the
methods of European fascism than the formation and strategies of the
British welfare State. Yet in the 1900s the eugenics programme
commanded the attention and support of an important section of the
British establishment. Its proposals appeared in the recommendations
of official reports, in the editorial columns of The Times, even in the
minutes of Cabinet meetings, and the Eugenics Society numbered amongst
its members many of those men and women whom historians like to term
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the 'architects' of the British Welfare State.
The absence of any mention of this programme in contemporary
analyses of social regulation and penality would suggest that this
once—popular eugenics was nothing mors than a temporary aberration
of British social thought. It appears, if at all, as coincident in
time with the construction of modern welfare policies, but in no way
influential within them.
Qur discussion of eugenics precedes upon a different premise. It
will argue that though the eugenic programme soon disappesred from
respectable political discourse it did not disappear "without trace".
Many of its strategies, techniques and proposals were in fact to become
inscribed in the new complex of social and penal regulation, though
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usually without acknowledgement, and in terms which are less
embarrassingly explicit.
Although the Eugenics Education Society was not formed until 1907,
the eugenics programme was being articulated from the late 1880s
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onwards in the work of Galton, Rentoul, Chappie and others. As with
the other programmes we have discussed, eugenica took "the social
question" as its primary focus and point of departure, but of course
its characterisation of this question was in keeping with its
distinctive concerns. For eugenics the social problem was above all a
crisis of racial deterioration. Britain's population, particularly
the urban population, was fast becoming degenerate as a consequence
of demographic movements from country to city, misconceived social
policies and the differential reproduction of classes. Evidence of
this degeneracy was culled from the Annual Reports of the Army Radical
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Department, the Prison Commission and the Commissioners in Lunacy
as well as from the medical inspection of school children and various
family case studies, all of which were said to show an alarming decline
in the physical and mental quality of Britain's racial stock. The
social question was alternately posed as the problem of "the unfit"
whose "increasingly disproportionate progeny" threatened to "swamp
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our civilisation", or else as an hereditary decline of "national
77intelligence". In both cases the significance of this racial decline
was directly linked to questions of National Efficiency, "the welfare
78
of the Nation" and the survival of the Empire and its Imperial Race.
The crucial source of this decline was identified as the
differential rates of reproduction achieved by different sectors of the
79
population. Using the newly invented technique of correlation
analysis, Heron presented evidence that:
"there is a very close relationship between undesirable
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social status and a high birth rate. ... The birth rate of
abler and more capable stocks is decreasing relatively to
the mentally and physically feebler stocks."
while Arthur Tredgold went so far as to quantify this differential,
countsrposing the national average birth rate of A.63 to an average
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of 7.3 in "degenerate families". Against the abundant "fertility
of the unfit" with their lack of sexual inhibition and social
responsibility, the eugenists contrasted the falling birth rate of the
'better1 classes and produced the threatening conclusion that "our
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professional classes almost certainly form a group that is dying out".
At first sight this analysis appears to reduce the social problem to a
question of contingent 'natural' processes, like some updated version
of Malthusianism. But in fact the eugenic case was explicitly directed
against certain social institutions whose operations were seen to
overlay and organise the development of the race. The "natural"
processes of selection described by Plalthus and Darwin had been
interrupted by artificial social policies - with disastrous consequences
for the race:
"The fertility of the unfit goes on unrestrained by any other
check save vice and misery. The great moral checks have not,
and cannot have any place with them. But the State is, by
its humanitarian zeal, limiting the scope and diminishing
the forces of theee natural checks amongst all classes of
the community but especially among the unfit, so that its
policy now fosters the fertility of this class, while it
fails to arrest the declining nativity of our best
citizens." 83
These counter-eugenic policies operated wherever State or private
provision intervened to alleviate the stern but vital processes of
natural selection, but the eugenists reserved most critical for three
particular institutions:
(i) the poor law system:
"If the State had desired to maximise both feeble¬
minded procreation and birth out of wedlock there
could not have been suggested a more apt device than
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the provision, throughout the country, of General
nixed Warehouses, organised as they now are, to serve
as unconditional naternity Hospitals.** 04
(ii) the doles of private charityj
"It is characteristic of such charity that it not only
neglects all eugenic principles, but that in so far
as it has any discrimination it often discriminates
the wrong way. That is to say, it tends to maintain,
without any possibility of segregation, exactly the
worst, i.e. the weakest, the most afflicted and
therefore the most appealing, cases.** 08
and (iii) the Uictorial penal system:
nThe eugenist condemns our existing system whereby the
habitual criminal is subjected to numerous short
imprisonments, because not only does it not tend to
lessen the number of his progeny, but is, indeed,
likely to increase his racial productivity by, from
time to time, giving him renewed vigour.N 00
As Carl Russell put it, summing up these effects:
**The insane and the extremely vicious, the idiot and the
weakly, are all killed off by Nature herself, but our modern
humanitarian methods preserve thess wretched people alive,
and incidentally give them the chance of reproducing and
multiplying their kind." 87
What we see here is the eugenist version of the critique of indiscriminate
charity and public provision, familiar to us from our discussion of the
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COS. But the terms of that critique are altered to substitute
genetic characteristics for moral ones, thereby rendering irrelevant
even the most discriminating of methods for the improvement of
character and morals.^
At the same time eugenists rejected those proposals for social
reform which sought 'environmental' or economic improvements while
neglecting the fundamental problem of the "human raw material" upon
which these worked:
"To aim at economic change, without seeking to change the
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quality of the human element, is to waste good energy to
no purpose." 90
The rejection of "environmentalist^ was somewhat ambiguous though, not least
because Galton's analysis of urban degeneration appears to rely upon
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the environment as a direct cause of racial decline. Occasionally
this appeared as a rejection of the environment as a cause of human
behaviour -
"We must be careful not to assume that the environment is
thrust haphazard upon us, for it is largely moulded by our
own characters",9^ -
but more often it is characterised as a non-transmissable factor, whose
long-term racial influence is therefore seriously limited. As Pearson
put it:
"No degenerate and feeble stock will ever be converted into
healthy and sound stock by the accumulated effects of
education, good laws and sanitary surroundings. ... We have
placed our money on Environment when Heredity wins in a
canter." ^3
The eugenic analysis thus characterised the social problem in a
manner which marginalised the potential of both the social work and the
social security programmes. (We will see later that the relationship
between eugenics and the criminological programme was not so much
antagonistic as complementary.) Against these programmes, the
eugenists advanced their own proposals for the reorganisation of the
social realm and its racial base. However before discussing these
proposals it is necessary to enter into a little more detail concerning
eugenic analysis and its arguments.
(b) An outline of eugenic discourse
The eugenists social theory was premised upon a conjunction of
two hitherto separate realms of study which were brought together in
the work of Francis Galton. First of all he developed a "genetic
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theory" or more precisely, s theory of human characteristics and their
94
hereditary transmission, and his early work was dev/oted to showing
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that human qualities were in fact acquired via genetic mechanisms.
To this he added his "biometric" method of analysing biological
phenomena using statistical techniques such as correlation and
regression (which he himself invented) as well as genealogies, twin
studies and family histories. The result of this combination was a
theory of population and its individual characteristics:
"the natural character and faculties of human beings differ
at Isast as widely as those of domestic animals. Whether it
be in character, disposition, energy, intellect, or physical
power, we each receive at our birth a definite endowment.
[And these various] natural qualities [or] talents go towards
the making of civic worth in man."
For Galton, these hereditary qualities were not only measurable at the
level of the individual, but could be specified across the whole
population, since "Experience shows" that they follow the "Normal Law
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Fig. 1 Gallon's view of social structure
(from D. McKenzia (1981: 17))
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As PIcKenzie points out, Gal ton's assumptions that 'civic worth' was
quantifiable relatively fixed and normally distributed "were indeed
assumptions", without empirical support. But this a priori framework
was "filled out" by adopting the social data of Charles Booth to
illustrate how the distribution of natural qualities underpinned and
paralleled the distribution of social position;
Leaving aside the accuracy of Booth's figures and cla88ifications,
the mapping of these social categories onto natural ones was an
outrageous procedure without empirical or theoretical support other
than the social and class prejudices of Galton and his readership.
Nevertheless, this socio-genetic map of the nation's population formed
the unquestioned basis of the eugenic programme. The lower classes,
criminals, paupers and the unemployed, held a social position which by
and large reflected their natural attributes. As Norman Pearson put it:
"It is a mistake to suppose that the typical pauper is
merely an ordinary person who has fallen into distress
through adverse circumstances. As a rule he is not an
ordinary person, but one who is constitutionally a
pauper, a pauper in his blood and bones." 97
Given this analysis, the solution of Britain's social problem must
address the genetic material of which the population is constructed, end
not merely the social arrangements which surround it. Leonard Darwin
stated the aim of the eugenic programme as being:
"to promote the fertility of the better types which the
nation contains, while diminishing the birth rate amongst
those which are inferior." 90
The eugenists thus argued for a policy of intervention in the process
of population reproduction, replacing the weak and now-distorted
processes of natural selection with a process which was artificial
but at the same time "rational".
The practicable object or target population of these eugenic
interventions differed significantly from those of the other three
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programmes in that it included the 'middle classes' as well as the
various sectors of the lower orders. "Positive eugenics" was
concerned to design measures for increasing the fertility of the
"better" classes. It is notable, however, that this privileged sector
is never defined or discussed in any detail whatsoever. Rather, it was
assumed that fitness to breed was the unspoken but easily recognised
characteristic of the well-to-do middle-classes whose level of income
and social standing already bore witness to a sound constitution and
heredity.
In contrast to this reticence to specify the characteristics of
"the best", eugenic texts are positively locquacious in defining the
population to be addressed by "negative" eugenic policies. If the
distribution of "civic worth" forms a continuum from the worst to the
best, it is nonetheless possible to identify cut-off paints which
define an individual as "unfit" or "inferior", and these points are
conveniently supplied by the already existing processes of social,
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legal and medical classification. Consequently we find these texts
again and again reciting a compendium of the conventionally undesirable
social categories as the proper target for intervention:
"The unfit in the State include all those mental and moral
and physical defectives who are unable or unwilling to support
themselves according to the recognised laws of human society.
They include the criminal, the pauper, the idiot and the
imbecile, the lunatic, the drunkard, the deformed, and the
diseased ... [all of whom] are prolific and transmit their
fatal taints."
or again, answering his own question of "Who should be sterilized?"
Rentoul lists:
"... those suffering from leprosy, cancsr, epilepsy, idiots,
imbeciles, cretins, weakminded under restraint, lunatics,
persons with advanced organic diseases ... prostitutes ...
mental degenerates ... the sexual degenerate ... confirmed
tramps and vagrants, characters well known to workhouse
officials and to the police ... confirmed criminals. ..." 1<-'1
197
Nou one might have thought that, given the eugenist emphasis upon
statistical evidence and the quantifiability of individual attributes,
there would be some scientific rigour involved in this specification.
It comes as something of a surprise, therefore, to find that at no
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point is any such rigour evident. Instead the process of identification
of those 'unfit' to breed is both circular and sssentialist. The
essence of degeneracy - "the fatal taint" - is never directly identified
but is rather indirectly known through its outward manifestations —
pauperism, criminality, lack of educational attainment, and so on.
Degeneracy is thus a constitutional or genetic state, but one which is
only knowable on the basis of social behaviours. Hence the procedure
of scientific identification is displaced by a less than proper listing
of undesirable social types. The target population for the eugenist
becomes an amalgam of all the social ills known to middle-class man
tied together by speculative reference to a hidden core of degeneracy.
This method of disguising speculation as scientific argument is
already familiar to us from our earlier discussion of the criminological
programme. As we noted at the time (page 109) the innate essence of
criminslity is, like degeneracy, knowable only through its external
social "effects" - in other words it is no more than a speculative
correlation between a matrix of social conditions and a putative internal
essence. The direction of the argument is then reversed to make this
putative (and unsubstantiated) essence appear as the cause of the social
conditions, thereby displacing causation from the social to the
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individual level. Nor is this the only overlap between criminology
and negative eugencis. Writers such as Havelock Ellis, Leonard Darwin,
Schlapp and Smith,and Henry Boies, straddled both fields and had no
difficulty transferring data and concepts from one to the other. This
was possible because of the discursive structure already mentioned,
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but also because of the overlapping target population of both
programmes - especially their joint concern with the habitual criminal,
the inebriate, the feeble-minded and the defective. Thus Rutherford
Waddell (in his preface to The Fertility of the Unfit) equates the
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unfit with "the progeny of the Criminal" and Havelock Ellis plainly
states that "Criminality is largely based on congenital psychic
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weakness" and degeneracy - a conclusion supported by the 'findings'
of Or. Goring'8 famous prison study. As we shall see in a moment, there
was also a substantial overlap in the recommendations of both
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programmes, each of which rejected short prison sentences, calling
for preventive detention, segregation, and even sterilization. Indeed,
for some eugenists, the penal system was itself above all, a eugenic
apparatus:
"Concerning the relationship between eugenics and crime, it
must ... be noted that the penal code is par excellence a
group of eugenic measures for the code exacts only the
conservation of certain interests and sentiments,
indispensable to the well-being and development of the race.
Hence the penal code ia a eugenic instrument, although until
today, it has been without consciousness of this function.
And following the results of eugenic science, it can
tomorrow widen or narrow the circle of crimes in the and
of conducing to the physical and psychic improvement of
the race." 107
We will return to this point in Chapters Six and Seven to suggest that
this parallel between programmes was important, forming one avenue for
eugenic intervention which is rarsly acknowledged as such.
(c) The techniques of Racial Improvement and their Social Support
The recommendations and techniques proposed by the eugenic
programme were of two kinds, following the division between positive
and negative objectives. To achieve the former, eugenists such as
Oarwin and Fisher suggested family allowances, and Income Tax benefits
108
for children, while Havelock Ellis pressed the idea of selective
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marriage-licencing to encourage beneficial unions. Galton
likewise proposed "diplomas of civil worth" entitling the holders to
special privileges, patronage by noble families and the provision of
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cheap housing. Rather more developed however, were the proposals
regarding negative eugenics. These ranged from various methods of
segregation in farm and industrial colonies, preventive detention
institutions and asylums to the more drastic techniques of *tubo—
ligature* and surgical sterilization111- which, as Ellis put it, would
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"make them eunochs for the kingdom of God's sake."
It was made quite clear that these techniques would necessarily be
applied on the basis of 'administrative* rather than judicial criteria,
usually in tandem with already existing forms of provision and regulation
such as ths poor law or the penal code. As W. A. Chappie l"1.P. put it:
"When the principle of artificial sterilization is accepted
by the State, the organisation necessary to ensure that
only the fit shall procreate, will only be a matter of
arrangement by experts." 11^
We will examine in Chapter Five the discursive and ideological
tactics used to legitimate this and other programmes, but it is already
clear that the appeal of eugenics derived from a number of powerful
sources. First of all its terms combined the authority of natural
science with the advancement of the Nation and its Imperial Race.
Apologists such as F. H. Bradley reminded their readers that Darwinism
teaches "the necessity of constant selection" and in the context of the
residuum, this consists in "the destruction of worse varieties, or at
least in the hindrances of such varieties from reproduction."114
"All this sounds very hard, and it is hard; but its
hardness is solely due to the fact that in some matters
nature is absolutely inflexible." 11^
Moreover as PIcKenzie points out, the assumptions of the eugenists
concerning the individual were continuous with the common sense doctrines
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derived from liberal political economy:
"The eugenic view of society was fundamentally individualistic
'and atomistic: it was to the individual, with his or her
strengths and weaknesses, that the eugenists ultimately
looked. ... Poverty, crime and stupidity arose from the
hereditary weakness of the poor, the criminal and the
mentally-defective."
Indeed the political character of the eugenic programme is best
dsscribed as a kind of utilitarianism in extremis - which extended the
calculation of utility to consider future generations as well as the
present - though the utility of the better classes was preferred to
that of the greatest number.
Whatever its basis, the appeal of eugenics was certainly
considerable. By 1914 the Eugenics Education Society had 1,047 members
as well as the backing of other important groups such as the Fabians
and the Ethological Society.117 As PIcKenzie, Abrams and Farrall11®
demonstrate, the Society's activists were drawn "almost exclusively
from the professional middle class", particularly those working in the
biological, medical and sociological sciences. The prominence of the
eugenic programme in establishment circles may be gathered from simply
listing the names of Beatrics and Sidney Webb, G. B. Shaw, J. B. S.
Haldane, J. M. Keynes, Cyril Burt, Dr. Bernardo and William Beveridge,
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all of whom were members or active supporters of the eugenic cause.
Samuel Hynes quotes a letter to The Times of flay 1911 which expressed
alarm at the "degeneration of the race" and called for eugenic
intervention and the "genetic control of the subnormal".
"Among the sixty-six signatories to the manifesto were eight
peers, an archbishop, six bishops, three fl.P.s, the heads
of two Cambridge colleges and a number of distinguished
professors, the editors of the Lancet and l*lind, and the
heads of the Free Church of Scotland, the Primitive Nethodist
Conference, the Congregational Union of England and Wales,
the Wesleyan Conference, the English Presbyterians and
Baptists ... General William Booth of the Salvation Army ...
Ramsay PlacDonald and Firs. Beatrice Webb."
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For particular proposals, especially concerning the segregetion of
'the feeble-minded' and mental defectives, the Eugenists also received
wide support from local authorities and Poor Law guardians, as well as
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prominent members of the Liberal Government. Indeed at one stage,
the standing of eugenics was such that The Times engaged in an appeal
for the funding of a Eugenics Laboratory, printing an editorial lead
which stated that:
"the state of morals and of intelligence disclosed by the
recent strikes, the state of health of the rising industrial
population as disclosed by the medical inspection of schools,
are alike in showing the need for the study and application
of Eugenics." 1^2
It is hardly necessary to add that one large group which did not lend
its support was the population upon which the negative aspects of the
eugenic programme were to operate. As McKenzie drily remarks:
"as far as we know, no manual worker ever joined the
Eugenics Education Society." 123
As for internal differences within the eugenics programme, these
were much less marked than in criminology or social security. The
programme was rather more coherent and controlled in form, having a
specific point of origin in Galton's work, and the Society and its
Review generally presided over and organised the expression of eugenic
opinion. There were of course theoretical disputes - especially over
the theories of Lamarck and Nendel - and varying points of emphasis.
Similarly some proponents, such as Rentoul and Chappie, were decidedly
less respectable in their open insistence upon the surgeon's knife,
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though even their writings attracted influential sponsorship.
Perhaps surprisingly, the eugenic programme attracted support from both
right and left of the political spectrum, and Pearson, Shaw, Nells and
the Uebbs were all able to combine eugenics with their own statist
brand of socialism. Besides its effect in widening the programme's
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breadth of appeal, this socialist support had the important effect of
suggesting that eugenic and environmental reforms could, under certain
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circumstances, be complementary rather than competing policies.
(d) Social Implications
The primary, and most radical effect of the eugenic analysis was
to shift the target of social regulation from the level of the
individual to that of the population. In contrast to the claims of
nineteenth century psychiatry and the reformism of criminologists and
social workers, eugenics adopted a kind of therapeutic nihilism with
regard to the deviant individual. As Norman Pearson put it:
"He is made of inferior material, and therefore cannot be
improved up to the level of the ordinary person." 12®
The consequence of this position was a reorientation 'upwards' to the
level of population and the racial stock. The concern with population
and its advancement which we witnessed in the social security programme
has here become a direct attempt to seize hold of the very life
processes themselves and subject them to a "rational" re-ordering. Of
course the forms of intervention proposed, operated and "made contact"
at the level of the individual who was selected for sterilization, for
segregation, was tested, licensed, and so on. But the individual was
always addressed in his or her function as progenitor, each person or
family was hailed in the name of the Race, as an intermediary between
population and its constituents, the present and the future.
The second point to make is already rather obvious. Despite its
opposition to present forms of State (and private) provision, the
eugenic programme implied a re-oriented but nonetheless massive form
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of State intervention, provision and regulation. As Sidney Webb
declared:
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"... No consistent eugenist can be a 'laisser-faire'
individualist unless he throws up the game in despair.
He must interfere, interfere, interfere!" ^8
Moreover this policy of selective provision and "thorough intervention"
uas presented as having the authority of science which was henceforth
to form the only proper basis for social policy. Government was to
become the practice of population management based on the science of
"rational selection".
Finally, we might note that this scientific apology for class
divisions and imperialist policies did more than just reassure the
ruling bloc of its natural ascendency. It also ensured the advancement
and promotion of a cadre of administrators, experts and intellectuals
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and the professional middle class from which they were drawn.
(3) Overview of the Programmes and their Significance
We have traced out the contours and characteristics of four
separate programmes of social action which were formed and articulated
at the turn of the twentieth century. As we have seen, each of these
displayed distinct conditions of formation as well as specific
discursive resources, techniques and objectives. But despite these
differences, each programme converged onto the site of "the social
problem" and presented itself, in part at least, as that problem*s
solution. Hence, beneath the different modes of "contact" and the
varying forms and scope of intervention, we find the same familiar
categories - paupers, criminals, casual labourers, vagrants and the
unemployed - within the sights of each and every scheme of reform.
Before we proceed (in Chapter Six) to investigate the struggles and
events which translated elements of these programmes into institutional
practices, it is worth pausing to consider the significance of these
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programmes as events in themselves.
Perhaps the first thing that needs to be said is that these
programmes are distinctively social programmes. Unlike the economic
or political programmes of the past, each one presupposes a relatively
independent social realm which has its own character and determinants
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and may be engineered by the application of apparatuses and techniques.
In each programme the field of "the social" is thus recognised and
addressed, signalling the new era of what Kirkman Gray termed "social
„ 131politics".
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In keeping with the character of social politics, each programme
held out a positive power of promotion and improvement, either of
individuals, or the race, or the social system. Contrasting themselves
to the negative and prohibitive policies of the past, each programme
represented a specific means of cultivating and improving the elements
of the social realm and thereby extending the power of government over
life. This is most apparent in the eugenics programme which seeks to
do this literally, by addressing itself to the reproductive process and
its manipulation. But the other programmes are equally engaged in a
task of improvement, whether it be rendering the workforce more efficient,
as with social security, or else the reform of individuals and families
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promised by social work and criminology.
Crucial to power, especially to 'positive' forms of power, is
the production of knowledge. Hobson put it well when he declared:
"the supreme condition of progress for a society is to 'know itself
and as we have seen each of the four programmes insisted upon an
apparatus of investigation and observation to facilitate its operations.
The knowledge produced by inspections, reports and surveys was in turn
used to categorise, classify and divide the population:
"... an adequate knowledge of our city population is
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essential. In epite of the researchee of fir. Charles
Booth, many people are still ignorant of the fundamental
divisions of the working classes; they confound the artisan,
the labourer and the casual in one appellation - 'the
poor'."
Power over life demands a knowledge of lives, and the population must
be known, divided, broken down into categories and arranged around
norms if it is to be reconstituted on an improved basis. Of course the
terms upon which this operation procedes cannot be neutral,and in
establishing categories, divisions and norms,each of these programmes
attempted to transform the terms by which the social problem was
understood. But whether translated into moral, biological, psychological
or organisational terms, in each case the social question was
fundamentally de-politicised - its provenance was displaced from
questions of power and its distribution to questions of individuals
and their improvement.
Ue should note too, that in each case this de-politicisation was
partly facilitated by the new rhetoric of scientism, be it the hard
naturalism of criminology and eugenics, or the rational bureaucratic
'science of administration' claimed by the proponents of social
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security. Indeed evsn the social work programme came to beg the
prestige of science for its casework methods and techniques, particularly
when the political unacceptability of its indiscreet moralism became
apparent in the years after 1914.
It is also important to realise that for all but one of these
programmes, the powers which they envisaged were to be exercised by the
institutions of the State. All but the social work programme courted
state power, requiring not just law and its authorisation but also
resources, funding and an administrative machinery which could address
the entire population. Indeed for these three programmes the power
which they proposed was so major as to fall "automatically" into the
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State's domain.
As we have seen, the social work programme was articulated in
combination with the anti-Statist philosophy of the COS, but so long
as this combination was retained, the programme was unable to fulfil
its ambitions. This contradiction between the programme's objectives
and its proponents' philosophy was no doubt a result of serious
political conviction and belief, but it also smacked of self-interest
on the part of the COS organisation. Uhile the other programmes
demanded that new initiatives be adopted, the COS was insisting that
its own practices be acknowledged and generalised. And while it
wished to see its programme carried out, it was determined not to give
137
up the control of that programme to any other agency. It is no
surprise then, that the programme was subjected to revision by Barnett
et. al. in an attempt to overcome this contradiction, nor to realise that
social work was to achieve its real 'take-off' as a national strategy
only when sponsored and authorised by the State - first of all with
probation in 1907, then more generally in the 'Uelfare State' of the
1950s and 1960s. This transformation of the social work programme has
a significance beyond the changing fortunes of the COS and Toynbee Hall.
The way in which 'social work' was forced to accommodate itself to the
conditions of its time, and in particular to the necessity of an
interventionist State regulation, is in fact a belated move along a
path already adopted by the other programmes. And the directions which
these programmes followed were not freely chosen or simply fortuitous;
they were shaped and necessitated by the material forces and conditions
which, as we saw in Chapter Two, were transforming the whole basis of
British political life.
Another point which emerges from our investigation concerns the
rhythm and form of historical change in this area. As we have seen,
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each of these programmes was a self-conscious reaction to a prior
failure and its effects, suggesting a historical pattern of strategy 4
failure programme strategy, making and remaking the social realm.
As Rose puts it:
"the formation and reformation of the social is a continuous
operation, obeying no single principle and subject to no
final resolution."
Such a sequence accords uith the popular conception of politics as a
form of 'crisis management* without denying the part played by
programmes and other forms of calculation and strategy.
It also suggests an image of the social realm as a multi-layered
mosaic, the product of layer upon layer of organisational forms,
techniques and regulatory practices, each one partial in its operation,
each one dealing with the residues and traces of previous strategies as
well as its contemporary rivals and limitations. This history
necessarily affects the operation of modern institutions and ideologies,
including those in the penal realm which have survived through a long
period of time. Indeed we will argue that it is those institutions
and ideologies which can most easily absorb different elements and
adapt to one strategy after another, which survive in the social realm -
as witness the survival of the prison and •reformism* in contrast to
capital and corporal punishment.
Finally, although these programmes would certainly extend the power
of the State over 'its' population, we should not forget that they
would also alter the balance of power within the State and the ruling
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bloc. As has been frequently noted, each of these programmes carries
the support and implies the promotion of the professional middle classes.
Each project envisages a staff of experts, of scientists and administrators
placed in key position of power - so that when the State appears,it is
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in the guise of "Or. State", as George Sim put it in 1883. William
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Beveridge continued this metaphor 50 years later in "My Utopia" when
he described his ideal society which:
"would be run not by dictators nor by parliamentary
democracy but by professional administrators or 'social
doctors', whose sole function would be, 'so to adjust the
economic and social relations of his clients as to
produce the maximum economic health'." 141
Whatever else can be said of the twentieth century world of social
administration and the 'Welfare State', there can be no denying that




Resistances, Manoeuvres and Representations
(1) Introduction
So far in this thesis we have identified an historical difference
to be explained and hav/e assembled some of the materials necessary to
that explanation. This difference emerges when one compares the
modern network of penal sanctions and their collective representations
with the features of the Victorian system which preceded it. It is
a difference which can therefore be taken to constitute the distinctive
individuality of modern penality.
In Chapter Two we identified the conditions and developments which
promoted the transformation from Victorian to Modern penality, arguing
that a number of diverse developments combined to produce a major
disruption in the functioning and legitimacy of the penal system and
of the wider network of social regulation. In the Chapters which
followed we identified and described the range of policy resources
that was historically 'available', reconstructing four distinct
'programmes' which addressed themselves to the repair and re-ordering
of social and penal relations.
It is quite clear that no one single programme completely
succeeded in impressing itself upon the world of practice. Instead,
particular elements of each programme were adopted and established,
while others were either rejected or ignored or else adopted in a
modified or compromised form. An analysis of this historical process
of selection, rejection and compromise is thus of crucial importance
if we are to understand the specific features of modern penality.
This Chapter and the next will be devoted to this task.
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The auestion raised by this last point is a substantive one,
concerning the outcomes or results of an historical process. However
it implies an equally crucial question relating to the form which this
process took. It will be argued that the outcome of this process
amounts to a strategy, or rather a number of connected strategies, of
penal and social regulation. But to assert a 'strategy' is normally
taken to imply 'a strategist'. So even if one insists, with Foucault,
that such strategies are not the conscious products of individuals or
agencies, then one has still to describe the non—conscious mechanisms
1
which produce the strategic effect.
In describing the process of formation of modern penality, these
two Chapters therefore set themselves the following question: Given
that there was no single 'strategist', nor any single programme which
constructed the new penal-welfare strategies, how are these strategies
set in place?
The answer they give is necessarily fragmentary. 'Fragmentary*
because there is no single process but rather a whole series of lines
of formation, involving arguments, resistance, intersections and
compromises, all of which contribute to the final outcome. And as we
shall see, the "consciousness" and calculations of agents and agencies,
although crucial to these struggles, are also fragmented and
attenuated, characterised more by a self-seeking myopia than a
strategic omniscience. Consequently, these Chapters can only trace
out the various lines of formation as they are revealed by the evidence
of the contemporary texts and statements, endeavouring to present
revealing snapshots of events which were scarcely perceptible at the
time they occurred. The focus is therefore not upon grand strategic
planning, of which there is little evidence, but instead upon how each
fragment (each sanction, each image, each relation) is set in place
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piece by piece.
Given the detailed and extensive nature of this task, our analyses
will concentrate solely upon the processes of change which pertained
to penal questions, though the occasional example or comparison will
refer to the debates and decisions relating to other areas such as
labour regulation or welfare provision. This choice of focus by no
means eases the problems of analysis. The processes which established
our Edwardian welfare institutions have already been subjected to
fairly detailed analysis by writers such as Gilbert and Harris, who
2
had available to them a large range of explicit evidence. For as soon
as public assistance for the socially disadvantaged had been registered
as a political necessity, the problem of its form was explicitly posed
in political debate. Evidence of this debate - which was often fully
3
and self-consciously ideological in character - can thus be had from
the Parliamentary records, from the press, and from the hustings where
these issues were openly addressed. This question of social provision
(described then as 'social reform') provoked controversies within and
between political parties and sections of the public and was
4
consequently addressed as an important political issue. In marked
contrast, the question of social discipline, though equally pressing
for numerous reformers and politicians, and though equally political in
its implications, was never openly and publicly debated as such. It
does not appear in the party manifestoes, or in Parliamentary debate,
nor was it anywhere acknowledged as an issue of public controversy.®
Instead it emerges, fragmented and diffused, throughout a multitude of
programmes, Official Reports, specialist debates and administrative
discourses. Taken individually, as they usually are, each of these
sets of texts, official investigations and recommendations appears to
be dealing with specific, unrelated and relatively minor issues of
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control - vagrants, inebriates, youth, habitual criminals, the
mentally ill, prisoners, the unfit, and so on. But taken together,
as we shall see, they display a remarkable coherence in the definition
of problems (cf. Chapter Five (3)) and the construction of solutions,
a coherence which registers an unstated, yet fundamental, reference
to the disciplinary crisis which we described above.
One explanation for this 'public silence' in regard to issues of
discipline and penal control might be that these questions did not
divide ruling class opinion in the same way as did the other social
issues. One might even argue that the question of social discipline
can never be publicly discussed in class-divided societies,lest it
threaten to reveal that very division. But whatever its causes, the
covert nature of this process makes its explication all the more
difficult and all the more crucial.
These two Chapters then, attempt to describe the ways in which a
strategic solution to this disciplinary problem was pieced together in
the years between 1895 and 1914. However, this description will not
resemble a conventional account of Parliamentary passage and enactment.
Such accounts already exist in the work of Bochel and Rose but are
limited in their value for two reasons. First of all, none of the
penal legislation of this period provoked any serious controversy, so
the Parliamentary records suggest an account wherein penality appears
6
drained of all real social or political significance. More
importantly, this kind of account omits the important social struggles
that promote issues to Parliamentary attention in the first place,
giving them their exact terms, significance and social support. It
is not enough to suggest simply that "Reform was in the air" and
"the Home Office, under Gladstone and Samuel, was as progressive as it
7
had ever been". Moreover in describing these 'other', social
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processes which determined the shape and form in which penal issues
emerged as Parliamentary topics, we can begin to identify a number of
social and penal phenomena which are still of crucial importance
today. In particular we will be concerned to examine (1) how and why
some elements of the various programmes were adopted while others were
closed off, silenced or dismissed; (2) the precise nature and effects
of the compromises, alliances and ambiguities which were formed in
these struggles; and (3) the invisible field of ideological forces




Standing over against the reforms and innovations proposed by the
social programmes were numerous forms of inhibition and obstruction
which stood in the way of change. These forces of resistance defined
the lines of conflict and the field of confrontation which lay between
the various programmes and the power of implementation, so we can
form a clearer picture of these struggles if we begin with a brief
description of the main sources of this opposition.
To start with, the four programmes themselves presented mutual
forces of resistance, with,for example,strong opposition between the
COS and the advocates of pensions and State insurance, and between
eugenists and proponents of environmental reform. Similarly those
groups with vested interests in the status quo could be relied upon
to oppose any suggestion which might disturb their domain. Such
opposition is well documented in regard to Friendly Societies,
Industrial Insurance Companies and the British Medical Association,all
9
of whom resisted compulsory State insurance, and of course voluntary
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organisations such as the COS, the Liberty and Defence of Property
League, and the diddle Class Defence Organisation were energetic
10
opponents of any extension of State provision.
In the penal realm, resistance to change is less well documented,
but was clearly present nonetheless. In the face of recommendations
which suggested reformative and educational regimes for offenders,
the customary arguments for deterrence and less-eligibility presented
a strong line of opposition which was deployed by men such as
Anderson, Tallack and Du Cane, as well as a variety of Official
11
Reports. Similarly the normal resistance of bureaucratic institutions
to troublesome innovations ensured that reforms such as classification
and association were obstructed becauee of the "practical difficulties"
12
attendant upon their implementation.
However it is also passible to identify other farms of resistance
here which are perhaps more significant. Against the arguments for
reformative regimes in prisons and other institutions, a number of
authorities including Sir Godfrey Lushington and Dr. Carswell (and
before them Lords Cockburn and Blackburn) doubted the very possibility
13
of reforming prison or asylum inmates. Indeed Sir Edmund Du Cane,
and more surprisingly Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, actually argued that
a "heavy roll of recidivism" can be construed as "a sign not unfavourable
14
to" the success of a penal policy - a view which taken seriously would
negate the necessity of reformism altogether.
The early resistances of Du Cane and The Times,which opposed
'criminological' innovations in the name of a more traditional penality,
are revealing,because unlike the criminological programme, they point
up the political implications of the suggested reforms. Thus Du Cane
objects to the suggestion of individualised treatment and its attendant
executive discretion because it would undermine the equality of justice
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and open the "Government ... to charges of showing favour to or
15
prejudice against particular prisoners". The Times editorial of
Way 15, 1899 agrees with Ruggles-Brise that "public opinion in this
country would not tolerate the inquisitorial powers given to the
probation officer", and on Duly 17, 1901 described the indeterminate
sentence as "an alarming extension of officialism, too much like a
revival of lettres de cachet to be hastily accepted". Similar
opposition was offered by Mr. Booth M.P. and a Times editorial of
November 21, 1896,to the extension of reformatories and supervisory
powers over juveniles, taking this to represent an unacceptable
dilution of parental responsibility and an unwarranted extension of
the State's role.^ Similarly Du Cane made very clear his opposition
to an interventionist penal State when he declared himself against
the erosion of the private, voluntary character of Aid on Discharge.
Such erosions (by way of regulation or subsidy) would have:
"A positively mischievous effect, by creating a
presumption that 'Government' admitted it to be
within its proper functions to find employment on
discharge for any person who came into prison".
Other instances of resistance brought out issues which the
original programmes had skirted around or actively suppressed, such as
the political problems associated with authorised expertise,or else
the class bias of many criminological or eugenic arguments. Of the
proposed preventive detention legislation, Hilaire Belloc said:
"The first principle is that the liberty of the man
who committed the pettier crimes of violence and
larceny - not the most dangerous to society but the
most irritating to the wealthier classes - and not the
great crimes against society which so easily go unpunished,
should be, at the discretion of the governing classes ...
imprisoned for life."
In a similar vein of exposure and resistance, 0. C. Wedgwood PI.P.
remarked that the "horrible" Eugenics Society was "setting out to
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breed the working classes as though they were cattle" with the aim of
19
turning people "into better money-making machines".
This same 'Liberal-Anarchist' M.P. berated the general tendency
of Bills based upon the various programmes to promote "the autocracy
of the expert", pointing up the anti-democratic tendencies which had
gone undiscussed in the programmes themselves. For example:
"If a specialist, a doctor, or a eugenist said that
So-and-So is a danger to society and ought to be
imprisoned, it is not possible for the ordinary layman
to criticise the grounds on which he has based his
dictum of imprisonment." *0
The lines of opposition which we have so far described were openly
represented as such, and generally expressed a defensive reaction by
the administrators and supporters of Victorian liberalism and its
institutional apparatus. However, Du Cane's position was seriously
weakened by the failures of the prison and the penal scandals of the
1890s, and on his retirement he was succeeded by Sir Evelyn Ruggles-
Brise,whose appointment was a deliberate move in the direction of
21
reform. More generally, the political ramifications of the social
crisis ensured that the laisser faire liberalism of the status quo
was displaced from its position of dominance. As Gilbert argues, by
1906 there was:
"... a permanent change in the politics of welfare
legislation. Party contention over the principles
of social reform practically vanished. In politics,
nineteenth-century laissey faire orthodoxy fell without
a fight. Of the great measures ... old age pensions,
unemployment insurance and labour exchanges, or
national health insurance - none was opposed by the
Unionists on the grounds that the proposals constituted
an invasion of individual responsibility." 22
But there were also other lines of resistance which were less
visible and less easily traced to their sources, but which were at the
same time more powerful in their effects. Unlike those mentioned
above, these deeper resistances were not overcome by the tide of
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events but rather continued to exert their inhibitive force against
the programmes of change. As we shall see, u/herever this deep
resistance emerged, the outcome was always the rejection or modification
of the change in question. It will be argued later in this Chapter
that these resistances actually express some of the unspoken but
fundamental ideologies which support and maintain British society in
its modern capitalist form. Being fundamental, these ideologies are
never expressed as such, but can nonetheless be traced in the assumptions
and manoeuvres of the defensive discourse which is provoked whenever
these positions are challenged. Indeed the arguments and expressions
of the new programmes are frequently formed in such a way as to avoid
such provocations, the very existence of which is silently acknowledged
in their evasions, apologies and circumlocutions. Like the
unconscious of Freudian analysis, this deep or 'primary' resistance is
allusive, inarticulate, and displaced in its expressions. It does not
reveal itself for what it is but has to be deciphered and 'analysed'.
It does not acknowledge itself, nor is it consciously known by the
individuals who express it since it involves the fundamentally-assumed,
23
and hence unspoken,ideologies which structure modern society.
This kind of resistance occurred at a number of key points in the
intense struggles which the criminological and other programmes
provoked, and we shall discuss them in some detail in a moment. But
by way of illustration for now,we can mention the following examples.
Thus beneath the professional jealousies of lawyers, there is a deep
resistance of this kind at work in the vehement defences of 'guilt',
'responsibility' and 'free-will' - categories which underpin not only
legal discourse but also the primary relations of production and
24
association in capitalist societies. Similarly the violent rejection
of those fatalistic doctrines which denied reform was certainly
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encouraged by the self-interested desires of social administrators
and functionaries - but ultimately the strength of this rejection had
its source in the cult of welfare and reformability from which the
25
modern State derives its legitimacy. As a final example here we
might mention the repeated assertion made against 'criminological
science' that "the internal habits and disposition of the mind and
26
heart ... are impenetrably veiled from all human scrutiny". This
position, which occurs again and again in the early years of this
struggle, speaks of more than a hearty scepticism of the new 'sciences'.
It voices a desire not to know which has its roots in the depths of
certain religious convictions and certain assumptions about the
necessity of 'freedom' as a basis for social discipline. Ruggles-Brise
comes closest to expressing this clearly when he makes the quite
remarkable statement that:
"public opinion would not be disposed to admit that the
causes of the criminal act are discoverable by physical
observation, or by the precise research of a criminal
or clinical laboratory." 27
As we shall see, similar considerations of (fictional) freedoms stood
in the way of innovations such as the Labour Colony, though again no
such position was acknowledged or explicated.
Before proceeding to describe these discursive manoeuvres and
ideological clashes, we should draw attention to an important absence
amongst the forces of resistance. This absence is perhaps brought
into focus if we begin by quoting Justice the weekly journal of the
Social Democratic Federation. On November 2, 1907 Justice carried
the following statement headed "Victims of Capitalism":
"Unemployables, criminals and tramps are mainly recruited
from the ranks of the proletariat. They are chiefly
workers who have been discouraged in the hard and bitter
struggle which the capitalist system forces upon them.
... If the majority of them were asked what brought about
their social and moral degradation, their reply would be:
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lack of work, lack of opportunity, of any outlook, any
future, lack of nourishment, despair following upon
fruitless efforts to maintain themselves in decency
and comfort. They are the wreckage of individualism."
The following year, on Dune 20, 1908 this statement was followed
by another on the theme of larceny and habitual offenders:
"... such crimes are an inevitable result of the system,
an unconscious revenge on the primal robbery, and those
who represent the robbing class must need be vindictive
towards their trifling imitators."
The remarkable fact about these statements is not that they should
be made - after all, the class bias of the institutions of penal
discipline has long been obvious to socialists. The remarkable fact
is that amongst the publications of the major parties of the Left (the
SDF, the ILP, the PLP, the Fabians, the Syndicalists) these are
virtually the only critical engagements with penality which were made
in this period. Given the class bias which has already been noted in
the criminological and eugenic programmes, and the fact that their
disciplinary measures were aimed largely at the lowest social classes,
one might have expected to meet strong resistance from the parties
and organisations which claimed to represent the interests of these
groups. No such resistance occurred.
In recent years there has been some controversy regarding the
relation of the various sections of the Labour movement to the Liberal
reforms, with some writers claiming these measures as "achievements"
28
of the Left and others characterising them as "defeats". The
evidence, however, is now fairly clear and suggests that, with a few
exceptions, the main parties were generally in favour of the social
reforms, despite the opposition of the Friendly Societies and the
29
Syndicalist movement. From the evidence that is available, it would
seem that the criminology and eugenic programmes,when they were not
ignored, were also greeted with some favour. To take the criminological
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issue first, if we examine the party literature and Conference minutes
of the ILP from 1903 to 1914 we find no reference whatsoever to any
penal matters, despite the large number of important penal Statutes
passed in that period. Where questions of criminal justice do arise,
they are approached as issues of political franchise (the demand for
payment of jurors) or else as issues growing out of industrial
disputes (the demand for the transfer of the Metropolitan Police to
the London County Council to help end class bias in the policing of
30
strikes, etc. ). Similarly The Socialist Review and the various
Fabian publications (including 172 tracts published up to 1914)
contain no discussions of the penal measures of that period. In the
few places where the criminology programme is mentioned, it is
welcomed and endorsed as a more rational means of organising justice.
Thus in The Socialist Review of 1909,F. H. Minett uncritically
endorses 'the principles of modern criminology' stating that the
"sterilization and segregation of the habitual criminal or the
dangerous epileptic" is the only means of ensuring the protection of
31
society. And when, by 1912, the imprisonment of suffragette women
forced the Fabian Society to adopt a position on penality, the result
was an equally fulsome support for the new principles and methods of
32
criminological science. This brief endorsement was more fully
backed if one examines not just the publications of the Fabians, but
also their 'recommended reading' guides for members, one of which
listed practically all the criminological literature which had been
33
published in English by 1910. Far from providing a source of
opposition to the disciplinary implications of criminology, the 'parties
of the working class' either ignored its significance or else gave it
an uncritical support. Indeed much the same position was adopted with
regard to eugenics, which,though more controversial on the Left, was
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still given a fair degree of support, particularly by the Fabians
34
and in the ILP's Socialist Review.
This lack of resistance can be accounted for in a number of ways.
It may signify a simple failure to comprehend the disciplinary and
discriminatory implications of the programmes, or perhaps it expressed
the kind of political position urged by Karl Kautsky in The Socialist
Review (1911) where he insisted that the proletariat distance itself
from the criminality of its weaker elements:
"Nothing is more dangerous to our cause, nothing can
degrade the proletariat deeper, than the dissolution
of legal mass action of the proletariat in a series of
individual crimes."
On the other hand, the support given to the more repressive measures
of the penological and eugenic programmes by Fabians and the ILP cannot be
explained away 'tactically', and would seem to raise some fundamental
questions about the nature of the Labour Movement in Britain and its
relation to the classes it claims to represent.
The effect of this absence is important. In the absence of
organised support from the political parties and unions of the Left,
those threatened by these programmes - the lower classes deemed by
their 'betters' to be inebriates, vagrants, feeble-minded, unfit,
delinquent - are virtually powerless. Without a collective political
voice they have no authority or opportunity to speak. In the multitude
of Reports and Inquiries which pose the problem of disciplining these
categories, we find no evidence whatsoever given by the people in
question - they are discursively fixed as the dehumanised and silent
objects of administration. And, of course, active, bodily resistance
by those already within the institutions of penality is undercut by
the isolation, individualisation and superior force which they meet
there.
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The general effect of this absence then, is to allow the
depoliticisation of the penal issue. It becomes a realm of least
ii n
| resistance where changes that can command the consent of the ruling
bloc and its various fractions will meet with little serious
opposition. Consequently we will find that the crucial struggles which
traversed the penal realm were not explicitly political, inter-class
affairs, but were instead conducted within the ruling bloc. But if
the forces of the working classes were absent from these struggles,
they were not forgotten. Indeed the crucial process which followed
was the formulation of new terms and representations for penality which
could command legitimacy both within the ruling bloc and outside of
it, amongst legal and professional circles, but also amongst "the
people" themselves. In other words, the major political struggles
over penal change were displaced to the level of ideology and
representation, with only minor 'political' struggles occuring
within the legislative process and between the government and private
agencies (see Chapter Seven). In the account which follows most
detail will thus be accorded to the discursive struggle to found a
viable new scheme of penal representation.
(3) Programmes, Knowledge and the Struggle for Power
Having described the forces of change and the lines of resistance
which they encountered, we are now in a position to examine the process
of struggle which brought about the transformation of penality in the
1900s. The present Chapter will concentrate upon the important
discursive and representational issues, while the political and
institutional struggles which accompanied these will be dealt with in
Chapter Seven. It cannot be stressed enough that this was not a
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rational or orderly process of enlightenment whereby sound new ideas
were recognised and adopted in practice. Not only were the new
knowledges themselves of dubious scientific value, but the complex
process of official recognition is by no means scientific or rational
in character. On the contrary, its "rationale" is always also
political and ideological, since the agencies and institutions in
question are involved in government.not scholarship or science.
Consequently we cannot accept that 'rehabilitation' or 'criminological
positivism' were adopted in the twentieth century penal system
because they represented the scientific wisdom of their time. The
relationship of 'theory' to 'practice' - the intersection of
theoretical discourses and institutional practices - is always more
complex and 'irrational'. As Donzelot remarks:
"To understand the social fortune of a knowledge [un
savoir], one has to locate the reason favouring its
acceptance, find the existing link between its
discursive properties and the problems posed by the
functioning of institutions." ^6
In the following pages we will attempt to describe in detail
precisely how this relationship was constructed at the turn of the
century, utilising a conception of knowledge which always sees it in
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its relation to power. We shall argue that the history of
knowledges such as criminology, or eugenics, or social work, their
transformations, relationships and fortunes, cannot be understood
except as 'politicised' discourses whose relation to State practices
is always a complex one of strategic intersection. Hence the care we
have taken to refer to these not as free-floating 'ideas' or discourses,
but as programmatic elements, supported and mobilised by the various
social forces and objectives which were detailed in earlier Chapters.
Given these circumstances, a sound theoretical basis and the
promise of effective penal or social intervention were never enough to
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ensure the success of new proposals. They had also to be representable
in political and ideological terms. New sanctions or practices had to
be argued for effectively in the political domain and had to be
capable of being represented within the legitimatory discourses which
overlay penal relations and represent them to 'the public'. The
promotion of programmes to institutional practices was thus crucially
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about representation, imagery and forms of legitimation. But it
is important to note that this process was by no means one-sided,
with the authorities selecting from a range of passive alternatives
those ones which best fulfilled this task of representation. As we will
demonstrate, the reformers and their discourses were actively involved
in this struggle, striving for legitimacy and acceptance through
political compromise and discursive manoeuvre. Dohn Clarke suggests
the essence of this process in the following remark (although he gives
no detailed substantiation of it):
"... in practice, the abstract philosophies do not remain
visible in their 'pure forms' - they become adapted to
the conventions of the already existing logics in use,
shape themselves around those of the opposing tendencies,
organise themselves to 'win' the support of public and
political opinion and so on. Even in the case of the
reformers themselves, one finds a strange mixture containing
traces of both the classical view of the criminal and the
emergent positivist conception of the delinquent." 39
Nicholas Rose has argued, talking of psychology, that the errors
or inconsistencies in a discourse - its contradictions, ambiguities,
conflations, even its use of particular metaphors - all function and
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play a certain role within the discursive field. And Geoff Pearson,
again talking of the 'irrational' or 'extra-theoretical' elements
within a theoretical discourse, says:
"The marks which social-science literature leaves in its
readers are partly made by implicit and unacknowledged
literary and poetic devices. ...Social Science makes its
mark when attitudes within its own texts make links with,
and resonate with, attitudes within its audience; but
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these attitudes are nevertheless, rarely explicitly
rendered." ^
The structure and development of the various discourses surrounding
the social question amply demonstrate the arguments of Clarke, Rose
and Pearson. As we shall see, the programmatic 'desire' which runs
through the conceptual fabric of these discourses (cf. Chapters Three
to Five) ensured a full compliment of such motivated errors and
ambiguities, and dictated a path of development which was politically
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pragmatic rather than theoretically sound. The following pages
will identify the numerous literary and discursive tactics and
devices which occur in those struggles, concentrating particularly
upon criminology since we have already analysed this discurse in
some detail, kle will try to show how these discursive figures and
manoeuvres functioned in the struggles, and how they contributed to
the 'success' of some programmatic elements, the 'failure' of others,
and the compromising of most.
(4) Discursive Figures and Manoeuvres
One important way in which knowledges such as criminology respond
to resistance and to ideological demands is by means of what we might
call discursive manoeuvre. This involves the formation of certain
movements in theory, e.g. the production of conceptual compromises
or new alignments, which are produced not so much by conceptual logic
as by political desire. Such movements are visible at each stage in
the knowledge-power process - in the theoretical text (in anticipation
of, or in reply to, resistances); in the official and quasi-official
documents which take up these theories and represent them for
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political consumption; and finally,in the calculated language of
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Parliamentary drafting and debate. Sometimes they occur 'spontaneously',
or rather, in anticipation of resistance, often extending a theme
which is already discursively present (e.g. the use of administrative
rather than judicial forms, the tendency to eclecticism) or else
playing upon the internal differences that we identified earlier.
At other times, the manoeuvre is the result of actual struggles or
debates and is characterised by a 'resolution' which is politically
satisfactory rather than theoretically adequate (see the discussion
which follows on 'criminal man', 'responsibility' and the criminal
character).
(a) The Movement from Judicial to Administrative Mode
One such manoeuvre involves a continual play on the distinction
between 'judicial' and 'administrative'. The judicial sphere is seen
to be the proper place for public rules, hearings, the contestation
of evidence and the ascription of 'responsibility' and 'guilt',
while the sphere of administration is concerned instead with expert
knowledge and decision-making, discretionary procedures and the
estimation of norms, needs and dangers. One finds that the constant
tendency of penological texts and Reports is to displace argument from
one of these spheres to the other, stressing that any recommendations
they make should be understood and evaluated in administrative rather
than judicial terms.
There is moreover the suggestion that in these matters, the
former mode is anyway to be preferred to the latter. Thus the
neutral rationality of "administrative acts" is contrasted favourably
with "punishment" and its irrational basis, as in the statement:
"Is not the confinement for indeterminare periods by
administrative act . . preferable to punishment by short
sentences." (original emphasis) ^
227
Of course this example is contrasting indeterminate sentences with
repeated short imprisonments, but the contrast clearly goes beyond
the question of sanction to emphasise the framework in which it occurs.
The issue of short sentences also reveals another feature of this
displacement. Throughout the whole series of Reports (Prison
Commissioners Annual Reports, Reports on Inebriates, on Vagrants,
on Habituals and so on) which attack the short sentence, in each case
the problem is phrased in terms of utility, to the complete exclusion
of all questions of justice or desert. This promotion of "the
interests of society" against the individual's claims to justice is a
common characteristic of these texts, recognised (and endorsed) by
The Times in 1906 in its editorial on "The Treatment of Criminals":
"There are ... signs that an overprudish sensitiveness
as to interfering with personal liberty will not continue
to be used as a pretext for allowing persons who cannot
control their actions to ruin themselves and others."
This utilitarian disregard for justice is even more apparent where
the offenders are seen to be suffering from "morbid conditions
affecting the power of self-control". In such cases it is said to be
"practically useless to punish for the offence, while the predisposing
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condition is left untouched. ..."
Perhaps the clearest example of this manoeuvre is where questions
regarding offence-behaviour are displaced by investigations relating
to the individual's "mode of life". Numerous texts, and later at
least four distinct Reports and several Acts repeat the insistence
that the individual "... should be treated not as a criminal, but as
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a person requiring detention on account of his mode of life".
And of course a major advantage of this concern with character and
style of living is that it can demand the incarceration of "persons
48
who have committed no public offence" - a situation in which
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judicial modes would be powerless. Thus a judicially-based authority
would have tr ~uble accepting the procedure that Leonard Darwin
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outlined for habitual petty criminals and their descendants, but
the allocation without trial of individuals to carceral institutions
on the grounds of 'mental and bodily defects' and 'racial danger' is
one which can easily be accommodated within an administrative mode.
In this 'administrative' system, 'knowledge' and not 'justice*
becomes the basis for decision. It also becomes its justification,
as The Times argued in January and August of 1901:
"There must be something inherently wrong in his [the
habitual's] construction, and it should be the business
of science to discover what this something is, and by
what means it can be corrected. In all probability the
knowledge would justify committal to a reformatory long
before the distinction of three convictions had been
attained." (January 12, 1901)
"With larger knowledge it will probably became possible
to distinguish the curable from the incurable drunkard.
... Such knowledge, were it once attained, would justify
not only the temporary confinement of the curable
drunkard, but also the lifelong confinement of the
incurable. ..." (August 27, 1901)
The authors responsible for such statements take great care to
distinguish the 'reasonable' administrative act from the 'unjust'
judicial sentence, ensuring that everything possible is done to fix
the public image of their recommendations in the former terms and not
the latter. In this way 'extra' or 'lengthened' coercion is protected
from criticisms regarding its apparent injustice:
"... the lengthened care and control which may follow
the sentence of the fact on the committal of the offence,
will attach itself, not to the fact of committal, but
to the decision which the court may adopt, acting as a
'judicial authority' [i.e. a judge acting in an
administrative capacity] in relation to the detention or
segregation of the offender under the medical certificates
which have been submitted to it. In that case there would
be, strictly speaking, no indeterminate sentence pronounced
on the ground of the nature of the offence. ... What might
in that case be regarded as an indeterminate sentence,
would not be a sentence at all; it would be an authorisation
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similar to other judicial authorisations of a like
kind, to detain or segregate." ^0
F. H. Bradley put the same point more crudely when he argued of
dangerous offenders:
"Bustice is the assignment of benefit and injury according
to desert. ... But if he is not a moral agent I reply,
surely what follows is that justice is indifferent to
his case. What is just or unjust has nothing to do with
our disposal of his destiny. And hence, so long as we do
not pretend retributively to punish him, we may cut him
off, if that seems best for the general good."
The central form of justification that accompanies the judicial-
administrative shift is the concept of irresponsibility. According to
Boies, the fact of irresponsibility on the part of the "criminally or
insanely diseased ... naturally and manifestly requires their secure
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confinement until cured of their dangerous propensities".
Consequently, "the doctrine of irresponsibility thus becomes a more
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efficient protection of society than the dogma of punishment".
This doctrine is clearly at work in a large number of Reports of this
period, among them that of the Royal Commission on the Feeble-minded of
1908 where we are told:
"... the mental condition of these persons, and neither
their poverty nor their crime, is the real ground of
their claim for help from the State."
There are occasions when this particular manoeuvre is undertaken,
but its authors lack confidence in its success. In such cases a
compromise position is sometimes adopted wherein the administrative
procedure is allowed to retain a semblance of judicial imagery in
order to relieve public concern, as when the Minority Report on the
Poor Law felt it advisable to adopt such a stance when recommending a
three year administrative detention for habitual paupers:
"We feel, that a proposal to commit a person to
compulsory control for such a period on a mere order
of the Public Assistance Authority might meet with
great opposition, and would not, in the present state
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of public opinion, be accepted. Ule therefore propose
that in all these cases an Order for Continuous
Treatment should only be obtainable after an application
on behalf of the PAA to Justices of the Peace and upon
such Justices being satisfied that the conditions which
we have specified ... have been fulfilled." (emphasis
added) ^5
It will be apparent from Chapter Three that the tendency to an
administrative logic is already present within the discursive
foundations of criminology itself. Its categories and differentiations,
particularly the classifications of character which it produces, are
radically non-judicial, based upon 'science' rather than law or
justice. Our contention here, is that the manoeuvres now being
described extend that logic, utilizing it for representational and
political purposes. Moreover they do so in a manner which is not
•innocent' since it is apparent from our examples that they took place
in full knowledge of their political effects. In each case the control
of habitual petty crime or inebriacy or vagrancy could have been
undertaken within the terms of criminal law, by criminalizing these
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patterns of conduct and attaching severe penalties to them. However
this would inevitably have raised questions of justice or
•proportionality' as well as all the inconveniences of proving
intention, convincing juries and evidencing particular acts. An
administrative framework evades these limitations, in both practice
and representational terms.
UJhen in 1904 a Penal Servitude Bill introduced the question of
indeterminate sentencing on the basis on character and antecedents,
it provoked two divergent reactions. The first was characterised by
a traditional concern for due process, well voiced by Sir Robert
Anderson, ex-head of the CID:
"... his sentence is not to depend merely on what he has
done, but on what he is. ... Here then all our national
instincts of justice and fair play demand that ... this
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grave charge [of being a habitual] shall be formally
made and openly investigated, adequate notice of it
having been given to the accused, and full opportunity
allowed him to meet it." (original emphasis)
This, however, was not the line that was adopted, in this instance,
nor on any of the other occasions when such questions arose. The
preferred reasoning is specified in the following "Confidential
Report" compiled by a number of senior judges and subsequently accepted
as standard procedure:
"A difficult question arises as to the method by which a
prisoner's antecedents should be brought before the judge
in order to enable him to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred by the Bill. ... If formal evidence is required
there will be presumably a right of cross-examination by
counsel, and a right of counsel to address the court for
and against the prisoner. This is very undesirable.
The information required by the judge is solely for his
own mind, to guide his unqualified discretion in passing
sentence."
Moreover evidence of mode of life, character, etc. are "not matters
within the compass of strict legal proof", and so according to this
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Report "cannot be a matter for the jury". And yet, of course, these
are matters which can make an enormous difference to the fate of the
accused. This refusal of cross-examination, of appeal to a jury, or
even reference to legal standards makes the process of fact-finding
and sentencing into an extra-judicial procedure. It is a clear and
knowing displacement of the 'judge' from one sphere to the other.
And in this new administrative role, his discretion is to be unqualified,
his knowledge closed off from judicial challenge, and the basic rights
of natural justice denied as being out of place.
(b) The Pragmatic Compromise
As we have already seen, the demands of the new criminology faced
serious resistance from those forces which supported the tenets of
traditional legalism and its procedures. In the face of this opposition,
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and indeed in regard to the internal divisions which weakened the
movement, the most frequent response was a pragmatic compromise which
effaced theoretical difference in the name of practical unity. The
architects of these compromises were normally the professional
practitioners who stood between the theoretical programme and its
practical enactment,or else the second generation of theorists such
as Prins, Saleilles and Von Hamel who were more committed to political
success than theoretical invention.
In Britain, Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise played a key role in this
regard in his position as Chairman of the Prison Commission between
1895 and 1921. Moreover this was a role of which he was fully aware,
as his statements throughout this time make perfectly clear. In
1901 he asked:
"Can the wisdom and discretion of our judges be respected
consistently with the intervention of non-judicial
authority in the determination of
great battleground for the future ...
Ruggles-Brise might have added that this was a battle in which he too
was engaged, though more in the role of 'honest broker' than
committed participant. His interventions repeatedly sought to bring
both sides into alignment by means of various compromise formulations,
as witness his celebration of the Brussels Congress resolution of
1900,which stated that:
"... in certain cases, strictly defined, the principle
of 'indeterminism' might be usefully applied, but ... for
ordinary crime it was absolutely rejected."
As we shall see, Ruggles-Brise was to repeat this formula frequently
in the course of the next two decades, but each time with subtle
alterations in its terms and extensions of its 'strict' definitions -
changes which no doubt followed the fortunes of the battle as he
judged them.
penalty? Here is a
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In much the same vein, Raymond Saleilles argues a convincing
theoretical case for individualised treatment, to be specified by
an expert sentencing panel of "physicians, directors of reformatory
schools, professional educators, etc.". But thereafter he completely
reverses the logic of his case to maintain that while the 'experts'
should decide upon the form of treatment, it should be left to the
CO
judge to determine its duration! Bearing in mind the skill and
precision of Saleilles' analyses and texts, there can be little doubt
that here we have a clear case where the political will to compromise
disrupts the flow of conceptual logic.
Like Ruggles-Brise, Saleilles is quite explicit about the political
destination of his conceptual manoeuvres. He stresses that the law is
by no means "hospitable fo sudden revolution" and insists that "the
reconstruction of penal law requires co-operation"and a united front
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on "matters of practical concern". As we shall see Saleilles
himself made an important contribution to this task of theoretical
'reconciliation' by his efforts to realign the divergent positions of
the 'Italian' and 'neo-classical' schools around a novel conception
of 'responsibility'.
Besides such key individuals, there were a number of organisations
committed to the formation of alliances and the broadening of support
for particular penological reforms. Most prominent amongst these were
the International Union of Criminal Law (founded in 1BB9 by von Liszt,
von Hamel and Adolphe Prins) and the American Institute of Criminal
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Law and Criminology (established at the Chicago Conference of 1909).
The 'Union' was precisely that. It was not a school but rather an
amalgam or alliance of schools whose founders "sought to attract the
largest number of adherents, even when not convinced".^ De Quiros
describes the Union as a reform movement promoting a kind of "double-
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entry penology" which, like Ruggles-Brise, advocated a combination
of old and new concepts and sanctions. And to aid this compromise
between legalism and the new criminology, the schisms, debates and
internal divisions of the latter were glossed over in the Union's
texts,or else reduced to the compromise formations of a pragmatic
eclecticism. In much the same way, the American Institute sought
"to co-ordinate the efforts of individuals and organisations",
demonstrating its eclectic approach by translating into English a
number of texts representing each of the divergent positions within
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the new criminology's programme.
It should ba understood that the eclecticism of the Union and
the other reformers is a different character from that of Ferri or
Ellis or the later work of Lombroso. For writers of the latter sort
it was the logic of positivist method and the overdetermination of
'criminality' which led to their theoretical eclecticism or "multi-
factorialism". Such a position was quite different from the pragmatic
eclecticism of the reformers where theoretical argument was subordinated
to political will in the search for alliance and synthesis. Thus
Enrico Ferri, himself a theoretical eclectic, violently attacked the
'befogged eclecticism' of the reformers and their "Error" of
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"subjecting science to the state of popular opinion":
»[Those whojfreely invoke a marriage of convenience
between the old penal law and the young positive
science ... always forget that the new school stands
for a complete innovation in scientific method, and
that there is no middle term; either one syllogises
on crime considered as an abstract juridical being or
one studies it as a natural phenomenon." ^8
But if purists like Ferri were unreceptive to this conciliatory
approach, there was a much more positive response from the political
audience at which this manoeuvre was aimed. Britain in particular was
well known for its resistance to theoretical argument and the
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pragmatism of its penal establishment. Thomas Hardy may have been
exaggerating when he declared that "Ue Britons hate ideas!", but
the need to maintain a 'practical approach' in any new proposals was
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well known to reformers. As Von Hamel put it:
"... it has always been one of the most beneficient
characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon penal jurisprudence,
that it kept away from purely theoretical reasonings
and was influenced mostly by realistic views."
And "beneficient" or not, it was this 'audience characteristic' which
motivated many of the pragmatic compromises which feature in the
criminological texts and Reports of the 1690s and 1900s. For example
we find the Gladstone Report acknowledging the "learned but conflicting
theories" which have subjected "Crime, its causes, and treatment" to
"scientific inquiry", but then resorting immediately to a compromise
position put forward by the International Union and other reformers -
a "recognition of the plain fact" that most criminals, with important
exceptions, are indeed reformable, no matter what these "scientific
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theories" might imply.
The strategic site chosen for these compromise manoeuvres was,
of course, the realm of the practical. Theoretical difference and
conceptual discrepancy were made to disappear if divergent positions
could be satisfied by a common recommendation or objective. The
consequence of this was a search for practices which could veil their
underlying theoretical disagreements and a resulting investment in
ambiguity and the kind of 'polysemic' practice which will be
discussed in Chapter Seven. William Clarke Hall, grappling with the
contending positions of "free-will" and "determinism" attempts just
such a resolution:
"In spite ... of the apparent irreconcilability of these
two views in theory, I do not think that they are equally
irreconcilable in practice, and it is essential to arrive
as far as possible at a common ground of action rather
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than to investigate and accentuate theoretical and
metaphysical differences. If my attempt to do this
seems to the scientists crude and superficial it is,
I trust, at least practical." ^
In the same mode, Leonard Darwin argues that segregation, or more
precisely the preventive detention of habituals, is a point at which
'environmentalists' and 'eugenists' can find "common ground",
detention being "the right policy to adopt from whatever direction
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we approach the subject".
This last example of "reconciliation" is important because it reveals
the crucial conceptual point at which disparate theories are linked
into a single recommendation. This point of intersection, appearing
again and again in these pragmatic formulations, is the category of the
individual. Moreover the possibility of this intersection is precisely
related to its political desirability (as was demonstrated in Chapter
Three) One would imagine that the position of eugenists and of those
criminologists who individualised the sources of crime would be
radically incompatible with the theories of 'environmentalists' and
social determinists. Yet time and time again a workable compromise was
drawn out in which both positions were assimilated behind a single
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recommendation. Such a paradox was possible because the
'environmentalists' did not take social relations as their object of
analysis and transformation, nor even the social phenomenon of crime.
Instead, they, like their 'opponents', took as their object the
criminal individual as affected by social factors. Boies' statement
makes plain this centring of the individual in both kinds of
explanation:
"All the immediate causes of crime are either extraneous
or intrinsic to the individual. The extraneous causes are
the opportunities, incitements, and temptations which his
nature is unable to resist. The intrinsic causes are
inordinate desires and passions, defective or diseased
physical organs, or a weakness of moral character which
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yields to the power of the extraneous influences. The
ultimate cause of all crime, therefore, is to be found
in the character of the individual." 75
As we saw in Chapter Three, this analytical primacy of the individual
stemmed from the socially-defined nature of criminology's problem,
and the manoeuvre we are now describing is no more than a return to
the individual in the attempt to influence social politics. The
focus upon social circumstances which ' environmentalists' suggests, is
here postponed or marginalised as either a task for the future, or a
political impossibility, and what remains is a common concern with the
individual, shared by all sides, if for different reasons. Ruggles-
Brise seizes this point and maximises its utility when he declares:
"... there is, I think, one common principle from which
we can all start forward today in our campaign throughout
the world - that is, the common belief in ... the
individualisation of punishment." 76
It is worth simply adding at this point, that this focus upon the
individual was in itself a means of gaining entry into the 'commonsense'
of British penal policy. For like all 'empiricisms' the anti-theoretical
character of the penal authorities rested upon a number of entrenched
but unstated theoretical propositions. And the major assumption of
that policy was - and i_s - that the individual is always the proper
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locus of penal intervention and concern.
(c) The Linking of Themes
Another discursive device at work in this knowledge-power
struggle involves the tactical linking of disparate themes and
categories. The linking of themes takes place by means of a vertical
chain of reference which ties particular penal issues to more general
political questions in order to extend popular concern and attract a
wider support. The most common linkage of this type draws together
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questions of (criminal or deviant) Individual, Nation and Race in an
open appeal to the concerns about "National efficiency" and racial
deterioration which we described in Chapters Two and Five. Thus an
account of the issues surrounding inebriacy in 1903 is presented as
follows:
"The consequences of alcoholism are well-known and need
only to be recapitulated:
1. To the individual - degradation of the intellectual
faculties and mental degeneration.
2. For the descendants - the tendency to drink, epilepsy,
insanity, physical sufferings, idiocy, and lastly,
extinction of the race.
3. From a social point of view, the consequences are
increase of mortality, diminution of the number of
births, diminution of moral energy and of the rate
of intelligence, in a weakening of the life power
of the papulation."
The laconic tone of Dr. Ptarr is no doubt meant to accentuate the
devastating consequences of inebriacy for Nation and Race, but it also
suggests the ease with which these connections could be made by this
time. In fact this same, somewhat breathtaking, chain of reference
is to be found clearly stated in a whole series of texts and official
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statements of this period. Before long, the associations which were
developed at length in these statements had found expression in a
single term. The notion of "the unfit" signified all of these themes
and their connections in a condensed form,using an image borrowed from
Social Darwinism. It operated to fix the social significance of the
deviant population in an implicit but incisive manner, automatically
raising the focus from the individual deviant to his or her implications
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for the Nation and the Race. It is therefore no surprise to find that
when criminals, paupers, unemployables and the feeble-minded are dealt
with by the Cabinet of 1911, they are presented not as minor and separate
issues, but as a common "social danger" which directly threatens the
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progress and survival of the nation and its Empire. At the Cabinet
meeting of 22nd December, 1911, Churchill introduced a paper by
Dr. A. F. Tredgold, entitled "The Feeble-minded - A Social Danger",
which Churchill described as a "concise ... and not exaggerated statement
of the serious problem which we face". Tredgold's paper states that:
"... the problem of the feeble-minded is no isolated
one, but ... is intimately connected with those of
insanity, epilepsy, alcoholism, consumption, and many
other conditions of diminished mental and bodily vigour.
And when we remember that these are the conditions which
connote social failure and which give rise to such
a large proportion of our criminals, paupers, and
unemployables, we begin to see how far reaching the
question is."
Having settled the scope of the problem, he then specifies its
significance:
"This brings me to ... the subject of national degeneracy.
Now national degeneracy is no myth, but a very serious
reality. In the past more nations have sunk to a position
of utter insignificance or have been entirely blotted out
of existence as a result of the moral, intellectual and
physical degeneracy of their citizens, than of wars,
famines, or any other conditions. ... It is impossible
for any nation to progress, or even to hold its own,
which contains a preponderance of individuals who are
deficient in moral, intellectual and physical vigour.
It would be well if we English were to ponder these facts.
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Another linking process, this time of a 'horizontal' kind,
operates to bring together disparate categories of the various deviant
populations and merge their characteristics under a single term. This
process involves a kind of reasoning by analogy which argues that
several different categories can be commonly treated in a way that is
presently deemed appropriate for only one of them. The use of the
term "moral imbecile" was thus used to link together groups such as
the feeble-minded, the inebriate, the habitual criminal and the
vagrant, extending to the others the pathological character of the first.
Thus we find Havelock Ellis stressing:
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"... the immense importance of Lombroso's identification
of 'moral insanity' u/ith 'instinctive criminality'.
Madmen and criminals have been brought into line. They
are both recognised as belonging to the same great and
terrible family of abnormal, degenerate, anti-social
persons. This point will remain unshaken whatever
disputes may occur on matters of detail."
Once again, the success of this manoeuvre is apparent, and its echoes
are to be found in official Reports, Parliamentary debates, and a
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multitude of texts. As The Times declared on October 2, 1911:
"No study of the problem of crime will, we are convinced,
penetrate to all its roots, no measures at once bold and
effective are likely to be taken, until the close connection
of feeble-mindedness, pauperism and crime is examined and
clearly realised."
One very important consequence of these linkages was that they
opened up indirect routes of advance for the eugenic programme. As
the eugenists themselves realised, their programme was rarely
acceptable when presented in explicit terms, and every opportunity was
taken to insinuate eugenic demands into other, more respectable
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projects. One such project was Criminology and its penological
programme,which proved to be a valuable site for a number of displaced
eugenic demands.
The infiltration of eugenic terms into penological discourse was
encouraged by a number of factors. As we saw in Chapter Three, the
two programmes had much in common, and many criminologists such as
Boies, Ellis and Garafalo were committed eugenists. Moreover as
Battagliani, Lombroso, and later Goring pointed out, the institutions
of penality had a definite eugenic Bffect of their own, whether it be
the 'automatic' effect of the scaffold or long-term imprisonment, or
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else the more deliberate policies of Broadmoor women's prison.
A number of leading eugenists, including Leonard Darwin, Arnold White
and Sidney Herbert, argued for penal reforms which would promote
eugenic ends, concentrating particularly upon the demand for the
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preventive detention of habitual pstty offenders:
"... increased periods of detention of habitual criminals
would produce both immediate social advantages and
ultimate improvements in the racial qualities of future
generations, and, if this be the case, the social reformer
and the eugenist ought to be able to march together on this
path of criminal reform." 86
The effects of this infiltration can be clearly seen in the terms
used by penal reformers when they came to talk of preventive
detention. Ruggles-Brise, for example, slips easily into a eugenic
terminology, despite the fact that "segregation" and "the unfit" are
terms which had no previous currency in penological discourse:
"... the State is justified in segregating, for long
periods of time, a dangerous class of offenders, who
by their antecedents have proved themselves unfit to
be at large." ^
And Sir Robert Anderson and Sir Alfred Willis, while arguing the
"humaneness" of preventive detention, explicitly stress the fact that
such measures are effective in "preventing [the habitual] propagating
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and training a new generation of thieves".
Perhaps the greatest eugenic success in infiltrating this field
was the famous Goring research on "The English Convict" completed in
1908. This study was the most important official investigation of
'criminality' prior to the First World War, and it is therefore very
revealing that the research was conducted under the auspices of Karl
Pearson's Biometric laboratory - the scientific nerve centre of the
eugenic movement. Nor was the decision to house it there merely a
consequence of the laboratory's statistical expertise} the actual
terms of the research - ostensibly to 'test' the hypothesis of the
Italian School - precisely mirror the basic eugenic concerns with
heredity, the transmission of 'degenerate' characteristics such as
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criminality, and the use of anthropometric measurement. It is no
surprise then, to find Goring stating the following conclusions:
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"Our figures, showing the comparatively insignificant
relation of family and other environmental conditions
with crime, and the high and enormously augmented association
of feeble-mindedness with conviction for crime, and its
well-marked relation with alcoholism, epilepsy, sexual
profligacy, ungovernable temper, obstinacy or purpose, and
wilful anti-social activity - every one of these being
heritable qualities - we think that crime will continue to
exist as long as we allow criminals to propagate."
and their eugenic corollaries:
"Modify opportunity for crime by segregating the unfit ..."
"Attack the evil at its very root - to regulate the
reproduction of those degrees of constitutional qualities -
feeble-mindedness, inebriety, epilepsy, deficient social
instinct, insanity, which conduce to the committing of
crime." *0
In the years that followed this publication, more explicit
proponents of the eugenic programme refer again and again to Goring*s
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study as solid, official evidence for their assertions and policies.
Moreover a reciprocal reference was also established in the opposite
direction, as official statements about habitual crime came to be
commonly phrased in a language borrowed from the discourse of
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eugenics.
(d) The closinq-off of social questions
It was demonstrated in Chapter Three that the original
criminological programme involved a number of radical, 'social*
elements which raised the issue of social change as a response to
criminality. Given the individualising logic of criminological
discourse, and the absence of any external socialist support for these
positions, these were necessarily weak and somewhat marginal features
of the programme. However their political significance belied this
marginality, since so long as these elements existed, the question
of social change would always be linked to the question of crime.
In the texts and statements of this period we can trace a series
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of manoeuvres which effectively remove this political threat and close
off the question of social change. Once again, the 'motive' of this
manoeuvre appears to stem from the reformers'will to power. To raise
the social question in a strong form would contradict the fundamental
logic of both the criminal law and the penal system as they were
presently constituted. In keeping with the basic ideologies of
individualism, these institutions were structured around 'the individual",
making it impossible, as The Times teased, "to put society in the
dock",or to deal in legal terms with the social relations which
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promote criminality. Institutional structures such as these made
the radical elements of criminology politically 'unthinkable'. They
therefore posed a serious threat to the programme's success and
prompted moves to forceably exclude them from its discursive field.
In the texts of Andre, Carpenter, and later, of Fenner Brockway,
this process is simple and self-imposed. Despite the radical
positions which each of these stakes out, reminding the reader of the
social causes of crime and the need for their reform, these social
elements later disappear in the actual arguments and policy
recommendations which follow. Frequently the social aspect is reduced
to a token mention, with no real place in the texts investigatory or
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policy framework. Thus Fenner Brockway says "we must not concentrate
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on the individual so much that we forget society" but his text does
just that in its exclusive concern with the individual and his penal
treatment. Ue are not, of course, suggesting here that this effect
was consciously achieved by Brockway or anyone else. Rather what
appears to happen is that these authors unconsciously allow themselves
to follow the well-established lines of argument which sharply
separate penality from politics. And in their desire to address penal
questions and achieve practical reforms, they focus their attention
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upon penal institutions, leaving the arguments for political change
to other texts and other institutions. But it is precisely this
separation of 'penal' and 'political', and its unintended reiteration,
which effectively emasculated the radical elements in the criminological
programme.
We can see this separation - and its effects - most clearly in the
work of Raffaele Garafalo. Garafalo accepts that 'social' and
individual causes are both necessary to explain criminal behaviour,
but he insists that the former are beyond the scope of penal law;
indeed of law in general:
"we take fully into account the influences of the physical
and moral environment. ... But the contention that, in
lieu of punishing, we should aim to modify the environment
and thus suppress the causes of crime, is one not entitled
to serious regard. The law-maker cannot accomplish that
which is the work of time alone." ^6
Within this logic, environmentalism ceases to be radical and
becomes an argument for individual segregation - the removal of the
individual from the criminogenic environment. Several years later
Ruggles-Brise employs precisely the same separation in his
representation of penal issues for the British public. Of course in
that age of liberal reform he was more convinced than Garafalo about
the capacities of the legislature to effect social change. But he
was just as insistent on distinguishing "social or political science"
from the "medical science" proper to penologists. The first will,
perhaps, "reconstitute the 'milieu' whence vice and misery spring",
but the second shall "by diagnosis and therapeutics of the mental and
physical state, in early age before it is too late, correct and
restrain by suitable preventative means, institutional or otherwise, the
tendency to anti-social conduct". Safe in the knowledge that the
social question "is engaging the attention of our statesmen today",
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the penologist can proceed to the proper task of penality, viz., "the
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individualisation of treatment".
(5) The Conduct and Resolution of Key Debates
The conceptual manoeuvres which we have described so far took
place largely without controversy - or more precisely, in anticipation
and evasion of controversy. There were, however, a number of serious
and intense theoretical conflicts which did see the light of day,
centring upon questions of 'criminal man', 'responsibility* and
determinism. Our intention here is to analyse the conduct of these
debates and the direction of their paths of resolution,in order to
identify the ideological and political pressures which helped to
shape the eventual theoretical outcomes.
(a) Criminal Plan, Fatalism, Reform
The most renowned and sensational 'discovery' of nineteenth
century criminology was that there existed a distinct and identifiable
'criminal man'. The controversy which followed this contention was
world-wide and its echoes resonate to the present day, but it is
9
nonetheless a controversy with very distinct contours and directions.
The central points at issue quickly became established as firstly,
the implications of this position for penal intervention and second,
the precise way in which the 'criminal type' was to be differentiated
from the non-criminal.
The first field of contention is clearly established by Ruggles-
Brise when he represented the Italian School's 'criminal type' as
"... a race of beings predestined to criminal acts,
against whom any system of punishment would be futile
as by nature such beings would not be amenable to the
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deterrent influences of penal law."
The fact that this amounts to a gross overstatement of the
'Italian' view (as Ferri and Garafalo never ceased to protest?^,
misrepresenting even the early work of Lombroso, powerfully confirms
the importance of this question of "fatalism".
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Against this imputed fatalism there was no end of protest.
But the attack was launched not so much against the veracity of the
proposition, or the evidence for it, but against its implications
for penal practice:
"Like all half-truths, it is extremely dangerous. ... [it
is] what Dr. Goring calls the great 'superstition' of the
day which stands in the way of Prison reform, which
darkens counsel in dealing with crime, which renders
rehabilitation difficult, and which stifles and
discourages the zeal of the philanthropist. ..." ""^2
"Nothing in the past has so much retarded progress as
the conviction ... that the criminal is a class by
himself, different from all other classes, with an innate
tendency to crime. ... It accounts for the unfavourable
and sceptical attitude which we still find in many places
towards any attempt to reclaim the criminal."
Whatever the theoretical merits or demerits of the proposition,
it was too dangerous to be allowed to circulate. We can see this
political closure operate even more clearly in relation to Dr. Goring's
study. Here was an official, British investigation of impeccable
scientific credentials (at least in the eyes of the Prison Commission)
which alleged that criminality was indeed an inherited characteristic.
The intervention of Ruggles-Brise to write a preface to the study,
representing it for a popular audience, was therefore crucial. Here
is his 'rescue' manoeuvre in operation:
"... the criminal diathesis, revealed by the tendency to
crime, is affected by heredity to much the same extent as
other physical and mental conditions in man: but this does
not mean that a man is predestined to a criminal career
by a tendency which he is unable to control. ... Heritable
constitutional conditions ... can be regulated, encouraged
or stultified by training and education ... and it is in
247
the acceptance of this belief that lies hope for the
race and encouragement for reformers of all kinds. Its
acceptance rescues the notion of hereditary criminality
from the stigma of predestination which necessarily
attaches to any idea of a criminal ne."
See how 'science* and statistics quickly give way to their political
purposes - and how in the name of the Race, of hope, and Reform we
must believ/e in the power of intervention. The space for positive
intervention - which criminology constructed and which, ironically,
the Italians threatened to reduce - is thus re-opened by the anxious
Chairman of the Prison Commission. This same 'rescue' operation can
be seen in the work of William Clarke Hall and of the reformers of the
International Union, their political slogan - "causality and not
fatality of crime" - being designed to ensure that the notion of
determination is retained, but is simultaneously stripped of its
self-defeating possibilities.
The direction and resolution of this controversy is clearly
motivated by the desire for intervention and reform,which, as we saw,
is an integral part of the criminological programme. Its "meaning" is
hardly mysterious, particularly when one recalls that the careers and
status of a new generation of penal and social administrators depended
upon an endorsement of positive intervention. But the force of this
debate, and one or two remarks which occurred, suggest that it may have
had a rather deeper significance. We mentioned earlier a reluctance
to define "incorrigibility" which is evident in the Congresses and
texts of this period, and no doubt much of this reluctance stemmed
from the practical difficulties of definition. But it is interesting
to consider the statement made by The Spectator in 1904 (January 16)
in welcoming the indeterminate sentence proposed by the 1904 Penal
Servitude Bill. The article's title describes this as "An Important
Social Reform" which the magazine welcomes, but it takes care to warn
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that there are limits to be observed for "... it would revolt the
public conscience to contemplate the absolute shutting of the door of
earthly hope". In the same vein, Churchill's well known statement
of 1910 refuses to "cut off hope" and represents the will to bring
about reformation as a central symbol of the modern British State.
Among his "unfailing tests of civilisation" he lists:
"Tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and
regenerative processes: unyielding faith that there is
a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of
every man. These are the symbols, which, in the treatment
of crime and criminal, mark and measure the stored up
strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of living
virtue in it."
Perhaps, as shall be argued in Chapter Seven, we can take Churchill
at his word here and suggest that reformation is indeed a vital
symbol of the modern State's ideology. So vital, that it must
always be asserted discursively, whatever its role in practice.
The second major line of conflict which followed from Lombroso's
contention took up the question of differentiation. But it was not
so much concerned with the specific 'anomalies' or 'differences'
which supposedly stigmatised 'the criminal'. Instead it focused upon
the mode of differentiation that was implied, attacking the idea of
an absolute demarcation and replacing it with a more sophisticated,
more strategic conception. Writers such as Ruggles-Brise, Sante de
Sanctis and Leonard Darwin rejected the notion that criminals were a
"special type" of a "class apart"asserting instead the idea of
'relative'degrees of criminality, with a continuum running between
the criminal and non-criminal, the normal and the pathological:
"... criminals are not a class apart, but merely ordinary
individuals with certain innate qualities exceptionally
well marked." ^7
"... defectiveness ... is a relative term only."
"... the 'anthropological monster* does not exist, ... The
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truth is that these [are] deviations from the normal. ..."
The rejection of an absolute demarcation, and the substitution
of a relative scale running from the normal to the pathological,
carries with it a number of consequences. Firstly, there is no
longer any need to set a fixed, agreed line of differentiation
whereby the criminal can be known absolutely, thereby relieving
criminology of a task which had so far proved impossible. Secondly,
it established a definite place for the expert, for if criminality
was a delicate matter of degree, only the expert could be relied upon
to identify its subtle marks and traces. Ferri recites a tale wherein
several uninitiated Conference members failed to identify any anomalies
amongst a group of 'degenerates' from the Asylum of St. Ann in Paris.
Cesare Lombroso, "trembling all over with the tremor of a good
bloodhound close to his quarry", confounded them all by finding in
each case numerous serious 'stigmata', though "these anomalies were
invisible to the inexpert" J Thirdly, the new continuum establishes
a much wider field for intervention - for two reasons. The declaring
of an absolute demarcation which all can agree (e.g. the insanity rule
in NcNaughten's case) will necessarily tend to be restrictive. A
continuum, leaving each decision to expert decision in the individual
case, allows a kind of "floating standard", unspecified in advance,
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left to experts to define as the occasions arise. As The Times
declared:
"... there is forming ... a consensus of opinion among
those having an actual conversancy with criminal man
... that there exists a large category of individuals,
intermediate between the wholly insane and the normal.
... The recognition of the existence of this class, and
of the necessity of dealing with it firmly, marks a
great advance."
The other reason why this marks an extension of intervention is
clearly and simply put by William Clarke Hall when he applies this
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conception to the children appearing in his courtroom:
"... there can be no such entity as the completely
normal child."
We can also see from these last two statements that the rejection of
an absolute demarcation of the 'criminal type' leaves untouched the
assumption of pathology. The continuum is between the normal and
the pathological and it provides the basis and justification for a
potentially infinite field of intervention.
Once again, the meaning of this debate has become more intelligible
in examining its lines of contest and resolution. But perhaps a deeper
significance can also be suggested. If we were to crudely summarise
the conduct of the criminology programme, we could say that it began
by promising to demarcate and identify the criminal by means of
objective, specifiable criteria. Having convinced its audience of
this possibility, it then withdrew the offer of a publicly specified
I 0I line of demarcation and instead abrogated to itself the task of
demarcating. Moreover this regrouped strategy has advantages which
extend beyond the promotion of the criminological expert: for in its
new form it specifies not a norm but an apparatus to enforce norms.
It does not so much specify the criminal 'Other' as indicate his
existence and set up an apparatus gualified to identify and police
•him'. Thus to extend Foucault's arguments, it justifies an extended
form of policing by naming an 'Other' who can never be known in
advance of a generalised but closely drawn practice of observation
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and scrutiny which covers the whole population.
(b) The 'Responsible' Subject: Free-will and Determinism
It should be apparent from the above discussion that the new
penology was traversed both by theoretical logic and political desire.
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In consequence it was caught in a contradictory position, being both
for and against determinism. On the one hand, the notion of determinism
supplied criminology's theoretical raison d'etre, but on the other,
a total determinism or fatalism would altogether deny its penological
intent. On to this contradiction was added a further layer of
difficulty by the fact that 'determinism* itself was radically
incompatible with the prevailing legal, moral and political conceptions
of the free-willed individual. The result was a debate centring upon
'the subject' which was of crucial strategic importance in the
knowledge-power struggle.
We have already witnessed how the new criminology categorically
refused the classical conception of the free-willed criminal actor.
This axiomatic difference emerged most forcefully around the practical
question of 'responsibility'. In its traditional legal usage,
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'responsibility' implied a moral agent, and therefore the denial
of free-will entailed a parallel refusal of responsibility, and the
procedures of social accountability which founded themselves upon the
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subject's responsibility for his actions. The desired shift from
the judicial to the administrative register, and the substitution of
criteria of dangerousness and social defence for 'responsibility'
and 'retribution',are the direct consequences of this deterministic
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denial of free-will.
Although there were some writers such as Ferri and De Fleury who
took up this strong position against responsibility, stating it boldly
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and without compromise, most others were careful to temper their
formulations with a degree of caution and respect for tradition.
In the face of loud protests that the doctrine of irresponsibility was
119
"demoralising", "subversive" and a "social dissolvent", a more
subtle and ambivalent position was elaborated.
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Instead of dismissing responsibility as a delusion to be swept
away by science, writers such as Saleilles pressed the argument that
responsibility was indeed a fiction, but nonetheless a valuable and
necessary fiction which should certainly be retained. If 'responsibility'
and 'free-will' were subjective illusions, their 'illusory' nature by
no means precluded their real-world existence and effects. On the
contrary, for "it is as a subjective conception that responsibility is
efficient and becomes a conscious motive force". These 'fictions' were
thus "subjective realities" and, for Saleilles, it was "this subjective
reality, this mental image and concept that the penal point of view
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must consider". Such fictions may thus be scientifically "false"
but nonetheless effective in social terms:
"It is through the ideal and fictitious that men are
governed and societies regulated; and whatever may be
said or done, governments and legislation cannot really
run counter to factors and phenomena as they exist, for
these form the very structure of society. ... The way
to assure public safety and social protection is not to
overthrow the conception of responsibility, but on the
contrary to implant it in the conscience of the masses and
strengthen it by every remaining vertige of belief.
The conception of responsibility is a principle to
be preserved at all costs." ^1
We can see the discursive preservation of this concept - and its
cost of theoretical incoherence - in the following passages by Ruggles-
Brise, where he attempts to accept the propositions of Goring's study
without their logically entailed implications of criminal 'irresponsibility'.
He begins by welcoming the 'general theory of defectiveness' as laid
out by Goring, but warns that:
"this theory, however, must not be pressed so far as to
affect the liability to punishment of the offender for
his act." "*22
Since no theoretical reason is provided, we can only presume that this
"must" is a political imperative and not a conceptual one. He confirms
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this interpretation later in the same passage when he states:
"Although ... the fact that on the average, the English
prisoner is defective in physiaue and mental capacity
would seem to call in question the whole responsibility
of any person guilty of an anti-social act, yet if fully
and properly understood, it does not mean more than that
in a perfect world where the faculties of each could
be fully and highly developed, the problem of punishment
would not exist."
The Chairman of the Prison Commission is, for once, unable to
convincingly rescue political desire from theoretical logic and here
retreats into a simple evasion and the nonsense of non sequitor.
But despite these difficulties of manoeuvre, a compromise position
was developed along the following lines. As Saleilles had argued,
the fiction of responsibility had to be retained. But if this
conception were operationalized in its traditional form, it would leave
no place for criminology and its investigation of the causes of the
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crime. The solution was to retain "responsibility" and "freedom"
as general principles - but to put them in question with respect to
each individual case. Responsibility thus became a presumption which
was always put in doubt. The Law would maintain its commitment to
responsibility as the normal case, but be willing to accept deviations
from this norm, particularly with regard to criminology's special
categories - the inebriate, the feeble-minded, the habitual and so on.
Consequently, the individual case would not proceed, as before, by
assuming that the universal principle of Reason and responsibility
would apply in all cases other than those where the accused was
palpably insane. Instead, the apparatus of criminology would be called
in to investigate the individual in question and establish his relation
to the norm. Saleilles' compromise thus did not demand:
"the renunciation of the idea of responsibility, but only
the renunciation of the dangerous and puerile fiction,
whereby positive and practical applications were derived
from merely abstract premises." (emphasis added)
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Criminology thus specifies "a true responsibility in place of an
assumed responsibility" substituting "the realities of experience
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for purely judicial abstractions". It replaces a philosophical
principle (all men are free and responsible) with a positive
psychology (each man must be investigated, his personality assessed).
These arguments of Saleilles which set up this compromise
formulation will nor be found each time their conclusion is endorsed,
although writers such as Havelock Ellis and Hamblin Smith did rehearse
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them explicitly. Instead they came to be expressed in a single term
which conveyed the ambivalent combination of freedom and determinism,
responsibility and irresponsibility, which Saleilles was at pains to
implant into the criminal process. The general term which did duty
for this complex range of meanings and significance was the concept of
"character". Wherever this compromise position is adopted, its
contradictions and ambivalence are covered by this simple term which
can convey both the freedom of the normal personality and the
irresistable determinants of the pathological. Thus it appears with
this function in the work of Ruggles-Brise, Goring, Ellis, Garafalo,
Boies and Darwin, as well as in various Official Reports and statutory
phrases, most notably the Gladstone Report and the many Acts which
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followed its recommendations.
This compromise between freedom and determinism was based upon a
developmental logic. Individuals are somehow "free" to develop their
moral character (through the acquisition of habits, discipline, etc.),
but at a certain stage of maturity, "the fundamental law of physical
causality prevails. Freedom prepares the soil, determinism receives
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the seed and makes it fruitful". A normal, healthy character
untrammelled by genetic defect or vicious habit, will be able to
exercise control and choice. It can therefore be said to be free and
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responsible. But the crucial point is that this freedom is neither
absolute nor essential. It is a contingent and fragile freedom
which depends upon the delicate mechanisms of character formation
and the vicissitudes of individual and social life. Alongside these
responsible individuals are numerous characters which are either
jl uniformed or else malformed. The latter category (inebriates,
habituals, unemployables, the unfit, etc.) are pathologically
determined by their defective character structures. They cannot be
deterred or persuaded and so must become the target of a more
positive intervention - either a reformative technology or else a
preventive segregation. The unformed characters of children and
juveniles also present scope for positive transformation, this time
the more hopeful forces of training, discipline and education.
The concept of 'character' allowed the classical legal subject
to be practically transformed and yet ideologically retained.
Through these means the notion of the subject was progressively
modified and psychologised, transformed from its former (philosophical)
status as essential Will to the (positive) status of contingent
character structure. In this manner the legal and political ideology
of the responsible subject could be preserved (against a determinism
which would have it destroyed) but at the same time opened up to
intervention. The subject now possessed a structure and determinants
which could be the site of positive interventions, an object to be
acted upon.
Given the subjectivity of free-will, the appropriate strategy was
one which structured choices - hence the rewards and deterrents of
classical criminology. The new subjectivity of character structure,
on the other hand, gives rise to a strategy which operates upon that
structure and its determinants - to a positive criminology.
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It is not difficult to see the deep significance of a debate
such as this in the context of British political culture. The
'responsible subject' is an indispensable element of any capitalist
society structured around 'free' contract, commodity exchange and
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representative democracy. It allows a morality of individualism
which allocates reward and blame 'automatically' to the individual,
thereby protecting social relations of wealth and discipline from
immediate scrutiny. It is therefore an essential requirement of
individualism, competitive enterprise, and our form of moral and
political rule.
The notion of 'responsibility' must be continually ascribed to
individuals (and neither generally denied, ncr ascribed elsewhere) if
these social requirements are to be met. In denying freedom and
responsibility the 'Italian School' allowed itself to be excluded
from the terms of serious penal discussion in Britain and elsewhere.
But the need to make individuals responsible by forceably ascribing
responsibility to them was well met by the Saleilles compromise. Not
only did it promise reformative techniques which would construct
responsible subjects, its very divisions and distinctions reaffirmed
the value of 'responsibility'. Each time a deviant individual was
identified as 'irresponsible' and in need of treatment, the value of
being responsible was practically and ideologically reinforced for
the rest of the population.
Nor should it surprise us that the term which functioned to
promote this outcome was that of 'character'. For 'character' had
the crucial advantage of according with both commonsense discourse
and the more specialist language of social work and social security.
It thus contained within itself a whole array of different
connotations, ranging from traditional moral judgements about an
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individual's worth, through psychological theories of subjectivity and
its determinants, to the concern with character formation espoused by
both social workers and Imperialist politicians.
It thus tied together several distinct chains of reference
within a single discursive term while simultaneously containing both
poles of the free-will/determinism debate within an ambivalent theory
of character formation. As we have seen, it was through discursive
manoeuvres of precisely this kind that alliances were formed,
resistance overcome, and strategies put in place.
(6) Discursive tactics and Modes of Representation
At a different discursive level - not of conceptual structure but
of the presentational form of argument and justification - we can
identify in these criminological texts the operation of certain
discursive tactics and modes of representation. It is not a serious
charge against a text or programme to allege that it utilises the
persuasive forms of rhetoric and argument to elaborate its positions:
most texts do precisely this. However these tactics and
representational forms can be revealing, particularly when the same
'l few forms appeal again and again throughout a multitude of texts and
utterances as they do in the criminological programme. They reveal
the political strengths and weaknesses of the programme, the means
employed to circumvent resistance, and the chosen forms of legitimation.
In the same way, our discussion of the operative metaphors, analogies
and imagery is undertaken not to complain that a "scientific"
discourse employs literary forms to present its arguments (though
criminology does so more than most) but to analyse the direction,
connotations and representational effects of these discursive forms.
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(a) The Appeal to 'Precedent*
In arguing for their new departures and reforms, British
criminologists insisted upon tempering the shock of innovation by
reference to traditional practices which might be taken as "precedents"
for the reform in question. And while the practices of neo-classicism
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formed a kind of general precedent, more particular precursors were
also identified and utilised Thus the Reformatory and Industrial
Schools become the much-quoted precedent for Adult Reformatories,
indeterminate sentences and the "right of the non-responsible
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offender to special disciplinary and educational treatment";
the practice of supplementing the gaol sentence of recidivists with
periods of police supervision becomes a justification for the double
133
track system of preventive detention; and the narrow powers of
detention allowed by the Public Health, Lunacy and Poor Law Acts
become the legitimatory basis for the very widest kind of restrictions
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on the liberty of paupers, the feeble-minded and the "unemployable".
There is of course a certain irony involved here, inasmuch as a
judicial form of legitimation is being employed to undermine "the
Judicial form" itself, and no doubt this says much about the power of
both legal and traditional ideologies in this period. But rather more
surprising is the speed with which small reforms and tentative
innovations, once achieved, themselves come to be cited as important
precedents, thereby allowing the programme's success to feed upon
itself as further legitimation. Thus we find Ruggles-Brise employing
the 1908 Prevention of Crime Act as a precedent for further use of the
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indeterminate sentence and the 1908 Report on Inebriacy justifying
its own proposals by reminding that:
"The course of recent legislation shows that the legislature
does not now hesitate to enforce restrictions on the liberty
of persons whose unchecked vagaries are clearly contrary
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to the public weal."
(b) Soecial Cases as Points of Entry and Extension
The effect of argument by precedent was frequently to use a
special case (e.g. the semi-determinate period of a child's stay at
an Industrial School) to legitimate a new practice which was
significantly different and more general (the indeterminate sentencing
of adults to prison custody or Labour Colonies). In fact as we
have seen, criminology operated precisely by producing "special cases"
or categories of individual who should not be subject to the normal
procedures of legal accountability because of their irresponsible or
abnormal characters. However these "special cases", once established,
had a tendency to extend their domain - and that of criminology - and
we can cite many instances where a special case is established only
to have its special features erased in the name of its subsequent
extension. Thus we see Ruggles-Brise take pains to argue that the
indeterminate sentence is suitable only for the special category of
habitual offenders, or else that 'reformatory' treatment can be
justified only for juveniles, only to find him in later years
arguing that there is no good reason why these practices should not
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be extended to "ordinary crime" and adult criminals.
This tactic functions by attacking the points of least
138
resistance in the status quo. Categories such as children or the
insane, already recognised to be special cases in the eyes of the law
and the public, were seized upon and used as points of entry, or
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tactical bridgeheads for the criminological programme. Starting with
characters which are 'obviously' unformed - namely children -
criminology proceeds to add the less obvious cases of firstly the
'juvenile adult' then 'first offenders' and all offenders under thirty
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years and finally the full range of "irresponsibles". In the
same may the malformed category of the insane undergoes a gradual
extension until it includes 'the feeble-minded', 'the inebriate' and
'the habitual' within its terms. What begins as a narrowly defined
special case extends itself indefinitely, and having made its case
at either end of the criminal spectrum, criminology turns inwards
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from the obviously deviant to the apparently normal.
This tactic was important in establishing many of the penal
reforms and innovations of the period under study, but it also has a
more contemporary relevance. The focus upon exemplary cases to
legitimise the non-exemplary by implication is still a major feature
of penal discourse, and one which is amplified whenever that discourse
enters into the popular idiom. It is therefore no accident that
popular discourse about crime and control 'automatically' coheres
around images such as "the psychopathic killer" or "the ruthless
professional" for whom prison is of course "essential" - those being
the hard cases which settle the direction of uninformed ck~<a
promote the demand for a general severity. One hardly need add that
this works to the detriment of a balanced and fuller view which
would give due consideration to the vast majority of offenders who
differ radically from the image of these special cases.
(c) Tactical Trade-offs
"I think that when we do so much to prevent crime,
and to train those youths up, so that they do not
pursue criminal avocations, we are bound on the other
hand, to be more stringent in the punishment of those
who still pursue a course of crime in spite of what
we have done for them."
Crofton's remarks were made in 1363,but the 'balancing' of
increased reform by increased severity is a device which recurs again
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and again in penological argument. It was particularly important
in the debates surrounding preventive detention since on the face of
it, an additional sentence of ten years (initially life)
imprisonment for habitual offenders, on top of the proper punishment
for their immediate offence, was unquestionably severe and difficult
to justify. This legitimatory problem was overcome by promising to
mitigate the conditions of this detention, 'exchanging' length of
detention for leniency of discipline. As a Confidential Memorandum
on the Penal Servitude Bill states:
"It may not be necessary during that period of time,
that the punishment should be a severe one. All that
is wanted is that they should be under discipline and
compulsorily segregated from the outside world. In
the case of a conviction for a small offence, e.g.
stealing a pair of boots, both judges and public
opinion would be averse to the passing of a long
sentence. ... The new prison rule [states that] ...
the ordinary convict discipline will be greatly
mitigated ... and thereby seeks to encourage in
appropriate cases the passing of long, as opposed to
severe, sentences."
This trade-off tactic is rehearsed on vitually every occasion
that Preventive Detention is officially discussed,as well as being
used in a similar fashion to justify the lengthy detention of
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inebriates. In the same way, the fact that the 1908 Prevention of
Crime Act allowed Borstal inmates to be released "on licence" at the
discretion of the authorities, was used to justify the passing of
longer sentences:
"In order to carry out this system of licenses, it is
also important that the courts should have the power
of passing longer sentences, because there must be a
power given to the authorities to bring the lads back
again, if they do not take proper advantage of the
licence given to them."
(d) Language, Metaphor and Desire
If one means of justifying severity was to set it off against a
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purported leniency elsewhere, another method was to insist upon the
severity of the problem being faced. In this endeavour to
characterise the social harm caused by crime, criminology tended to
neglect its concern with scientific measurement and statistical
quantification and to slip into a less rational discursive form.
Thus we find the frequent deployment of a kind of discursive violence
whenever harsh measures need to be powerfully justified. And of
course these emotive and alarmist descriptions of criminality go a
long way to explaining the deep sense of social threat and danger
evoked by the imaginary figure of the criminal - both then and now.
The following are only the most striking instances of a violence which
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is pervasive in this discourse; thus liJ. A. Chappie, the eugenist and
M.P. - arguing for a policy of sterilization:
"Consider what a burden is the criminal. Every
community is more or less terrorised by him, our
property is liable to be plundered, our houses
invaded, our women ravished, our children murdered." 148
And Baron Rafaele Garafalo, invoking a sensationalist statistic
to prepare the reader for his "eliminatory" proposals:
"... here statistical science steps in. Adding the
figures, combining the scattered sums of human misery
produced by human wickedness, it unrolls to us the
scenes of a world-appalling tragedy. It shows us a
field of battle littered with the remains of frightful
carnage, it joins in a single heartrending cry the
groans of the wounded, the lamentations of their
kindred; it causes to file before us legions of the
maimed, of orphans, and of paupers; it blinds us with
the light of a vast incendiary conflagration devouring
forests and homes; it deafens us with the yells of an
army of pirates. And in sinister climax, it reveals
to us the author of these scenes of desolation - an
enemy mysterious, unrecognised by history - we call
him the CRIMINAL." 149
In similar terms, and for similar purposes, Lydston talks of "social
excreta" which demand "total elimination"'^ and Boies talks of "the
unfit, the abnormals, the sharks, the devil-fish and other monsters"
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who of course "ought not to be liberated to destroy and multiply,
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but must be confined and secluded until they are exterminated".
And echoing the more technical but equally violent morphologies of
Lombroso and Ferri, Boies describes criminals as:
"Human deformities and monstrosities, physically
illshapen, weak and sickly with irregular features,
they bear a sinister ignoble, and furtive expression.
They have an unbalanced and distorted cranium, and
are of a low order of intelligence, apparently devoid
of the nobler sentiments; with a depraved if not
utter absence of moral sense or conscience."
This tactical symmetry between the form of language and the form of
measure being proposed is well brought out in the texts of Thomas
Holmes, police court missioner and Secretary of the Howard Association.
When he comes to prepare the ground for probation and social work
sanctions, his language moves from the borrowed vocabulary of
'pathology'and 'degeneracy' to the more familiar evangelical mode:
"Even as I sit and write, it is all before me and
around. I hear again the horrible speech and diverse
tongues. I hear the accents of sorrow and the burst
of angry sound. I hear the devil-may-care laugh and
the contemptuous expression. I hear the sighs and the
groans and bitter plaints. I see men shorn of all glory.
I see womanhood clothed in shame. I see vice rampant.
I see misery crawling ..."
As we have suggested above, the actual language and modes of
representation employed in these discourses are themselves of
significance. These terms, styles and literary figures do much more
than simply convey propositions or communicate proposals: they
simultaneously operate as persuasive devices in the knowledge-power
struggle and help to fix the associations, emotions and responses
which these issues popularly evoke. The most obvious illustration of
this operation whereby the social meanings and connotations of
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'criminality' are discursively constructed,is the use of metaphor,
and there is a sense in which the chosen metaphors of a discourse
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reveal its social desire - the significance and connotations it
would attach to its propositions. Our previous discussions of that
'desire' are thus given confirmation by the fact that criminology's
favoured metaphors closely correspond to the analysis we have made.
The scientistic and pathologising tendencies of the criminological
programme,as well as its professional ambitions, are well brought
out by the medical metaphor which saturates the surface of this
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discourse. And although The Times and Ruggles-Brise warn that this
metaphor should not be pressed too far (cf. the compromises over
responsibility, determinism, etc.) we find it appearing in the
Parliamentary debates, the Official Reports and even in The Times
itself. It is this metaphor above all else which authorises a
language of care and protection to substitute for the more awkward
vocabularies of discipline and punishment. Consequently the
compulsory detention of paupers becomes 'continuous care and treatment',
the incarceration of the feeble-minded is rendered as "special
protection suited to their needs",which of course must continue as
long as is necessary, and Borstal becomes "merely a teaching and
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training institution" or a "moral hospital".
It also transforms the conception of penal time from its
negative value as a measure of severity to a more positive statement
of the period during which reformative facilities will be offered.
It was only through this important inversion that repeated pleas for
lengthier sentences could become the mark of the progressive penal
p 157reformer.
One might also add that it was precisely this metaphor,and its
images of treatment, help and care,that necessitated the emphatic
and frequently asserted denial of leniency which runs through the
reformers'texts, striving to restrain the unacceptable connotations
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which had been set in train.
As we have already seen, the images and metaphors of efficiency,
'degeneracy', and 'fitness' are also constantly present here, as is
the evolutionary analogy from which they derive, linking criminological
proposals with the future of the Race and the Empire. In much the
same way a recurring description of recidivists as a "blot" or
"stain" upon civilisation, operates to link these diverse concerns in
a single figure of speech. Finally, there is also a frequent
reference to criminals (and sometimes to the whole of the lower
classes) as 'savages' or 'semi-savages' with "a very low order of
intellect and a degradation of the natural affections to something
little better than animal instincts".^^The effect of these statements
is to do by implication what Garafalo and Ribot do explicitly, viz.,
to present the deviant population as "beings [who] are completely
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dehumanized". Like the violent descriptions noted above, these
dehumanizing terms allow an escalation to take place in a "war
against crime" which is not just metaphorical.
(7) The Process of Calculation
These detailed discussions of texts and statements should by
now have demonstrated that it is not an unwonted cynicism which leads us
to talk of 'manoeuvres', 'tactics' and 'political struggles' within
criminological and penal discourse. And although there is no space to
demonstrate it here, there is good reason to suppose that a similar
process of representational struggle took place within the other
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programmes of this period. These discursive manoeuvres were
clearly motivated rather than accidental. The texts we have examined
were not rough and ready drafts or careless outbursts - they were
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rather the carefully constructed formulations of a contradictory
process wherein theoretical logic is continually interrupted by
political desire. The purposes, aspirations and social objectives
of organisations and individuals were thus introduced, sometimes crudely,
but often very subtly,into these discourses. They can be identified,
as we have shown, because they have no theoretical place there - or
rather because the theoretical place they carve out for themselves
involves arbitary assumptions, non-sequitors and logical contradictions
which become intelligible only through political analysis. The outcome
is an array of texts and supposedly scientific statements which are
in fact persuasive documents; they are aimed not at 'truth' but at
the political process, through which they would establish a new
"regime of truth".
The significance of these analyses is that they allow us to use
substantial forms of evidence and description to meet questions which are
otherwise grossly speculative. Chamberlain's much quoted remark that
"the foundations of property are made more secure when no real grievance
is felt by the poor against the rich" might hint that a political
strategy runs through the social reforms of this period. But only by
a detailed examination of how such a politics entered into the fabric
of these reforms - their actual discourses and apparatuses - can this
thesis be substantiated.
This method of approaching the question of social strategies and
their constituative struggles removes the need to posit a 'grand
strategist' or any God-like omniscience, but it does raise the
problem of calculation, albeit in a different form. This problem
is particularly acute here, given our assertion that much of the
resistance which was circumvented in these debates, and many of the
positions which were discursively established, stemmed from the
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deep-rooted 'unconscious' ideologies of modern capitalist society.
How could authors like Ruggles-Brise and Saleilles so skilfully
steer around issues such as 'responsibility', 'determinism' and
'reform' thereby preserving the ideologies of the free-subject and
the welfarist claims of the modern state? How was it that the
progressive social elements of their discourse were delicately
marginalised and subordinated to the re-affirmed ideology of
individualism? In other words, do we have to conceive of these
individuals as having the insight of sociologists or sophisticated
social critics in order to understand the conditions whereby their
calculations were possible?
Put simply, we do not. Nor do we have to speculate as to the
precise 'intentions' or knowledge of these particular figures.
Instead we have to show what kinds of knowledge was objectively
available to them, and to demonstrate how this could lead to
calculations which followed the lines we have described. On this
basis, the most likely answer is not that all of these authors
clearly recognised these ideologies for what they are, and set out
to protect them from challenge. Indeed it is unlikely that any of
the individuals concerned would have been able to formulate the
issues in this way. But if they did not recognise these unconscious
ideologies,they certainly were in a position to recognise and
appreciate the practical effects which these ideologies produced.
They could certainly understand the firmly held beliefs of lawyers,
liberals, Christians and others in 'the freedom of the individual'.
They were likely to have a reasonable understanding of 'public
opinion' and its insistence upon the values of pragmatism and
individualism, and they were clearly aware of the developing political
climate of reform and welfare. In other words they could know the
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contours of the political realm well enough to guess intuitively
what was 'practical' and what was not, though understanding of this
practicality probably stopped short at the givenness of 'public
162
opinion' or the 'public conscience'. Their calculations would
therefore be "short-sighted",based upon the knowledge, resources and
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objectives they had available to them as individuals. But if they
could not "see" these ideologies for what they were, nor realise their
structural significance, they could nonetheless take into account
their practical manifestations and consequences, as our analysis has
shown. And theoretically this is precisely what we should expect,
since ideologies do not have a social existence except through their
practical effects, and it is through the maintenance of these
practices that their unspoken ideologies are in turn reproduced.
In case an impression has been created that all of these
calculations were undertaken with unerring accuracy and realism, we
might end this section with some of the errors and miscalculations
which occurred. Thus the delicacy of representational issues
frequently led Ruggles-Brise into contradictory positions where the
appeasement of one audience led to the displeasure of another, and
hence we find him simultaneously asserting and denying the 'leniency'
of preventive detention, or else arguing that classification must
be the prerogative of the judiciary, only to reverse this principle
when the judiciary failed to use this prerogative to the executive's
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satisfaction. Similarly, his suggestion that the preventive
detention institution should be termed a "penal colony" was hastily
suppressed by the Home Office on the advice of the King's Bench Judges
who feared that this nomenclature would "engender misconceptions and
,,165prejudices".
Lombroso's early avowal of the criminal man might also be viewed
269
as miscalculated in these terms, and de Fleury was not alone in lamenting
the harm done to criminology's cause by this "exclusive, silly and
166
false notion ... which was revolting to common sense". Indeed
Lombroso's subsequent work appeared to recognise this problem and to
modify his conceptions accordingly. As he put it in 1911:
"... nothing is less logical than to try to be too
logical: nothing is more imprudent than to try to
maintain theories ... if they are going to upset the
order of society. ... The sociologist must observe
still greater circumspection, for if he puts into
operation innovations of an upsetting nature he will
simply succeed in demonstrating the uselessness and
inefficiency of his science."
Such circumspection was clearly also absent from Ferri's purist
assertions of determinism and irresponsibility, and from the first
Mental Deficiency Bill in 1912 which came too close to the explicit
avowal of eugenics policies. By the following year Home Secretary
McKenna had clearly learned his lesson, introducing a redrafted
Bill thus:
"We have also omitted any reference to what might
be regarded as the Eugenic idea ..."
The present Chapter has concentrated upon the various means used
to overcome resistance,and especially upon the politico-discursive
struggles which took place over questions of penal representation.
It has tried to show generally that the process of penal (or social)
reform entails a crucial struggle in the realm of social imagery and
symbolism, and more particularly, to demonstrate how this process shaped
both criminological discourse and the development of British penality.
Our two final Chapters will conclude this demonstration by
detailing the other forms of struggle which were involved in this
transformation, the practical outcomes which they secured, and the
strategic effects which these in turn produced.
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CHAPTER 7
The Formation and Institutionalisation of Penal—Itielfare Strategies
(1) Introduction: The Entry into Official Discourse
The last feu Chapters have described the formation of the
discursive and technical resources uhich uere brought to bear upon the
questions of social and penal change in the 1900s. We have seen hou
these resources uere developed first of all in programmatic form and
then subjected to a series of refinements, realignments and compromises
in the struggle to overcome resistance and "become practicable".
Moreover, our argument has been that it is only by reference to these
programmes, resistances and refinements that the precise forms taken
by the penal and social reforms of the 1900s can become intelligible.
Given that these reforms laid the basis for some of the central
strategies of British penality in the tuentieth century, it is not too
much to argue that our understanding of the present may benefit
considerably from an analysis of this past.
The purpose of these final Chapters is to trace in detail hou
these programmatic elements entered into official practice (or else
failed to do so) and hou they functioned once they uere established
there. In other uords, they uill examine the formation and functioning
of uhat might be called "penal-uelfare strategies" and uill suggest
the general penal and social significance of these forms of regulation.
The first line of success for these programmes in the process of
"entering into pouer" uas the Official Report. During the period
betueen 1895 and 1914 there uere as many as 40 Reports and Inquiries
uhich dealt directly uith questions of penal or social regulation.
In virtually every case these Reports dreu upon the neu stock of
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discursive resources, taking over the concepts, techniques and
compromises which had so recently been formed. As uie shall show, one
consequence of this was that despite the great multiplicity of these
Reports, and the very diverse range of issues with which they dealt,
they nonetheless gave rise to a series of recommendations which
displayed a remarkable degree of coherence and uniformity, involving
the adoption of similar terms, parallel strategies and complimentary
techniques.
For the various programmes, this success at the level of Reports
was of crucial importance since it marked the entry of their terms
1
into the circuits of official discourse. Thereafter, their proposals
would circulate not as academic ideas but as serious and respectable
policy options which were officially 'known' to Government.
It is clearly impractical to quote at length from all 40 of these
Reports in order to demonstrate the adoption of programmatic elements
and the ways in which these were worked into the fabric of official
discourse. On the other hand it is important that this process should
be described since these selection and reworking operations were of
great consequence for the eventual practical outcomes. Accordingly, we
propose to summarise not the whole of the Reports, but only those
passages which introduced, or else implicitly relied upon,elements drawn
from the new programmes. Alongside these summaries, references will
be given to the full Reports and the particular passages cited. The
listing which follows is in chronological order which has the
advantage of showing the shifting patterns of influence of the four
programmes. For instance, it will be clear that although the
criminological and the evangelical social work programmes are often
fused together, the former becomes more effective in later Reports
while the latter's strong influence begins to fade to some extent.
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Similarly the rather vague concern with "degeneration" present in
the earlier Reports can be seen to give way later to more specific
recommendations drawn from the eugenic and social security programmes.
No distinction has been made between 'penal* and 'social' issues
because, as these summaries confirm, the two were usually intertwined
in any particular Report. Consequently the Reports of the Poor Law
Commission of 1909 are quoted here at length because they supply the
fullest and most explicit statement of the principles and techniques
which would support future strategies in the social and the penal
realms.
(2) A Summary Analysis of Official Reports
1894: Report of the Departmental Committee on the Identification of
Habitual Criminals
- Presents a compromised or two-fold notion of classification,
based upon severity (i.e. legal guilt) and corrigibility
(i.e. reform potential), (passim)
- Recommends a form of preventive detention on the explicit
analogy of "the incurably insane". (p.209ff)
1895: Report of the Scottish Departmental Committee on Habitual
Offenders, Vagrants, Beggars, Inebriates and Juvenile Delinquents
- Recommends Labour Settlements for habitual offenders run
on reformatory lines, (p.xvii)
- The reformatory elements are to consist of compulsory
labour and the visits of "charitable and temperance
associations", (p.xix)
- A 'double-track' system of preventive detention is
suggested which would combine a punitive and a reformatory
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sentence, the first judicial-penal, the second
administrativ/e-therapeutic. Despite their practical
combination in a single sentence, these two elements are
to be "kept distinct" in their public image: "... it is
most desirable that Labour Settlements should be kept
entirely distinct from prisons and that any association,
even of ideas, which should connect them in the public
mind ... should be avoided", (p.xxiv)
1895: Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on the
Proceedings of the Fifth International Penitentiary Congress:
by Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise
- Sets out a Belgian scheme for the control of vagrancy and
begging which "demands special notice" (p.15). The scheme
involves a 'Registry' system of centralised information
and the following classification-treatment categories:
(a) Juveniles are sent to reformatories ("Ecoles de
bienfaisance")
(b) Invalids are sent to hospital
(c) "Sturdy paupers" of good antecedents and willing to
work are sent to a Labour Colony ("House of Refuge")
(d) "Incorrigible Rogues" are subjected to a "repressive
discipline" and detained "under sentence of two
months at least up to seven years", classified
according to character, (p.15)
1895: Report of the Departmental Committee on Prisons
(The Gladstone Report")
- Its Warrant of Appointment makes special mention of the
guestions of "classification", "juveniles", "first offenders",
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"habituals" and the "moral and physical condition"
of prisoners.
Establishes a compromise position which allows that
"some criminals are irreclaimable, just as some diseases
are incurable" but nevertheless "the great majority of
prisoners" are curable, (p.8)
Asserts the separation of social and penal reform: "the
improvement of general social conditions is the work of
the community. But ... some of its worst and most
dangerous products ... can be reclaimed by special and
skillful prison treatment", (pp.11-12)
Accepts that it is the duty of "the State" to reform (p.13)
but makes this "concurrent" with the duty of deterrence,
(p.18)
Despite references to the training of staff "by experts in
criminal anthropology" (p.37) and the "most essential value"
of "medical science and criminal anthropology" (p.8),
the vision of reformative treatment amounts to"personal
influence" (p.13), "philanthropic agencies" (p.28) and
"moral influence" (p.30)
Classification should be made "according to individual
character and physical development", (p.30)
Combines reformatory and repressive positions in the
familiar tactical trade-off by arguing that "... if
offenders relapsed into crime [after a reformatory effort]
it would be their own deliberate choice in spite of every
effort to save them", (p.31)
Inebriates "should be dealt with as patients rather than
as criminals". "Special medical treatment should be
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applied to them in Reformatories or "special prisons",
(p.32)
- kJeakminded prisoners are not "fully responsible" and
should be placed "under special observation and treatment",
(p.34)
- The question of "degeneration" is raised in an attached
Memorandum on Insanity in Prisons where Dr. 3. Bridges
states "the habitual criminal, I regard as a degenerate
offspring of a very degenerate stock. Insanity and crime
are simply morbid branches of the same stock", (p.49)
1896: Report of the Departmental Committee on the Education and Moral
Instruction of Prisoners in Local and Convict Prisons
- This investigation into reformative methods followed on
from The Gladstone Report. As the title indicates, its
findings owed little to the new human sciences: "Ule find
that the daily services in chapel, the visits of the
chaplain, and a system of putting every prisoner in
possession of a Bible, prayer-book and hymn book, together
with a book of moral instruction are the direct means [of
reform]", (p.12) These direct means are to be supplemented
by lectures on "temperance, thrift or self-help", (p.13)
1B96: Report on the Operation of Discharged Prisoners Aid Societies
by Rev. G„ P. Merrick (Prison Chaplain at Holloway)
- Again following on from Gladstone, recommends that the
private, voluntary, Aid Societies be subjected to State
regulation and rationalization through registration at the
Home Office, certification, proper rules, accounts, etc.
(passim)
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- Recommends that the Societies should aim to produce a
knowledge of the "character" and "mode of living" of their
charges (p.36) and to this end suggests COS-type methods
of co-operation, centralisation, record-keeping and
thorough visiting and inspection procedures, (passim)
1897: Special Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy on the Alleged
Increase of Insanity
- Acknowledges the alleged increase and the threat that this
poses to the Race, as well as its fiscal implications,
but points out that this can partly be explained by
reference to changes in institutional practices, e.g. more
registration, altered admission procedures, more
institutions, etc. (passim)
1899: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1898-99
- Endorses the practice of classification by reference to
character and "criminality" but compromises this criminological
position by ascribing this function to the judiciary: "this
power to classify ... according to their degree of criminality,
is one, of course, that can only be exercised by a Court
of Law and not by the prison authority", (p.6)
1899: Report of the Scottish Departmental Committee on the Rules for
Inebriate Reformatories under the Inebriate Act of 1898
- Despite the medicalisation of the discourses surrounding
"inebriacy",and the emphasis of this Report upon
"reformatory treatment" and studying "the individuality
of each inmate", the vision of treatment is once again
"personal influence" and the utilisation of "labour" and
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"religious influences ... to raise the moral status of the
inmates", (p.ix)
1899: Report to the Secretary of State on the Treatment of Crime in
America: by Sir Evelyn Ruqgles-Brise
- Condemns the indeterminate sentence because "it violates
the fundamental principle that punishment shall be certain
and definite: that the sentence of the court shall be the
final arbitrament of the case", (p.17) but then advocates
2
indeterminacy for the special case of juveniles.
- Condemns the parole system and the idea that a Warden
"can fix with accuracy the psychological moment in a
criminal's career when he may be set at liberty" (p.18)
despite his advocacy of precisely this technique for
juvenile offenders.
1900: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1899-1900
- Endorses "Indefinite Sentences" and discretionary release
on ticket of leave for juveniles. Supervision to be
X
provided by the Church Army or the Salvation Army. (p.18)
1901: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1900-1901
- Utilises an eclectic criminological argument which merges
constitutional-hereditary, environmental and psychological
factors, running together "natural perversity" plus "evil
/ x 3
milieu" plus "evil example from infancy", (p.13)
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1901: Report to the Secretary of State on the Proceedings of the
Sixth International Penitentiary Conoress: by Sir Ev/elvn
Rugqles-Brise
- Raises the issue of "criminal predestination" (as Ruggles-
Brise terms it) and argues that "congenital disease or
latent insanity" should be regarded as "contingencies" and
not "dogmas" in regard to crime, (p.49)
- The importance of medical science is stressed, but so too
is "the Temperance Question" (and it is significant that
this traditional term is used, and not the notion of
•alcoholism')• (p«50)
- Endorses the distinction between "responsible" and
"irresponsible", citing Professor Thiny's division between
those "who are, or who are not, in possession of their
entire personality", (p.57)
- Ruggles-Brise proposes a double-track sentence for habituals
whereby the judge's penal sentence is "supplemented" by
another "indeterminate" sentence, thus combining judicial
power and executive discretion. This contradicts not only
his earlier principled denial of indeterminacy for adults,
but also his earlier estimate of the prison authority's
proper scope and expertise (see 1899 Report on The Treatment
of Crime in America) since his proposal involves the
"advice of the prison authority" to the Secretary of State
that "reasonable guarantees exist that the criminal can be
discharged without danger to society", (p.59)
- He proposes a Reformatory System for juvenile-adults,
arguing there is "scientific" evidence that persons below
21 years of age (25 or 26 in "the poorer classes") "cannot
be regarded as fully responsible", "character" being
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"closely allied to physical development". (p.92)
1902: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1901-1902
- Attacks "the promiscuous consignment to the common form
of imprisonment" and insists upon the need for "a
differentiation of penalty", (p.8)
- Recommends special treatment of young prisoners whose
characters "cannot be said to be fully formed before the
age of 21". (p.11)
- Recommends the segregation of professional criminals
who are currently beyond control ("whose acquisitive
instincts have been uncontrolled by the fear and example
of punishment"), (p.10)
1903: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1902-1903
- Endorses the recommendation that "labour colonies should
be established on the Belgian model", (p.15)^
1904: Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical
Deterioration
- Proposes that the State should intervene to enforce a
given standard of physical efficiency and hygiene:
"... the State, acting in conjunction with the Local
Authorities, [should] take charge of the lives of those
who, from whatever cause, are incapable of independent
existence up to the standard of decency which it imposes.
In the last resort, this might take the form of labour
colonies ...". (p.85)
- On "Alcoholism" ( not the Temperance Question): "... more
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may be dons to check the degeneration resulting from
"drink" by bringing home to men and women the fatal
effects of alcohol on physical efficiency than by
expatiating on the moral wickedness of drinking", (p.87)
- Recommends grants "from the National Exchequer in aid of
all clubs and cadet corps in which physical or quasi-
military training, on an approved scheme, is conducted,
subject to public inspection", (p.91)^
- Recommends an organised and permanent system of inspection and
data collection on the physical health of the population,
and an Advisory Council "to advise the Government on ...
points concerning public health in respect of which State
interference might be expedient", (p.85)
1906: Report to the Secretary of State on the Proceedings of the
Seventh International Penitentiary Congress: by Sir Evelyn
Ruqqles-Brise
- Proposes an institution "half-way ... between the prison
and the mad-house" (p.15) for the "large category of
individuals, intermediate between the wholly insane and
the normal". This notion of the continuum between Normal
and Pathological is necessary because although "these
abnormal physical states cannot be classified under any
known diseases of the mind", these irresponsible
6
individuals are nonetheless "a danger to social security",
(p.14)
1906: Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy
- Recommends a scheme of police-run employment offices
linked to a system of labour colonies "... to place the
281
vagrant more under the control of the police, to help
the bona fide wayfarer, and to provide a means of
detaining the habitual vagrant under reformatory
influences", (p.1)
- The vagrant is to "be treated not as a criminal, but as
a person requiring detention on account of his mode of
life", (p.59)
- Following the model of the Inebriate Reformatories, a more
coercive State-run institution will attach itself to the
network of privately run Colonies and Institutions, (p.75)
- Indiscriminate alms-giving is formally specified as the
root cause of vagrancy, (p.121)
- Voluntary and local initiatives (regulated by the State)
are recommended because "... the best chance of any
reformatory effect would be from that personal supervision
and care which can only be expected from those who are
actuated by religious and charitable motives. ..." (p.75)
1908: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1907-1908
- Asserts the principle of corrigibility which underlines
the Borstal scheme: "... up to a certain age, every
criminal who is not mentally defective is potentially a
good citizen", (p.13)
- Presenting statistics as to the differential height and
weight of juvenile-adult prisoners against the general
population, the notion of urban degeneration is used to
support the Borstal system. This is described as "removing
the youth from ... an evil environment, and placing him
under conditions favourable to his healthy growth", (p.36)
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- Recommends a system of "Continuation Schools" to regulate
the entry of school leavers into the labour market and
divert them "into the paths of permanent employment,
skilled or unskilled", (pp.14-15)
1908: Report of the Departmental Committee on the Operation of the
Law Relating to Inebriates and to their Detention in Reformatories
and Retreats
- Adopts a compromise position between determinism and
free-will whereby, in the name of intervention the
individual is made responsible for his own character
formation. While admitting the effect of congenital
factors (inherited cravings, congenital qualities of self-
control, etc.) it argues "... that desire for drink may be
diminished by abstinence, and self-control, like any other
faculty can be strengthened by exercise. It is erroneous
and disastrous to inculcate the doctrine that inebriety,
once established, is to be accepted with fatalistic
resignation".
- Taking advantage of the fact that "the legislature does
not now hesitate to enforce restrictions on the liberty
of persons whose unchecked vagaries are clearly contrary
to the public weal", the Report proposes compulsory
powers of detention even over "inebriates ... who have
committed no public offence".
1908: Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of
the Feeble-Minded
- Recommends a fundamental extension of State control over
all classes of mentally defective persons as a means of
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resolving the problems of racial deterioration and the
existence of groups "over whom no sufficient control is
exercised", (p.187)
- A movement of this category of person from the judicial to
the administrative realm is recommended: "... the mental
condition of these persons, and neither their poverty nor
their crime, is the real ground" of intervention, (p.191)
Accordingly, any mentally-defective offender should be
dealt with "as a patient" under the Lunacy Acts (p.333)
and detention ("protection")"should be continued as long
as is necessary", (p.191)
- Th8 fertility of the Unfit (more discreetly termed "the
Natality of Mentally Defective Persons) is reported as
higher than average, which, despite a high death rate,
"allows a considerable survival of mentally-defective
persons", (p.386)
- Insists upon the need for the systematic identification
and notification of the whole population of defectives:
"... it is necessary to ascertain who they are, and to
bring them into relation with the local authority", (pp.191-2)
1909: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1908-1909
- Endorsing Part I of the 1908 Prevention of Crime Act,
the Report argues that the 16 to 21 year old category can
equally be justified in legal and psychological terms.
It quotes at length from both "scientific" criminological
authority and an anthropometric study conducted at
Pentonville in 1898. (pp.14-15)
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1909: Report of the Departmental Committee on Probation
- Recommends the investigation of cases by means of
"Preliminary Enquiries" to ascertain character, mode
of life, home circumstances, etc., however, legal
procedures are respected to the extent that this
information should be made available only after a
finding of guilt, (paragraph 36)
- Argues that "probation should be kept distinct from
charitable relief" (i.e. from distributing funds, food,
clothes, etc.) (paragraph 42) although social work
techniques of visiting case-records and reformatory
personal influence are simultaneously endorsed, (passim)
1909: Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of
Distress: Majority Report
- Classification to take place between and within institutions
(ix.75) according to age, sex, "physical condition and
moral character" (iv.354) and "every effort should be made
... to dissociate the respectable unemployed from the
habitual in and out", (iv.634)
- Recommends Labour Exchanges to "assist the mobility of
labour", collect "accurate information as to unemployment"
(vi.487) and classificatory knowledge of individual cases,
(vi.620)
- Recommends Labour Colonies for those in need of "restoration
to physical efficiency" where treatment should be "as far
as possible curative and restorative" (Recommendation 67)
and Detention Colonies for the "irreclaimable" who "require
detention and discipline", (vi.628)
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- Home Assistance (i.s. Outrelief) to be given only "after
thorough inquiry" and all persons assisted "should be
subject to supervision". (Recommendations 72 and 75)
"Such supervision should include in its purview the
conditions, moral and sanitary, under which the recipient
is living", (ix.79)
- "The case-paper system should be everywhere adopted" in
regard to inquiry and supervision. (Recommendation 73)
- All treatment should be individualised so as to be
"appropriate for each case and yet encourage general
thrift and independence", (vi.615)
- Recommends "systematic co-operation between the Public
Assistance Authorities and recognised Voluntary Aid
Societies", (vi.301) and a system of public subvention
for private schemes of unemployment insurance, (vi.604)
1909: Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of
Distress: Minority Report
Part I The Non-Able Bodied
- Endorses the eugenic argument that the Nation is confronted
with a "grave three-fold problem as to Birth and Infancy.
... The prevention of the continued procreation of the
feeble-minded; ... the rescue of girl-mothers from a life
of sexual immorality; ... the reduction of infantile
mortality in respectable but necessitous families", (p.799)
- Defines the "proper sphere" of voluntary philanthropy thus:
the "service of visitation" is encouraged, but on condition
that no distribution of money, food or clothing is
involved, since the private agency cannot know the
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resources of the family and cannot enforce proper
behavioural conditions for the receipt of such aid. (p.1022)
- Voluntary endeavour is to be "definitely organised, under
skilled direction, in association with ... the public
administration" and the volunteer must "undergo technical
training", (p.1022)
- Trained volunteers should "search out those who need public
assistance [and] keep them constantly under observation
before and after the treatment", (p.1022)
- Public relief is to be made available without
disenfranchisement, but upon precise conditions as to
subsequent behaviour. Refusal to accept these terms is
to result not in refusal of relief but in "compulsory
removal", (pp.1020 and 1031)
Part II The Destitution of the Abla Bodied
- Adopts a macro-political perspective, arguing that the
Workhouse Test rids the local Guardians of a nuisance,
but fails to rid society of it. "Whilst an able-bodied
man remains a loafer and a waster, it is urgently desirable
that he should be in hand and under observation, rather
than lost in a crowd", (p.1076) The blind refusal to
receive (which is also a refusal to regulate, observe, and
to control) "may produce a saving on the local rate, but
not on the national balance sheet", (p.1076)
- Knowledge and regulation is demanded, even of those who
remain outside the Workhouse, because without such knowledge
sectors of the population remain beyond control: "the
Able-bodied who shun the Test Workhouse are to be face to
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face with the alternative of either working or starving.
As a matter of fact, our social organisation is still far
too loose to narrow their choice to any such extent. They
can beg, they can steal, they can sponge ... they can
combine the predatory life with the parasitic. ..." (p.1076)
- Rejects the principles of less-eligibility and minimal
contact implicit in Poor Law practice and insists that
"what is required is to take hold of a larger section of
that man's life, in order to find out the cause and
character of his distress, and to bring him under
influences which may set him on his feet", (p.1089)
- Produces an ambivalent position on questions of character.
The Report separates the question of character from that of
the causes of unemployment, but also argues that "the
character of [the unemployed] class is comparatively weak
... in intelligence, training, physique or morale" and
insists that the question of character is central to the
treatment of the unemployed, (pp.1172-3)
- Concludes that "distress from want of employment ... is a
constant feature of industry and commerce as at present
administered" (p.1177) and designs a new mode of
administration and regulation of the labour market by "The
National Government" (p.1101). This involves "regulation
of the national demand for labour" by a Ministry of Labour
(p.1195); "Absorption of surplus labour" by reducing the
permitted working of children and mothers of young children
("it is suicidal for the nation to drive the mother to earn
money in industry", p.1194) and the reduction of hours of
work in Rail and Transport industries, (p.1193)
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- Recommends the establishment of a national network of
Labour Exchanges to mobilise the labour market,
decausualise industry by 'dovetailing' short-time
engagements, and to suppress vagrancy. Registration
"should be legally enforced on all men who fail to fulfil
any of their social obligations, or are found homeless,
or requiring Public Assistance for themselves or their
families", (p.1217) Refusal of the offer of work in
such cases will be "occasions for instant and invariable
commitment ... to the reformatory [Detention Centres which
must form an integral part of the system. ..." (p.1189)
- Recommends that the government should "deliberately alter
... the social environment so as to render impossible (or
at least more difficult) the present prolific life below
the National Minimum, or the continuance at large of
persons of either sex who are unable or unwilling to come
up to the Minimum Standard of Life".
- Recommends "Medical and other inspection of all infants,
school children, sick or mentally defective persons, and
all who are 'unemployed' or otherwise need public help
so as to discover the unfit, as well as to remedy their
defects".
- Recommends "enforcement of the responsibilities of
parenthood at a high standard, and hence discouragement of
7
marriage among those unable or unwilling to fulfil them".
1911: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1910-1911
- Advises a shift of the power to classify prisoners into
divisions (under the 1898 Act) from the judiciary to the
289
prison administration. This reversal of the principled
position stated in the 1899 Report is justified by the
greater knowledge of the prisoner's character and
antecedents available to the executive, (p.23)
1911: Report to the Secretary of State on the Proceedings of the
Eighth International Penitentiary Congress: by Sir Evelyn
Ruggles-Brise
- Discusses "the application of scientific experiment to
criminal problems" as conducted in America, including "the
treatment by sterilization of confirmed criminals and
'defectives"', (p.2)
- Insists upon "the individualisation of punishment" (p.74)
and the prisoner's "reversionary rights of humanity", (p.73)
- Describes the "scientific investigation" conducted by
Goring as refuting the notion of the irreclaimable criminal
type and strengthening the "faith and hope" in reformative
treatment, (p.74)
1913: Report of the Departmental Committee on Reformatory and
Industrial Schools
- Suggests a link-up between the Schools and the Poor Law
authorities: "the Local Government Board are considering
the question of improving the after-care of poor-law
children and it may be possible in some cases to arrange
for the same agents to supervise both classes of children.
It might also be possible ... for employments to be found
and after-care to be undertaken ... by the Juvenile
Employment Committees organised ... in connection with the
Labour Exchanges", (p.57)
- Emigration is recommended "as one of the best means of
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disposal open to the schools".
- Physical training is also much emphasised in view of its
reformative effects "on the mind and the character", (p.38)
1913: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1912-1913
- Argues for an extension of Borstal principles to include
persons between 21 and 25 years old. This involves the
extension of semi-determinate sentencing and reformatory
training, despite earlier argument that 21 years was the
proper legal and psychological limit of this special case
(see, e.g., 1908-09 Report).
1914: Report of the Prison Commissioners for the Year 1913-1914
- Endorses Goring*s criminological findings on the extent
to which the "criminal diathesis" (disposition or
character) is the effect of hereditary and constitutional
defects, while refusing the implications of "predestination",
(p.24)
- Recommends the "segregation and supervision of the
obviously unfit", (p.24)
- Calls for "fuller information as to the mental states of
prisoners" brought before the courts, (p.22)
- While it is "within the power of the State" to "control
the unfit", surveillance must be left to the "individual
worker" who is to "enter into the lives and homes of those
who, in the absence of uplifting, and restraining and
inspiring influences, would, in obedience to some
constitutional defect of mind or of body, inevitably follow
the line of least resistance", (p.24)
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These summaries have been limited to showing only the points
of entry of programmatic elements into official discourse. They have
avoided repetition when the same element appears almost everywhere
simultaneously (as do the calls for "classification", "reform",
"investigation", etc.) or else is gradually circulated from one Report
to many subsequent ones (as with "mode of life" arguments, Statist and
interventionist positions, and so on). Nonetheless it is already
apparent that these official documents take over not only elements of
the original programmes, but also the discursive tactics and compromise
formations subsequently developed, often forging new compromises and
g
realignments in the process.
As well as endorsing specific proposals on indeterminate sentencing,
Labour Exchanges, segregation of the unfit, and so on, the Reports
introduced virtually all of the fundamental axioms of the programmes
and gave them an official authorisation. Thus we witness a definite
and profound movement towards the desire for knowledge of both
populations and individuals, as well as the correlative construction of
apparatuses of rsgulation and normalisation. In this movement the
place of the expert, of 'technique*, and of 'science*,are each secured,
as is the more general commitment to the interventionist State and an
extensive policy of social engineering. 'Investigation',
•individualisation', 'classification' and 'reform' are the terms which
manifest this current in the penal realm. Moreover the penality of
theae Reports diversifies not only its sanctions but also its
accredited knowledges, as the extra-legal discourses of medicine,
criminology, philanthropy and psychiatry are given a definite place
alongside that of the law.
Ida can also see the points at which the limitations and problems
of one programme are minimised in their 'take-up' by being supplemented
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by the elements of another. Thus, for example, criminology's failure
at the level of technique is compensated by augmenting its proposals
with the devices of social work - the visiting method, case records and
"personal influence" - in an alignment which can achieve wider support
as well as greater effect. Indeed this disregard for theoretical
integrity leads to a number of pragmatic formations of an eclectic
nature wherein separate programmes and discourses are intertwined
within a single set of recommendations, for instance, the combination
of social security and eugenics in The Minority Report, or else the
10
admixture of 'medical* and 'moral' discourse in regard to Inebriacy.
The movement from a judicial to an administrative register can be
clearly traced in these Reports, as can the correlative shift from the
penal to the 'therapeutic' idiom. Notions of determinism are
vehemently denied only to be reintroduced via marginal categories,and
there is a perceptible slide along the newly adopted continuum linking
the Normal and the Pathological, life can even trace the reappearance of
many of the familiar discursive manoeuvres and tactics as they emerge
anew within these Reports. Thus 'special cases' are defined only to
be extended, and a number of strategic metaphors 'spontaneously'
occur to give arguments a particular direction or else to lend to a
certain measure the legitimacy of a happier analogue. Likewise we
find that the Reports regularly revolve around those particular
categories - the juvenile, the habitual, the defective - which, as we
saw earlier, were the strategic points of entry, carefully selected by
criminologists or eugenists to achieve maximum effect.
Finally, we see the Reports construct compromise formations of
their own, thereby balancing the opposing forces which are represented
in their intended audience, the evidence they receive, or even in the
membership of the Reporting body itself. The Poor Law Majority Reports
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compromise between CQS-type objectives and the need for thorough State
interventionism is a well known case of this type, but other
compromises are equally significant. Thus a delicate balance was
struck between penal expertise and judicial knowledge - the power of
the judge and that of the executive - by the various Prison Commission
proposals for classification procedures or 'double-track' sentences.
Similarly it is noticeable that when eugenic proposals are considered,
it is always segregation rather than sterilization that is the
preferred option - an option which allows the 'purification of the
Race' to be displaced by arguments about the care and protection of
individuals.^ And although the role of the State is everywhere
extended, this is not a matter of private initiative being 'replaced*
by public engagement. On the contrary, virtually every Report presents
its position as an alliance between the private and the public, the
State and the Volunteer, in which the State's engagement will supplement,
co-ordinate and empower voluntary action rather than emasculate it.
This then, was the first line of success achieved by the various
programmes and at the same time the first official phase in a process
of strategy-formation. The relative coherence and shared direction of
these Reports, as well as their frequent use of parallel or
complementary techniques and discourses,were eventually to contribute
to the patterning and shared logics of official practices which we
have described as "strategies". Since we continue to insist upon the
fragmentary and 'myopic* nature of this process, it is worth pausing
to consider how this relative coherence emerged.
Since these Reports and Inquiries were disparately constituted,
with diverse memberships focusing upon different issues, we cannot
point to a shared organisational basis which could have controlled and
formulated proposals,except,of course,for the broad boundaries
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established by their common relationship to the political
establishment. Rather this coherence must be seen as the result of
two kinds of process. Firstly, the Reports could produce similar and
parallel outcomes for the simple reason that a kind of precedent-based
domino-effect occurred whereby particular Reports would refer to the
proposals of earlier or simultaneous documents and produce
recommendations which were related to them by deliberate imitation,
co-ordination or complimentarity. This process of mutual recognition
and emulation can be clearly traced in the texts of these Reports
12
which are often positively incestuous in their relations inter se.
But if this first point can explain the fact of coherence, it cannot
account for the particular form of this coherence, based around the
axioms of the four major programmes of social reform, tile must explain
this effect in terms of the propaganda work of these programmes, the
evidence they proferred to the Committees,and their success in shaping
the terms in which the social and penal problems were addressed.
However it must be emphasised that this was not purely a matter of
successful argument and persuasion. The Reports were not simply
'persuaded' by discursive manoeuvre any more than they were simply
'convinced' by scientific reason. Rather, the political developments
and disruptions described in Chapter Two channelled official policy
in certain definite directions, exerting pressure around specific
issues and provoking a particular kind of political response. This
'response' encompassed the programmes themselves (or at least their
eagerness to address the social question) and the initiatives which set
up the various Enquiries, Commissions and Departmental Reports. Thus
the Reports were constituted by the same problems which mobilised the
reform programmes. They existed within a politico-discursive field
which these programmes had already elaborated and transformed, so by
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the time they came to construct their proposals, a series of discursive
developments and manoeuvres had provided them with a number of refined
and ideologically-attractive resources which they willingly deployed.
(3) The processes of strategy formation
To sum up our analysis so far, we have seen a social crisis,
discursively interpreted in accordance with certain political positions,
programmes which elaborate a series of paths of resolution, a politico-
discursive struggle in which these programmes are compromised,
resisted and transformed, and then another process of political
filtering when these programmes are translated selectively into the
realm of official discourse via inguiries, reports and recommendations.
The next stage of this process is much more in keeping with
conventional notions of political calculation and strategy. Now
recognised as terms within the field of official discourse, the concgp ts,
technigues and recommendations of the programmes are laid hold of by
governmental decisions. They become the basis for legislation, or else,
lower down the hierarchy, for administrative decisions and procedures
within the Prison Commission, the Board of Trade, the Home Office and
so on. Once again, this next stage involves a process of calculation,
selection and struggle within the Parliamentary process and also
outside of it, "in the country". Thus certain measures were selected
and proposed but thereafter withdrawn because of Parliamentary or popular
opposition (e.g. the withdrawal of Bills involving explicitly eugenic
terms, labour colonies or life-long preventive detention), and
throughout this process the government is engaged in representing the
significance of these issues, or else negotiating, bargaining and
winning support for its measures and enactments. Moreover these
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processes take place within the limits of governmental calculation,
i.e. within a situation where contradiction as well as co-ordination
exists between Ministers and Departments, which is not long-term but
piece-meal and reactive, limited by the constraints of Parliamentary
13
time, 'political plausibility' and popular legitimacy.
If out of all of this we insist that a strategy developed - a
strategy which we will soon proceed to dissect and explicate - then
it will be appreciated that this notion of strategy refers to a pattern
or logic inscribed within a network of apparatuses which operate in
loose co-ordination around a series of common or complementary
objectives. It will also be appreciated that such strategies are not
the results of a single battle-plan,drawn up in advance, but are
rather the outcomes of a complex and fragmented process of struggle
within which the calculations of individuals and agencies play a
crucial, but by no means controlling, part. Such strategies are always
"at a distance" from the fragmented points of calculation and
programming which promote them. They presuppose multiple, but myopic,
knowledges, not a single omniscience. They are calculated, but never
directly or comprehensively. They are the outcome of struggles, but
struggles which are to some extent directed, delimited and deliberate
in their political direction. Strategy-formation is thus a matter of
fragmentary lines of development crossing and intersecting, or else
being lost as they go off on 'implausible' tangents. These lines are
then transformed and finally, officially inscribed,into a strategic
pattern in the operational discourses and practices of institutions.
To return to our exposition, the elements of the new penal and
social strategies were in fact put into place by a number of different
processes,which we can list as follows:
(a) political struggles in the country for social reform, and,a
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more limited pressure for penal change which emerged as a
corollary of social reform and from the demands of
criminologists, prison administrators and penal reform groups.
(b) negotiations between government agencies and various private
or voluntary bodies (e.g. the prisoners* aid societies, the
Friendly Societies, Charitable and Social Work agencies,
etc.).
(c) administrative initiatives which introduced certain measures
or appointed certain individuals to this end.
(d) parliamentary debate and legislation.
The next few sections will trace these processes in some detail:
(a) Political Struggles
In Chapters Two and Five we have already outlined the main forces
engaged in the political struggles which contributed to the development
of social reform legislation, and there is no need to repeat that
description here. However, it is worth noting that the major direct
pressure for these reforms emanated not from the lower classes, nor
their "representatives" in the labour movement, but rather from within
the ranks of the dominant political parties and the intellectuals on
14
their fringes. As the Radical writer L. A. Atherley-Jones pointed
out as early as 1893:
"... the present movement for social reform springs from
above rather than below. The cry for an eight hours bill,
for further factory legislation, for improvement of
sanitation, for the increase of allotments and small
holdings, for the readjustment of the incidence of taxation,
for old age pensions, is less the spontaneous demand of the
working classes than the tactical inducement of the
political strategist." ^
By the time of the 1906 Liberal landslide, considerations of national
efficiency, averting the socialist threat, regulating the labour
market and of securing the allegiance of the 'respectable worker*, had
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combined with intra-party interests to ensure the success of these
social reform arguments.^ And as Bentley Gilbert points out, the
traditional terms of political action had been so thoroughly undermined
by the time of the 1906 School Heals Act that:
"... Party contention over the principle of social reform
practically vanished. In politics, nineteenth century
laissey-faire orthodoxy fell without a fight. Of the
great measures [such as] old age pensions, unemployment
insurance and labour exchanges, or national health
insurance - none was opposed by the Unionists on the
grounds that the proposals constituted an invasion of
individual responsibility. ..." ^
The success of social reform arguments, most notably those of the
social security programme which Gilbert mentions, had a spin-off effect
in the area of penal reform. As well as creating a 'climate of reform*
in which new techniques, expertise and social provision had a place,
these changes overcame the ideological, prohibitions upon State
interventionism which had previously fixed the proper limits of
government in penal affairs. The willingness of a Liberal Parliament
to be seen to introduce a whole series of penal and quasi-penal
measures which clearly flouted the traditions of liberalism can thus
be partly explained in these terms.
Before leaving this point about the very extensive 'State
interventionism' which can be seen in measures such as Borstal,
preventive detention, the Wental Deficiency Act, and even in the new
probation and prison practices, it should be pointed out that these
were not the terms in which such measures were discussed. Despite the
19
isolated attempts of M.P.s such as Wedgewood, Rawlinson and Belloc
to point up the political significance of these innovations, the
discussions in Parliament and the Press circumvented such issues by
reference to the 'moral duty' of a charitable State to extend its
20
'care* and 'protection' to those in need of 'rescue'. It is at this
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point that we see the full significance of the mediation of the
criminology programme by the traditions of evangelical penal reform.
For despite its tendency to de-politicise its own categories and
techniques, criminology was quite explicit about its Statism, as the
social defence arguments of Ferri or Garafalo amply demonstrate. It
bias not the least of its advantages that the 'evangelised* version of
criminology that mas imported into official discourse dissolved these
political terms into questions of care and benevolence. Thus, viewed
through the prism of evangelical discourse, the new penality appeared
to reconstitute sanctioning as a charitable act of rescue rather than
an authoritative form of coercion. In this refracted light, the
argument for placing limits upon State intervention was not so much
a political safeguard as a failure of moral nerve.
(b) The merger of public and private agencies
It was noted earlier (p.294) that most of the Reports of this
period recommended that an alliance should be formed between public
21
and private agencies in the social and penal realms. The actual
process of forging this alliance was frequently a matter of delicate
and difficult negotiation - as Bentley Gilbert has already shown in
22
his account of the development of National Insurance - and the precise
details of these negotiations may no longer appear particularly
relevant. However if examined closely, the terms and arguments used
in this process can be very illuminating, frequently revealing just
what was at stake in these negotiations, and by implication, the
character of the alliance that was eventually formed. Although such
negotiations also took place in regard to Friendly Societies,
Industrial Insurance Companies, relisving charities, and others,
our discussion will focus upon the formation of a merger between the
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penal authorities and the various voluntary agencies uhich services
the courts and prisons.
Uie have already touched on the reasons uhy such a merger
bias desired, and u/hy this uias preferred to the annexation of the
functions of these voluntary agencies, but it is uorthuhile here to go
into this reasoning in more depth. The desire to enter the traditionally
'private* field of reformation and after-care reflected a changed
perception of the significance and status of such an endeavour. By the
turn of the century this had become "a subject of State concern and
23
interest", uhich uas "too difficult and too costly to be left
24
entirely to voluntary societies". As the Prison Commissioners stated
in 1910, "a system uhich maintains a complete divorce betueen
philanthropic service and authoritative State control must be regarded
25
as imperfect". Given this neu "concern", the extension of public
control uould have a number of advantages. As first Gladstone and then
Merrick had pointed out in their Reports, the entry of public authority
into this field uould render it more uniform, more regular and more
efficient than the rather diverse and uneven pattern established by
local and private initiatives. At the same time it uould extend the
range and efficiency of the penal authorities, by harnassing these
voluntary efforts to their oun ends, and providing them uith "useful
26
adjuncts" in the uay of existing resources, institutions and
personnel, at a relatively lou cost. This "harnassing" uould allou
the philanthropic logic of the aid and missionary societies - uhich
27
helped only 'deserving' or 'uorthy' prisoners - to be redirected
touards a logic of social control, extending to all prisoners and to
A
the offenders judicially classified as 'suitable' for probation. It
uould also ensure that "a knouledge of a man's character and mode of
28
living" uould consistently be made available to the courts,and
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would provide a viable alternative to imprisonment for those whose
characters justified the risk of a non-custodial sentence. As for
29
after-care - which was to become "a kind of after-prison probation" -
official direction and control would ensure a more efficient system of
surveillance, resulting either in the successful channelling of the
prisoner back into useful work, or else his peremptory return to
captivity. Finally, the alliance with the voluntary sector would have
the definite advantage of refining the mechanisms of normalisation at the
point of contact with the offender. The experience of police supervision
of released convicts had already proved to be inefficient in its
severity and stigma, and so the possibility of articulating the subtle
personal influence of the charitable volunteer with the direction of
the public power appeared very attractive. As Churchill put it:
"... there is a need for that personal touch which even
the best official work cannot wholly achieve."
and a later Report confirmed that:
"the P.O. has hitherto owed much of his success to the
relationship he has been able to establish with the
probationer, who looks upon him as a friend, not as an
official. To turn P.O.s into a new class of Civil
Servant would, we believe, tend to destroy this valuable
influence." (Departmental Committee on Probation Officers
(1922: 7).)
However if this merger appeared advantageous to the official
authorities, the first response of the voluntary agencies was
distinctly unwelcoming. When the Rev. derrick conveyed to the Aid
Societies the proposals of The Gladstone Report as to their
re-organisation and subordination to the official Visiting Committees,
he was told that this was simply "not acceptable" to any of the
societies concerned. Similarly the proposal that they should engage
in a more thoroughgoing form of supervision of offenders was refused
by at least four societies who replied that "as a matter of principle
302
31
any kind of espionage is in itself objectionable". As to the more
general recommendation that they should be regulated (andfinanced) by
y
public authorities, the majority of societies replied that the did not
like "the idea of interference on the part of the higher authorities"
which would "do away with the sense of independence. The D.P.A.
Society is not an official body, it is outside the jurisdiction of the
Home Office and cannot be held accountable to it". Indeed they were
able to declare - without the irony that later events would lend to
their remarks - that they objected to "being too much under official
32
supervision".
Against this initial resistance, the authorities proposed a
number of arguments and inducements. The first of these was the
standard inducement of financial assistance which was offered in a
number of forms. Thus increased subventions were offered to Local
Aid Societies, and the Societies which dealt with convicts were
offered a scheme whereby the prisoner's gratuity was paid not directly
to the man, as before, but instead to the Aid Society for it to dispense
according to its own conditions. But of course this financial
provision also carried a cost, it being:
"the duty of Government to satisfy itself in all cases
where there is a grant ... that the grant is expended in
a proper and effectual way on the object for which it is
designed." ^3
It was argued that the improved organisation and co-ordination which
public direction would bring would lead to the collating of information,
knowledge and experience, and in turn to improved methods and a more
effective system of aid. Moreover the voluntary societies would enjoy
•W
an improved status which would ensure automatic recognition by the
courts and prisons, special rights of access to prisoners, and priority
34
over other 'unofficial' agencies. The crucial argument here though,
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was one which concerned itself not with finance, organisation or
status, but with more basic questions of 'power1. It was recognised
by both sides that the major problem faced by the voluntary bodies in
their work was that they lacked any real power or sanction to enforce
conditions upon their 'clients'. As one Police Court missioner put
it:
"If they cared to resent your calling to see them
they could. One had no power; it was only a moral
influence." 35
As for the Aid Societies themselves:
"It is obvious that the power of the Societies to
influence the prisoner for his good has stood upon a
very weak foundation, and any success which they have
achieved in humane endeavour has been due to personal
service and enthusiasm unsupported by extraneous
power." 36
The inducement that was offered, and quite soon accepted, amounted
to the power of a legal sanction,which was in various ways extended to
these agencies in return for their co-operation and alliance. For the
missionary agencies, this was to be achieved via the statutory
provisions of the 1907 Probation Act,which empowered the probation
officer through the sanction of recall for breach of conditions. The
offender henceforth knew "that the hand of the law is still hanging
over him" and the reformatory power was correspondingly increased.
Indeed this power was further increased after a 1909 Report had
endorsed the sentiments of a dr. Way, probation officer, who declared:
"What an excellent incentive it would be to the keeping
of the pledge if the friend of the case at the court
had a little official power at his back." ^
The Criminal Justice Administration Act of 1914 provided this
"incentive" by allowing temperance (as well as residence) to become
enforceable conditions of a probation order.
For the Aid Societies dealing with convicts, a different mechanism
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was employed. Their power was to derive from a suspension of the
convict's duty to report to the police, which would continue so long
as the Society's conditions of licence were observed. On breach of
these conditions, the suspension would be lifted and the convict
38
recalled to prison for breach of his "ticket-of-leave" police licence.
The consequences of this proposal were clearly spelt out by the Home
Secretary at the Conference arranged between himself and
representatives of the Aid Associations on Duly 19th, 1910, to propose
the setting up of a Central Agency:
"Your authority for all purposes will be greatly
strengthened under this scheme. ... You will take over
the whole of the man's affairs. You will have the
liberty of the man in your hands under the Central
Agency. It will not be just as you are now, that you
only have the leverage of your personal influence and
your spiritual administration, because besides that
there is the monetary grant which you have the
administering of, and also the power of saying whether
they have to go under the police." 39
Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise added later that "your spheres will be
AO
enormously increased", but he did not forget to mention the trade-off
price for this advantage. The minutes of the Conference report him as
stating:
"they were taking upon themselves a great responsibility -
relieving convicts from the necessity of reporting to the
police ... that was a State concern." 41
and of course it was a 'concern' which would now justify the
involvement of the State in this previously 'private' field of
social action.
It should be added that great care was taken on the part of the
authorities not to appear heavy handed or overbearing in their
approaches. Throughout the period from the proposals of Gladstone to
the final completion of this merger, the Prison Commissioners
42
continually denied any "desire to hamper or interfere" with the
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societies, avoiding any hint of coercion and talking instead of a
43"close and friendly co-operation". However this delicacy should
be understood in the context of a situation wherein the agencies of the
State were ultimately in complete control. After all, as we saw in
Chapter Four, philanthropy in the penal realm was always in the end
dependent upon the State for its authorisation and access.
The successful outcome of these negotiations can be seen from the
fact that the Central Association for the Aid of Discharged Convicts
was set up in 1911, and a Central Committee to organise and co-ordinate
44
the Aid Societies of Local Prisons established in 1913. Similarly,
most of voluntary societies,which by 1907 provided missionaries to
the police courts around the country, were happy to accept official
45
recognition after the Probation Act of that year. The co-operation
of the Borstal Association required no such bargaining as it was set
up tie novo by Ruggles-Brise following the 1908 Act, and its powers of
licence and recall were of a direct statutory kind, as were those
designed for released prisoners who had served a sentence of preventive
46
detention. The Oaily Express of 13th February, 1911, welcomed the
new schemes with the headline "New Plan of Friendship Backed by Force",
which perhaps sums up the alliance as accurately, if not so discreetly,
as the formulation of Rugglas-Brise:
"... this Central body should be supported by a contribution
from the State and clothed with the necessary authority.
By this means earnest personal effort would not in the last
resort be unsupported by power, nor would the supervision
which the law requires be forced to operate independently
of the agencies of moral and religious endeavour." 47
(c) Administrative initiatives
The third means by which the elements of the new strategy were
put in place was the administrative fiat. Given the considerable
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discretionary powers of the Prison Commission (especially after the
1898 Act) and even of individual prison governors, it often proved
possible to implement new measures or changes in the regime without
the inconvenience of obtaining direct Parliamentary approval. In
such a situation, the appointment of high-ranking officials was in
itself a policy measure, as can be seen from the letter of appointment
received by Ruggles-Brise from Home Secretary Asquith in 1895:
"I propose if it is agreeable to you, to appoint you
to the office of Chairman of the Prison Commissioners.
I am, as you are aware, very anxious that, as far
as is practicable, the recommendations of the recent
[Gladstone] Committee should be carried into effect,
and I believe that you have the disposition, as I know
that you have the ability, to bring about this object."
Subsequently Ruggles-Brise was to use his administrative powers to
undertake a number of important initiatives, including an experimental
regime at Borstal prison (1902) and the later introduction of the
Modified Borstal in 1906. These initiatives were of course limited,
since they could not impose an undeterminate sentence without statutory
power, however the fait accomplis "success" of these experiments did
much to ease the passage of Part I of the 1908 Prevention of Crime Act
49
when it was eventually introduced. The same device of the
administrative initiative was deployed to extend the special Borstal
treatment to offenders of up to 25 years of age at Lancaster Prison
from 1909 onwards, and was used in the Prison Commissioners Report for
1912-13 to argue for legislation along these lines.
The space for administrative action of this kind was considerably
extended by Section 2 of the 1898 Prison Act.which allowed the Secretary
of State power to make rules for the government of local and convict
prisons, thereby effectively delegating the power to legislate from
Parliament to the executive.^
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(d) Parliamentary enactments
The fourth and most important process whereby the new policy
elements were finally framed and put into place was that of Parliamentary
legislation and the executive action which followed on from it.
Together with the social legislation for which they are be9t remembered,
the Liberal Governments of 1906 to 1914 rapidly enacted a series of
major penal measures which completed the process of transformation
tentatively begun by earlier Conservative administrations.
The Parliamentary passage of the various social reforms has been
described in detail in the work of Gilbert, Harris and others and it
is not proposed to repeat it here. As for the penal legislation,
the pages of Hansard and the recollections of the Ministers and
officials concerned are not particularly illuminating. Despite the
major importance of these statutes, there was little serious debate or
discussion proceeding their enactment. All of the measures concerned
were 'uncontentious' in Party terms and virtually unopposed on the floor
of either House. Apart from the isolated opposition of a few M.P.s to
the massive detention powers provided by the Mental Deficiency and
preventive detention measures, the only notable feature of these
debates was the uncritical manner in which many of the metaphors and
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legitimations of criminological argument were casually adopted.
Given the double process of •de-politicisation* which occurred,
first within the various programmes and then again upon their
compromised reception into official discourse, this absence of political
debate should come as no surprise. Indeed it is this displacement of
penal and social measures away from the site(s) of their political
significance that necessitates the kind of analysis attempted in this
dissertation. Nonetheless if we examine not the just declarations of
M.P.s but also the statutory documents which they enacted, we can begin
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to recover some of this significance for analysis.
Appendices numbers 1 and 2 list the relevant penal and social
measures which were enacted between 1895 and 1914 and which,taken
together, constituted the new penal and social configurations of
the early twentieth century. These should be referred to in order to
gain an overall image of the extent of the transformations undertaken
during this period. However the remainder of this Chapter will
scrutinise several of the major statutes in more detail, examining
their terms and provisions in the light of all that has gone before.
If, fallowing the balance of this thesis, and the spaces of
existing historiography, we concentrate upon the 'penal* rather than
the 'social', then the first important measure to be passed was the
Prison Act of 1898. Ue have already discussed the importance of
section 2 of this Act in shifting the power to make prison rules from
Parliament to the executive, and in fact the remainder of its
provisions operated to introduce various changes to the prison
regime which could not be achieved by administrative means. Its
introduction of remission, classification and limitations on the use
of corporal punishment in prisons should be viewed,along with the New
Prison Rules declaring the abolition of unproductive labour,
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modification of the silence rule and the separation of juveniles,
as the early implementation of the Gladstone Report's recommendations.
Indeed it is worth noting that it was only the recommendations
addressing the causes of popular scandal which were immediately
implemented. The less visible features of the penal crisis were left
until almost a decade later when a more fundamental restructuring took
54
place in penal and social affairs.
If we examine the provisions on prison classification introduced
by this Act, we discover both a tentative step towards individualisation
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and a typically eclectic compromise formation which merges together
a number of disparate logics and connotations. The scheme of three
divisions introduced by section 6 appears at first sight to be a
definite move towards the individualisation of treatment on the basis
of the offender and his 'antecedents'. However, in contrast to the
demands of the criminological programme, this individualising
classification is to be the prerogative of the Court and not the
prison authority:
"The principle here given expression is very far-reaching,
and, as far as we are aware, is in advance of the penal
systems in force on the Continent of Europe. By it is
destroyed, in emphatic language, the theory that had
prevailed hitherto ... that the duty of classification is
a matter for prison officials." 55
Moreover, if we read closely the provisions of the Act, or else the
Home Office Circular that followed it, we find that the classification
criteria are certainly to include the offender's 'antecedents',
'character' and 'natural disposition'; but they also involve reference
to the "nature of the offence" and any "exceptional temptation or
special provocation".66 In other words, the court's classificatory
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power is to be exercised - if at all - upon a composite logic
involving criminological individualisation and a neo-classical concern
with extenuation and degree of guilt.
Such a provision allows more than just discretion to the court to
implement its favoured line of reasoning: it also allows the measure
to be presented in a number of different ways (e.g. as more 'scientific',
more 'fair', more 'charitable', etc.) and to issue in a number of
different directions. Thus although it would later be used as a
precedent for individualised treatment, its immediate practical
effect was not different treatment but merely a different public status
and the "segregation" of those who were not "really criminal" from
310
those who were.
It might be added here that a similar ambiguity inhered in the
notion of "reformative treatment" that was promoted to prominence
by the Gladstone Report. When discussing the Report we noted that
despite a criminological 'framing* of these discussions, and the use
of terms such as "individualisation" or "treatment", the actual
practices mentioned were always more in keeping with the evangelical
tradition of philanthropy and social work. In those discussions
immediately following Gladstone which described the reformative
function, this religious aspect continued to appear, along with a newer
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emphasis upon certain techniques of discipline and reward. However
it is important to note that during the next decade and thereafter,
official discussions frequently employed the notion of 'reform* or
'reformative treatment' in a much more positivist or scientific form,
and did so without any need to distinguish their position from that of
Gladstone.^ The point here, as with the 'classifications' of the
1898 Act, is simply that an ambiguous or composite term can often be a
kind of discursive bridgehead to later and more fundamental changes
which need not then be acknowledged as such.
In the same year as the Prison Act, another important measure was
enacted, following a further recommendation of the Gladstone Report,
as well as the quite separate demands of the medical and temperance
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lobbies. The Inebriates Act of 1898 established an alternative
means of dealing with habitual drunkards, allowing the removal of
large numbers of inebriates from prison, and the curtailment of the
'futile' and expensive practice of repeated short prison sentences.
Its importance was that in doing so it took penality a first step
beyond the normal constraints of criminal law. Where the criminal law
traditionally rested upon questions of guilt, proportionality, a
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determinate offence and sentence, and so on, the new Act's provisions
allowed an indeterminate sentence, based not upon responsibility for an
offence but upon the offender's assumed condition of irresponsibility.
It amounted to an important extension of the powers of detention
beyond the offence itself. Moreover, the section which establishes
this power does so by means of a double-track sentence which allows
habitual drunkards (or offenders whose crime was drink-related) to be
first sentenced for their immediate offence and then, supplementally,
subjected to a detention order on the grounds of their condition. The
logics of the judicial sentence and the administrative order, of the
penal and the therapeutic, are thus kept formally separate while being
substantially conjoined.
The detention order itself for an indeterminate period with a
maximum of three years (section 1 (1)) and was to involve "classification,
treatment" and "absence under licence" (section 4) while the Rules for
Inebriate Reformatories, published the following year, make it clear
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that "treatment should be reformatory and not penal". The Act itself
empowers the Secretary of State to establish State Inebriate
Reformatories (section 3) to be run by the Prison Commissioners
(section 4) and to regulate, certify, inspect and finance such
Reformatories as may be provided provately and by local authorities
(sections 6-9). And it quickly becomes clear from the Annual Reports
of the Inspector that while the private institutions should be
mainly reformative, the State Reformatories are primarily
concerned with discipline and security and the safe detention of
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•refractory' inmates transferred from other institutions. Once again,
however, there is a clear discrepancy between the language of
reformatory intent - "special treatment", "knowledge", investigation of
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the inebriate's "past history", etc. - and the reports of the
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treatment actually provided year by year which are much more in keeping
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with traditional "spiritual, moral and educational influences".
Finally, it should be pointed out that this measure, whatever
its limitations in regard to the reform of inebriates, subsequently
operated as a kind of precedent or model for similar measures in
regard to the feeble-minded, vagrants, habitual criminals and even
•normal* offenders:^
"... by rendering possible the special treatment of a
morbid condition which causes crime, [the ActJ approves a
most important principle. It recognises that ... the
offending person is only in a modified degree responsible
for his criminal action and that the force which impelled
him to its commission is only partly if at all under his
control. It acknowledges that the crime is the result
of the condition." ^
In a rather different manner, the Probation of Offenders Act of
1907 also constituted an important extension and transformation of the
sanctions of the criminal law. In establishing a State-authorised
system of social work, financed from the rates and ordered by the
courts, the Act heralded a profound revision of the State's proper
functions with regard to the offender. At the same time,section A of
the Act established measures of investigation, surveillance and
normalisation which extended and refined the field of vision and
intervention available to the court. And precisely because these
duties of 'visiting', 'reporting* and 'advising' were the stipulated
duties of a paid and accountable official - unlike the vaguer status
of investigation and reform in prisons - they were all the more
likely to operate in actual practice.
If we scrutinise the terms of the Act's provisions we find once
again that its categories are compromise-formations borrowing from more
than just one programme. As with the 1898 Prison Act, section 1 (l)
combines a criminological logic ('character', 'antecedents', 'mental
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health') with the concerns of neo-classicism ('extenuating circumstances',
the 'triv/ial nature of the offence'),appealing more to the positions
of ev/angelical penal reformers and child-rescue than to the science of
criminology. The same section directly implies the non-penal status
of probation by recommending it be imposed where "it is inexpedient
to inflict any punishment".
It is absolutely clear from subsequent Reports and commentaries
that early probation practice did indeed follow this philanthropic
social work logic, appointing personnel from the various missionary
societies and adopting their techniques of visiting, inspecting and
exerting 'personal influence'. Indeed probation was widely viewed
by figures such as William Tallack, Secretary to the Howard Association,
as intended for "deserving" offenders - a kind of penal equivalent of
the Poor Law's "out-relief". However in the 1920s and 1930s, when
the transformative techniques absent from criminology were supplied
by psycho-analysis and its derivatives, probation was able to shift
gradually towards these without the need to challenge the ambivalent
terms of its original charter.
If the foregoing Acts were qualified and tentative in their
endorsement of the terms of the criminological programme, then the
Prevention of Crime Act of 1908 suggests a much more solid and
explicit commitment. Part I of the Act, headed "The Reformation of
Young Offenders", adopted the juvenile adult category of the 16 to 21
year old which we have already described, and even built in a line of
extension for this 'special' category to include offenders up to the
age of 23 in certain cases (section 1 (1) and (2)). It also defined
eligibility for this treatment in terms of "criminal habits or
tendencies" and potential corrigibility (section 1 (1)), a knowledge
of which was to be derived from investigatory reports on the youth's
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"character ... health and mental condition" (section 1 (l)). The
purpose of this sanction is defined as the "reformation" of the offender,
though of course this statement is coupled with "the repression of
crime" (section 1 (l)).
The sentence established to this end is an indeterminate one, to
last "not less than one year nor more than three years" and release
under licensed supervision is available at the discretion of the Prison
6Q
Commissioners at any time after six months (or three months"in the
case of a female") (section 5 (1)). Whether or not the maximum term
of detention is served, a six month period of supervision follows on
the expiration of the sentence, during which time the offender may
be recalled and made to serve a further three months detention.
Introducing the Bill in the Lords, the Earl of Beauchamp declared
that the "one principle underlying it is that there should be
individual study of the character and habits of each prisoner",^
the purpose of this individualisation being to direct a form of
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treatment "affecting alike his body, his mind and his character".
Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, who did most to propose and develop the
institution of Borstal training, characterised it thus:
"The object of the System was to arrest or check the
evil habit by the 'individualisation' of the prisoner,
mentally, morally and physically. To the exhortation
and moral persuasion of a selected staff, we added physical
drill, gymnastics, technical and literary instruction
[and] inducements to good conduct by a system of grades
and rewards."
We might add to these remarks that this noticeable emphasis upon the
cultivation of the body through physical exercise and drill, whereby
"the puny city-bred lad, after a few weeks of this treatment, generally
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grows out of his clothes" owed as much to the political concern with
"deterioration" and "physical efficiency" as to the often cited
American model of the Elmira Reformatory.
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Part II of the 1908 Act is headed "Detention for Habitual
Criminals" and lays out the provisions of a new system of
"Preventive Detention". Habitual criminals are those whose "criminal
habits and mode of life" make it "expedient for the protection of the
public that the offender be detained for a lengthened period of
years" (section 10 (l)), and the Act proposes that such persons should
be dealt with by means of a double-track sentence of penal servitude
("punishment") followed by a "less rigorous" term of preventive
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detention ("something quite distinct" ). The term of detention is
specified as being between five and ten years (section 10 (l)) and
may be terminated "at any time" by the decision of the Secretary of
State to release the inmate on licensed supervision (section 14 (2))
if the Secretary "is satisfied that there is a reasonable probability
that he will abstain from crime and lead a useful and industrious
life" (section 14 (2)).
Clearly such a measure constitutes a radical departure from the
traditional terms of criminal law, and the Prison Commissioners
stressed its innovative character by pointing out that it had "no
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analogy in present European law". However it should be equally
clear that this measure had a direct and proximate 'analogy* in the
social defence arguments of criminologists for "elimination", and,
equally, the eugenic demand for the segregation of the unfit; for
'preventive detention' is nothing but a form of compulsory administrative
segregation, as its rejected title - "the penal colony" - made rather
more explicit.
However there ij3 a crucial difference between the eliminative
demands of eugenics and criminology, and the system proposed by the
1908 Act. The whole notion of preventive detention for habituals
implies a definite notion of incorrigibility. Indeed this suggestion
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of a population 'beyond reform' is explicitly stated in criminological
and eugenic discourse and in the private Home Office documents which
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circulated prior to the Act. It is therefore significant that the
section 13 (3) of the Act explicitly demands "disciplinary and
reformatory influences" (our emphasis), a correctionalism also implied
by the licencing system designed for those who have reformed as well as
those who are too old or infirm to engage in crime (section 14 (2)).
And in the Parliamentary debates the Home Secretary goes out of his
way to state that:
"He [the habitual] will not be there as a hopeless
offender, but from the first every effort will be made
to reclaim him."
and:
"... while the system is for the prevention of crime,
it is also to be used for the reclamation of even the
very worst offenders." ^6
Here again then, we encounter the profound reluctance to entertain in
public a category of offenders beyond reform, a reluctance which echoes
our earlier discussion of the discursive rejection of "incorrigibility"
and "criminal man", and the strategic purpose of this refusal.
Before leaving this important Act we should note a number of
points which apply in common to both Parts I and II. In the case of
Borstal and of Preventive Oetention the legal notion of proportionate
punishment is displaced by a more utilitarian logic of reform and
prevention, as well as which,in each case it is the offender who is
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addressed and not his offence. In both cases too, the power of
release is shifted from a decision of the judiciary to that of the
executive, as indeed is the power to revoke a licence and recall to
further detention. This shift of power, and the indeterminacy
accompanying it, is justified by explicitly invoking "... the authority
78
of many criminologists in America and elsewhere", and the fact that
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such a system ensures "time to reform".
Finally it should be pointed out that this strange combination,
in the same Act,of reformative measures for youth and segregational
provisions for habituals,becomes less paradoxical on closer analysis.
Indeed the two measures sit very well together if one considers them
as a form of tactical trade-off, with the apparent generosity of the
first offsetting the severity of the second, or else as following the
dictum of criminological discourse which insists that intervention
should "start from both ends", aiming at "the beginning and the
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end of a criminal career". Indeed as we shall see in Chapter Eight,
there is a definite sense in which these two conjoined measures
precisely illustrate the dual form of a wider strategy of socialisation
and segregation which this and the other Acts helped to put into place.
The Children Act of 1908 was a much wider-ranging statute than
any of those previously discussed, encompassing sections on "Infant
Life Protection", "Cruelty to Children" and prohibitions on the sale
of liquor and tobacco to juveniles, as well as the care and control of
offenders. It was in fact a composite, consolidating measure which
synthesised the demands of child-saving philanthropy with those of
national efficiency and the criminological programme. As the Lord
Advocate declared upon its introduction at the Commons Second Reading:
"Many high-minded men and women, and many philanthropic
societies, havs been working upon this subject, and of
recent years one is glad to note a large development of
scientific knowledge. All these facts, together with
... the Report of the Committes on Physical Training and
the Report of the Commission on Physical Deterioration,
have made out the case for this Bill. ..." 90
With regard to offenders, sections 102 and 103 of the Act
prohibited imprisonment, penal servitude or judicial execution for
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children and young persons, and established the Reformatory and
Industrial School network as the normal disposition for offenders
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below the age of 16 years:
"... the object being to treat these children not by
way of punishing them - which is no remedy - but with
a view to their reformation." 82
Importantly, section 111 (1) established the statutory principle of
special juvenile courts separate from those used for adult offenders.
While this was not a particular demand of the criminological
programme, it did endorse the conception of the child or juvenile as
a special category and promoted a separate institutional basis for the
future development of social work and criminological initiatives.
In that sense the Act marked the success of the criminological tactics
which we discussed in Chapter Six and allowed a subsequent expansion
of criminological influence in this newly demarcated, 'special*
domain. Thus if the juvenile was the tactical point of entry
established in criminological discourse,the juvenile court provided
its institutional equivalent in practice.
Perhaps the major significance of this Act though, was that it
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established the "revolutionary" principle that the problems of
family "failure" were to be administered not solely by charity and
voluntary social work but through a series of public channels,
presided over by the specialist juvenile court. As the Under
Secretary Herbert Samuel put it, "... the State must step in where the
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discipline of the home is absent". Once again this involves the
extension of State interventionism, beyond the limits of offence
behaviour stipulated by the criminal law, and sections 58 (1) to 58 (8)
specifies a whole catalogue of circumstances where a child may be
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detained in an Industrial or Reformatory School. Removal and
detention of children is thus permitted where a parent is "unfit" to
have the care of the child, or else is a thief, a prostitute, an
inebriate and so on, ensuring that from the start the juvenile court
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is empowered to intervene to deal with 'neglected' as well as
'offending* children. As Oohn Clarke points out:
"The significance of this lies not only in the breadth
of the conditions which were taken to constitute neglect,
but that from the first the court was empowered to
intervene to rescue the child from the vagaries of working
class socialisation."
By 1913 the incipient influence of the eugenic and criminological
programmes which we traced in earlier Acts had become much more
pronounced and forceful. The introduction of two important Committee
Reports,and then a number of Bills centring upon the problem of the
mentally defective, demonstrated the strength of national concern
surrounding the issues pressed by these two programmes, and the
provisions of these Reports and the subsequent Mental Deficiency Act
of 1913 bore witness to their success in establishing their terms.
From being a localised difficulty faced by the managers of casual
words and prisons, the question of 'the feeble-minded' had become a
degenerative threat to the Race and to National Efficiency. As the
Home Secretary remarked in introducing the initial Bill:
"The question of mental deficiency is essentially a
national question and not a local question. It is to
the interest of the nation as a whole that the race
on
should be maintained, and not become degenerate."
Thus whatever was said about the care and protection of the individual
defective, his or her treatment was now to be devised with an eye to
racial consequence and the prevention of procreation:
"What the supporters of the Bill mean is not protection
of people from violence, but the segregation of people
so that they shall not have children. They mean to
protect future generations. ..."
Once again the 1913 Act provides for a major extention of state
powers of control, this time over all specified categories of defective,
and as with the new controls over inebriates, habituals, young
offenders, vagrants, etc., the Act established yet more specialist
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enclosures where such defectives will be detained and treated.
Again too, the powers of intervention are not to be withheld until an
offence is committed or a voluntary committal is sought. Instead
detention will be triggered by a large number of circumstances
(section 2 (1) (i) - (vi)) including the decision of parents or
school authorities, the fact of the defective's being neglected, being
found guilty of a criminal offence, being an inmate of a prison,
reformatory or asylum,or else being found to be an habitual drunkard.
And despite the Home Secretary's claim that this Bill "omitted any
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reference to what might be regarded as the Eugenic idea", it is
worth noting that section 2 (l) (vi) empowers the detention of any
person "who is in receipt of poor relief at the time of giving birth
to an illegitimate child or when pregnant of such child".
Nor was this general shift in the principles of intervention
undertaken without knowledge of its significance. As fir. Ellis Davies,
fl.P. declared, approvingly:
"liJe are legislating with the purpose practically of
putting another class outside the pale of the law." ^
Section 1 of the Act sets out the four classes of persons deemed
to be defective within its terms, and it is useful to examine how
these characterisations were constructed, ti/hile "Idiots" were those
defectives "unable to guard themselves against common physical
dangers" (section 1 (a)) and "Imbeciles" those "incapable of managing
themselves or their affairs" (section 1 (6)), the new categories of
"Feeble-minded person" and "Moral Imbecile" (cf. the place of this term
in criminological discourse) were defined by reference to the failure
of particular institutions. Thus a Feeble-minded person was one whose
defectiveness was recognisable by his or her being incapable of
"receiving proper benefit from the instruction of ordinary schools"
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(section 1 (c)), and a Moral Imbecile was one upon whose "criminal
propensities ... punishment has had little or no deterrent effect".
It is perhaps typical of a much broader strategy (see Chapter Eight)
that the failure of a normative institution should be displaced onto
the character of the 'failed* individuals,who are then deemed 'beyond
control' or 'beyond education'. It is equally typical that new forms
of control such as those of the 1913 Act should subsequently be
provided to return such individuals to the enclosed space of
institutional detention.
We might add, finally, that the Act did not rest content with
its new mechanisms for administering all those defectives who 'came
to notice' through their offences, public deviance, or claims for State
benefits. Like the Webbian strategy of the Minority Report, the Act
insisted that a comprehensive system of information, knowledge and
reporting should be set up which would cover the whole population of
defectives. Sections ? ^a) and 30 of the Act provide that Local
Authorities must "ascertain what persons within their area are
defectives" and convey this information to the central Board of
Control. Henceforth all defectives are to be brought into a relation
with the institutions of control thus averting surprises and
embarrassments with the security of administrative knowledge.
(4) The significance of these outcomes
The six statutes we have now described do not by themselves
exhaust the penal developments of this period, though they do constitute
the most important innovations. We could continue to evidence the
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various tendencies such as the de-centring of the prison, the
establishment of specialist enclosures and the movement towards
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individualisation and 'reform', as will be clear from a glance at
Appendix number 1. However enough has been done to allow us to see
a number of definite lines of development taking shape, sometimes
adopting the terms of the original programmes, sometimes the
compromise-formations framed subsequently, but almost always in the
directions specified and made possible by the programmatic discourses
already described. The most notable outcomes in this regard are the
extension of the role of the State, which becomes the subject of wider
and more penetrating forms of social regulation; the movement towards
an administrative mode of regulation, promoting expertise and the
accumulation of disciplinary knowledges;and the establishment of
practices of individualisation accompanied by rhetorics of reform.
Of course in all this the judicial power is never directly
challenged. Instead it is discreetly unsettled, being subjected to
numerous modifications and required to give space to a developing and
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increasingly autonomous penal power, in much the same way that the
'responsible subject' of law is retained on condition that it be
skirted around with the irresponsible 'exceptions' named by the
administrative sciences. At the same time there is a compensating
extension of that judicial power. Its formerly absolute predominance
in the traditional field of criminal law has now given way to a
directive role in regard to the much wider field of knowledge, controls
and potentialities provided by its new social work and criminological
auxiliaries. The other side of this picture is that the versions of
criminology, social work and eugenics which enter into practice are
mediated and sanitized versions, stripped of their radical ideological
content and put to service in a diluted, disguised or displaced form
which retains their "practical advantages" if not their theoretical
integrity.
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All of this amounted to a profound transformation in the realm
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of penality, and one uhich was recognized as such at the time. At
the same historical moment, the organisation and institutions of the
social realm were being subjected to a re-ordering in accordance with
selected elements of the social security programme, as can be seen
from the establishment of labour exchanges, health and unemployment
insurance, the provision of pensions, school meals and medical
inspections and non-penal relief for unemployed workmen (see Appendix 2).
We have already begun to show how these penal and social transformations
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were interrelated in more than a temporal sense and in a moment we
will indicate a crucial strategic linkage which articulated these two
realms and allowed each to support the other. But it is worthwhile
pointing out a number of important parallels and similarities between
these social and penal transformations - homologies which derived from
their shared programmatic origins and which were to facilitate their
strategic articulation.
We can sum up these homologies rather crudely by noting that on
each side there was (1) an extension of State intervention and
engineering; (2) the development of an extensive regulatory knowledge
of populations and individuals; (3) an attempt to address the question
of degeneration and 'inefficiency';either by building up the physical
forces of the population or else segregating defective elements and
prohibiting their procreation; and (4) the establishment of a
de-policised administrative mode of action which claimed legitimacy
in terms of its efficacy, its 'scientific' basis and its 'humane'
qualities.
A more detailed demonstration could centre, for example, upon the
precise parallels that are to be found between the prison reforms
already mentioned and the Poor Law reforms which took place at the turn
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of the century. Thus as Williams demonstrates, there was a definite
movement from the 1890s onwards to introduce an individualised form
of relief which involved a departure from disciplinary uniformity,
the formation of a "quasi-clinical" knowledge of the character and
history of applicants, the introduction of case papers, classification
procedures and medical expertise. In other words the developments
which overtook the general mixed workhouse of this period were almost
identically those which transformed the general mixed prison at the
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same time.
(5) The significance of failures and absences
By this point we have covered the broad range of successful
outcomes which contributed to the "putting in place" of the new social
and penal strategies. The next and final Chapter will conclude this
study by elaborating the mechanisms of that strategy, its various
effects, and the conclusions to be drawn from our investigation.
However before proceeding to that conclusion it is necessary to mention
one or two programmatic elements which did not become empowered, and
the significance of this 'failure'.
During the period under study, there were a number of relevant
Bills which were drafted and even introduced into Parliament only to
be subsequently withdrawn or else dropped from the legislative
programme. Thus there were three Inebriate Bills (1912, 1913 and 1914) -
which would have given powers to detain inebriates before they had
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offended - which had to be withdrawn due to lack of time. Similarly,
various plans wars officially stated for legislation on the special
treatment of young recidivists, the detention of habitual petty
offenders, and the establishment of a national society to co-ordinate
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and oversee the supervision of all young persons on licence from the
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various types of institutions. None of these plans came to fruition.
Flore importantly though, there were a number of Bills which were
presented and then withdrawn not because of timetabling difficulties
but because of their failure to command widespread consent and
legitimacy. This appears to have been the case with the 1912 Flental
Deficiency Bill which made it an offence to marry a defective, and
provided for the detention of feeble-minded persons when "it [was]
desirable in the interests of the community that they should be
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deprived of the opportunity of procreating children". It was also
the case with the two Bills of 1904 and 1909 which attempted to
establish Labour Colonies along the lines proposed by the social
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security programme.
These two 'failures' are important. UJe have already seen in
Chapter Six how certain radical elements of the original programmes were
marginalised in subsequent politico-discursive manoeuvres, but the
failure to establish Labour Colonies and an explicit Eugenic segregation
has still to be explained. It will be recalled that a crucial axis
of the social security programme was what might be termed the
Eliminative principle of exclusion and segregation (see p.187 of
Chapter Five). This demanded that those elements who failed to
achieve the requisite standards of social or industrial performance,
despite the provision of insurance, education, employment, etc., should
be removed from the free social realm and subjected to a compulsory,
disciplinary segregation. As we pointed out then, the social provision
elements of every single scheme were balanced and supported by this
principle of elimination and the institutions which it required. The
Labour Colony was thus proposed by virtually every advocate of this
programme (as well as many eugenists) and was subsequently endorsed in
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numerous official Reports, as a necessary apparatus to exercise this
crucial function. And yet the Labour Colony network was never
102
assembled.
Historians such as Harris and Stedman Jones have tried to account
for this absence, and the problem that it poses,considering the
widespread support for these colonies and their functional
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significance. However they have done so without much success. In
each account the proposal for colonies appears to have simply faded
away, or else statesmen have become conscious of their repressive and
totalitarian implications and chosen to drop the idea despite its
attractions. But this leaves open the question of how the new social
security project could operate without an eliminative mechanism to
deal with the 'unemployable' and 'unfit' sections of the population -
or rather how the Liberal Governments of 1906 - 1914 could have
legislated a system which lacked an element widely believed to be
crucial to its success.
Ue would suggest that the answer to this question is that the
Eliminative principle was not altogether dropped. Rather its exercise
was entrusted not to the Labour colony or eugenic segregation but to
the more discreet but equally effective apparatuses of penality which
we have just described. As we shall see in the following Chapter, the
network of Borstals, preventive detention prisons, inebriate and
feeble-minded reformatories, probation, etc. provided a substitute
mechanism which could support the new social strategy, not by simple
elimination but by a more complex logic of normalisation, correction
and segregation. Host of this penal network was already in place by
the time the major social security measures were legislated and hence
it is by no means inconceivable,(though there is no direct evidence),
that the governmental decision not to implement these 'repressive'
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measures was shaped by an auareness of this more discreet alternative.
Whether 'intended' or not, the effect of this substitution was
to fragment the category of the Unemployable or Unfit into a
thousand forms of abnormality, pathology and deviance, none of which
betray their political implications in the crude manner of these
sweeping, derogatory categories. Moreover the fact of a diverse,
fragmented network of specialist enclosures,rather than a single
system of colonies ensured that the size of this mechanism, its
subject population,and its political importance, are all put out of
focus. Finally, the functional substitution of this penal network
for the labour colony ensured that there was no need to provoke the
legitimation difficulties which would inevitably follow any decision
to support the 'freedom of labour' by the open compulsion of those
who refused. In place of the forced labour implied by the colony
was established instead a system which was to be represented in
terms of a curative and benevolent reform. In such circumstances,
it is perhaps more than coincidence that the privately established
labour colony at Hollesley Bay was later to become a Borstal
institution, while the Scottish labour colony, in 1904, was to change its
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function to that of an Inebriate Reformatory.
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CHAPTER 8
Penal-Welfare Strategies and their Modes of Operation:
Som3 Conclusions
(1) The reconstituted social realm
We hav/e now completed our account of the long and complex routes
whereby the various elements were put in place to form a new field of
social and penal regulation. As we shall see, the contours of this new
field, and the techniques, discourses and objectives which function
within it, are quite different from those of the Victorian period,
while being essentially continuous with those of the present day.
The purpose of this final Chapter is to analyse this field and the
various strategies which compose it, while indicating the significance
of these policies for the conjuncture in which they were formed, and
more briefly, for the period since then to the present.
We begin with a discussion of "the social" since it is only
against this broader field of regulation and provision that the
details of modern penality can be understood.
The crucial feature of the social policies implemented by the
Liberal reforms of the 1900s was the establishment of mechanisms of
security and integration which could overlay and re-organise the
effects of the labour market while maintaining its basic capitalistic
terms. The provision of pensions, State—subsidised insurance, labour
exchanges, school meals and so on ensured that the harshest consequences
of the market system were tempered, and the inequalities of its
distributional effects modified. The degree of risk and insecurity
encountered by the worker or his family were significantly reduced for
those encompassed by the new schemes, and at the same time a small
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measure of equalisation took place. Although much was made of the
progressive taxation of Lloyd-George's 1909 budget, this equalisation
u/as not between classes but rather between the various employed and
unemployed, old and young, sick and healthy individual^ within the
labouring class. But the importance of this 'equalisation' was that
it talked not of classes, but of citizens, in which regard all were
to be treated alike. Members of the lower classes, like their better-
placed brethren, became:
"individuals within a population which is now treated
for this purpose as though it were one class." ^
In this way the new social policies added an image of "equality of
status" to the "political equality" which had followed the expansion
of the franchise. The social message of these new provisions was that
workers were no longer to be viewed merely as commodities in the
market, to be used or discussed according to the desires of capital, the
moralism of charity and the repression of the poor law. In place of
these vagaries and hazards were substituted a measure of material
provision and a new form of social status and recognition.
Taken together, these measures of security and equalisation of
2
status were designed to bring about a "re-admission of the outcast",
and the formation of a solidarity which would unite the nation.
Thus Churchill in 1909:
"The idea is to increase the stability of our institutions
by giving the mass of the industrial workers a distinct
interest in maintaining them. With a 'stake in the country'
in the form of insurances against evil days these workers
will pay no attention to the vague promises of revolutionary
socialism." ^
and a Liberal Party pamphlet of 1912:
"... all the poor and the working classes have acquired
a new and a vast stake in the country. Instead of being
used when useful and cast aside when no longer useful,
they have become the children of the State ... not a
Socialistic State but a Social State." ^
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In this new domain of security and solidarity, the institution
of insurance is the key technology which supports the rest. It
ensures a redistribution, "spreading the costs involved in
compensating ... invalidity to all the social partners",^ and a
form of integration allowing "the passage of subjects from a merely
individual level to that of joint interests",^ giving all citizens
a stake in the Nation, and ensuring the allegiance of a lifetime of
regular contributions. But it does so in a manner which brilliantly
avoids "Statism" and any challenge to the system of free enterprise,
individuation and inequality. Through insurance, the State certainly
extended its influence, but it did so by setting up a regulatory
technology which does not depend upon "Statism" so much as a beneficial
relation established between the individual and a state-sponsored
7
scheme. It 'enlists' the individual's self-interest and desires for
□
security and promotion,rather than simply 'providing* his needs.
Likewise its legislators were careful to preserve the image and form
of a contract (albeit an obligatory one) and the entitlement to which
it gives rise, rather than admitting the principle of non-contributory
social provision which alternative schemes would have done. Insurance
thus establishes a social field of individual contracts and claims,
suppressing the notion of social rights and any competing forms of
social solidarity.
As Donzelot says, "need was made to operate as a means of social
g
integration and no longer as a cause of insurrection", but it must
be stressed that this integration took a very definite form. Like the
vote - that other great mechanism of integration which was expanding
during this period - insurance promoted a form of social solidarity
which nonetheless retained the primacy of the category of the
individual within it.
331
To the new technology of regulatory controls (labour exchanges,
public works, minimum conditions, etc.)* the new strategy added an
insurance-based safety net which reduced the risks of those within the
labour market, along with a set of auxiliary provisions (pensions,
school meals, healthcare, etc.) for those who had either retired from
their labours or else had yet to graduate to them. Together these
promoted a market that was more efficient and better organised, and a
workforce which was 'engaged* on a long term basis, not just by
individual employers, but also by the new agencies of the State. The
rewards, support and security which benefitted the worker were thus
made to operate simultaneously to the benefit of his employers and
the system as a whole by reducing waste and conflict and at the same
time increasing individual commitment and regularity.
Similarly, the apparatus of insurance and pensions used the worker's
self-interest and desire for security in both positive and negative
ways. These interests first of all drew him into the system, winning
his allegiance and commitment to it in the name of his own and his
family's future. But once committed, these same interests operated to
ensure that the worker observed the attached conditions of benefit -
i.e. was regular, stable, worked "according to his ability", was of
good character, avoided prison, and so on. The apparatus thus ensured
that the worker was policed and regulated by a manipulation and
utilisation of his own self-interest.^
(2) The New Penal Realm
If this elaborate apparatus of provision and State induced self-
control could be trusted to succeed for the majority of the population,
and for the 'normal' individual, it was nevertheless supported by a more
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compelling back-up mechanism for the recalcitrant minority of deviant
and marginal cases. As we have already indicated, this 'back-up*
was supplied by the newly assembled range of penal practices and
institutions which - because of their shared reliance upon a number of
common techniques, images and principles - could articulate easily and
effectively with the new social complex. The institutions of penality
thus came to support and extend those of the social realm in the
following ways:
(1) It is already clear that the rewards, provisions and
benefits of the social are conditional upon certain norms
of conduct, some of which are specified in regulations, while
others are merely implied or assumed. Penality negatively
reinforces these terms by threatening to deal coercively with
those who refuse them. This 'threat' comes into play
whenever the positive inducements of normal socialisation
are experienced as being weak or difficult to attain.
(2) Penality relieves the social realm of its 'failures',
subjecting them to a series of normalising, corrective or
segregative institutions which will either return the
individual to the normal social sphere or else will remove
him from it permanently. It thus sets up a series of
exchanges and transfers (of knowledge, records, individuals,
etc.) between the normal institutions of socialisation and
11
their penal adjuncts.
(3) The new penal complex provides extensive measures of State
control which serve to police such a system in the absence
of the traditional mechanisms of repression and exclusion
(cf. Chapter Seven, section 6). Moreover it does so in a
form which appears neither Statist (cf. the important
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mediation of voluntary agencies) nor repressive (cf. the
neu insistence upon abnormality and its correction).
(4) Finally, in representational terms, penality extends and
completes the positive character of the State's neu self-
image. This neu kind of 'Social State' is "bent on generating
12
forces, making them grou, and ordering them", and the
reformative character of the neu penal practices reinforces
this crucial image: "the old idea of penal discipline uas
to crush and break, the modern idea is to fortify and build
13
up force of character".
This neu field of penality has a function and constitution uhich
is quite different from those of the Victorian system uhich uere
described in Chapter Tuo. Although it retains a deterrent aspect,
it is by no means confined to this, being committed also to various
forms of correction and normalisation, care and improvement. In
accordance uith these revised objectives, it nou displays a neu
structure and overall form. What uas once a hierarchy of severity has
nou become a much more differentiated and diverse grid of dispositions,
the vertical axis of Victorian punishment being tilted increasingly
14
touards the horizontal.
As ue shall see, the neu aspects of this grid may be analysed in
terms of the three major sectors uhich compose it, each one containing
a number of institutions and agencies. These 'Normalising*, 'Corrective'
and 'Segregative' sectors are positioned at increasing distances from
the normal institutions of the social realm, and movement from the
first sector touards the last entails increased measures of control
15
and a deepening penal involvement. As uell as the exchanges betueen
social and penal spheres, a definite system of transfers from better
to uorse, uorse to better, is established uithin the penal netuork,
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which follows the insistence of numerous Reports that each line of
institutions should have at its end-point a coercive state-run
16
terminus. This system of grades and transfers between institutions
precisely parallels the new system of discipline which came to operate
within institutions, where the old systems of punishments were replaced
by a more positive structure of rewards, privileges and their
17
withdrawal. And both of these in turn are local examples of a more
general mechanism of promotion/demotion which runs the whole length of
the new social-penal complex.
(3) Sanctioning Criteria and Forms of Allocation
Before describing these sectors in more detail, it is necessary
to say something about the criteria of allocation and the forms of
administration which preside over this new penal network and direct
its functioning.
We argued in Chapter One that the Victorian system was inscribed
almost excluseively within the terms of legal discourse, being
regulated by criteria of guilt, responsibility, legal evidence and
proportionate punishment. In the new penal complex the terms of this
legal discourse are undercut and redefined by the introduction of other
discourses and considerations. 'Guilt*, for example, is no longer the
founding principle of legal intervention in this sphere. As we saw in
the last Chapter, the new legislation on children, inebriacy, habituals,
etc. allowed interventions to be triggered without the necessity of
offence behaviour and to be justified on quite other grounds than the
guilt of the subject. Besides 'guilt', intervention can now be
premised upon a 'condition*, a 'character' or a 'mode of life' which
indicates a failure to meet one's social obligations or else an inability
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to do so. •Responsibility' toc^ is subjected to a serious revision in
its scope and usage. Although it is, as we saw, retained as 'the
normal case1, the increasing number of exceptions, modifications and
deviations from this rule ensure that it can no longer be simply
assumed. There is consequently something of a movement from
Rationalism to Empiricism whereby 'responsibility' ceases to be an
£ priori which is universally presumed and instead becomes subject to
the test of empirical investigation in an increasing number of cases.
What these detailed changes describe is a more general movement
away from the traditional laying down of laws towards an increasing
resort to the mobilisation of norms, a movement which has the effect
of extending and revising the operations of the judicial power. As
Foucault points out:
"[This] does not mean to say that the law fades into ths
background or that the institutions of justice tend to
disappear, but rather than the law operates more and more
as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical,
administrative and so on) whose functions are for the most
part regulatory." 10
The sense and importance of this distinction between 'law' and 'norm',
and the revision of one by the other, can be gathered from the following
demarcations. The protocols of the law (ideally) require publicly
specified offences, guilt and responsibility, publicly proven according
to the specified conventions of evidence, fact and law. They involve
an open adversarial trial, definite safeguards and limitations with
regard to evidence, and the availability of review and appeal
procedures. In contrast, the 'norm* which comes to supplement the
law in cases of juveniles, children, the feeble-minded, etc., operates
according to quite different criteria. It bases itself upon expert
decisions (certified by doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, etc.)
regarding the normality or pathology of 'characters', 'mental or moral
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states' and 'modes of life'. These decisions, which need not be
publicly explained, are based upon an expertise in the 'human sciences'
which is not widely shared nor easily challenged. According to this
logic, sentencing becomes less a matter of 'justice' and more a
question of proper administration and diagnosis. The norms of the
human sciences become a new kind of raison d'etat whose demands
justify serious departures from the usual terms of the law.
Much more than with traditional law, the new system of laws-plus-
norms requires a thoroughgoing knowledge of the case before it. This
knowledge does not concern itself merely with the 'immediate facts'
and the legal provisions which apply, but also with the background,
history, character and corrigibility of the individual concerned.
At the same time there is a subtle shift in the role of the judge who
becomes not just the arbiter of adversaries but also the ultimate
interlocutor of various confessionals and processes of investigation.
This shift is most clearly visible in the new juvenile court:
"... it is always helpful to get from him, or her, a statement
of the reasons for being brought into court. It is the
direct and natural method of approach. ... The child
should be interviewed outside the hearing of any other
person. ... The important thing is to get the truth from
the child."
But also from the parents, the school, the investigating officer and
all the other potential sources of useful information.
As we have seen in the previous Chapter, this requirement of
knowledge gives rise to a whole apparatus of investigation and inquiry
which reaches far beyond the forensic inquiries of the police,and
supplements the various forms of inspection and inquiry entailed within
20
the new network of social institutions. Through the services of the
various voluntary agencies, probation officers, after-care agents, etc.,
the range of knowledge available to the authorities is extended to
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encompass not only the offender but also his family and his home.
As one manual of investigation put it:
"It is in the home and its immediate associations that
the most powerful environmental influences are found,
and it is from the home, therefore, that the most
important information will be obtained." 21
At the same time, the depth and penetration of this inquiry are
increased in order to peer into the character and history of the
offender, producing a knowledge which goes beyond immediate appearances,
and even beyond the understanding of the offender himself:
"It may be said that, in general, any reason given for
commission of an offence will be more in the nature of
an excuse than an explanation. It should be accepted as
such, and the probation officer should not, at this
stage, attempt to probe deeper. In all probability the
offender does not know the reasons which induced him to
offend, and it is only after a consideration of all the
factors in the offender's life that the probation officer
can venture to suggest any explanation." 22
With the aid of various techniques borrowed from the repertoire of
charity and social work ("the circular approach", "separate and
contradictory questioning", "practical verification of the family's
23
way of life", "the surprise visit" and so on ) the inquiries of the
law are transformed in their scope and their form.
In his 1908 account of the new 'social politics' Kirkman Gray
commented that:
"Inspection is undergoing an intersting development
which may be described as a movement from the inspection
of things to the inspection of persons." 24
A statement which applies as well to the penal developments we have
described as to the social innovations of which he wrote. Me went on
to argue that these same channels of inquiry and inspection serve not
just to gain 'knowledge' but also - in the reverse direction - to relay
advice and directions for conduct in a form and depth previously
unattainable:
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"This giving of advice represents a new function the
importance of which may easily be overlooked, but can
hardly be exaggerated. At first there is only an inspector
of things empowered to demand the observance of certain
rules. Action in regard to things is limited in extent,
and it might be possible for the legislator to foresee all
that should need to be done. But action is regard to
persons is illimitable in range and infinitely delicate.
It would be absurd to limit the function of the inspectors
of infants to any statutory schedule. Two women and a
baby are beyond the philosophy of the Parliamentary
draftsman. The real business is not so much to tell the
mother what she must do as to advise her as to what she
can and should do." *5
These important insights of Gray's apply just as well to the new
normalising style which followed the shift from the enforcement of
laws to the implantation of norms. Gray recognises, as others have
26
done since, how this new mode of inquiry opened up a new field of
intervention - its new supplies of knowledge implying a new scope for
power. For the new system of normalisation, with its capacity to
prise open and enter into the intimate details of the individual's
life, allows a measure of penetration and subtlety which was
altogether new to the forces of the criminal law.
Ide will now proceed to examine the various apparatuses which were
committed to this dual function of inquiry and normalisation, along
with the other institutions which make up the new penal complex.
(4) The Penal Complex and its Flodea of Operation
If we examine the new penal complex as a whole, it is possible to
discern a number of distinct modes of operation which underpin and
organise the various sanctions and institutions which make up its
diverse network. On this basis it is possible to distinguish three
27
major sectors - the normalising, the corrective and the segregative.
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(a) The normalising sector
The new, State-sponsored practices of probation, after-care and
licensed supervision which we saw established in the previous Chapter,
share a common commitment to a mode of operation which might be
termed "normalisation". Each of these practices is concerned not just
to prevent law-breaking but also to inculcate specific norms and
attitudes. By means of the 'personal influence' of the probation or
after-care officer, they attempt to straighten out characters and to
'reform' the personality of their clients in accordance with the
requirements of 'good citizenship'. Of the three sectors mentioned,
this one is closest to the normal or primary institutions of
socialisation - the family, the school, the workplace, etc. It is
physically close insofar as these are community-based sanctions which
do not remove the offender from his or her work at home. It is close
in the sense that it is the 'shallow end' of penality, used for those
who are not yet fully criminalised or else are returning to normal life
after a period of Borstal, Reformatory school, etc. Finally, it is
functionally close insofar as it uses the normal mechanisms of
socialisation such as "personal influence", friendly persuasion,
teaching, etc., with the important difference that it does so with the
backing of the court's coercive powers.
The establishment of this sector as an organised and extensive
apparatus of official penality was perhaps the most important innovation
in the new penal strategy, and one which had distinct repercussions
throughout the rest of the complex, life have already discussed the
effect of those normalising agencies in the provision of detailed
knowledge and means of inquiry, but in addition to this, they brought
about two major effects in terms of sanctioning practice. The first of
these - hinted at already - was the extension of the judicial power
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which this "entering into the lives and homes" of offenders
facilitated. The range of this power - its capacity to effect and
influence those it contacts - is thus extended beyond the offender
to include his parents and his family. As Herbert Samuel (Chairman of
the 1909 Departmental Commission of Probation) commented, "the home is
29
put under probation".
Probation, supervision, 'after-care' - all of these represent an
extension and multiplication of the judicial gaze, and of the
consequent range of intervention! the 1909 Report again:
"... the cardinal principle in this probation work is that
the court is always cognisant of the actions of the
probationer through the probation officer." 30
"Securing for him a respectful hearing, and furnishing a
motive for the acceptance of his counsels, there is always
in the background the sanction of the penal law - the
knowledge that the probation officer is the eye of the
magistrate; that misbehaviour will be reported to the
court, and will bring its penalty." 31
At the same time the depth and penetration of this power to intervene
are extended. The 'personal touch' of the supervising officer
actually does touch the person of the offender, engaging his personality
attitudes, beliefs and working upon them in a way that was previously
beyond the scope of official penality, moreover since the goal is
'normality' and good citizenship, the aim of this intervention goes
much deeper than mere crime-prevention. And,since "there can be no
32
such thing as the completely normal child..." - or adult for that
matter - is less easily satisfied.
The other major effect of this normalizing sector was one of
refinement. The Victorian system, as we have seen, was fairly crude
in its operations, with a tendency to be either too harsh - spiralling
individuals downwards into the criminal class - or else ineffective,
leaving those ineligible for prison completely "beyond control".
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This new apparatus was discreet, humane and relaxed by comparison,
but promised at the same time to be more effective in operation. To
begin with, normalisation could exercise its control without disrupting
those disciplines already provided by the home, the school, the
workplace, etc.:
"The sentence of probation, whilst it formally places
the child under the control of the probation officer,
allows him at the same time to return to his home and
family. In this way parental authority is respected
and parental responsibility maintained." 33
And as with the child and his parents, so too with the adult and his
family, his workplace, and so on. Indeed, far from disrupting these
'normal' controls, the supervising agent seeks to support them, to
prop and augment them with his or her own influence: as Gray points out
"A co-partnership has been established over the (working
class) home. The partners are the parents and the State.
... The result is not a breaking up, but a consolidation of
home. The incursion is not really the incursion of a
stranger, but the entrance of a member. The hearth is
empty, but the representative of society is found there." 34
Of course if the discipline of the home and the family is entirely
inadequate then probation or licensed release would not be deployed,
but there are cases where "the parents are as much to blame as the
children",whereupon the agent must turn his attention to improving
their conduct and protecting his ward from their infelicities. In
such cases:
"The parents quite as much as the children are 'put on
probation', li/orking through the family and the home,
the system gives the unfortunate a strong friend from
the outside who can provide education and training and
employment." 35
At the same time:
"The parent is advised and watched over by the probation
officer ... and ... the child is protected against the
weakness or unworthiness of the parent." 36
In all such cases, the agent seeks to extend his powers of influence
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and to continue them in his absence by enlisting the aid of other
agencies of improvement:
"One of the principal things the probation officer has
to do is to make use of existing social agencies. The
officer knows that in the offender's life he is but a
passing agent, not a permanent one. His endeavour,
therefore, is to put his charges in touch with such permanent
social and religious agencies as are appropriate to their
individual need; his purpose of course being that these
agencies shall continue to influence the offenders' lives
long after the probationary period terminates." 37
All of this, if it goes well, is efficient as well as economical and
discreet. But it should also be experienced by the offender and the
public as less negative and repressive than the prison, the fine or
corporal punishment. It appears as a positive and humane means of
'building up* offenders and their families, adding to the social
welfare rather than reducing it:
"It is better than prison from the economic as well as
from the humane point of view, for the offender is not
removed from work in the outside world, so need not be
maintained by the State, nor is the wage earner's family
thrown upon the Poor Law. There is no criminal taint,
no loss of status, no association with other offenders,
on the contrary in the most successful cases the whole
tone of the home is raised. The system aims at making
both the unit and the family more useful to society." 38
(b) The correctional sector
If we turn now to the next sector, one stage further into the
penal complex, we can identify another series of institutions sharing
a common mode of operation and a common position in the network.
The various Borstals, Reformatory Schools, Industrial Schools and
privately-run Retreats and Reformatories for the inebriate and the
weak-minded, together constitute what might be termed the correctional
sector, part of which was entirely new, the rest being continued from
the previous system in a somewhat augmented form.
Each of these elements centred upon a mode of operation which was
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institutionally-based, but distinctly correctional or 'reformative1
in design. These correctional features - which may or may not have
reformed offenders - were actually intrinsic to their mode of operation
rather than mere imagery or rhetoric. Each institution was to be
allocated only particular types of offender, selected in terms of
their corrigibility, youth, character, etc.; indeed they had the power
to refuse those who appeared to them to be incorrigible. Each one was
run on a basis of indeterminate "non-proportionate" sentences which
could be terminated at the discretion of the institution's staff,
release being subject to further supervision and specified as
depending upon criteria of correction and reform. Similarly each one
was statutorily obliged to provide a regime of corrective training,
education and reform, though the details of such regimes were never
thoroughly specified, depending largely upon the initiative of the
governors, superintendents and voluntary workers who ran the various
institutions.
This correctional sector is functionally adjacent to the
normalising sector and exhibits a number of links and continuities with
it. It is "next in line" after the failure of the normalising
apparatus, or in those cases where the character of the offender or
his background make that first sector inappropriate. Similarly it
depends upon the investigations of probation and after-care agencies
for the information required to make the original assessment and
allocation, the subsequent classification by character, and the
eventual decision as to release. Finally, the correctional institutions
utilise the services of these other agencies to conduct the supervision
and after-care which is an integral feature of the correctional
operation; and to feed back information about the offenders' progress,
the need for recall, the success of the training, etc.
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The effect of the legislation which consolidated this correctional
sector in the 1900s was thus once again to extend the duration and
effectivity of penal control - through the longer reformative sentences,
the additional periods of supervision, etc. - and to represent penality
with a positive public image of correction and reform. At the same
time as we shall see, it established an intermediary sector which
played a crucial role in firmly ushering offenders back into the social
fold or else placing them squarely within the sphere of penal control.
(c) The segregative sector
The third and 'final' area of the penal complex - furthest
removed from the realm of normal social life and containing those who
have refused or have been unable to submit to the disciplines of the
dominant social order - might best be termed the segregative sector.
The institutions which compose this sector include the various State
Reformatories for the Inebriate and the feeble-minded, the Preventive
Detention institutions, and to a great extent, the ordinary prisons
throughout the country.
It is important to note that although such segregation existed in
the institutions of Victorian penality, the formation of the new
complex served to demarcate this sector much more clearly, augmenting
it wi-th new institutions, specialising its tasks and distinguishing them
from the correctional and normalising sectors. It is also important to
realise that this segregative mode of operation, th.ugh firmly
established, was rarely represented in such negative terms.
If we take these institutions one by one, we can see how this
sectoral specialisation took place and also demonstrate the segregative
nature of each of them. As we saw in the last Chapter, the new
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preventive detention regime, established by the 1908 Act was designed
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to deal with those habitual offenders who were deemed to be
incorrigible. Its lengthy sentences were oriented towards the
incapacitation of the habitual and the protection of the public
through simple segregation, rather than touards punishment or reform:
"All that is uanted is that they should be under discipline
and compulsorily segregated from the outside world." ^0
Similarly, the State-run Reformatories for inebriates and defectives
were deliberately designed to form a warehouse which would contain the
failures and disruptive elements of the private institutions, thereby
allowing these other places to carry out their reformative functions.
As Rugglss-Brise admitted:
"The value of the State reformatory will not consist in
the production of actual results, but its existence will
permit of certified institutions carrying on a work of
reformation otherwise impossible."
The most controversial element of our argument here is in regard to
the prison, which unlike the others we have noted, was never presented
in primarily negative, segregative terms. And yet if we analyse the
effects of the various penal changes upon the role of the prison we
find that they have definitely displaced it away from correction and
touards segregation, despite an official rhetoric which claimed the
reverse. In the years between 1895 and 1914 the population of the
prison was re-constituted by the removal of a whole series of
categories to specialist institutions or else non-custodial measures.
But those removed included not just the habituals and the mentally ill
who were beyond reform, but also all of the reformable, hopeful
categories - the children, the juveniles, the first offenders - and
even the mildly inebriate and feeble-minded who might be expected to
respond well to treatment. In consequence, the prisons were left with
all those persons whose offences were serious or frequent enough to
warrant not correction or normalisation but the punishment of
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imprisonment. The reduction of the frequency of short sentences
(through legislation on fine instalments for example) only served to
compound this segregative trend. Moreover despite claims that the
prison regime was to become more reformative in orientation, there was
no introduction of the fundamental techniques of correction such as
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indeterminacy, release on licence, and so on. The paradoxical
effect of the post-Gladstone reforms upon the prison was thus to
4;
render it less rather than more likely to have a reformative function.
This segregative sector then, operated as the coercive terminus
for the whole penal network, in just the same way that the penal
complex as a whole supplied the coercive back-up for the institutions
of the social realm. It formed the 'deep end* of the complex which
functioned as a sanction of last resort, supporting the others by its
threatening presence. As an article of 1912 pointed outs
"The reflex effect of the segregation of the defectives
on the larger number of responsible prisoners is not to
be overlooked. ... The knowledge that their fortunes are
not at the lowest ebb, that there is a place to which
irresponsible offenders are committed indefinitely can
but act as a deterrent." *4
As we shall see in a moment, this segregative sector plays an
important negative role in the overall strategic operation of the penal
complex. But given this, we should again note the significance of the
fact that the public rhetoric of officials and ministers insisted,
and still insists, upon giving this negative function a positive
gloss - whether by calling P.D. a reformative regime or by referring
to incarceration as "positive custody". As we have noted before, it
would appear that negativity,in its various form^ is deeply
antithetical to the modern State's self-image.
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(d) Their interrelations
The three sectors we have identified interrelate by means of a
series of strategic connections and exchanges. The deeper, more
repressive measures supply a lever of deterrent force which allows
the normalising agents to operate in a way which is both relaxed and
yet ultimately forceful, being both within and without repression.
At the same time the more severe sectors relieve the milder ones of their
dangerous or unruly cases, allowing them to function without any
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unnecessary use of force. The other side of this transferral
mechanism is,of course,the incentive of promotion which exists in the
other direction, holding out the promise of more lenient institutions
for those who follow orders and show signs of improvement. Finally,
the existence of the milder institutions ensures that the existence
of repressive ones appears justified and necessary. Having done "all
we can", the only resort for these who refuse such offers of help must
be a positive and humane custody, to be quickly terminated on any sign
of reform. This complex of balances and leverage, promotion and
demotion, the offer of provision followed by the penalty for refusal,
as well as the circle of legitimation which it sets in motion, is the
strategic formation of modern penal-welfare. And if one recalls the
operations of the social realm, set out at the beginning of this
Chapter, it will be clear that the penal-welfare strategy is in many
respects a miniaturised version of the social strategy which it
underpins.
Before leaving this analysis of the new social and penal
strategies,to discuss their historical effects, there is one brief
point that should be made, li/e noted in Chapter Five that the social
engineering proposals of the various programmes set up a kind of grid
of possibilities, ranging through public to private, and from population
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to individual in its subjective and objective co-ordinates. Each of
the programmes favoured a different line on this grid, some proposing
that private "subjects" should act upon individuals, others proposing
that the object of intervention should be the population and its
subject the State. From our discussion of the social and penal
strategies which were actually established, it should be clear that
they combined State and private agencies as the new subjects of social
intervention with the latter usually regulated by, but formally
independent of, the former. At the same time, the objects which were
addressed by these strategies included populations and individuals -
frequently with one being addressed through the other, or else both
being addressed through the family as an intermediary relay of norms
and values. The overall effect of this eclecticism was not to choose
one line of intervention at the cost of another, but rather to merge the
whole range of possibilities in a strategic network which ranged across
the whole grid,simultaneously exploiting all of its potential.
(5) The new strategies and the problems of social regulation
(a) The problem of provision
It will be recalled that the transformations which have been
described, and the strategies that they constructed, were in fact
concerted attempts to deal with the political repercussions of a
social and penal crisis. If we remind ourselves of the central
elements of this crisis, and the political problems which they posed,
it will become clear that the new strategies did in fact address and
alleviate these problems, in a direct but always subtle manner.
To take the social crisis first, and simply mentioning the basic
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co-ordinates of a complex and overdetermined network of problems, we
can recall the following. A revised and more interventionist economic
policy was made desirable by a long term change in the relations of
production and market forces, but also by the perceived need to promote
efficiency at the level of market institutions and at the level of the
population which supplied the nation's labouring and military forces.
At the same time, new policies were demanded to avert the growing
threat of socialist agitation, to stabilise the political effects of
the market upon the lower orders,and to win the allegiance of a newly
extended electorate which appeared volatile and increasingly militant.
Moreover some means was required to modify the repressive and exclusory
operations of the institutions and ideologies through which the lower
orders were addressed.
As we have seen, the new institutions of the social' effected a
definite re-organisation of the market, an improvement of its
functioning and efficiency, and an extended range of interventionist
techniques more in keeping with the post-laissey fairs nature of the
economic terrain. At the same time, these and other institutions
improved the provision of health-care, housing and nourishment and
sought generally to promote the physical efficiency of the working
population. The political claim of this spate of reforms was to have
given the working class"a stake in the country", creating a unified
and extended nation to replace the divided and class-based society
which preceded them. Through pensions, insurance benefits, school
meals and labour exchanges a definite material improvement was accorded
to large sectors of the population;and the consequent alterations in
Poor Law practice, and the treatment of the unemployed provided a
response to the 'legitimate grievances' which they acknowledged.
Perhaps more importantly the new strategy involved a significant
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transformation in the mode of address officially deployed towards the
working classes and their disadvantaged sectors. The repressive
language of moral distinction, "desert" and "worth", and the odious
'testing' of the destitute by further destitution, were replaced by an
administrative machinery and discourse quite separate from those of the
hated poor law institutions. Pensions were to be distributed through
the Post Office; school meals, health care and insurance benefits
provided without disenfranchisement; and if the worker was still forced
to be responsible, regular and stable then this force was discreetly
contained in automatic administrative decisions, not in the mouths of
'philanthropists' and poor law officials. On the basis of this
ideological initiative the Liberal Government hoped to win for itself
the class loyalty of workers and their votes, and for the system,the
life-long allegiance of regular, contributing individuals.
As some recent writers have carefully pointed out, the very
structure of this new machinery involved an ideological effect of its
own, achieving a 'depoliticisation' or 'deconflictualisation' of the
social field within which it operated:
"This shift entailed, or was intended to entail, a
definite reduction in the general social and political
consequences of economic events - industrial conflict,
unemployment and so forth - by ensuring that, whether
working or not, citizens were, in effect, employees
of society. Attention was thus switched from the analysis
of the structure of the social and economic relations
within which unemployment, sickness and so forth are
produced, to a consideration of the consequences of the
various technical and actuarial options entailed in the
calculation and distribution of allowances and benefits."
At the same time it promoted the forms of passive solidarity and
individual integration in the social which we have already noted, as
well as the beginnings of an institutional incorporation or
'corporatism' which Marshall, the Barnetts and others had advocated,
and which the Industrial Conciliation Act (1896), the Industrial
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Council (1911) and the Poor Law franchise reforms of 1900, began to set
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in motion.
The subtlety of these measures, and the basis of their 'political
plausibility' at the time,lay in the fact that they comprehensively
reorganised the network of social and political relations without
disturbing the underlying distributions of wealth or the basic relations
of power and production. As we have already noted, the redistributions
which occurred were primarily intra-class, while the new insurance
scheme served to underwrite market relations rather than undermine them.
As Churchill pointed out in 1908, the essence of the social reforms was
the establishment of "that minimum standard below which competition
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cannot be allowed, but above which it may continue healthy and free".
Thus despite the ideological revision already discussed, the new
framework of social security preserved within itself the basic tenets
of an individualistic ideology. It preserved notions of individual
responsibility, thrift, self-help, freedom from State collectivism, and
the earned, contractual basis of individual 'rights' or entitlements.
As Beveridge argued later, endorsing these same principles as the
basis of the 'Welfare State':
"The plan for Britain is based on the contributory
principle of giving not free allowances to all from the
State but giving benefits as of right in virtue of
contributions made by the insured persons themselves." ^
Which is to say, of course, that such rights are not social rights at
all, but merely the individual entitlements which arise from a
contractual relation.
This retention of the contractual within the collectivist, the
individual in the social, is well illustrated by the insurance
principle. Although the notion of a contributory insurance provided
a means of financing benefits without a major resort to (progressive)
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taxation, this insurance principle was hardly an actuarial reality.
Not only was it State-subsidised from the start,but as Rose points out:
"... it differs from ordinary insurance practices in a
variety of ways: there is no adjustment of premium to
risk, nor are premiums accumulated separately to provide
for future benefits, as is done in pension funds or
Friendly Societies - indeed if they were they would be
by no means sufficient to meet obligations." 51
The insurance principle, with its apparent basis in normal financial
contracts, is in this sense, mythical:
"In fact, an appearance is constructed of some logical
relation between contributions and benefits for reasons
which may be termed 'moral' - that is to say, in terms of
th8 psychological effect which such a relation is
considered to have on those caught up within it. It was
these moral effects of the principle of insurance - its
reinforcement of the notion of contractual obligation,
its encouragement of thrift, the distinctions it maintains
between earned and unearned benefits - which formed one of
the major objectives of the advocates of this system rather
than the other 'universal' schemes which were considered." 52
By means of such measures the political effects of the social
problem were deflected and its forces re-oriented. In place of an
untrammelled market and a repressive policing mechanism was substituted
an apparatus which could regulate population, restore efficiency and
enforce responsibility, but could also present itself as merely the
combined outcome of a nation of contracting individuals.
(b) The problem of disciplinary regulation
We saw in Chapter Two that the penal realm of the 1890s was also
marked by a series of crises and disruptions, involving the failure of
the prison, the chronic problem of recidivism, an over-severity which
was often ineffective, and a corresponding crisis of popular legitimacy,
manifested in frequent scandals and public outcries.
The political repercussions of these problems were compounded by
the coming of "advanced democracy" which made it important to discover
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a means of policing the population which would accord with the new
political and ideological relations of the Social State. In the new
democracy, where citizenship and security extended to all classes,
discipline could no longer function through repression and exclusion.
Henceforth its modalities would have to be more refined and discreet.
Yet at the same time they would require to be more systematic and
penetrating, more thorough in their effects. Their task was to
ensure that the new and permanent threat posed to the system of class
domination by the workers vote, their mass trade unions and their
collective political existence was counterbalanced by an equally
extensive and thoroughgoing regulation and discipline, reducing the
'risks' that democracy entailed, ensuring that new citizens were good
citizens.
We have said enough already to show that the main co-ordinates of
this crisis were indeed addressed by the new penal strategy which, as
we have seen, repaired the deficiencies of the 1890s and created a
more extensive and refined network of control. But again it is
crucial to realise that along with this institutional change went a
definite alteration of the ideological mode of address implicit in
penal practice.
The categories and practices of the new complex did not employ
the openly repressive terms of the old prison-based system nor even
the explicit signs of the labour colony and its social segregation.
In their place it deployed a new language of reform, correction and
normalisation, supporting the inadequate, protecting the irresponsible,
and restoring the morally deficient to the fullness of good citizenship.
In the language of the new complex the deviant was no longer
represented as wicked or worthless - punishable because of the moral
choices for which he was responsible. Instead the deviant appears as
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deficient - mentally, morally or physically - his actions appearing
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as 'incompetent' rather than intended. The function of penality is
to restore him to an elusive normality by means of training and
treatment, substituting new values and norms for defective old ones,
supplying a discipline previously lacking,or a physical training to
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counteract degeneracy and neglect. As Ruggles-Brise clearly saw:
"Penal law is, through its prohibitions, the expression
of the social standard of life in the country. Where
that standard was high [and it was rising all the time]
there must be a residuum of individuals whose mental and
physical state does not enable them to live up to that
standard."
Penality's task was to intervene to address such deficiencies. The
various sectors of the penal complex mere to restore absent virtues and
capacities, correct vices and abnormalities,or else, in the case of
those whose incapacities were chronic, simply segregate in humane
conditions for the protection of society and the individuals
themselves.
This shift in the basis of penality's logic is what has been hailed
as the liberalisation of punishment. It appears again and again in
the texts of the 1900s end of today as the transformation which took
punishment into its present civilised era, an era in which repression
has become reform, and the "reversionary rights" of every citizen are
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recognised and provided for:
"It is in harmony with what one may perhaps call the
modern growth of social consciousness that society becomes
more and more concerned with the problem of treatment of
those of its members who fall below the accepted normal
standard. The submerged tenth, the insane, the degenerate,
the criminal, the problem of the abnormal factors of the
social organism becomes more and more insistsnt with the
advance in that order which is the expression of a higher
consciousness - social in its inception, humanitarian in
its activity." 5?
And yet if we look closer, a less worthy operation is
simultaneously taking place here. This drastic revision of penality's
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logic occurs precisely at the historical moment when the political
franchise is being extended to include the mass of the (male) working
class within its terms for the very first time. At this moment the
legal basis for full participatory political citizenship begins to
change fundamentally from a question of economic substance to one of
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straightforward adult status. But at precisely the same time a
whole series of institutions and regulations are put in place which
are designed to identify all those legal citizens (or prospective legal
citizens) who lack the normative capacity to participate and exercise
their new-found rights responsibility. Once identified, these deviants
are subjected to a work of normalisation, correction or segregation
which ensures one of two things. Either they become responsible,
conforming subjects, whose regularity, political stability and
industrious performance deems them "capable" of entering into
institutions of representative democracyj or, they are supervised and
segregated from the normal social realm in a manner that minimises
(and individualises) any 'damage' they can do.
So in fact the sweep of the franchise and the social realm is
indeed widened, but at the same time the conditions for participation
in social life are made more rigorous, more contingent upon behaviour
and character. Participation in the political domain is thus extended
along one axis only to be restricted along another. The political
reliability of citizens can no longer be assumed on account of their
economic substance, so a certain caution is adopted in regard to the
conditions of entry of the new classes. 3ust as the extending vote
59
argued in favour of an educational provision for all, it also
promoted the 'remedial education' of penality and its practices:
"The right of the state to subject the transgressor to
an education which makes him fit to fulfil the elementary
conditions of social life with others in an orderly
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society rests essentially on the same basis as the
right to provide for the education and the instruction
of children. In both cases the state sets up the level
below which its members must not sink and tries to help
those up who have not yet reached it or who have sunk
down below it." 60
This new and more subtle form of exclusion served to remove deviants
physically from the domain of full and independent citizenship (where
the extending franchise had placed them) and to remove symbolically
the apparent rationality of all such deviance by ensuring that its
perpetuators were deemed irresponsible, less-than-rational, less-than-
citizens. At the same time it ensured that fewer groups were left
'beyond control', having redefined as pathological all those
individuals who might fail to be deterred by the old system of
punishments. Failure to be deterred thus became a mark of individual
pathology, rather than a mark of the failure of penal institutions.
Not for the first time, the institutions of penality preferred to
change the nature of man himself rather than question the political
61
principles of their practice.
It was through this new version of citizenship and its necessary
attributes that the new penal notions of abnormality and irresponsibility
were articulated onto the strategies of the social field. And of course
the corresponding ideology of beneficial provision to help those
citizens-who-lacked was achieved without reference to the political
transformation of 'citizenship' and the extension of State control
which it undoubtedly involved. Instead it was represented as an
(a-political) moral duty to help those whom modern science had
recognised as being in need of care and control: a moral duty
previously left to voluntary philanthropy but now supported and
ensured by a benevolent charitable State.
As we saw earlier, this depoliticisation was achieved as a result
357
of the State-voluntary alliance and the mediation of the evangelical
penal reform groups in the 'reception* of criminological innovations.
This alliance (which took place in the social as well as the penal
realm) allowed probation officers, social workers and supervisors
eventually to become professionalised and to represent their
ministrations not as class-based moralising but instead as the provision
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of expert counselling and advice. At the same time this new concern
with reform tends to undercut resistance, both from the offender/client,
whose rights are displaced by his needs, leaving him unable to appeal
to justice or even to know his own interests and from the public which
sees only benevolence and compassion where once was cruelty.
Finally we should notice that this new extended strategy of
intervention is not expressed in the traditional terms of the criminal
law, which would involve declaring numerous minor irregularities as
crimes carrying serious and lengthy sentences. Nor is it 'totalitarian*
in establishing a State apparatus which constantly and universally
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intervenes in the lives and homes of all its subjects. Instead
the strategy functions by stating a series of normative expectations
and standards and at the same time establishing a number of authorities
and expert bodies to ensure these norms are met. These normative
requirements are stated not just by law but also by schools, labour
exchanges, housing authorities, health boards, poor law institutions
and so on, and the onus is placed upon individuals and families to
recognise these norms and comply with them (see Figure 2). Those who
succeed remain 'free' - within these terms - and undisturbed by the
incursions of state agencies. Those who fail thereby express their
inadequacy,and their deviant behaviour, failure to meet requirements,
or claims for special provision, function to trigger intervention
accordingly.
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"It is through the failures and deficiencies of families
that the State and public powers find the means and the
cause to intervene. Parental deficiency and juvenile
delinquency provide routes for intervention, pretexts
under the liberal order whereby children can be removed
from families or families placed under supervision.
The autonomy of the family comes to depend not on
law or proprietorial right but on competence. It enjoys
a loosely supervised freedom to the extent that it meets
social norms." 64
Or as one contemporary observed as early as 1915, in a chapter entitled
"The Administered Child":
"A consistent policy of acquiescence keeps a parent
out of reach of official and voluntary interference in
his home. But if he does not acquiesce, his case becomes a
abnormal and he is likely to feel the official weight." ^4-
Some idea of this 'weight* is provided by the following diagram,
although it makes no mention of the equally extensive penal apparatus:
Fig. 2 "The Invasion of the Home"
(from D. Peplar (1915: Appendix A))
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The penal and social agencies thus used such 'failures' as their
points of entry in a more subtle and systematic repetition of the old
philanthropic rescue - though 'failure' u/as now in relation to the
normative institutions of the social realm and not,as previously, to the
labour market itself. This strategy involves no violation of the
liberal ideology of an equal law for alienor yet any entry into a
totalitarian Statism. Instead certain categories of person are
identified (or identify themselves) on the basis of a 'failure' which
can only appear to lie with themselves, since so much in the way of
education, security and support has already been provided. Consequently
this failure or deficiency requires that they be removed from the
politico-judicial sphere to the technical-administrative realm of
penal-welfare. And so once more the deficiencies of the (modified)
market system are displaced onto these most disadvantaged by it. On
this basis a systematic but always discreet distinction can be made
between the bourgeois family, which may freely conform to norms made in
its image and for its benefit,and a lower class family which is
subjected to supervision and intervention in the name of a normative
order which is not its own.
(6) Long term consequences and effects
The major arguments and demonstrations of our thesis have now
been presented. Iiie have shown how the transformations of the 1900s
resulted in the assembly of a new set of penal and social strategies
which addressed the problems of regulation and provision which had
developed at the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover we have
traced the complex processes of formation which contributed to these
strategies and have given an account of their functioning,
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interrelationships and contemporary significance.
However we cannot end the dissertation at this point without
indicating some of the effects and consequences which have actually
followed from these strategies, and suggesting how a knowledge of their
structures may be of use for our understanding of the present. In
particular it will be necessary to indicate how the logics and
potentials of these strategies were limited, contradicted or redirected
in the years between their formation and the present day. But before
taking up this last task, we must emphasise that it cannot be anything
more than a brief and schematic discussion, given the limits of the
present work. A proper, detailed analysis of this subsequent development
is an important project which might hopefully be facilitated by the
present dissertation, but cannot be included within it.
(a) The social strategies
The establishment of these institutions of security and
administration in the 1900s provided the basis upon which the policies
of Keynsianism, social democracy and the 'Welfare State' have
subsequently been built. In other words the outcome of the transformation
we have described was to establish the balance of political forces and
the style of social politics which has persisted throughout the
twentieth century and is only now, in the 1980s, undergoing its first
serious challenge.
Lde can hardly begin to follow through the profound implications
of this structuration, and certainly not within the limits of this
thesis. Suffice it to say that this development not only established
the central structures of modern Britain, with all their familiar
contradictions, but also excluded a series of alternative forms which
have since been marginalised and lost to political view. These
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marginalised alternatives include not only the basic re-distribution
of wealth and power urged by socialists, but also various forms of
needs-based or even rights-based social provision, the establishment
of a national minimum income, of enterprise or union-based systems
66
of provision, and so on. In establishing insurance as the primary
form of provision, the Liberal Government established the terms of
subsequent social policy discourse, and excluded alternative terms as
utopian or impracticable. It thereby established a social realm of
individual claims and contracts, leaving the vision of group solidarity
and social rights to those who dreamt of an altogether different
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society. We might also add that the "utopia" outlined by Beveridge -
in which the social realm became the administrative empire of public
servants, technicians and professional expertise, charged with
adjusting the social and economic relations of their clients — became
in large measure the actual reality of post-war Britain.
(b) Penal-Welfare strategies
The subsequent effects of the new penal-welfare strategies are
also profound. They too laid the basis for the subsequent developments
of the twentieth century, including the post-war shift towards a more
scientific-sounding "rehabilitation", a development which merely
accentuated certain discursive and institutional elements already in
place, while playing down the evangelical and paternalistic elements
which had originally •balanced' them. In other words, the Liberal
penal reforms of the 1900s effectively settled the terms of penal
discourse and official practice, orienting them in a welfarist direction
which has continued throughout the century. Again, this direction is
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being disturbed for the first time only now, in the 1980s.
One or two of these consequences can be outlined in a little more
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detail in order to illuminate the present structure of penality in
the light of our analysis of its formation.^
First of all, we can now see more clearly how the still dominant
individualistic conceptions of penality and social work have been
arrived at and sustained. In both cases the correction of individuals
and families has altogether displaced the concern for social
transformation which can be discerned in the logic (and some of the
texts) of the original programmes. Questions of social reform, of
social reconstruction and change have become institutionally and
discursively separate from the task of individual correction, which
remains the major focus of penality. As Laurence Hausmann put it in
the 1920s:
"This is not to say that there is never such a thing as
a criminal, brutal, base or mean, who is mainly if not
entirely responsible for the crime of which he stands
charged, but it is to say that the shared responsibility
between society and the criminal varies through all degrees,
and that we have stereotyped our formula of justice upon
the false assumption that the criminal and not society
is always to blame." 70
Similarly with social work practice more broadly:
"The wider programmes of 'social reform' and 'social
improvement' of which social work is only one element,
have been ignored at the expense of developing technique
and specifically psychotherapeutic technique." 71
And of course the more 'social reform' occurred in the 1940s and 1950s,
the more this separation ensured that the problem of deviance became
increasingly seen as one of individual pathology and responsibility.
Secondly, we might notice that on the basis of these changes
the penal realm became more professionalised and expert-oriented.
This had the effect of further decreasing public involvement with
penality and also increasing the bureaucratic secrecy which had
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surrounded its operations since 1877. At the same time this
professionalisation of the executive furthered the shift from the
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judicial to the administrative mode, tending to exclude the operation
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of either public review or legal rights within the penal realm.
As we have seen, the categories and terms of the new penal-
welfare practices were different in form from those of the conventional
criminal law. The norms enforced by these practices - regarding say
"mode of life", "moral danger", "character" or "neglect" - cannot be
declared and specified publicly in the form of detailed behavioural
regulations. Instead, the precise values and standards which they
imply must be specified operationally, in the decisions of professionals
and 'experts' who are left to certify the 'abnormal* and demarcate the
•deficient' according to their special knowledge and expertise:
"... the practices here, though they may be constituted
by law, operate according to criteria which, from the
point of view of law, are indeterminate: their rules
and procedures are dependent upon the forms of
explanation and proof which have been elaborated in the
social sciences." ^
This problem is to some extent inherent in all penal practice, but the
new focus upon reform and correction - a focus which justifies longer
sentences, the evasion of legal forms,and enormous executive
discretion - seriously exacerbates its effects. All of the new practices
of reform, correction and normalisation routinely imply an 'ideal
character* to which the deviant will be approximated; a definite set
of attitudes, values, characteristics and images which are the
operational objective of the treatment. And yet these crucial
characteristics are never publicly stated or argued for, let alone
subjected to democratic processes of legislation. Instead these
spaces are filled by bland terms such as the notion of the "useful
citizen", the "good character", or simply the "normal" - a lack of
specificity which echoes the evasions of the criminological and
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eugenic programmes when faced with the same question.
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Without a close and detailed analysis of each particular
practice and institution it is impossible to describe the precise
norms and values which are involved in the new penal-welfare practices -
a feature of the new strategy which has no doubt preserved it from
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criticism as well as control. Such detailed operational analysis is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but we can point to some of the
value-objectives which seem to be involved, if not their precise forms
of implementation.
At a general level, it is clear that the value of 'individual
responsibility' is crucially inscribed in these practices. It is
formulated positively in the legal 'recognition* - and hence demand -
that 'normal' individuals take full responsibility for their conduct,
and negatively in the remedial treatment accorded to those found to be
'irresponsible*. Similarly, the system of reward incentives which
runs throughout the new complex, reinforces a definite image of the
proper order of things wherein promotion is the reward for individual
effort and hard work, and the fate of the individual rests upon his
own will to conform. These operational objectives correspond with the
values which are discursively specified here and there within official
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statements and directions. Thus the promotion of "regular habits",
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"punctuality, orderliness, smartness and obedience" and an
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"enlightened self-interest" are stated as definite Borstal objectives,
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as are "respect for authority" and "industrious labour". "Temperance
thrift and self-help'^ are the recommended topics of instruction for
adult prisoners, while female offenders are expected to learn
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housework, cooking, laundry, domestic service and so on. Sir
Alexander Paterson, a prison commissioner who followed Ruggles-Brise in
his concern with "reform" and "training", assured his Borstal lads that:
"Work is sometimes a bit monotonous, but to work for
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others is never dull ... that ue shall so learn to
become masters of ourselves that ue may be fit to be the
servants of others." 83
and the first issue of The Borstalian - the magazine for Borstal
inmates, later renamed 'Phoenix' - uarned the lads:
"to give trade unionism a uide berth, for it uill be
the uorkers' ruin and a curse to the country." 84
It might also be noted that the neu forms of classification instituted
in prisons after 1893 alloued definite social class and political
criteria to enter into prison categorisation. Thus the Churchill rule
of 1910 uhich alloued the privileges of the First Division to certain
offenders - on the basis that they did not belong to the criminal
classes - uas extended to suffragettes but not to conscientious
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objectors or communists in the same period. While these privileges
of keeping servants in prison, uearing personal clothes, being alloued
special food, uine, and so on uere no doubt befitting to "persons of
refinement and education" to uhom "the many restrictions for the safe
custody of criminals uould naturally seem harsh, unnecessary and even
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unnatural", it is not perhaps surprising that ordinary prisoners
uere reported to express "dissatisfaction", being "not able to
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appreciate uhat must often be a nice distinction".
Without further evidence, it is impossible to analyse the
normative content of the neu penality in a rigorous uay, but enough
has been said to raise the suspicion that a particular configuration
of values, derived from a particular social class, is indeed inscribed
in these practices. As one contemporary critic pointed out, "inspection"
and "reform" in these terms:
"means the judgement of one class by the standards of
of another, the teaching of people hou to live under
circumstances of uhich the teachers have no personal
experience. If carried through it means also the forcing
of the ideals of one class upon another class, and
nothing is so demoralising as that." 88
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Another important consequence of the struggles and outcomes
u/hich we have described was the gradual institutionalisation of
criminology as an officially sponsored form of knowledge. The
qualified 'recognition' which we saw accorded to criminology by
official discourse in the 1900s,opened up a process of
institutionalisation which culminated in the establishment of the
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Cambridge Institute and the Home Office Research Unit in the 1950s.
Throughout this period, indeed up until the present day, criminological
discourse has functioned as an important auxiliary of modern penality.
It provides resources and support for particular policies, lends a
certain 'scientific' credibility and legitimacy to official policy,
and supplies a knowledge-base for penal functionaries which supports
their professional status and their individual morale.
But if the social status of criminology was shaped by these
developments, so too was its discursive structure. The discursive
characteristics and compromises that we saw being constructed in the
1890s and 1900s have been sustained and reinforced by the 'discipline'
as it has expanded throughout the century. Criminology thus retains
its eclectic, individualistic, correctionalist features as well as
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its pragmatic quest for 'policy relevance*. Indeed, it has not
altogether dispensed with its Lombrosian and eugenic heritage which
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continue even today to direct research and shape conclusions. It is
hard to see how the contours of modern criminology can be understood
except by reference to this history of discursive manoeuvre and the
desire for institutional power.
Finally, we might simply note the new framework of penal ideology
which emerged for these transformations. This ideology centred around
the imaginary relation of a benevolent State extending care and
treatment to an inadequate individual, a positive image which fitted
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well with the ideology of welfarism which soon overlaid the new
apparatus of social security. Moreover the various chains of reference
which this central image evoked - those of paternalism, evangelicism
and scientism - were allowed to co-exist in an eclectic and flexible
framework of representation which excluded nothing but the negativity
of 'senseless punishment'. This ideology of the humane and the
reformative helped to establish a cross-party consensus on penality
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which has lasted through most of the twentieth century. It is not
the least of its achievements that the political opposition which was
absent at its inception has not yet been caused to appear.
(7) The Limitations and Revisions of the Strategies in Practice
We have now analysed the strategic structure of the modern social
and penal realms, and have indicated some of their general effects and
consequences. Before concluding our analysis it is necessary to
emphasise that there is a definite discrepancy between the structural
logic which we have described and the subsequent operation of these
institutions. Our concern has been to identify the underlying logics,
techniques and discourses which structure these realms and specify
their potential. We have therefore analysed their strategic formations,
the mechanisms they employ, the measures they exclude, and the effects
at which they are directed. It must be borne in mind however, that
there is always a distance between a strategy's potential and its
practical success. This distance or discrepancy is enforced by the
operation of resistances, contradictions, limitations and failures
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which ensure that no complex strategy is ever a total success.
Any exhaustive account of these realms would therefore have to
supplement an abstract strategic analysis of the type we have presented
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with detailed empirical descriptions of how that structure actually
operates in practice. This kind of description requires a series of
analyses which are beyond the scope of the present dissertation,
however we will briefly indicate the main points of limitation and
resistance which these strategies encountered. It should be stressed
though, that this is a complement to our analysis and not a corrective
of it. Our objective throughout has been to identify the mechanisms,
discourses and strategies which sustain modern penality, and while
this is intended to promote sound phenomenological accounts, it is
not a substitute for them. It should also be noted that although this
section will deal only with the penal realm, the social strategies
of the Welfare State have certainly not avoided resistance or
contradiction, as the political reactions of the 1970s and 1980s have
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made perfectly clear.
One need do no more than read the major Reports, policy statements
or research monographs of the last eighty years to learn of the limits
and contradictions again and again encountered by the new penal-welfare
strategy. The penetration and normalising potential of probation or
social work supervision has been drastically limited by enormous case-
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loads and the bureaucratic displacement of goals. Preventive
detention has been little used because of judicial resistance to its
terms, and the State Reformatories for Inebriates and the weak-minded
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dealt with only a few hundred cases each year. Similarly the
correctional objectives of Borstals and prisons have hardly been
prosecuted with maximum force. Comparatively few professional staff
have been employed in correctional institutions and where psychiatric
or psychological expertise has been utilised, it has frequently been
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redirected from therapeutic to managerial functions.
An examination of the official forms and case-papers utilised in
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"correctional" institutions between 1895 and 1939 also shows up these
serious limitations. The bulk of the information contained in these
dossiers relates not to the inmate's character or prognosis but to his
identificatory features, his institutional record and the marks and
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gratuities which he has earned. And despite various efforts to
overcome this ("opinions and observations will not be stated curtly
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or mechanically" ) official attempts to gain individualised knowledge
from the police and other authorities ran up against the mechanical
repetition of standard terms such as "respectable", "industrious",
'regular" or "disreputable". The tendency,then, was for classification
and individualisation to become an administrative matter and not a
therapeutic one. The new language of assessment and diagnosis only
functioned when actually inscribed in obligatory practices such as the
completion of assessment forms or release-on-licence documentation,
and only in rare and special cases did it serve to promote a form of
institutional treatment which depended upon its categories.
Oespite the claims of policy documents and the continual urging
of criminologists, the penal-welfare strategies never wholly displaced
other, more traditional strategies of sentencing and punishment, a
failure which is most clearly illustrated by the vast expansion in the
use of unsupervised fines - and by the massive use of short terms of
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imprisonment for those who default in payment. Indeed if it was the
compromising and mediating tendencies of the early programmes which
enabled them to become practicable, it was also these same tendencies
which ensured that the penal-welfare strategy was traced through with
persistent contradictions. In fact the manoeuvres and compromise-
formations of that early period set up a series of tensions and
balances of forces which continue to exert their conflicting pressures
right up to the present day.
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Take the process of sentencing for instance. As we saw, the
judicial verdict was never altogether replaced by a diagnosis or
character assessment. Instead the one was supplemented by the other
in an awkward two-stage process whereby the contradictory logics of
classicism and positivism were made to sit side by side. This
compromise leads to frequent absurdity, the most spectacular instance
being the case of capital murderers who were found to be both sane and
liable to execution under the McNaughton Rules,only to have their
death sentence commuted by a post-sentence psychiatric examination which
found them to be insane in terms of its less stringent tests of
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insanity.
Similar conflicts have continued to plague the relationship of
legal ideologies to those of social work and "welfare" as it operates
throughout the penal complex. The most obvious instance here is
perhaps the controversies surrounding the 1969 Children and Youno
Persons Act though it can also be traced in the persuasive and
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compromising discourse of the standard Social Enquiry Report. Even
within the normalising and corrective agencies themselves, the initial
compromise between a moralistic approach to reform and a more scientistic
psychotherapeutic model, has produced a continuing conflict which is
not yet settled.
The most successful feature of the whole strategy has undoubtedly
been its ideological effect and the legitimation it has produced.
Nonetheless we should not omit to mention that this success is
precariously balanced against an undercurrent of populist political
reaction which demands that these measures be always provided in a less-
eligible form and that they be supplemented by a strong deterrent
policy for the wicked and the dangerous - preferably one which involves
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that most negative of sanctions, the death penalty. Moreover the
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positive, correctionalist insistence of the penal-welfare strategy
makes it harder to accommodate and comprehend its own failures. It
is less easy to disown this failure or to displace it on to the
"recalcitrant" offender when a technical capacity for correction and
cure is the central claim of the whole strategy. Consequently the
status and morale of its functionaries can be, and has been, seriously
undercut by the continual ineffectiveness of their practices.
The overall consequence of these limitations and contradictions -
especially the failure to achieve real transformative effects upon
individual character - has been to provoke a subtle but profound
alteration in the functioning of the penal realm. At the level of the
individual agent there has been a widespread displacement of goals
which has had the overall effect of regrouping the original strategy
into a more cynical and less ambitious project. What was once intent
upon reforming characters, remoulding behaviour and improving its
clients now does so only in the marginal, special cases which each
agent recalls with hope or nostalgia, suppressing the memory of
hundreds of others for whom nothing positive can be done. The standard
performance becomes a less satisfying affair of surveillance, security
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and segregation.
Today's penal complex does not prevent or stop crime in the main -
the normal forms of socialisation and integration do that. Nor does
it generally reform criminals. Rather it administers criminals and
criminality, managing 'social failures' and not repairing them. Its
effect is to propel these individuals into a deterred conformity
or, more usually, into closely supervised spirals of failure and
continued failure. It thereby ensures that loose categories and
drifting individuals become fixed, decidedly one thing or the other,
and hence more manageable. It places them in a position of being known
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and predictable, properly connected with either social or penal
institutions - 'within control's^ ®
"The important thing for the apparatus is the individual's
identification, his inflection towards an 'uneventful' life
or towards a career of catalogued delinquency. More then
anything else, the system wants to eliminate surprises in
favour of management in one category of the other." ^7
The penal-welfare strategy thus allows a genuine hope and desire for
reform and yet simultaneously ensures that any "failure" is well
controlled. But it is important to realise that this fall-back
strategy which ensures that reform is 'covered' by an extended
apparatus of control, was in fact recognised right from the start and
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offered part of the attraction of the new programme. Surveillance
and long-term segregation have always been represented as the balancing
forces which allowed a measure of leniency without any corresponding
risks.
The 'success' of the penal-welfare strategy - a success which has
allowed its persistence for nearly a century - is not then the reform
of offenders or the prevention of crime. It is its ability to
administer and manage criminality in an efficient and extensive manner
while portraying that process in terms which make it acceptable to the
public and penal agents alike.
(8) Concluding Remarks; Some Theoretical Implications
The substantive propositions of this thesis have all been detailed
and demonstrated by now and it is not proposed to repeat or summarise
them here - not least because such a summary would run the risk of
reducing the detail and complexity which lies at the heart of these
arguments. Instead one or two reflections of a general kind will serve
as a final conclusion.
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The forms and processes of historical change have been written and
interpreted here in a manner very different from conventional accounts
of penal history. The value of this interpretation must be left to
the judgement of the reader but the following claims can be made on
its behalf. First of all, the use of a form of discourse analysis,
dealing with the substance of texts and their construction has allowed
these historical processes to be traced and described at a level of
detail not otherwise available. It has thus extended the intelligibility
of these processes beyond the vague and unsubstantiated notions of
'influence' and correlative change which organise most other accounts.
For example, rather than merely 'recognise' that the reception of
criminology's programme was qualified and mediated, it has proved
possible to show precisely how these 'qualifications' and 'compromise
formations' were discursively constructed and made available. Moreover
these discursive processes have been theorised within a field of
political forces, a method which again attempts to describe and detail
the relations between knowledge and power instead of occluding these
relations within simplistic and untenable notions of rational
enlightenment. It is argued that this politico-discursive approach has
allowed the timing, direction and significance of these changes to be
analysed in a more comprehensive and intelligible form than is
otherwise possible.
Finally, this method has the merit of describing and substantiating
more precisely the relationship which holds between specific 'theories',
such as criminology or eugenics,and the realm of official practices.
This has led us to argue that the development of each is best seen
as mutually conditioned and conditioning: thus while modern penality
cannot be understood without reference to criminological discourse, the
reverse is also true in a profound and fundamental sense.
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Another related point which emerges from our study concerns the
status of official penal discourse and its relationship to penal
practices. As our analysis of the discursiv/e manoeuvres of official
Reports, statements and legislation makes clear, penal discourse is
as much concerned with its projected image, public representation and
legitimacy as it is with organising the practice of regulation. With
regard to penal practice then, it can hardly be taken as an accurate
descriptive account, though neither is it merely a 'mystification1
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as some writers claim. Instead it should be regarded as partly
constituative of penal practice and partly its ideological representation.
Only detailed study of particular instances can specify the precise
balance of these elements, the entanglement of which is well illustrated
by a remark of a recent Report:
"We think that the rhetoric of 'treatment and training'
has had its day and should be replaced. On the other
hand, we intend that the rhetoric alone should be changed
and not all the admirable and constructive things that are
done in its name."
As for the relation between penality and other social institutions,
it has been demonstrated that this is a complex (though describable)
interlinking relationship of pulls and relays, exchanges and interactions.
On the basis of our analysis it can make no sense to conceive of this
relationship as one of simple determinism in the form argued by
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Rusche and Kirchheimer or even Emile Durkheim. Nor does it make sense
to conceive of penality as corresponding to a single 'form' or 'logic',
whether it be the bourgeois form of law or the inexorable logic of
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disciplinary society. As we have demonstrated, penality is constructed
around an eclectic series of disparate and contradictory forms and
logics which may sometimes be strategically related, but are never
singular or uniform. There is certainly a sense in which the realm of
the 'welfare sanction1 could be said to be the underside of the Welfare
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State, but this juxtaposition can only stand if qualified by the
fact that both of these terms are complex, relating to one another
not as cause and effect but rather as the mutually conditioning
elements of a general social strategy.
Finally, it should be clear from our central arguments that the
•practicable object' of penal practice - the individual, his guilt,
his character or whatever - is not something naturally and universally
given, nor even something gratefully received from scientific inquiry.
It is rather a category constructed within politico-discursive
struggles, with definite political implications which follow from its
adoption. Not the least significance of such analyses is that they
promote the possibility of a change in that object, with different




Major Penal Measures 1895-1914
1896: New Prison Rules for Ouv/eniles.
Establishment of a Prison Staff Training Scheme.
Parkhurst Prison established as an institution for long-term,
u/eak-minded prisoners.
1897: Separation of First Offenders from Habituals in local prisons.
Bail Act.




1899: Reformatory Schools (Amendment) Act.
Fine or Imprisonment (Scotland and Ireland) Act.
Inebriates Act.
1901: Youthful Offenders Act.
1902: Licensing Act.
Establishment of the post of Chaplain Inspector.
1903: Poor Prisoners Defence Act.
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1904: Prisons (Scotland) Act.
1906: Aylesbury Prison established as an institution for weak-minded
women.
1907: Probation of Offenders Act.
Extension of remission to prisoners serving sentences of more
than one month.
1908: Children Act.
Prevention of Crime Act.
Establishment of the Borstal Association.
1910: Establishment of the "Aged Class" category in prisons.
Reduction of periods of solitary confinement served by Penal
Servitude prisoners.
1911: Formation of the Central Association for aid to discharged convicts.
Camp Hill Prison established as an institution for Preventive
Detention.
1912: Rampton Prison established as an institution for criminal lunatics.
Appointment of a Medical Officer to the Prison Commission.
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.
1913: Mental Deficiency Act.
Mental Deficiency (Scotland) Act.
Formation of a Central Committee for the aid of discharged
local prisoners.
Prisoners (Temporary Discharge for Ill-health) Act.
1914: Criminal Justice Administration Act.
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APPENDIX TWO
Major Social Measures 1895-1914
1896: Industrial Conciliation Act.
1897: Workmen's Compensation Act.
1899: Poor Law Act.
1902: Licensing Act.
Labour Bureau (London) Act.
1903: Housing of the Working Classes Act.
Employment of Children Act.
1904: Outdoor Relief Friendly Societies Act.
1905: Unemployed Workmen Act.
1906: Workmen's Compensation Act.
Trade Disputes Act.
Education (Provision of Meals) Act.
1907: Education (Administrative Provisions) Act.
Released Persons (Poor Law Relief) Act.
1908: Children Act.
Establishment of an eight hour day in the Mining Industry.
Old Age Pensions Act.
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1909: Housing and Town Planning Act.
Labour Exchanges Act.
Trade Boards Act.
Development and Road Improvements Act.
Introduction of progressive income tax.
1910: Education (Choice of Employment) Act.
1911: National Insurance Act.
Old Age Pensions Act.
1912: Coal nines (Minimum Wage) Act.
1913: Trade Union Act.
1914: Temperance (Scotland) Act.




The term 'penality' is used throughout the dissertation to refer to
the whole of the penal complex, including its sanctions, institutions,
discourses and representations. It is useful insofar as it avoids
the connotations of the terms "penal system" (uhich tends to stress
institutional practices, not their representations, and to imply a
systematicity uhich is often absent) and "punishment" (uhich
seriously begs the question of the nature of the phenomenon).
With P. Young in "Towards a Social Analysis of Penality" in
Garland and Young (eds.): The Pouer to Punish (1983) London:
Heinemann.
The term "programme" operates hers as an analytical and expositional
device, rather than as a real category. It allows us to group
together and discuss a large number of projects, schemes and
propositions which shared certain fundamental objectives, discursive
resources and political positions. This notion of the 'programme'
needs, of course, to be grounded in the evidence of individual
statements and specific projects (see Chapters Three, Four and Five),
but its abstraction allous the broader significance and context of
these specificities to be analysed. In consequence, the programmes
discussed will be of varying degrees of integrity, uniformity and
cohesion, ranging from the tightly-knit eugenics programme to the
much more diverse programmes of social uork and social security.
In addition, the term "programme" allous us to recognise the
sense of motivation and purpose which lay behind discourse such as
criminology or eugenics, and the institutions uhich supported them.
As will be demonstrated, it was not at all uncommon for these
programmatic objectives to find their way into the conceptual




Modern and Victorian Penality: The Differences
1. A description of the strategic and ideological significance of
these penal-welfare elements will be developed as the dissertation
progresses. Suffice it here to say that the penal-welfare
institutions have operated as an important intermediary between
the integrating mechanisms of 'welfare' and the coercive thrust of
penality, as well as lending a positive legitimacy to punishment
within a State based upon an ideology of welfarism.
2. See, for example, Bean (1976).
3. See Foucault (1977) and Durkheim (1973).
4. See Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) and Melossi and Pavarini (1981).
5. See Cohen (1979) and (1983); Scull (1983) and Mathiesen (1983).
6. Nor is it to suggest that nothing new has occurred during the last
70 years: a proposition which would clearly be absurd considering
the importance of developments such as the abolition of the death
penalty, the introduction of open prisons, parole, detention centres,
the expansion of the fine, the creation of Children's Panels, etc.
Nonetheless it remains true that all of these, and most other
innovations of the twentieth century, fall squarely within the
pattern of penality which was first established in the 1900s.
7. Foucault (1977: 1-5).
8. See Radzinowicz (1956). As Palmer (1979) and Hay (1975) point out,
a very large proportion of death sentences were subsequently
commuted to transportation or imprisonment.
9. See generally The Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment
(The Cadogan Committee), Cmnd. 5684, February 1938.
10. On the significance of this shift from the corporal to the carceral,
see Foucault (1977) and Ignatieff (1978). On transportation, see
Shaw (1966).
11. The Report of the Prison Commissioners (for the year ended
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31 Inarch 1898) p.11.
12. The Penal Servitude Act 1864 which laid down these minimum
sentence terms, is discussed by Hinde (1951; 91).
13. This statutory supervision and reporting of 'ticket of leave'
prisoners was quite separate from the supervisory aspects of the
'after-care' offered by local Discharged Prisoners Aid Societies.
These latter were private, charitable agencies (though after 1863
they received a small subvention from central government) with no
legal powers of sanction for ex-prisoners who refused their
attentions.
14. See the data and discussion provided by Sutherland (1934). In an
undated pamphlet by Ruggles-Brise entitled "The movement of Crime
in England and Wales since the London Congress of 1872", it is
stated that in 1893, 23,749 indictable cases were sentenced to
imprisonment (without option of a fine), while only 960 were
sentenced to penal servitude.
15. L. Radzinowicz, introduction to Webb (1963).
16. There were, however, a small number of specialist institutions
such as Broadmoor (for criminal lunatics), Aylesbury Prison (for
disabled and female prisoners). Between 1835 and 1854, Parkhurst
Prison was used for juvenile offenders, as was Perth Prison in
Scotland.
17. See Rose (1967).
18. The maximum age for Reformatory detention was 19 years.
19. Quoted in Rose (1967: 11-12).
20. Ruggles-Brise (n.d.) gives the following figures for indictable
offences:
1893: Penal Servitude 960 : Imprisonment 23,749 : Fine 9,457
1912: Penal Servitude 876 : Imprisonment 23,118 : Fine 10,278
Unfortunately aggregate figures for the lower courts' use of
sanctions for non-indictable cases are not easily available for
this period.
21. See King (1958) and Bochel (1976).
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22. Ths most important statutes in this process were the Prison Acts
of 1823, 1835, 1844 and 1865. The administration of Scottish
prisons had a slightly different process of centralisation with
the Prison (Scotland) Act 1839 and the Prisons (Scotland)
Administration Act 1860 establishing centralised Boards of
Directors and Managers, see Cameron (1983: 122).
23. It should be noted that Scotland had its own separate Prison
Commission, established by the 1877 Prisons Act.
24. See Hobhouse and Brockway (1922) for evidence of this administrative
censorship.
25. See generally Foucault (1977).
26. To talk of the 'objectives' of a system, institution or agency,
is always problematic if the term is taken to refer simply to
subjective intentions or conscious aims. These can only be
ascertained by establishing speculative links from perceptible
speech or action to their presumed origins in the agent's
intention, and are consequently difficult to establish or verify,
especially in retrospect. The notion of 'objectives' used here
refers instead to the values and aims which can be positively
inferred from official policy documents and administrative orders
or else from the actual priorities and structure of institutional
regimes. Other less obvious 'objectives* which the prison served
will be discussed in Chapter Two. For this discussion, it is
the presence of the value or aim within the discursive or
institutional practice which is important, not the conscious
intention which may or may not lie behind it. The question of
calculation will itself be dealt with later, in Chapter Seven.
27. See Young (1976).
28. See UNSDRI (1975).
29. The 'silent system' permitted associated labour during the day on
condition that no communication took place between prisoners: it
thus allowed a greater degree of productivity although discipline
was relatively more difficult to enforce.
30. See, for example, The Committee on Dietaries of County and Borough
Gaols (1864); The Committee on Dietaries of Convict Prisons (1864);
The Committee on Dietaries in Local Prisons in England and Wales
(1878).
31. See Debb's evidence to The Lords Select Committee on Gaols and
Houses of Correction (the Carnarvon Committee) 1863 quoted at
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page IX of the Report.
32. It should be noted though, that the treadwheel and crank were not
adopted in Scottish prisons:
"... in Scottish prisons there are no tread-wheels or cranks or
other mechanical means of inflicting what is known in England as
first-class hard labour. Sentences, involving hard labour, are
comparatively rare in Scotland while in England they form the
great majority ... the treadwheel and crank have both been tried
in Scotland and abandoned many years ago as improper instruments
of punishment. The Scottish prisoner is therefore engaged
entirely in industrial labour ... for instance, oakum picking ..."
p.vii of the Scottish Departmental Committee on Habitual Offenders,
etc. (1895).
33. cf. The Carnarvon Committee Report (1863) p.vii:
"If the local authorities can make use of the crank or treadwheel
for productive work, the Committee see no objection to this".
34. An exception to this was the progressive stage system utilised in
convict prisons which allowed discipline to operate through the
removal of privileges, as well as the exaction of corporal
penalties.
35. Webb (1963: 204).
36. See, for example, The Carnarvon Report (1863); The House of Lords
Select Committee on Gaols and Houses of Correction, Third Report
(1835); and Du Cane (1885).
37. Howard (i960: 103).
38. Ruggles-Brise (1924: 10).
39. Ou Cane (1885: 155). Here Du Cane is talking of penal servitude,
but his comments also applied £3 fortiori to most local prisons,
which lacked even the elementary classifications of the convict
prison.
40. cf. Grunhut's comments upon the separate system, which he described
as:
"a system which by a grotesque exaggeration of a pretended
individualization fell back into the most unnatural mass uniformity.
It resulted in a complete extinction of all personal traits which
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could act as reminders of the prisoner's individuality, and
this made the whole scheme even more commendable to those who
wished criminal law and prison discipline to be based upon a
system of strict retribution." Grunhut (1948: 60).
41. Ellis (1910: X-XI).
42. Foucault (1979).
43. Quoted in Fox (1952: 48).
44. See Devon (1911).
45. Stephen (1883: Volume 11, 81).
46. Foucault (1977: 10).
47. See, for example, the comments of Lord Chief Oustice Cockburn,
quoted by Fox (1952: 48); the terms of the 1779 Penitentiary Act;
the Carnarvon Committee Report (1863: xii) and the Report of the
House of Commons Select Committee on Prison Discipline (1830:
passim).
48. The Carnarvon Committee Report (1863: xii); Du Cane (1885: 155).
49. cf. Beccaria's statement that:
"Reformation is not to be thrust even on the criminal; and while,
for the very fact of its being enforced, it loses its usefulness
and efficiency, such enforcement is also contrary to the rights
of the criminal, who can never be compelled to anything save
suffering the legal punishment."
Quoted in Radzinowicz (1966: 12).
50. cf. The rigorous manichean categories of the McNaughten Rules, set
out in Walker (1968: 84ff).
51. cf. Edelman (1979) and the commentary upon that text by Hirst and
Kingdom (1979: 8):
"Law both 'imaginately' fixes and sanctions social relations. It
compels things to be as it recognises they are. ... It denies
recourse beyond its forms ..."
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52. In fact in the years after 1908 the courts which utilised the
P.D. provisions often specified maximum sentences of less than
10 years. This interpretation of the Act appears to have been
contrary to the legislature's intention, and to have been
challenged, unsuccessfully, by the Home Secretary in the Court
of Criminal Appeal. See the Letter from the Home Secretary
[H. 0. Gladstone] to the Lord Chief Justice on the subject of
Sentences of Preventive Detention, December A, 1909, P.R.O.
Cab 37/101.
53. See Bochel (1976).
54. See Barman (1934) and Paterson (1951).
55. On the development of the juvenile court in Britain, see
Carlebach (1970).
56. As noted above, a similar system of 'progressive stages' had
previously been in use in convict prisons. On these internal
forms of administration and discipline, see Thomas (1972).
57. These were as follows:
"Convict Stars, Convict Intermediates, Convict Recidivists;
Convict Juvenile-Adult Stars, Convict Juvenile-Adult Intermediates,
Convict Juvenile-Adult Recidivists; Convicts Preventive Detention;
Convicts Long Sentence Division Stars, Convicts Long Sentence
Division Intermediates, Convicts Long Sentence Division Recidivists;
Locals First Division, Locals Second Division, Locals Third
Division; Local Stars, Local Ordinary, Local Second Division with
modifications; Borstal Inmates Special Grade, Borstal Inmates
Ordinary Grade, Borstal Inmates Penal Grade; Modified Borstal -
one month to four, Modified Borstal - four months or over; Lads
under sentences of one month and under."
Quoted in Leslie (1938).
58. No doubt judges had always taken some account of "character" when
sentencing, and the Penal Servitude Act of 1879 instructed that
antecedent record be considered in passing sentences of penal
servitude. But in the years after 1895 we can trace the
introduction of a formalised and across-the-board system of
character assessment and classification, qualitatively different
from the traditional practices.
59. For a detailed discussion of the prison in the years after the
Gladstone Report, see Hobhouse and Brockway (1922) and Ruggles-
Brise (1921).
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60. As we shall see in later Chapters, the "incorrigible" status of
Preventive Detention prisoners posed an ideological problem for a
State which increasingly relied upon reformative representations
of itself and its penal practice. The result was the
simultaneous representation of such prisoners as beyond reform
and yet-to-be reformed.
61. Ruggles-Brise (1911: 74).
62. See page 17 above.
63. Ellis (1910: X-XI).
64. The Gladstone Report (1095: 5).
65. The Times, 11 Play 1912. On the development of the criminal law in
relation to insanity, see Walker (1968), Whitlock (1963) and
Smith (1981).
66. Saleilles (1913: 8-9).
67. cf. Williams (1981) who makes this point in regard to English
poor law strategies and their transformation in this same period.
68. See Ruggles-Brise (1921: 2):
"Formerly, 'Prison Reform' meant the structural reform of prisons,
sanitation, order, cleanliness. Today, it means the reform of the
'prisoner* by improved methods of influence and treatment while
in prison."
69. "The principle of the obligation to work remains a fundamental
one, but it has entirely changed its meaning: although it still
has its justification as an economic factor, it is now used
above all as a re-educative method, and not as a means of
retribution."
The International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation (1951: 122).
70. On the nature of this continuity, see Chapter Eight below.
71. It is worth noting that, as The Times quotation suggests, this
transformation was recognised as such at the time of its occurrence.
See, for example, the Report of the Prison Commissioners for
1908-09, page 26, and also The Times, 15 Oanuary 1901.
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72. On the generalisation of these methods throughout the western
world, see the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation's
text on Modern Penal Methods (1951).
73. Foucault (1977). See also Scull (1983) which follows Foucault
in this, and, in his review of Rothman's work, explicitly denies
the significance of the transformations which occurred at the turn
of the twentieth century.
74. Walker (1965s 133).
75. Morris and Mclsaac (1978: 5).
76. Rose (1961: 15-16).
77. One important text which acknowledges such a transformation and
presents a similar periodisation is Rothman (1980):
"In the opening decades of the twentieth century, new ideas and new
programs transformed public attitudes and social policies toward
the criminal, the delinquent and the mentally ill. The
innovations are well-known for they have dominated every aspect of
criminal justice, juvenile justice and mental health right through
the middle 1960s." Rothman (1980: 3).
Rothman goes on to present a very detailed account of this
transformation as it occurred in the United States of America; an
account which in many broad respects supports the findings of the
present dissertation, for example, with regard to the distance
between what he calls "rhetoric and reality" and the extent to
which penal administrators "benefitted" from these new developments.
However, there are a number of reasons why Rothman's work has not
been a central resource for the present study. First of all,
Rothman's account is fully and deliberately specific to the
American experience. Moreover he refuses generalisable conclusions
and avoids explicit theorisation which might transcend these
empirical limits. As the scope of the present dissertation cannot
reasonably include a comparative element, Rothman's work therefore
rules itself out of account. Secondly, there is an important
sense in which Rothman's project differs from the present one.
His concern is primarily with the "internal" developments and
changes in the penal system, and his investigations focus upon
those reformers and administrators who stand within that system.
The present work attempts to broaden the focus of study and to
pose questions about the "external" social and political
transformations and events which condition and direct penal
developments: its investigations are consequently of a wider and
less specific kind. Finally, there are numerous theoretical points
at which Rothman's work differs from the present dissertation, not
least his concern to judge the intentions of individuals rather than
analyse their operative discourses and his facile rejection of
Foucault's work as a crude "economic determinism", Rothman
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(1980: 11). For a different account of this transformation,
again referring to another nation's experience, see
Tove Stang Dahl: 'The Emergence of the Norwegian Child Welfare
Law', Oahl (1974) and her untranslated Norwegian text on Child




Victorian Strategies of Social Regulation
1. On these wider issues, see Lubenow (1971) and MacDonagh (1958).
2. Obviously the developments and transformations mentioned here are
not the whole story of social change in this period - only those
which have a bearing upon penality and its transformation will be
discussed. The degree of detail of our discussion corresponds with
the importance and proximity of these developments in this respect,
for example, economic change is discussed only insofar as it
affected the ideology of laisser faire individualism and the
policies and institutions which depended upon this ideology.
3. cf. Sutherland (1907: 342) who warns that:
"Those who today, in exalted stations under the aegis of the law,
are carrying on, in the name of haute finance, etc., with the aid
of wealth, gigantic frauds against the weak and trusting members
of society ... [may tomorrow] find themselves carrying on their
schemes under laws calculated to check this ... just as the vulgar
thief is now."
Also Holmes (1912: 46):
"Probably the proportion of criminals per number of men and women
who comprise the different stations of life is about the same for
every rank, though I am sure that the statement will be considered
absolute heresy. But it must be remembered that rich criminals are
more likely to escape detection, arrest and punishment than the
criminals of the poor. They are still more likely to plan
numerous transactions which technically do not come within the
meshes of the criminal law, but which morally are as dishonest and
rascally as any crime against property can possibly be."
4. On the distinction between working class "crimes" and bourgeois
"illegalities" see Foucault (1977).
5. See Gattrell and Hadden (1972) and the interpretation of their
statistical work offered by Young (1976). It is pointed out that
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the prisons held large
numbers of artisans, craftsmen and skilled workers, mostly
convicted on 'political' charges of arson, conspiring and sedition.
By the 1880s these protest offenders had greatly diminished in
number and the vast bulk of the prison population was composed of
recidivist property offenders. The implication drawn by Young,
and followed here, is that the official "criminal population" had
been narrowed and stabilised into a primarily working class
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phenomenon, and at the same time, a more rigorous distinction
was established between political and criminal forms of action.
6. See Gattrell and Hadden (1972). In 1S65, 35 per cent of male
prisoners could neither read nor write, in 1890, 22 per cent.
Even as late as 1902, by which time illiteracy had been virtually
eliminated in England and Wales, 15 per cent of prisoners were
still illiterate. As for prisoners poverty, this is strongly
suggested by the fact that in the period 1896 and 1900 inclusive:
"A trifling annual average of 24 out of some 40,000 convicted of
indictable offences possessed property sufficient to justify the
appointment of administrators of prisoners' property under the
Abolition of Forfeiture Act of 1870." Gattrell (1980: 335).
For contemporary descriptions of the prison population in the
1860s and 1900s, see Mayhew (1862) and Goring (1913).
7. "... it is held by very careful and recognised authorities, that
the number of reconvictions can be quoted not as proof of the
badness of a prison system, but as a hopeful sign that crime is
being confined to one set of people, that the stream of criminality
is becoming, as it were, narrowed ..." Report of the Prison
Commissioners for the year ended 31 March 1898.
Du Cane and Tarda are the authorities quoted in support of this
claim.
8. See Foucault (1977) on the construction of this social division.
9. Gattrell and Hadden (1972), Young (1976).
10. See Hobsbawm (1964) and Gray (1976) on the question of the labour
aristocracy in Victorian Britain.
11. cf. Engels (1975): Letter to Marx of October 7, 1858:
"The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more
bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is
apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois
aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie.
For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to
a certain extent justified."
As Gray (1977: 88) points out:
"When bourgeois intellectuals like Alfred Marshall praised the
enlightened moderation of the 'largest and best managed unions'
this was something that the bourgeoisie had been forced to accept,
and to legitimize through shifts in its ideology, not a cunning
scheme to 'integrate' the labour aristocracy. Any 'integration'
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was a two-edged affair, as the whole history of working class
struggle indicates."
12. On this question of "working class incorporation", see Cousins
and Davis (1974).
13. On the "New Model Unions" which adopted this stance, see Harrison
(1965).
14. See Dones (1971: 10-11).
15. Booth (1902) termed them Classes C and D.
16. The term "perishing class" derives from the work of Mary
Carpenter:
"That part of the community which ... consists of those who have
not yet fallen into actual crime, but who are almost certain from
their ignorance, destitution and the circumstances in which they
are growing up, to do so, if a helping hand had not been extended
to help them - these form the perlshina classes." Quoted in
Rose (1967).
Oones and Williamson (1979: 84) extend this term into the economic
sphere and the analysis of pauperism:
"... the existence of criminality clearly implied the existence
of a criminal class, but a growth in criminality implied in
addition a moral contagion between this criminal class and other
classes, particularly those 'perishing classes' whose members
are always susceptible of passing into the ranks of the criminal
class. In the analysis of pauperism, similar relations of
contagion obtained between the working classes and the class of
paupers; that is, in relation to the latter, the working classes
form perishing classes. The term 'perishing', like 'dangerous',
is thus a generic term, but a generic term that indicates
susceptibility to moral contagion."
17. In the terms of Booth's classification scheme, the residuum would
be Classes A and B. See Booth (1902).
18. Booth (1902: 38).
19. Dendy (1895: 82).
20. cf. Viscount Ingestre's account of the "fearful" statistics found
in the report of the chaplain of Preston Bail in 1850:
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"... out of 1,656 males ,,, it is a fact that 674 usre unable to
read in the slightest degree; 977 did not know the reigning
sovereign's name, and were unable to repeat a word of prayer;
and although such was the case, 713 of them were well acquainted
with the exciting adventures of Turpin and Jack Sheppard; knew
that they were famous robbers and housebreakers; admired them as
friends of the poor. ..." Quoted in Pearson (1975: 155).
21. Dendy (1895: 83).
"... for the member of the Residuum who has no fears for the
future ... With his debts cleared off, and a week's wages in
hand, the final utility of the reward is so small that he has
absolutely no inducement to work; the smallest temptation will
keep him away, the smallest inconvenience cause him to throw up
the job; and it is not until he is destitute and his credit
exhausted that he finds himself beginning his [marginal utility]
curve again." Dendy (1895: 86).
22. Sir Thomas Bart. Bernard: Of the Education of the Poor, page 47,
quoted by Jones and Williamson (1979: 68).
23. These phrases are taken from Booth (1902: 38).
24. Of course there were rogue elements which did not conform to this
pattern - e.g. the indiscriminate alms-giver - but the concerted
rejection of such practices throughout the institutions and
respectable discourses of the establishment is proof of the
general rule. The characteristics of this strategy will be
specified in a moment, though we will not tackle the historical
problem of how it was formed in the first place. However, this
dissertation will address itself to the problem of how a
subsequent strategy was formed in the 1900s (see Chapters Six and
Seven) and at that point we will discuss the methods of investigation
and the forms of analysis which are appropriate for the
elucidation of such 'strategies'.
25. As we shall see, this common focus did not preclude important
ideological disputes between and within these agencies, but this
fundamental problem posed by the residuum remains a constant
factor underpinning all of these diversities.
26. See Gray (1977) and Johnson (n.d.).
27. Although this ideology of self-help individualism was essentially
of bourgeois origin and application, its impact was socisty-wide,
bringing about a 'reform of manners' among the landed gentry, as
well as among the top fraction of the working class. The reform
of the public schools and universities, the opening up of the
civil service to competition, reform of the army and the formal
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regulation of sporting activities indicates a growing acceptance
of the new values among Tory elements, while State policies and
legislation (in which the landed gentry still had an important
voice) were almost totally dominated by the orthodoxes of free-
trade, economic liberalism and social laisser faire. See Gray (1977).
This conception of an ideology which becomes inscribed within real
practices and hence becomes 'real' (despite the unreality of many
of its tenets) and 'true' (despite the falsity of its judgements
and propositions) is discussed in the work of Nietzsche, Foucault
and Althusser. The same point is made by Edelman (1979) when he
talks of ideologies - such as law - which can sanction their own
categories.
See Hobsbawm (1968).
See Pashukanis (1978), Edelman (1979) and Hirst (1979). It should
be stressed that a conception of the "individual free subject" is
necessary to capitalist relations (and similar social forms) but
not to social life as such. Hirst and UJoolley (1982) discuss the
significance of this term, and point to empirical evidence of
society's which do not employ it at all, or else do so in a
qualified manner. As we shall see, even in capitalist society,
the generality of this term's application has been limited and
modified in the ideologies and institutions of the twentieth
century.
See Smith (1981: 75); Collini (1979) and Dickens (i960).
cf. Schlapp and Smith (1928: 17):
"... though the heavenly Father was all knowing and all powerful,
He did not interfere in mundane matters to the extent of hampering
the human will or controlling the decisions of the individual.
One must feel that this was an ecclesiastical rather than a
theological decision, since its difficulties are considerable,
not the least of them being the tacit negation of the efficacy of
prayer. Be that as it may, the decision was in favour of free
will and responsibility, and in this the later metaphysical
philosophies concurred."
This quotation is from Ferri (1917: vi), where he describes this
position as "the old and still dominant thought", cf. Garafalo
(1914: 273):
"'Moral responsibility'; 'penal proportion': these two postulates
continue to form the keystone of criminal law, notwithstanding
that science has demonstrated their inherent impossibility. The
stone has already been loosened, but the ideal in question too
intimately bound up with commonly obtaining philosophic prejudices
for any hope of its immediate dislodgement."
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34. Radzinowicz (1963).
35. See Saleilles (1913: 93) and Moulin (1975).
36. Schlapp and Smith (1928: 17-18).
37. See Marshall (1963: 84-85); Fraser (1973: 22) and Evans (1980).
38. Thomas Scanlon: "Mr. Chamberlain's Pension Scheme: A Friendly
Society View of It" quoted in Evans (1980). As its title
indicates, this succinct statement of bourgeois commonsense in
fact comes from a director of a workers' Friendly Society.
39. Or so, at least, said the ideology of legalism. In practice the
laws of vagrancy, breach of the peace, conspiracy and sedition,
allowed some leeway beyond this general principle.
40. cf. Du Cane's position was characterised by Grunhut (1948: 97)
thus:
"Reformation ... may be the object of charity organizations, but
not of a State institution."
More specifically Du Cane (1885: 197) argues that any State
system of after-care might have:
"... a positively mischievous effect, by creating a presumption
that 'Government' admitted it to be within its proper functions
to find employment on discharge for any person who came into
prison."
41. The Scottish Poor Law was even more strict in this respect. As
the Scottish Departmental Committee on Habitual Offenders etc.
(1895: vii) put it:
"... the Scottish Poor Law system is one of outdoor relief with
the poorhouse only as an auxiliary or as a check. On the other
hand, the theory of the Scottish Poor Law, differing on this
point totally from the English, absolutely denies relief, not
only to all able-bodied persons themselves, but to those persons
dependent upon them, who, if they were in employment, they would
be held to be able to maintain. In Scotland the relief of the
able—bodied and of their dependents is left to the charity of
public bodies and private persons."
On Scottish Poor Law generally, see Ferguson (1958).
42. Williams (1981: 58): the quoted passage within this statement is
taken from the 1834 Poor Law Report - see Checkland (1974: 378).
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43. Williams (1981: 99) comments that the setting out of conditions
of eligibility in the form of published rules:
"... gave the working class an educative opportunity to reflect on
the reasons why an application for out-relief would not be
successful. Ideally, the conditions would make the working classes
reflect on their shortcomings, their failure to practise thrift,
their deficient sense of family obligation, their dirty and
unsavoury homes. At the same time, the conditions were an
assurance that virtue would not go unrewarded; after a lifetime
of thrift, caring for elderly relatives and housecleaning, the
virtuous would be rewarded with an out-relief dole."
In fact this official strategy, like the parallel efforts of
private agencies like the COS, were not to be achieved. See
Williams (1981: 102).
44. Williams (1981: 102).
45. This indeed, was precisely the problem of the Speenhamland system
and other systems like it, in the view of the 1834 Report.
46. Checkland (1974: 216).
47. Jordan (1978: 131).
48. cf. Marshall (1963: 84):
"The Poor Law treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral
part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them -
as claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be
citizens in any true sense of the word. For paupers forfeited
in practice the civil rights of personal liberty, by internment
in the workhouse, and they forfeited by law any political rights
they might possess."
49. See Williams (1981: I08ff) on the introduction of "classification
and treatment indoors".
50. On the development of compulsory education in nineteenth century
Britain, see Jones and Williamson (1979), Fraser (1973) and
Marshall (1963).
51. Jones and Williamson (1979: 60).
52. Joseph Butterworth, 1816, quoted in Jones and Williamson
(1979: 77).
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53. See Jones and Williamson (1979).
54. Jones and Williamson (1979: 85). See also Blanch (1979).
55. According to Holmes (1908) offenders appearing in the police
courts were frequently encouraged to enter into marriage as a
condition of their probationary release. One Police Court
Missionary claimed to have arranged seventy such marriages and
Holmes maintains that this practice was quite common in the early
1900s. He describes one such "Police Court Romance" as follows:
"Not very long since, one of our judges had before him a young
man charged with the attempted murder of the girl to whom he had
kept company. His jealousy and brutality had alarmed her, so
she had given him up. But he was not to be got rid of so easily,
for he waylaid her and attempted to murder her by cutting her
throat. He was charged, but the charge was reduced to one of
grievous bodily harm. At the trial, the young woman was asked
by the judge whether she would consent to marry the prisoner,
adding that if she would consent it would make a difference in
the sentence imposed. The matter was adjourned to the next
session, the prisoner being allowed his liberty, that the marriage
might be effected. During the adjournment they were married, and
when next before the magistrate the marriage certificate was
produced. She saved the man from prison, and the judge bestowed
his benediction in the following words: 'Take her away' (as if,
forsooth, she had been the prisoner) 'and be good to her. You
have assaulted her before: don't do it again' - thus giving him
every opportunity of doing at his leisure what he had barely
failed to do in his haste." Holmes (1908: 108-9).
56. Fraser (1973: 123) states that:
"Loch (the founder of the COS) and his colleagues supported two
propositions: first that poverty was avoidable through personal
initiative and was not a consequence of the social and economic
system; and second, that the extent of poverty was well within
the capability of voluntary philanthropic effort which precluded
the need for any large-scale state-intervention."
57. As we shall see in later Chapters, this terminology of 'desert'
was later dropped in favour of a less explicit language of
classification.
58. As Beatrice Webb (1938: 231) remarked:
"Neither the churches nor the hospitals, neither the orphanages
nor the agencies for providing the destitute with food, clothing
or shelter, would have anything to do with a society [the COS]
which sought to improve methods that appeared the very negation
of Christian charity."
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59. Jones (1974: 484). "Working-class culture and working-class politics"
in Journal of Social History.
60. Quoted in Jones (1971):
"Regularity of habits are incompatible with irregularity of income.
... It is a moral impossibility that the class of labourers who
are only occasionally employed should be either generally
industrious or temperate - both industry and temperance being
habits produced by constancy of employment and uniformity of
income." Henry Mayhew, quoted in Hay (1978: 53).
61. Hobson (1909: 213).
62. cf. Hobson's description of this sector of the population as,
simply, "The Prisoners".
63. Ou Cane's claim that prison costs had been decreased during his
administration was publicly refuted in 1894 when the famous
Daily Chronicle articles stated that average annual costs per
prisoner had risen from £27 to £29 between 1877 and 1894. See
The Daily Chronicle, 28 June 1894.
64. For details of this development, see Lynd (1945) and Lenin (1975).
65. See Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972).
66. The Socialist Democratic Federation (SDF) was founded in 1882, the
Fabian Society in 1883 and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in
1893.
67. See, for example, Atherley-Jones (1893). The most vivid evidence
of this alarm at the spectre of socialism comes from the
literature of the Conservative Party in this period: see
especially the leaflets entitled "Socialism and Irreligion"
(NU No. 898); "Socialism Makes Man a Machine" (NU No. 1011);
"Socialism and Your Children" ("Under socialism your children
will be 'State-items', vote for Unionism and protect your
children") (NU No. 1044); "Socialism Destroys Liberty" (NU No. 1039);
"Socialism offers No Reward to Thrift" (NU No. 1038); "Socialism
Spells Industrial Ruin" (NU No. 1013) and "Socialism is the End
of All Things" (NU No. 1010). Leaflets of the National Union of
Conservative and Constitutional Associations, National Library
of Scotland.
68. See Gray (1974).
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As Hobsbawm points out, in a book entitled Labour's Turning
Point, 1890-1900 (1974: II):
"The period was not merely one in which the nature of the battle
between capital and labour changed - it produced the first
conflicts which can be reasonably called national strikes or
lock-outs - but also the pattern of negotiation, the political
and administrative attitude to labour."
The point being made by Hobsbawm and again here, is not that the
1880s saw the first movements of working class resistance, nor
even the first mass movements. The point is rather that such
movements were now increasingly underpinned by the organisational
force provided by mass unionisation - amongst the unskilled as
well as the skilled of the working class.
Oones (1971: 335):
"As the depression deepened, signs of distress began to appear
in the ranks of the respectable working class. 'Agitators' were
already beginning to blur the distinction between the respectable
working class and the 'residuum' by appealing to both under the
slogan of 'relief to the unemployed'. The dangerous possibility
existed that the respectable working class, under the stress of
prolonged unemployment, might throw in its lot with the casual
poor."
See Booth (1902); Fleams (1883); Sims (1883); George (1907);
and the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical
Deterioration (1904). Kirkman Gray (1908: 17) points out that:
"... the most far-reaching results of these publications has been
achieved among those who have never studied them. ... [They] have
gained a symbolic meaning. Life and Labour, Town Poverty,
Physical Deterioration are phrases which represent vague dreads
and hopes. The facts percolate through the strata of society.
... The social value of this refracted light is incalculable.




The assault upon laisser fairs policies combined a number of
powerful (and otherwise opposed) social forces, including many
of the larger industrialists, finance capitalists, the various
socialist and labour groupings, social reformers, radical
economists, etc.
See Oones (1971: 111).
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76. See Chapter Five.
77. Quoted in Palling (1968). See also Semmel (i960).
78. See Harrison (1965).
79. Quoted in Emy (1973: 105).
80. On Bismarck's policies, see Semmel (i960).
81. A. 3. Balfour, quoted in Fraser (1973: 129).
82. On the practical problems and limitations of local £»d hoc forms of
relief for the unemployed, see Harris (1972).
83. The term "discipline" is used here in its conventional sense to
imply a problem of ensuring obedience through mental and moral
control of whatever kind. As uie shall see, Foucault's more
restrictive concept of "discipline" (or dressage) was only one
amongst many techniques used towards this end. On Foucault's
conception of discipline, see Bottoms (1983).
84. Rothman (1971) identifies a similar course of events in the United
States of America.
85. Ferri (1917: 35) mentions what he calls "the English Crisis of
Imprisonment" and cites three Italian language articles by
Morrison, Mario and Griffiths on this subject.
86. Garafalo (1914: 211).
87. Morrison (1896: 273).
88. Carpenter (1906: 6).
89. Saleilles (1913: 153).
90. Holmes (1912: 72).
91. See Charlton T. Lewis, President of the National Prison
Association of the United States, quoted in Carpenter (1906).
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92. Boies (1901: 129).
93. The Times, 26 March 1898.
94. Report of the International Prison Congress (1900: 107),
95. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1906: 14).
96. Report of the Proceedings of the International Prison Congress
at Washington (1910: 37).
97. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1909-10: 8).
98. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1908-09: 26),
99. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1912-13: 31). On all of
these official declarations of failure, see Brockuay (1928).
100. Brise (1924: 194).
101. The Report of the Scottish Prison Commissioners for 1898, page 7.
102. The Report of the Prison Commissioners for the year ended
31 March 1898, page 8.
103. See Sutherland (1908) and Morrison (1892).
104. Sutherland (1908: V).
105. On these developments, see Morrison (1892).
106. See Rose (1979: 42).
107. See Goring (1913) and the Report of the Royal Commission on the
Feeble-minded (1908).
108. See Goring (1913) and The Daily Chronicle, 25 Oanuary 1894.
109. See The Gladstone Report (1895).
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110. On the provisions and affects of the Act, see Du Cane (1885: 155)
and Hinde (1951: 91).
111. See Morrison (1892).
112. Brise (1900: 28). See also the letter by Ruggles-Brise of
21 December 1899 which states:
"... our difficulty is that Judges will not pass sentences of
penal servitude on such cases [i.e. petty criminals and habituals]."
Letter in PRO file, P. Com 7. 286.
113. See, for example, the Report of the Departmental Committee on
Inebriates (1898: 7) and Bradley (1893-4: 283).
114. See Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy (1906: 1),
Brise (1900: 29) and C. J. Ritchie of the Home Office in a
confidential letter to the Lord Chief Justice, 22 March 1902 in
PRO file, P. Com 7. 286.
115. A similar situation of ineffectual terror motivated many of the
critiques of criminal law and punishment at the end of the
eighteenth century, see Foucault (1977).






1. For a discussion of these 'human sciences' and their development
and conditions of emergence, see Foucault (1967), (1973) and (1970).
2. Clearly we are not talking here of "criminology" as the study of
crime simpliciter: such studies have a very long and varied history,
going back to Plato and beyond. Rather it is out intention to
trace the "science of criminology" in its new, self-proclaimed,
positivist form, which as we shall show, differs significantly from
that which went before.
3. For classic statements, both for and against this criminological
science, see Barnes and Teeters (1943) and Taylor at. al. (1973).
4. Perhaps the best available are those by Jeffrey (i960) and Cohen
(1974). A more critical analysis of this "special savoir" has
been attempted recently by Pasquino (1980) but his essay is badly
researched and overly schematic.
5. See especially the various essays in Mannheim (i960).
6. See Taylor et. al. (1973).
7. Lombroso describes his 'discoveries' thus:
"In 1870 I was carrying on for several months researches in the
prisons and asylums of Pavia upon cadavers and living persons in
order to determine upon substantial differences between the insane
and criminals, without succeeding very well. At last I found in
the skull of a brigand a very long series of atavistic anomalies,
above all an enormous middle occipital fossa and a hypertrophy of
the vermis analogous to those that are found in inferior vertebrates.
At the sight ... of these strange anomalies the problem of the
nature and of the origin of the criminal seemed to me resolved.
This was not merely an idea, but a flash of inspiration. At the
sight of that skull, I seemed to see all of a sudden, lighted up as
a vast plain under a flaming sky, the problem of the nature of the
criminal." Lombroso (1911: xiv).
8. Saleilles (1913: 203).
9. On the work of Gall and Spurzheim, see Smith (1981).
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10. De Quiros (1911s 2). On the development, influence and metho ds
of nineteenth century positivism, see the Introduction to
Mannheim (i960) and also Taylor et. al. (1973), Chapters 1 and 2.
11. On the limited influence of Compte's Positivist Movement in
Britain, see Farmer (1967) and Ferri (1917: 14).
12. On the development of statistical technique, see McKenzie (1981).
13. On the history of statistical information in general, see Cullen
(1975), especially the Prelude "Social Statistics in Britain
1660-1830". For criminal statistics in particular, see Ij/iles (1971)
and Gatrell and Hadden (1972).
14. See A. M. Guerry's "Eesai sur la statisque morale de la France"
(1833) and A. Quetelet's "Essai de physique socials" (1835). The
work of these "moral statisticians" has sometimes been referred
to as the first phase of criminological science, insofar as they
applied "scientific" techniques to criminal data. See, for instance,
Bonger (1916). Whether or not this compliment is granted, the
"science" of these writers differs significantly from the "science
of criminology" with which we are concerned, and is perhaps more
properly viewed as an early sociology of deviance. Guerry and
Quetelet were concerned to show that crime was a social fact, with
the regularities and social basis of all such phenomena: insofar
as they had a conception of individual criminal behaviour, this
appears to have been neo-classical in form, assuming choices
within social constraints. See Morris (1957: 48ff).
15. See Cullen (1975).
16. On Mayhew and other nineteenth century writers who investigated
and documented the 'ecology' of English crime and criminals, see
Lindesmith and Levin (1971) and Morris (1957). It is significant
that the untheorised but persistently sociological approach of
writers such as Mayhew, Rawson, Fletcher and others was marginalised
or else reformulated by the appearance of the new positivist
criminology. On this marginalisation, see Morris (1957) and
Chapter Six of the present work.
17. cf. The Lunatics Care and Treatment Act (1845) and the Lunatics
Asylum Act of the same year. For details of psychiatry's
institutional development, see Smith (1981) and Scull (1979).
18. See Smith (1981) and Walker (1968). De Quiros (1911) states the
following texts as the most influential in criminology's development.
Clapham and Clarke's The Criminal Outline of the Insane and Criminal
(1846); Winslow's Lettsonian Lectures on Insanity (1854);
Thompson's Psychology of Criminals (1870) and 'The Hereditary
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Nature of Crime* in The Journal of Mental Science (1870); and
Maudsley's Mental Responsibility (1873)~
19. For a discussion of a parallel development in French psychiatry,
see Castel (1975) and Donzelot (1979).
20. On the concept of 'surface of emergence', see Foucault (1972).
21. Ruggles-Brise (1924: 10).
22. cf. The Times, July 17, 1901:
"... one is struck by the fact that experts in all civilised
countries are face to face with the same problems, and are seeking
to solve them in the same ways."
23. See the article by C. R. Henderson in The Dournal of the American
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.II(1911-12)
entitled "The Cell: A Problem of Prison Science".
24. Garafalo (1914) argues explicitly that criminology's proper object
of study is "the natural delinquent". Goring (1913) is more
circumspect than Ferri or Lombroso, stating this as an hypothesis
rather than an ai priori presumption:
"... we are forced to the hypothesis of the possible existence
of a character in all men which ... we call the 'criminal
diathesis." Goring (1913: 26).
or again:
"Assuming that conviction and reconviction for crime are not
purely circumstantial occurrences, and constitutional factors play
some part in this eventuality. ..." Goring (1913: 123).
25. But cf. too Burt's comments on parallel developments in psychology:
"Like so many advances in theoretical science, the annexation of
this new field may be traced to the pressure of practical needs.
The psychology of education, of industry, and of war, the study
of the criminal, the defective and the insane, all depend for
their development upon a sound analysis of individual differences."
Quoted in Rose (1979: 7).
26. Ferri (1917: xli).
27. Garafalo (1914: xxvi).
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28. As we shall see in Chapter Six this purism later gave way to a
more pragmatic compromise.
29. Ferri (1917: 38).
30. Smithers (1911-12).
31. Ancel (1965: 51) describing the position of Adolphe Prins, whom he
describes as the foremost exponent of the doctrine of social
defence.
32. Saleilles (1913: 61).
33. Ferri (1917: xl).
34. Robertson and daudsley (1864).
35. Saleilles (1913: 73).
36. Ferri (1917: 14).
37. Saleilles (1913: 72).
38. Bradley (1893-94: 272).
39. Report of the Prison Commissioners 1901-02, p.8.
40. Ellis (1910: xxv).
41. The International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation (1951: 54).
42. Ferri (1917: 37):
"Anthropology shows by facts that the delinquent is not a normal
man; that on the contrary he represents a special class, a
variation of the human race through organic and physical
abnormalities, either hereditary or acquired."
43. lames Devon in The Glasgow Herald, 29 lanuary, 1908.
44. The Daily Chronicle, Oanuary 29, 1894. The series of articles
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from which this is taken, was published anonymously, but the
most probable author is W. D. Morrison.
45. Lombroso (1911: 333). He is quoting Granthier here - with
approval.
46. On these writers, and the impact of 'neo-classicism', see
Taylor et. al. (1973).
47. Ferri (1917: 372).
48. Garafalo (1914: xxv).
49. Garafalo (1914: xxv).
50. Garafalo (1914: xxxiii).
51. Uhiteway (1902: 25).
52. Wilson (1908: 204). cf. Our remarks on page 44 where we argued,
contra Foucault, that individualisation did not take place in
Britain until such a knowledge was institutionalised in the 1900s.
53. Ferri (1917: vi).
54. cf. Healey (1915: 22):
"The dynamic centre of the whole problem of delinquency and crime
will ever be the individual offender."
55. Quoted in De Fleury (1901: 47).
56. Boies (1901: 35).
57. De Fleury (1901: 57).
58. This movement was in fact an aspect of a broader development which
constituted modern psychology:
"It is commonly accepted that psychology emerged as a coherent
and individuated theoretical field, in Britain as well as in
Europe and the United States, during a period which stretched
from about 1875 to about 1925. ... One can ... distinguish
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something happening over this fifty year period which has the
character of an 'event', an event which seems to consist of the
translation or extension of certain recurrent questions concerning
the nature and attributes of man from the closed space of
philosophy to the domain of positive knowledge." Rose (1979: 6).
On this development also see O'Neil (1968).
59. Oe Fleury (19Q1: 35).
60. Oe Fleury (1901: 32).
61. Garafalo (1914: 274).
62. Claye Shaw (1902-04).
63. Hollander (1908: 2).
64. Saleilles (1913: 184).
65. liiilson (1908: 236).
66. De Fleury (1901: 21-2).
67. Boies (1901: 38).
68. flarro, quoted in Garafalo (1914: 67-8).
69. Again, Burt points out a parallel two-stage transformation in the
field of psychology:
"... that in the late nineteenth century whereby psychology
changed its method to that of systematic observation and research,
and that in the twentieth century whereby psychology changed its
subject from man-in-general to a concern with individual
differences ... the question of the individual and its differentiation."
Quoted in Rose (1979: 7).
It was Alfred Binet who added to this the necessity of measurement
and argued that "the study of criminals", (together with the study
of races, children and patients) was one of the "principal routes
to be pursued". Rose (1979: 8).
70. The term belongs originally to Ruggles-Brise (1924: 91).
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71. Boies (1901: 35).
72. Ferri (1917: 38).
73. Ferri (1917: xl).
74. Hollander (1908: 13).
75. Wilson (1908: 236).
76. Lydston (1904: 599).
77. Garafalo (1914: 408).
78. See Elliot (1929).
79. Elliot (1929: 36-7).
80. Ferri (1917: v/i).
81. cf. G. C. Fernald (1912-13: 866):
"It is to be noted that about all of the measures proposed as
reforms in penal administration could be catalogued as 'Recommendations
of an extension of classification', and, from another viewpoint,
there are probably but feu/ authorities in criminology who would
suggest any other avenue as that along which penological science
is to advance than that of an extension and improvement of
classification."
82. This was variously described as 'correctionalism' or 'penal
tutelage' (Oe Quiros (1911)) or even 'moral orthopaedics' (Hall
(1914: 409)) as well as simply 'reformation'. It implied positive
techniques of transformation, not just the provision of space or
time for the individual to will his own improvement.
83. Boies (1901: 447).
84. Boies (1893: 292).
85. Quoted in De Quiros (1911: 96).
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86. Ferri (1917: 420).
87. cf. The resolution of the 1906 Turin Congress:
"... The Judge must be given the power to choose, with unlimited
freedom and according to the exigencies of the individual case,
from a series of measures. ..." Quoted in De Quiros (1911: 98).
Also Ellis (1910: xxv).
88. For typical lists of these recommended sanctions, see Boies (1901)
and the resolutions of th8 Congress of Cincinatti (1870), quoted
in Ruggles-Brise (1924). As we shall later argue, it is
significant that most of the major sanctions and techniques
recommended by the criminology programme actually pre-existed it,
as the Cincinatti resolutions clearly demonstrate.
89. cf. The Cincinatti resolutions of 1870 which are in most respects
identical with the recommendations of forty years later. See
note 88.
90. See, for example, Ferri (1917); Lombroso (1911) and Morrison
(1891).
91. cf. Burton (1980: 138) on present day criminologies:
"Anthologies on violence demonstrate the intellectual incompatibility
of the classificatory systems they celebrate: disparate
epistemologies, contradictory concepts, mutually exclusive facts.
But the paradigms all make claims to a knowledge that justifies
modes of intervention. The criminology of violence espouses as
knowledge sclecticist anthologies and presents the criminal
justice system with maximum discursive licence to forge tactical
alliances that result in pragmatic technologies."
92. See Ruggles-Brise (1924: 93) where this issue is discussed and
Saleilles1objections quoted and endorsed.
93. Report on the Proceedings of the Seventh International Penitentiary
Congress (1906:26).
94. Boies (1901: 446).
95. Virtually every text of this period engages in these disputes:
see note 81.
96. On the congress debates, see Dahl (1974).
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97. For a discussion of this development, see Chapter Six.
98. See Ferri (1917) for an explicit discussion of this movement.
99. See Boies (1901) for example.
100. McHardy (1906).
101. Lombroso (1911: 245).
102. See Brockway (1928).
103. Lombroso (1911: 245-6).
104. Garafalo (1914; 257).
105. Ruggles-Brise quoted in Holmes (1908: 35). See Chapter Six for
a detailed analysis of this dispute and its consequences.
106. See Ferri (1917).
107. Saleilles (1913: 177).
108. Saleilles (1913: 192).
109. This eugenic aspect of the criminological programme has not, to
our knowledge, been discussed to any extent in contemporary
literature. As we will show in Chapter Six, the intrusion of
categories and objectives derived from eugenics has been of real
significance in the development of modern criminology and penality.
110. See Garafalo (1914: 251).
111. Battaglini (1914-15: 15).
112. See Ellis (1910: xiii).
113. Bradley (1843: 94).
114. Garafalo (1914: 251).
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115. Boies (1893: 293).
116. "Large numbers of persons who are socially inefficient - some
from physical degeneracy, others from mental deficiency, and
others from confirmed inebriety - will be secluded for
considerable periods, and prevented for the time being from
propagating their kind." Quinton (1910: 119).
117. Holmes (1913: 252).
118. Goring (1913).
119. Sutherland (1908: 92).
120. Devon (1911: 19-20).
121. 'Prevention' is also used to signify interventions which operate
solely at the level of the individual or the family, for example,
preventive detention, segregation, etc..
122. Bonger (1916), Ferri (1917) and (1909).
123. This narrowing of focus and the marginalisation of criminology's
radical elements will be discussed in Chapter Six.
124. Ferri (1917: xl).
125. Sutherland (1908: 7-8), Holmes (1912: 41).
126. See, for example, Carpenter (1906).
127. Ruggles-Brise (1921: xvi).
128. Sutherland (1908: 106-107).
129. Investigator and St. John (1904: 100). dagriand is quoted by
ClcHardy (1906). The demand for access to prisons and the
democratic accountability for prison authorities might also be
included here: see the Daily Chronicle series, January 1894
cited at note 44 above. It is significant that this issue was
entirely ignored by the Gladstone Report and the legislation
which followed.
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130. This is not to suggest that the law was actually practised in
line with these ideals. But whenever is was partial, and took
account of class or 'character' it always risked scandal by
this failure to conform to its public principles.
131. See, for example, the Howard Association (1882), (1907), (1908),
(1909) and (1910) which argue for such 'provision' to be made for
inebriates, epileptics and vagrants. As Thomas Holmes, Secretary
of the Association, said in his letters to The Times and The
Daily Telegraph of September 17, 1907:
"The cry of the inebriate is heard all through the land, but
unless the wretched victims succeed in getting into the hands
of the police at least four times in one year the law does not
heed the cry."
See also Quinton (1910) who would extend powers of detention to
all of the 'socially inefficient'. Quinton (1910: 119).
132. Boies (1893).
133. Boies (1901: 66). cf. Castel (1975: 252):
"... mental medicine was trying to erect a new apparatus ... an
intervention which would not always be bound to come too late,
for it would be based on a knowledge capable of anticipating the
possibility of criminal behaviour before the act was put into
execution."
De Ouiros (1911: 127) provides the term "near criminals". Boies
(1901: 60) argues that the identification of "Presumptive Criminals"
is "a sufficient substitute for judicial decision" and it is
within this context that we must understand his demand that the
Bertillon system of identification be used to record the details
of every individual over ten years old in the population.
134. Hall (1914: 393).
135. cf. Foucault (1977: 92-3).
136. Garafalo (1914: 312):
"Once punishment is measured by the perversity of the criminal,
the question of attempt by insufficient means completely
disappears. If the attempt, quite as much as the executed crime,
suffices to reveal the criminality of the agent, there can be no
difference between the two.
137. Saleilles (1913: 51 4 97). Jeffrey (i960: 388) mentions the Spanish
criminologist Pedro Dorado Montero as worthy of interest because
414
he "placed emphasis on the protection of individual rights and
the limitation of the power of the State". In fact as Lopez-Rey
(1960s 320-21) argues, Nontero, like most of his international
colleagues, that the interests of the "Individual and Society"
became identical in the process of corrections
"In the application of penal treatments, the individual rights
should be considered as subordinated to the effectiveness of
such treatment aimed at the moral correction of the offender."
138. Bradley (1893-94; 270).
139. Bruck-Paber suggested "neuro-electricity" at the 1906 Turin
Congress, quoted in Oe Quiros (1911s 96). The "plethysmograph" -
a device for testing variations in the circulation of the blood,
resting for its usefulness upon the way the circulation "responds
to what is passing in the mind" - was invented by Ptosso and is
endorsed by Lombroso (1911: 253).
140. Pepler (1915: 4-5).
141. Ruggles-Brise (1899). As we shall see, a reward-incentive scheme
of discipline was eventually adopted through the penal complex.
However this was not a demand of the new programme so much as a
product of the experience of prison management, particularly that
of the 'Irish System*.
142. See Oe Quiros (1911) and especially Gross (1911). The Report of
the Departmental Commission on the Identification of Habitual
Criminals (1894) demonstrates the early official adoption of
registry systems, using anthropometric systems such as the
Bertillon method, and also the finger-printing method, developed
by Sir William Herschel and Francis Galton. These systems were
soon extended to include most prisoners and convicted offenders -
often at the instigation of Chief Constables of Police - see
S.P.R.O. HH 35/4.
143. cf. Boies (1901: 438):
"The State must provide skilled penologists to superintend the
treatment of all convicts."
144. cf. Oe Fleury (1901: x):
"... These doctrines seem to tend towards the restriction of the
role of the jurist and the magistrate respectively, and to
diminish the importance of their office and rank."
145. cf. Castel (1975: 252) talking of the conflict between law and
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medicine, guilt and madness, which surrounded the case of
Pierre Riviere:
"Behind this theoretical issue is concealed, too, a competition
between actors defending their position in the division of
social labor: to what type of specialist is he to be entrusted
and what will be his 'career'; is it to depend on verdict or
diagnosis?."
See also Smith (1981: 75).
146. The contribution of these groups and individuals will be
examined in more detail in Chapter Four.
147. On the development and significance of these new 'middle strata',
see Hobsbawm (1964) and McKenzie (1981).
148. UJ. D. Morrison is clearly an exceptional case, being both a
clergyman (the Chaplain of Wandsworth Prison) and a leading
advocate of the criminological programme.




Social Work and Penal Reform
1. On the history of social work, see Young and Ashton (1967),
Woodruffs (1971) and Bruce (1961). On eugenics, Searle (1976) and
(1971) and on social security, Gilbert (1973) and Harris (1972).
2. cf. Boies (1893: vi):
"The highest happiness, advantage and presperity of the individual,
indeed, is only to be secured by such a widening of the scope of
public care, as will comprehend and benefit the entire social mass."
3. Hodges and Hussain (1979: 105).
4. See Kirkman Gray (1905).
5. See Curran (1982: 311-312) and Young and Ashton (1967: 30).
6. This was not the first or the only attempt to suppress the
•indiscriminate1 giving of alms. As Curran (1982: 315) points
out, as early as 1530 and 1535 there were "statutory attempts to
outlaw alms-giving outside organised relief" though these proved
to have little deterrent effect. The revival of indiscriminate
alms giving, and subsequent attempts to stop it, in the middle
years of the nineteenth century have been traced to their routes
within the fractional conflicts of the English middle classes by
Peter Young in his essay on the emergence of the police court
mission, Young (1976a).
7. This was not a matter of influence or imitation so much as one of
parallel development, a parallel which was duly noted by Raymond
Saleilles:
"Poverty requires the aid that relieves and does not encourage the
condition itself. There are at present societies guided by this
spirit of individualisation; they dispense with any regular form
of administering charity and leave to their members the duty of
assisting the poor and unemployed to such positions as they are
capable of filling. ... The provisions for the relief of material
distress must be applied to moral distress; and in place of
punishment administered by rule and with an invariable uniformity,
we ask for a system of individual superintendence through ... which
the individual initiative may be appealed to, and the most
suitable measures of assistance provided for each case."
Saleilles (1913: 310).
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8. Quoted in dowat (1961: 70).
9. dowat (1961: 26).
10. G. S. Loch (1909; 2). In fact the writers of the COS themselves
used the term 'class', as a glance at the texts of Loch, Dendy or
Bosanquet will make clear. But whereas Booth and Rowntree (and
later, the discourse of social security) are describing the common
effects of structural and environmental patterns upon sections of
the population, the COS concept of class is merely a fictional
shorthand term for an aggregate of individuals sharing common
moral characteristics. This is a vital political and practical
distinction which Loch clearly recognises in his distinction
between "the individual method as opposed in the general method
of charity", (quoted in dowat (1961: 75)).
11. See dowat (1961: 23) and also Beatrice Webb's comment:
"... the COS found itself baulked in its purpose of organising
the multifarious charities of the Metropolis; neither the Churches
nor the hospitals, neither the orphanages not the agencies for
providing the destitute with food, clothing or shelter, would have
anything to do with a society which sought to impose methods that
appeared the very negation of Christian charity." B. Webb (1938:175).
12. See dowat (1961: 29) on "The Apparatus of Casework". The 1895
COS Report states that:
"Investigation has a four-fold value. It enables us to decide
whether a case is one for help or not. It helps us to decide
the form that assistance should take to give the most permanent
results. It enables us to find means of assistance apart from
cash, and it helps us to give the best advice for the future
welfare of the client." Quoted in Young and Ashton (1967: 103).
13. "Notice to Persons Applying for Assistance:
(1) The Society desires to help those persons who are doing all
they can to help themselves, and to whom temporary assistance
is likely to prove a lasting benefit.
(2) No assistance should be looked for without full information
being given in order that the Committee may be able to judge:
(1) whether the applicant ought to be helped by charity; and
(2) what is the best way of helping them.
(3) Persons wishing to be assisted by Loans must find satisfactory
security, such as that of respectable householders. ... Loans have
to be paid back by regular instalments.
(A) Persons who have thrown themselves out of employment through
their own fault ought not to count upon being helped by charity.
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(5) Persons of drunken, immoral or idle habits cannot expect to
be assisted unless they can satisfy the Committee that they
are really trying to reform.
(6) The Society does not, unless under exceptional circumstances,
give or obtain help for the payment of back rent or of
funeral expenses. But when help of this sort is asked for,
there may be other and better ways of assisting.
(7) Assistance will not, as a rule, be given in addition to a
Parish Allowance.
By Order, COS Committee."
Quoted in Woodruffs (1971: 41).
14. Quoted by dowat (1961: 28-9).
15. Twenty-first Annual Report of the COS (1889) page 2, quoted in
dowat (1961).
16. cf. 8. Webb's comment:
"Its leading members added to their sectarian creed as to the
necessary restrictions of the impulse of charity, an equally
determined resistance to any extension of State or municipal
action, whether in the way of the physical care of children at
school, housing accommodation, medical attendance or old-age
pensions, however plausibly it might be argued, in the spirit of
Chalmers and Chadwick, that only by such collective action could
there be any effective prevention of the perennial recruiting of
the army of destitutes." B. Webb (193B: 177).
17. Quoted in dowat (1961: 72).
18. Dendy (1895: 87).
19. C. S. Loch, quoted in Woodruffe (1971: 33).
20. Young and Ashton (1967: 105).
21. Gilbert (1973: 51).
22. cf. B. Webb (1938: 175). According to the Popular District
Guardian, dr. Goult, "the COS stunk in the nostrils of the working
men ... [and] ... spent £25 in office expenses for every £5 that
went to the poor". Quoted in dowat (1961: 130). It is significant
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that the industrial bourgeoisie does not feature prominently in
the patron lists of the COS. Jones (1971) suggests that this
was because employers would fear the consequences of association
with this unpopular organisation. It might also be suggested,
however, that this reflects the growing ambivalence of this class
towards the policies of laisser faire, reflecting its direct
involvement within the changing relations of production and
exchange. Ironically the most devoted supporters of individualistic
ideology are those least in contact with its intended sphere of
operation, cf. Laclau (1977).
23. This influence is well marked by the appointment of C. S. Loch to
serve upon the Royal Commissions on the Aged Poor (1893-95), the
Feeble-Minded (1904-08) and the Poor Laws (1905-09).
24. Mowat (1961: 59).
25. Barnett (1888: 106).
'"Scientific charity' or the system which aims at creating
respectability by methods of relief, has come to the judgement
and has been found wanting. Societies which helped the poor by
gifts made paupers, churches which could have saved them by
preaching made hypocrites, and the outcome of scientific charity
is the working man too thrifty to pet his children and too
respectable to be happy." Barnett (1888: 96).
26. Barnett (1888: 73). The rapid expansion of the Settlement
Movement is discussed by Masterman (1901) who states that in the
15 years following the founding of Barnett's Toynbee Hall in 1883,
there were 30 settlement houses established in England, about
half of which were in London.
27. Barnett (1888: 196).
28. See the proposals 3et out in Barnett (1888) generally.
29. Barnett (1888: 66). Moreover this collectivist intervention was
to regulate the rich as well as the poor:
"Generally it is assumed that the chief change is that to be
effected in the habits of the poor. All sorts of missions and
schemes exist for the working of this change. Perhaps it is more
to the purpose that a change should be effected in the habits of
the rich." Barnett (1888: 41).
30. Barnett (1888: 45) and Jones (1971). The encouragement of trade
unions among the unskilled is also advocated:
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"It would be wise to promote the organisation of unskilled labour.
... The v/ery organisation would be a lesson to those men in
self-restraint and in fellowship." Barnett (1888: 44).
31. Barnett (1888; 45). Alfred Marshall put it more urgently;
"The peril is really very great. Soon the control of the working
classes over Imperial and Local Government will cease to be
nominal and become real. If they had learnt to look for guidance
to the CDS people, they could have been shown how to use out-
relief and not abuse it. As it is, I believe that they will
abuse it. ... The main evils of our present system of aid to the
poor is its failure to enlist the co-operation of the working
classes themselves. It is because I believe that the working
classes alone can rightly guide and discipline the weak and erring
of their own number that I have broken silence now. ..."
Quoted in Bones (1971; 302).
32. cf. Marshall;
"... the residuum ought not to exist, and ... they will exist till
the working class have themselves cleared them away." in Bones
(1971; 302-3).
33. The settlement houses themselves became a kind of institutional relay
between these two programmes, providing individuals with an
experience and knowledge which they would later employ in
government;
"Institutions like Toynbee Hall continued to flourish in the
1890s, but their function had changed. They were no longer seen
as urban manor houses from which a new squirearchy would lead the
poor to virtue. ... They were now seen as informal social
laboratories where future civil servants, social investigators,
and established politicians could informally work out new
principles of social policy." Bones (1971; 328).
34. Notable amongst these were the Salvation Army, the Church Army,
the Church of England Temperance Society, the Reformatory and
Refuge Union, the National Association of Certified Reformatory
and Industrial Schools, the State Children's Association and the
Committee on Wage Earning Children. For details of the various
Discharged Prisoner Aid Societies, see the Report on the Operation
of Discharged Prisoners Aid Societies (1896).
35. See Young and Ashton (1967; 179-80).
36. Rose (1961; 70) states that it was the pressure of the R.R.U.
which led to the appointment of the Departmental Committee on the
Inebriate Laws in 1892.
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37. See Foucault (1977: 234). See also Ryan (1978) on the 'special
relationship' which continues to exist between the Home Office
and its 'official opposition', the Howard League.
38. See, for example, the Association's pamphlets on "The Prison
Congress of London" (1872), "Vagrancy and riendicacy: A Report"
(1882) and "Defects in the Criminal Administration and Penal
Legislation of Great Britain and Ireland with Remedial
Suggestions" Tallack (1872) as well as the various texts by
T. Holmes, Id. Tallack, F. Peek and T. B. L. Baker.
39. Rose (1961: 15 and 30).
40. See Rose (1961: 50), Tallack (1895) and Holmes (1907).
41. Howard Association Pamphlets (1919).
42. Tallack (1895).
43. For a discussion of these demands, see Rose (1961) and the
literature cited in note 38.
44. The form taken by this official 'recognition', where granted,
varied according to circumstances. In the case of Reformatory
and Industrial Schools this recognition was statutory; with the
police court missions it depended upon the enthusiasm of the
presiding magistrate; and with prisoners aid societies, recognition,
as well as visiting, access and information, depended upon the
discretion of the prison governor concerned.
45. It will be recalled from Chapter One that the "State agencies"
charged with this task have changed over time, generally from
local to central. The precise nature of the agency concerned is,
of course, of great importance, but it does not alter the point
being made here.
46. We will see later that once it was clear that the State would
take responsibility for the poor (as it was by 1909), the COS
also demanded a reformative State practice, just as the Howard
Association had done in the penal realm.
47. See Rose (1961: Chapter 2) and Tallack (1895) passim.
48. See Grunhut (1948); Fox (1952).
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49. See Rose (1961).
50. Rose (1961: 50).
51. cf. Tallack (l895)'s Chapter title: "Prison Officers, their
Responsibility to God".
52. Tallack (1095: 33).
53. It is important to note, however, that the Association's position
changed over time. By the time Thomas Holmes became its Secretary
in 1905 the list of demands which it shared with other programmes
had increased to include institutions for the feeble-minded,
labour colonies and parole. See Holmes (1906) and (1913). It
is also noteworthy that Holmes* position was by then much closer
to the social work revisionism of Canon Barnett: see Holmes (1913:
252-53).




Programmes of Social Security and Eugenics
"Old Age Pensions" - an article in Tribune, dune 11, 1906, guoted
by Uieiler (1982: 91).
cf. Rose (1979).
cf. Masterman (1909: A):
"The 'condition of the People' problem now occupies the dominant
position. Every political party has realized that Social Reform,
on broad and generous lines, is as inevitable condition of future
progress."
and Gilbert (1966: 61):
"The quest for national efficiency ... gave social reform what it
had not had before - the status of a respectable political question.
Imperialism and the 'condition of the people' question became linked."
The intersection of these concerns allowed a very wide basis for
certain social reforms. At various points it alligned Imperialists
such as Rhodes, Tariff Reformers such as Chamberlain, Milner and
Mackinder, eugenists like Pearson and Fabians such as Shaw. See





It is no exaggeration to say that the Settlement Missions, and
particularly Toynbee Hall, amounted to a kind of training college
for future proponents and administrators of social security measures.
Residents there included hJ. Beveridge, R. L. Morant, U. 3. Braithwaite
(architects of National Health Insurance), H. Llewellyn Smith
(Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, responsible for Labour
Exchanges and National Unemployment Insurance), E. H. Aves (Chairman
of the first Trade Board) and C. R. Atlee (Labour Prime Minister)
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as well as writers such as N. Buxton, H. W. Nevinson and P. Aldan.
See Bruce (1961).
10. Quoted in Harris (1972: 97) and in Parry (1979).
11. Hobson (1909: 207).
12. Hobson (1909: 207).
13. See Gilbert (1966: 53) and Clones (1971: 354-5).
14. "The domain of operation of macro policies is not individual
bodies but large aggregates of bodies - population. ... They are
directed towards statistical phenomena like birth rate, death rate,
infant mortality and the balance between the number of bodies and
the quantum of available resources. ... They are focused away from
the minutiae, towards the species treated as a unit." Hussain
(1981: 189).
15. See Gilbert (1966: 268) and Harris (1972: 47). The Minority
Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of
Oistress (1909!1215) which embodies one version of this programme,
argued that "it is now administratively possible ... to remedy most
of the evils of Unemployment", but admitted that 'techniques' and
a body of expert knowledge can only develop when "actually put into
operation".
16. A. Marshall in his evidence to the Royal Commission on the Aged
Poor (1895), quoted in Gilbert (1966; 27).
17. Harris (1972: 42) attributes this statement to the UJebbs and
William Beveridge.
18. 3ones (1971: 354-5).
19. See generally Weiler (1982). There was in fact a political grouping
within the Liberal Party which was founded in 1B96 calling itself
the 'New Liberals'. Its founding statement describes its
objectives as being to unify the "multiplicity of progressive
movements", to come to grips with "that huge unformed monster",
the social question, and to implement "a specific policy of
reconstruction "based on a new conception of economic freedom ...
the conscious organisation of society" and "an enlarged and
enlightened conception of the functions of the State". Quoted in
Emy (1973: 105). Although the term 'New Liberalism' is used to
cover a wider political movement, these objectives and the
individuals like Hobson and Hobhouse who formulated them, give
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this wider term its meaning.
20. "Man is free only when he chooses an object which tends to his
self-realization. Man could be free, therefore, even when obliged
to action by law if this obligation tended to develop his better
nature." Quoted in Weiler (1982: 316).
21. As the following quotation from Ritchie shows, this conception of
power accords closely with that of M. Foucault in rejecting the
notion that power exists in a 'zero-sum' relation between the
State and the individual. See Foucault (1981).
22. Quoted in Brown (1974; 6).
23. Gilbert (1966: 54).
24. Weiler (1982: 17). This position, which is clearly articulated in
the writings of Hobson, Beveridge, Hobhouse and the lilebbs amongst
others, is clearly a stark parallel to that of Emile Durkheim who
was writing at much the same time in France (see his The Division
of Labour in Society, 1st edition 1893). There appears to be no
evidence of any direct influence here, rather both reflect a
developing feature of modern society.
25. See Beveridge (1909).
26. See Harris (1972). 3. A. Hobson further argued that 'under¬
consumption' was a major cause of unemployment which could be
remedied by a redistribution of wealth. A. H. Marshall argued
a similar position (without its radical consequences) in his
evidence to the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor.
27. See Harris (1972: 11).
28. COS statement (1904), quoted in C. L. Mowat (1961: 157).
29. Hobson (1909: 174).
30. Rose (1979: 26). This theoretical ambivalence is the cause of a
number of contrary interpretations of Booth as environmentalist
(see Brown (1968)) and as individualist (Williams (1981)). Booth
himself went so far as to estimate the causal weight of 'both*
of these 'factors': see Booth (1902).
31. 3. A. Hobson in The Crisis of Liberalism (1909), quoted by
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Gilbert (1966: 257).
Samuel (1902: 4). G. R. Sim (1883: 11) made the same point when
he talked of "Dr. Stata" and 'his' "power of rescuing future
citizens. ..."
3. A. Hobson in The Crisis of Liberalsim (1909) quoted by Gilbert
(1909: 257). It should be noticed that our analysis is not at odds
with that of H. M. Lynd who argues that the beginnings of the
movement from "negative" to "positive" freedom can be traced in
the intellectual developments of the 1880s. The purport of this
section is that these developments only emerged in the political
arena in the 1890s and 1900s. See Lynd (1945).
On emigration, see Booth (1890) and (1905) and the proposals of
Lord Brabazon, Sydney Smith and Arnold White as summarised in
Jones (1971: 309). On Old Age Pensions, the various schemes of
3. Chamberlain, C. Booth and the National Committee of Organised
Labour on Old Age Pensions are described in B. Gilbert (1966: I99ff),
On schemes of decasualisation, see G. Stedman Jones' account
(Jones 1971: 335) of W. Churchill's proposals while he was
President of the Board of Trade and the later arguments of the
Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws.
While these institutions were certainly new developments at the
level of national politics, one can find local or else foreign
instances of an earlier date. Thus 'Labour Registries' were
established for certain trades in London as early as 1886, and
after 1890 the Salvation Army was involved in running its own
"Labour Exchanges", see Gilbert (1966: 37-8). Labour Colonies
existed in various forms in several European countries in the
1880s and 1890s and were the subject of frequent Reports in this
country: see for instance The Report on Methods of Dealing with
Vagrancy in Switzerland (1904) and The Report on the Belgian Labour
Colony at Marxplas (1903). As for insurance against sickness and
unemployment, the Friendly Societies and Industrial Insurance
Companies are obvious instances of private precursors to this
proposal.
Rose (1979: 36).
Harris (1972: 202). As Percy Alden put it in 1905:
"What is required is that the State and local authority should
attempt what every employer does for himself every day, distinguish
between men of good and bad character." Quoted in Brown (1968: 356)
Rose (1979: 35).
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39. Id. Beveridge, quoted in Harris (1972: 285).
40. Id. Beveridge, quoted in Harris (1972: 206).
41. The conditions of eligibility specified in the 1908 Act excluded
anyone in receipt of poor relief (s.3(l)(a)); anyone who "has
habitually failed to work according to his ability" (s.3(l)(b));
anyone "convicted of any offence and ordered to be imprisoned"
(s.3(2)) as well as lunatic, inebriates and others.
42. According to John Brown, Booth's concern "was to preserve the
morale of old people who had previously led independent lives from
a humiliating enquiry into personal circumstances". Brown (1981).
43. Thus Id. Churchill:
"The spirit of the Insurance Scheme is not to weaken the impulse
of self-preservation, but to strengthen it by affording the means
of struggle, and the fear of running through benefits, or passing
out of the Insurance Scheme altogether, must be constantly
operative." Quoted by Gilbert (1966: 272).
See also Rose (1980).
44. Rose (1980: 123).
45. "Beveridge's preference for social insurance derived partly from
his belief that it was the most efficient means of caring for the
poor, but more centrally from his belief ... in the capacity of
social reform to promote integration and cohesion in place of
conflict. He believed that social insurance ... could foster
independence, social solidarity, and feelings of identification
with a benevolent state." Thane (1981).
See also Harris (1977).
46. Gilbert (1966: 251).
47. Jones (1971: 335).
48. See Jones (1971: 332) and (1971: 302-3). As Jones points out, the
early schemes of Booth and the Barnetts involved 'voluntary'
entry to these colonies, but in later versions committal was seen
to necessitate compulsion.
49. Report on the Belgian Labour Colony at Marxplas (1903) by a
Committee appointed by the Lindsey (Lines) Quarter Sessions.
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50. The Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Lau/s
(1909), (vi. 537).
51. Winston Churchill, 1906, quoted in Oones (1971: 335).
52. We should note that there were also a number of proposals of a
different sort for rural colonies of a pastoral or communal
orientation. Three such colonies were privately established,
first by the Salvation Army at Hadleigh in Essex, as part of
General Booth's regenerative scheme of aid to the destitute, and
later by the Poplar Board of Guardians at Laindon (in 1904) and
by the London Central Committee for the Unemployed at Hollesley
Bay (in 1905). See Broun (1968: 357) and Crooks et. al. (1905).
53. 0. A. Hobson, quoted in Weiler (1982: 172).
54. Harris (1977: 101).
55. See the various competing schemes of insurance, pension, emigration
and labour colonies in Gilbert (1966), Harris (1972) and (1977),
and Oones (1971).
56. On the range of political positions of these various proposals of
social security, see B. Semmel (i960), Masterman (1909), and
Gilbert (1966).
57. Booth (1902: 167). As K. Williams points out:
"... labour colonies and old-age pensions had much the same
status for Booth as regulating the banks [has] for Friedman; they
were strategic interventions that made other interventions
unnecessary." Williams (1981: 338).
58. Gilbert (1966: 245) paraphrasing Beveridge's position.
59. Churchill's determination to confirm the 'contractual' basis of
national insurance was defeated in this respect, being successfully
opposed by the arguments of Llewellyn-Smith, see Gilbert (1966:
271ff).
60. Hobson (1909: XII) where he insists upon "rights of self-
development" and a "just apprehension of the social".
61. "The unconditionality of all payments under insurance schemes
constitutes a grave defect. The State gets nothing for its money
in the way of conduct, and may even encourage malingerers."
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62. Beveridge:
"... men who cannot in ordinary circumstances support themselves
in independence are not citizens in fact, and should not be in
right. ..." Toynbee Record, March 1905, quoted in Brown (1981).
63. Quoted in Brown (1968: 112).
64. cf. Masterman (1909: 92):
"All the poor want ... is to be left alone. They don't want to be
cleared, enlightened, inspected, drained. They don't want
regulations of the hours of their drinking. They assiduously
avoid the hospitals and parish rooms. They don't want compulsory
thrift, elevation to remote standards of virtue or comfort,
irritation into intellectual or moral progress."
65. Id. Beveridge in 1906, quoted in Oones (1971: 335).
66. See references cited above: notes 48-50 and also Hay (1978: 32).
67. Rose (1979: 26).
68. Sidney Idebb, quoted in Gilbert (1966: 77).
69. See Semmel (i960). And cf. H. Spender (Lloyd George's publicity
agent):
"It is not enough for the social thinker in this country to meet
the socialist with a negative. The English progressive will be wise
if in this at any rate, he takes a leaf from the book of Bismarck
who dealt the heaviest blow against German socialism not by his
laws of oppression ... but by that great system of state insurance
which now safeguards the German workman at almost every point in
his industrial career." (1902) quoted in Gilbert (1966: 257).
and Speech by H. H. Asquith, Chancellor of the Exchequer, reprinted
as the Liberal Party Pamphlet "Liberalism and Socialism":
"I do not under-rate the activity or the progress of the Socialistic
propaganda, or the importance of meeting it with a constant and
persistent exposure of many of its cloudy though alluring fallacies;
but the real danger lies in leaving evils unredressed and problems
unresolved. ..." In Pamphlets and Leaflets for 1907, The Liberal
Party of Great Britain.
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Pearson's desire that "every citizen must learn to say with
Louis XIV 'L'etat c'est moi"', quoted in Semmel (i960).
71. H. Dendy, "The Industrial Residuum" in Bosanquet (1895).
72. This definition is based upon Galton's own, as contained in his
will; see McKenzie (1981: 15).
73. See The Times editorial of October 7, 1911 and the Cabinet
Minutes of December 22, 1911. PRO Cab. 37/108. Members and
sympathisers included Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard
Shaw, Lowes Oickinson, 3. B. S. Haldane, 3. M. Keynes, Harold
Laski, Cyril Burt, William McDougall, T. C. Horsfall and
Havelock Ellis. See Searle (1976).
74. See, for example, Galton (1869) and (1889); Chappie (1904); and
Rentoul (1903).
75. Cited by Rentoul (1903).
76. Chappie (1904: iii). This remark has distinct echoes in the
notorious public statement made by Margaret Thatcher in 1979,
this time referring to the question of immigrants and the 'threat'
they posed to our nation and culture.
77. L. Darwin, quoted in McKenzie (1981: 41).
78. See Rentoul (1906: 165) and Searle (1976).
79. "All the major European nation states suffered a decline in their
birth rates in the last half of the nineteenth century, a decline
whose discursive effects it should be noted, were themselves
conditional upon a certain apparatus of censuses, demographic
statistics and so forth which had only recently been established.
... And calculations showed that Britain's decline had not only
been worse than any other nation but France, but its recovery had
also been slower." Rose (1979: 30).
80. Quoted by Rose (1979: 31 ).
81. Dr. A. F. Tredgold: "The Feeble-Minded - A Social Danger" - a paper
circulated to the Cabinet by W. Churchill on December 22, 1911.
See PRO Cab. 37/108 Paper 189.
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83. Chappie (1904; 118).
84. Webb (1910-11: 234), quoting the Minority Report on the Poor Laws
(1909). See also Karl Pearson's proposals for closing the casual
wards and excluding the "congenital pauper" from the workhouses,
described in Semmel (i960).
85. Webb (1910-11: 235).
86. Darwin (1914-5: 212). In a later collection of his writings, he
states:
"... the system of short imprisonments is nearly useless as a
method of promoting racial progress; whilst it may also be
condemned quite as vigorously because it has proved to be a
complete failure as a method of reforming the criminal himself."
Darwin (1926: 218).
87. Russell (1902-4: 100).
88. cf. Rose (1979: 32).
89. This position "implied limitations on the efficacy of other
strategies for dealing with the residuum proposed by other elite
groups. There really was not much point preaching to the residuum,
attempting to save their souls and convert them to a decent and
hardworking Christian life, if they differed naturally from
respectable workers." McKenzie (1981: 41).
90. Lidbetter (1910-11: 227-8).
91. "It is perfectly distressing to me to witness the draggled,
drudged, mean look of the mass of individuals, especially of the
women, that one meets in the streets of London and other purely
English towns. The conditions of their life seem too hard for
their constitutions, and to be crushing them into degeneracy."
K. Pearson, quoted by McKenzie (19B1: 39).
92. Edward Schuster in the British Medical Journal, August 1913, p.225
quoted by Searle (1976: 42).
93. Quoted in Semmel (i960: 48-9).
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94. This theory was based upon the work of August Weismann which
differentiated germ cells (or plasm) from 'body' or somatic
cells. While it was body cells which were affected by environment,
disease, etc., it was only the independent germ-plasm which was
transmitted, thus dismissing Lamarkian theories of adaptation and
the transmission of acquired characteristics. After 1899 Mendel's
theory of genetic process came to form the basis of most eugenist's
views, though Galton himself remained sceptical. See Searle (1976).
95. See Galton (1883) and (1869).
96. Quoted by FIcKenzie (1981: 16).
97. I\l. Pearson, "The Idle Poor" (1911) quoted in Hay (1978: 62).
98. L. Darwin, quoted by McKenzie (1981: 18). cf. A. Tredgold:
"I would lay it down as a general principle that as soon as a
nation reaches that stage of civilisation in which medical
knowledge and humanitarian sentiment operate to prolong the
existence of the unfit, then it becomes imperative upon that
nation to devise such social laws as will ensure that these
unfit do not propagate their kind." Tredgold (1911: 3).
99. "... There is every grade of insanity, and yet it is necessary
for legal authorities to declare one man to be insane whilst
holding another man, nearly as abnormal, not to be so."
L. Darwin, quoted in McKenzie (1981: 19).
100. Chappie (1904: Introduction).
101. Rentoul (1903: 17-8). Lydston (1904) provides a similar list:
"Persons with a history of insanity, epileptics, dipsomaniacs,
incurable syphilitica, certain persons who suffer from deformity
or chronic diseases, criminals and persons with criminal records
should not be permitted to marry upon any conditions. Incurable
criminals, epileptics, and the insane should invariably be
submitted to this operation [sterilization] and irrespective of
matrimony. Even the rare cases of reformed habitual criminals
should be subjected to this operation, for the cure of their own
criminal tendencies will not interfere with the transmission of
these tendencies to their progeny." Quoted in Rentoul (1906: 167).
102. IQ testing has developed subsequently as an attempt to supply this
lack, though its general effect has been simply to displace the
problem from the quantified and 'rigorous* test result to the
basis of the test itself.
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debates surrounding the question of feeble-mindedness. See
Rose (1979: 45):
"Feeble-mindedness is a psychological state which is, however,
knowable only on the basis of the social behaviours which it
induces. As Tredgold puts it, 'The condition is a psychological
one, although the criterion is social'."
104. Chappie (1904: iii).
105. Ellis (1910: XI-XII).
106. cf. L. Darwin, quoted above, note 86.
107. Battaglini (1914-15: 15).
108. See McKenzie (1981: 20).
109. See Searle (1976: 103).
110. See Rose (1979: 27). W. A. Chappie was also concerned to prevent
middle class women from avoiding conception, and proposed that
induced sterility be made an offence in such cases. See Chappie
(1904: 123).
111. See NcKenzie (1981); Rentoul (1903) and Chappie (1904) passim.
112. Ellis (1910: xiii).
113. Chappie (1904: 21).
114. Bradley (1893-4; 280-1).
115. L. Darwin, quoted in McKenzie (1981: 21).
116. NcKenzie (1981: 33-4).
117. See NcKenzie (1981).
118. Farrall (1970) and Abrams (1968).
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119. See Searle (1976) and Rentoul (1906). Of course the reasons for
this support varied between individuals. One can assume, for
example, that the likes of Shaw and the Webbs were drawn less
to the Society's implicit political economy (with which they
would certainly disagree) than to its explicit promotion of the
role of science in administering the social realm and the place
of the professional class in this enterprise.
120. Hynes (1968: 287).
121. See The Eugenics Review, Vol. 6; Bones (i960: 62) and Home
Secretary McKenna: "... I am not exaggerating when I say that
local authorities have been overwhelming in their petitions in
favour of this Bill", describing the Mental Deficiency Bill 1913,
Hansard, Vol. 53, Second Reading Debate, col. 221.
122. The Times, October 7, 1911, "A Laboratory for Eugenics".
123. McKenzie (1981: 24).
124. See the lists of notables declared as sponsors in Chappie (1904)
and Rentoul (1906). The latter text sets aside a chapter titled
"Has my proposal to sterilize certain deteriorants and degenerates
secured support?" listing figures such as Sir Bohn McDougall,
Dr. Barnardo, and the Physic ans and Superintendents of various
English asylums.
125. See Webb (1910-11).
126. N. Pearson in Hay (1978: 62-3):
"The old, easy optimism - the belief that almost all defectives
could be cured, given time and patience - had vanished. In its
place grew a profound pessimism, a conviction that mental
deficiency was hereditary, insusceptible to treatment and training
and a growing danger to the whole of society." Bones (i960: 49).
127. As Ellen Pinsent pointed out, the eugenic programme implied a
"thorough and complete scheme of State intervention",
E. Pinsett, The Lancet (1903), quoted in Rose (1979: 43).
128. Webb (1910-11: 237).
129. See McKenzie (1981: 27-29).
130. Clearly there had previously been 'social' projects which aimed
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to produce a social change dependent upon neither the realm of
economics nor that of politics. The social hygienic programmes
of the early nineteenth century are an obvious example (see
Pearson (1975) for a discussion of these). However, the late
nineteenth century programmes were the first to conceive of this
more elaborate notion of the social as a distinct realm which could
be organised, regulated and administered - not simply through
individuals' conduct but through the institutions and relations
which ordered individual conduct.
131. For general accounts of the formation of "the social" see Donzelot
(1979); Rose (1979) and Hirst (1981). The "recognition" of the
social is well illustrated in the book by B. Kirkman Gray entitled
Philanthropy and the State (1908). Describing the "transition
from philanthropy to social politics" Gray remarks that:
"Comparatively few people read [Census and Official] reports, but
some of their more obvious results are promulgated through the
newspapers, and people have become gradually permeated with the
inmost lesson the Registrar-General has to teach, viz.: that
birth, marriage, death, which are so intimately and seem so
exclusively personal concerns, represent also a national interest
of the highest moment." Gray (1908: 18).
For Gray, this social realm becomes known through "the science of
statistics" which can "determine those principles upon which the
well-being of society depends", (1908: 16).
132. For a discussion of the characteristics of 'social' or 'bio-
politics' see Foucault (1981).
133. cf. Boies (1893: vi):
"If the time has not yet arrived, it is certainly approaching
fast when the public welfare, the progress of civilisation, the
elevation of humanity, the regeneration of the race, will be
recognised and obeyed as the supreme motive in the social
organisation - the final purpose of legislation."
134. 3. A. Hobson, quoted in Weiler (1982: 172).
135. Masterman (1909: ix).
136. Harris (1972: 6) notes that the Webbs were "concerned to create
an 'administrative science' for the treatment of the unemployed
workmen, analogous to the science of public health" and Gilbert
(1966: 6) refers to the Webbs' project as "scientific reform".
N. Parry also points out that the COS claimed a "scientific"
basis for their procedures and techniques, though this "was a
notion of science without much substantive content, being in
fact little more than an adherence to the principle of
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'bureaucratic rationality'", Parry ,et. al. (1979s 33).
137. See Harris (1972: 103) where she argues that the COS was
latterly less concerned with avoiding State intervention than
with maintaining its own grip on the treatment of the problem.
138. Rose (1979: 37).
139. See Bones (1971), Gilbert (1966), McKenzie (1981) and Hobsbawm
(1964).
140. Sims (1883).
141. Part quoted, part paraphrased, from U. Beveridge's "My Utopia",




Resistances, Nanoeuvres and Representations
1. Foucault (1979), In fact Foucault's own work fails to do this -
particularly in regard to the thesis in Discipline and Punish
concerning the strategic regrouping which occurred in order to
exploit the latent functions of the prison. (For a brief statement
of this thesis, see Foucault (1980).)
2. Gilbert (1966), Harris (1972) and (1977). See also Fraser (1973).
3. The clearest evidence of this explicit concern u/ith the ideological
issue is contained in Gilbert's account of the exchanges between
Churchill and his Department's Permanent Secretary, Llewellyn Smith,
over the proposed conditions for insurance benefit: Gilbert (1966:
271). Fraser's (1973) account also makes this point and adduces
different evidence. The crux of the matter is well expressed by
Charles Booth when he declared the need for a 'limited socialism'
as the solution to the problem of social reform, i.e., "a socialism
which shall leave untouched the forces of individualism and the
sources of wealth" (1902: 177).
4. Russell (1973) shows that Liberal, Labour and socialist candidates
and backbenchers did raise social reform as an issue at the general
election of 1906. Nonetheless, the general agreement of the
parties on the necessity of social reform meant that the issue was
less prominent than questions which divided the parties, such as
Education policy, Free Trade versus protectionism, and so on.
5. This silence was noted and criticised at the time by
nr. 3. C. Wedgewood, the radical I*1P. See Hansard 1913, Vol. 53,
Second Reading Debate on the Plental Deficiency Bill, column 244.
6. Most of the penal Bills of this period were received in Parliament
as "non-contentious" penological reforms, independent of political
or ideological relations: see, for example, the debates on The
Prevention of Crime Bill 190B, The Probation Bill 1907, The
Children's Bill 1908 where this is stated again and again.
7. Rose (1961: 72).
8. 'Resistance' here does not refer to the resistance of the objects
or targets of the practices of power (e.g. the resistance of bodies
to complete discipline, as described by Foucault (1980a) or of
working class culture to bourgeois ideology, as described in
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Chapter Three of this dissertation). Rather it refers to the
resistances met by programmes in the political/ideological domain
which would prevent or obstruct them from becoming actual practices
and strategies of power.
9. See Gilbert (1966).
10. See Emy (1973: 172), Lynd (1945: 75) and Fraser (1973).
11. See Du Cane (1885: 79); Rose (1961: 49); the Report of the Scottish
Departmental Committee on Habituals, etc. (1895: XIX); the Report
of the Departmental Committee on the Education and Moral Instruction
of Prisoners (1896: 13); Anderson's view is quoted in The Times,
12 February, 1901.
12. See the Observations of the Prison Commissioners on the Recommendations
of the Gladstone Report (1897).
13. See Lushington's evidence to the Gladstone Report (1895: 7);
Dr. Carswell's view - that there is "little ground for believing
that ... curable results can be looked for" - is expressed in the
file on Lunacy and Alcoholic Excess (S.P.R.O. HH 59/13) which
records an exchange on this question, taking place in 1903.
Dr. Carswell was Glasgow's Certifying Physician in Lunacy. The
opinions of Lords Cockburn and Blackburn were rendered to the
Parliamentary Committee on Juvenile Crime in 1847, see Ruggles-
Brise (1921: 89).
14. Report of the Prison Commissioners for the year ended 31 March, 1898,
page 8.
15. Du Cane (1885: 156).
16. Booth MP, quoted in Hansard, Vol. 65, 20 July 1914, column 121.
17. Du Cane (1885: 197).
18. Belloc MP, quoted in Hansard, Vol. 190 (1908), Second Reading of the
Prevention of Crime Bill, column 476.
19. Wedgwood is quoted in McKenzie (1981: 37), as is G. K. Chesterton:
"At root ... the Eugenist is the Employer." What the eugenist "is
really wanted for ... is to get the grip of the governing classes
on the unmanageable output of poor people."
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20. Wedgwood I*1P, quoted in Hansard, Vol. 53 (1913), Second Reading
Debate on the Mental Deficiency Bill, column 244 and in Hansard,
Vol. 39 (1912) in the Second Reading Debate on the Mental
Deficiency Bill of that year, column 642.
21. See the letter from Asquith to Ruggles-Brise, quoted in Chapter
Seven.
22. Gilbert (1966: 157).
23. In the Second Reading Debate on the Prevention of Crime Bill 1908
Hansard, Vol. 190, column 476, Belloc describes the new provisions
as "utterly at variance with every political or social principle
that western Europe has ever known or any Christian country had
ever held". Schlapp and Smith (1928: 67) describe the advert of
criminology thus:
"... the new criminology was looked upon as ... the attack of
evolutionary science upon the churches and the gods. ... The
teaching was rebellious, radical and anarchic to the classes
which had arrogated to themselves and long controlled the temporal
government. To the Lords spiritual it was heretical, atheistic and
damnable, if not openly blasphemous."
24. For examples of this resistance, see Oppenheimer (1913: v);
Mercier (1905) and (1911) and the discussion in De Fleury (1901:
x). On the ideological elements which underpin capitalist
relations, see Sumner (1979) and Therborn (1980).
25. For examples of this, see Holmes, quoted in Rose (1961: 94) and
Holmes (1912: 35-36) where he also quotes Ruggles-Brise to this
effect. The Report of the Departmental Committee on Inebriates
(1908: 5-6) also resists the denial of reformism. The interests
and arguments of social administrators are discussed in Piatt
(1969) and McKenzie (1981). On the question of the modern State's
commitment to an ideology of welfarism, see Chapter Eight.
26. The quoted statement was made by the Home Office Prison Inspectors
in 1836, and is taken from Webb (1922). See also the doubts
and denials expressed by the 1896 Committee on Distress from
Want of Employment (1896: XIV-XV) - quoted by Harris (1972); and
by J. S. Davy, Chief Inspector of the Poor Laws, quoted by
McCord (1978: 46).
27. Brise (1921: 195).
28. See Hall (1978: 175) and Polling (1968) for examples of these
opposing views.
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29. The I.L.P. resolved in favour of pensions, school meals, medical
inspections and the recommendations of the Poor Law Minority
Report at its Annual Conference of 1912 (see the Report of the
Fifteenth Annual Conference, published by the I.L.P.). The
Fabians were clearly in favour of many of the reforms, though not
of insurance in the form which was legislated, see MacBriar (1966)
As Yeo (1979: 64-66) points out, the P.L.P. and the I.L.P. were
divided on the issue of insurance. Nearly all of the labourist
parties joined in support of the campaign for Old Age Pensions
from 1899 onwards, though many were critical of the 1908 Act
itself. Only a few small groups such as the British Syndicalists
opposed the reforms on principle - see Holton (1976) and issues
of The Daily Herald and Solidarity from this period - the
principle being that these reforms were attempts to co-opt and to
discipline the working classes.
30. See the Report of the Fifteenth I.L.P. Annual Conference, published
by the I.L.P., and also Pelling (1968: 64).
31. Minett (1909: 297-8).
32. See Fabian Tract No. 163: "Women and Prisons" by Helen Blagg and
Charlotte Wilson (March 1912).
33. Fabian Society: What to Read on Social and Economic Subjects
(1910), section on "Crime and Prison Treatment".
34. See S. Herbert "Socialism and the New Science" in Socialist Review.
Vol. 1 (1908) which argues that eugenics is a necessary corollary
to socialism, and the article by Minett (1909) cited above. The
Fabian guide as to "What to Read" (1910) contained a selection on
"Physical Degeneracy and the Birth Rate" in which eugenic texts by
Chappie, Saleeby and Webb are recommended. cf. McKenzie (1981)
and Chapter Four on the relation of Fabians to the Eugenic
programme.
35. K. Kautsky: "Unlawful Direct Action" in the Socialist Review,
Vol. 8 (1911-12: 453ff).
36. Donzelot (1979: 135-6).
37. This approach to the relation of knowledge and power is, of course,
derived from the work of Foucault, see especially Foucault (1977)
and (1979).
38. cf. Young (1976: 153):
"The limits of penal reform find their restrictions in the nature
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of the appeal they have to current everyday concepts prevalent
both at the public and Parliamentary levels. In the penal arena
proposals for reform must not violate the typifications that
encircle common knowledge of crime and punishment if they are to
receive legitimation."
yje might add, though, that this common knowledge can be
substantially transformed over a period of time, as in fact
occurred in the period under study.
Clarke (1976: 14). This conception is borrowed direct from
Gramsci (1971).
Rose (1979: 11):
"... not only does every discourse contain a certain number of
statements which are 'errors', are incoherent or internally
contradictory, but these 'errors' are not merely marginal, cannot
merely be partialled out in an attempt to isolate the gold from
the dross, but they function, they play a certain role within a
discursive field, they have their own history and their own
significant consequences."
Pearson (1975: XI).
The term "discursive desire" is a shorthand expression for the
objectives and social forces which we have shown to be partly
constituative of these discourses.
cf. Burton and Carlen (1979: 6):
"The great inquiries found in the blue books of this period ...
are clearly products of contemporary political struggles. Their
main function was to provide and to publicly propagate knowledge
of social conditions that would shape the technology of social
engineering. Their contents became part of the discursive
armoury of the political scene. As such the inquiries had a
clearly dual function of not only creating information but
manipulating its popular reception."
Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on the
Proceedings of the Fifth International Penitentiary Congress,
Paris (1895: 14).
The Times, 23 March, 1906.
Brise (1921: 157). cf. Bentham's dictum:
"The proper end of human punishment is not the satisfaction of
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justice, but the prevention of crime", quoted in Pincoffs (1966:
18).
47. See the Prison Commissioners Report for 1908-09; the 1909 Poor
Law (majority and minority) Reports; the Report of the Departmental
Committee on Vagrancy (1906); the Report of the Departmental
Committee on Inebriates (1908); The Inebriate Act of 1908, etc..
48. Report of the Departmental Committee on Inebriates (1908).
49. Darwin (1926: 225).
50. Report of the Royal Commission on the Feeble-minded (1908: 335).
51. Bradley (1893-94: 276).
52. Boies (1901: 219).
53. Boies (1901: 219).
54. Report of the Royal Commission on the Feeble-minded (1908: 191-2).
See also the Report of the Departmental Committee on Inebriates
(1908). One should perhaps add that the state "help" mentioned
here refers to a very lengthy period of incarceration, as do other
administratively-preferred terms such as "continuous treatment"
or "asylum treatment" when used in this context.
55. majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law (1909: R212).
56. This was in fact the position adopted by the Personal Rights
Association, which objected to the illiberal manoeuvres described
here (though not to the severely restrictive control of inebriates,
vagrants, etc.: their concern was to ensure that such control was
mobilised via the normal legal process). See the P.R.A.'s
evidence to the Departmental Committee on Inebriates (1908).
57. Anderson (1904: 130). It should be noted that Anderson's concern
was with the problem of public representation and legitimacy.
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The Formation and Institutionalisation of Penal-Welfare Strategies
1. See Burton and Carlen (1979) for a discussion of this term and the
functions and significance of Official Inquiries and Reports.
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Penitentiary Congress, Ruggles-Brise presents the same compromise
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Representatives of the Prisoners Aid Associations on 19 Duly 1910,
page 9. Contained in the P.R.0. file on "Formation of the Central
Association of Aid for Discharged Convicts", P.Com. 7 413.
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(1896: 82).
32. Report on the Operation of Discharged Prisoners Aid Societies
(1896: 82).
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taken (1895: 4-5).
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37. Mr. Way P0, quoted in the Report of Proceedings at the Fourteenth
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Association, 6 September 1910. Contained in P.R.0. P.Com. 7
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42. Report of the Commissioners of Prisons (1896-7: 23).
43. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1909-10: 16). Given this
background, it is of interest to read the reply of E. Ruggles-Brise
in 1917 to a letter from the Borstal Association which had complained
that Borstal discipline was too severe. The Chairman treats this
very courteous letter from the B.A. as positively mutinous, and
replies with thinly guarded threats that such behaviour will lead
to the B.A. being simply closed down. See the file on "The Borstal
Association's Criticisms of the Administration of Borstal",
P.R.0. P.Com. 7 541.
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Association were: Royal Society for the Assistance of Discharged
Prisoners; Church Army; Catholic Discharged Prisoners Aid Society;
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45. See the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Training,
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46. See Hobhouse and Brockway (1922: 467ff).
47. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1910-11: 14).
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"There is but a slight difference in the actual treatment of
prisoners sentenced to the Second or Third Division, but the
sentence to the Second Division implies at least the segregation
of the prisoners, and marks the distinction between really
criminal and only quasi-criminal. ..."
59. cf. Brise (1921: 12): "The true meaning of 'prison reform'", i.e.
the building up of character on the basis of strict discipline,
obedience and order, tempered by progressive stages of increasing
trust, liberty and material improvement of status.
60. See, for example, Col. McHardy's use of the psychiatric expertise
of Dr. Dohn Macpherson, Medical Commissioner in Lunacy, to train
his prison staff to treat prisoners "scientifically" and
"psychologically". S.P.R.O. HH 60/116. See also the psychological
expertise employed in discussions and practices of Borstal
assessment and training, e.g. P.R.O. P.Com. 7 532 "Psychological
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61. cf. Rose (1961: 70).
62. Report of the Scottish Departmental Committee on Rules for
Inebriate Reformatories (1899; ix). Contained in S.P.R.O. HH 57/61.
63. Report of the Prison Commissioners (1901-2: 29):
"... while Certified Reformatories can well be trusted to control
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